بواسطة Katty Alhayek | نوفمبر 21, 2017 | Roundtables, غير مصنف
Katty Alhayek (KA): Recently, you published an article titled “Militias and crony capitalism to hamper Syria reconstruction,” how do you define “crony capitalism” in this context and what challenges it poses to future reconstruction efforts in Syria?
Joseph Daher (JD): Crony capitalism can be defined generally as when owners of big businesses use their links with the state and the government to gain a decisive advantage over their competitors.
In the region of the Middle East and North Africa, Crony capitalism has been strengthened by the patrimonial nature of the state in which the centers of power (political, military and economically) within a regime are concentrated in one family and its clique, just as in Syria with Assad’s family.
In Syria’s patrimonial regime, you have had the development of a form of crony capitalism in the last decades dominated by a rent seeking alliance of political brokers (led by Assad’s mother’s family) and the regime-supportive bourgeoisie. In other words, the circles close to the ruling family exploit their dominance to amass considerable fortunes. The main sectors of the economy in Syria, prior to the uprising, were dominated by businessmen with direct connections to the regime. This form of crony or mafia capitalism, in which economic opportunities were dependent on loyalties to the regime, alienated and marginalized some elements of the bourgeoisie that were not connected to the regime and therefore did not constitute a strong element of support for the regime. No deal or large venture was actually possible without crony capitalists linked with the regime.
Rami Makhlouf, the cousin of Bashar al-Assad, represented the mafia-style process of privatization led by the regime. His economic empire was vast including telecommunications, oil and gas, as well as construction, banks, airlines, retail, etc. Makhlouf was also the main shareholder of Cham Holding Company, the second largest holding company in the country, while holding more than 300 licenses as an agent for big international companies. The personal fortune of Rami Makhlouf was estimated at close to 6 billion dollars. At the beginning of 2011, the British magazine “World Finance” actually extolled Makhlouf’s visionary leadership and his outstanding contribution to the Syrian economy, calling him a symbol of the positive change at work in the country. According to different sources, he controlled directly or through indirect means nearly 60 percent of the Syrian economy, thanks to a complex network of holdings.
The Crony capitalists have been the heart of the regime coalition and its main supporters. At the beginning of the uprising, the crony capitalists first mobilized people to demonstrate in favor of the regime, and private media, owned by them, tried from the first days of the uprising to undermine the message of the protesters by defaming the protest movement and promoting the regime’s propaganda. Moreover, they played an important role in the development of pro regime militias by funding them to make up for the lack of manpower in the regime’s army.
The “business” of reconstruction is in this perspective no different from other sectors of the economy: The main contracts will benefit businessmen linked to the regime and will reward foreign allies for their assistance with a share of the market. There are already some early examples of this happening and in other sectors of the economy as well.
The reconstruction process will help the regime and crony capitalists consolidate their political and economic power, while also rewarding foreign allies for their support by granting them a sizable share of the market. As such, reconstruction will consolidate and even reinforce the patrimonial nature of the state.
The Decree 66, enforced in September 2012, allows for example the government to “redevelop areas of unauthorized housing and informal settlements [slums].” This policy will allow for the transfer of assets to private companies and regime cronies free of taxes. It will also provide the legal and financial framework for reconstruction by allowing for the destruction and expropriation of large parts of the country and the dispossession of a number of people. In addition, whenever there have been expropriation projects in Syria, compensation has been extremely low. It’s a very clear dispossession of the lower strata. This is a transfer of public assets, tax-free, to private companies and it will be a big boost to regime cronies. Secondly, the reconstruction process will also help the regime crackdown on dissent in certain areas. The government can leverage this decree to use reconstruction as a punishing measure against the part of the population known for their opposition to the regime. This is the case with the two large informal districts of Damascus (the first in the Mezzeh district and the other in a large area extending from Qadam to Daraya) and Baba Amro neighborhood in Homs, which are being rebuilt while the majority of its population is outside of Syria or in other areas of the country. In both cases, the most probable scenario is the replacement of these hostile Sunni impoverished constituencies by middle and wealthy higher classes, from various religious backgrounds, including Sunnis, less willing to oppose the government.
More generally, the regime’s continuous policies in the socio-economic and political spheres will probably strengthen social and regional inequalities throughout the country, deepening problems in terms of development that were already present before the beginning of the uprising in 2011. We could add that the absence of independent trade unions and democratic rights for workers to defend themselves will probably lead to many cases of exploitation, irregularities, and lack of good conditions on working places for workers in the reconstruction process. The increasing reliance of private crony capitalist and foreign actors in this process will reinforce these problems.
Therefore, the absence of democracy and social justice, which were at the roots of the uprising, are still very much present and were even deepened.
Unfortunately, as I mentioned in the article, the absence of a structured and independent democratic, inclusive and social Syrian political opposition, which appealed to the popular classes and social actors such as the independent trade unions will prevent or render difficult the transformations of various struggles to come into connected and organized political battles challenging the regime on a national scale.
KA: In your article, you indicate that any reconstruction efforts in Syria needs massive foreign funding. You referred that Iranian, Russian and Chinese capital might not be enough. How do you see the future of foreign investment in Syria reconstruction projects and do you think Western states and Gulf monarchies will be more involved giving the political changes regionally and internationally?
JD: The states that will benefit are definitely the countries allied to the Assad regime, particularly Iran, Russia and China. India and Brazil might also benefit from the reconstruction drive. Assad and Syrian officials have repeatedly declared that companies from allied countries will be rewarded, while European and American companies will first need to have their governments apologize for supporting the opposition before benefiting. Damascus has also adopted a similar position towards Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey for the current period. Assad in his speech in August 2017 went as far as to declare that the regime will not “let enemies, adversaries, and terrorists, through any means, accomplish through politics what they failed to accomplish on the battlefield and through terrorism”.
On the other side, the so called “Friends of Syria” group, Western countries, Turkey, and Gulf Monarchies, in a side event in New York in September during the U.N. General Assembly) declared that “recovery and reconstruction support for Syria hinges on a credible political process leading to a genuine political transition that can be supported by a majority of the Syrian people.”
The European Union had announced a similar position in April 2017, in arguing that they will be ready to assist in the reconstruction of Syria only when a comprehensive, genuine and inclusive political transition, negotiated by the Syrian parties in the conflict on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015) and the 2012 Geneva Communiqué, is firmly under way. It is therefore hard to see or expect in the near future a high involvement of these states in the reconstruction process, except funding rather small-scale, local projects in areas outside the regime’s control and without the regime’s participation or consent. This is actually already the case for Turkey in some areas controlled by its armed forces and proxies for example in Jarablus and al-Bab, and for some Western institutions and states also providing some financial assistance, including support for local governance and for the rehabilitation of basic services, to regions under the domination of the PYD or some opposition held areas. These projects are however isolated and limited and can’t replace a wide reconstruction process.
Changes on the international and regional political scenes can however occur rapidly as we witnessed on several occasions, so the doors are never completely closed one would say. For example recently, Saudi Arabia’s Gulf affairs minister, Thamer al-Sabhan, visited Raqqa on September 19 after the capture of the city by Syrian Democratic Forces (an Arabic, Kurdish and Assyrian military alliance dominated by YPG, the arm branch of the Kurdish PYD), supported by US led international coalition, to meet with the civil council established six months before under the leadership of SDF and composed of local dignitaries and discuss the reconstruction of the city. No concrete plans were however set.
KA: Last year, you wrote an article discussing federalism as a political option in Syria? What was the goal of this article? How do you see federalism as a future solution for Syria in light of recent political developments?
JD : The article had the objective to promote the idea of federalism (or decentralization) in a progressive and secular framework in order to tackle a certain number of problems within Syria, including notably the Kurdish issue, social and regional inequalities and trying to encourage self-organization from below.
The Assad’s regime and the mainstream opposition, represented by the Etilaf, oppose a federalist option, preferring a rather authoritarian centralized state.
The main opposition body today in the negotiation (and mostly linked to the Etilaf), the High Negotiations Commission (HNC) for « the Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces », has actually failed in providing any democratic and inclusive message, quite on the opposite. In Autumn 2016, its vision within an Executive Framework for the Political Solution in Syria that was far from offering an inclusive and pluralistic citizenship or of Syria as we can see in its first article:
“Syria is an integral part of the Arab World, and Arabic is the official language of the state. Arab Islamic culture represents a fertile source for intellectual production and social relations amongst all Syrians of different ethnic backgrounds and religious beliefs as the majority of Syrians are Arabs and followers of Islam and its tolerant message which is distinctly moderate”.
This is of course exclusionary for all ethnic and religious minorities in the country, in addition to all people not identifying with these identities. This is without forgetting that the Etilaf has supported and supports the Turkish intervention in Syria against the Kurds in general and not only PYD.
The Etilaf and many of the personalities linked to it have also promoted a sectarian, racist (particularly against Kurds), and authoritarian discourses and behaviors. Similarly, when it comes to women, the Etilaf has completely neglected their large participation in the uprising, providing them with only “decorative positions” without any effective role in the decision making process.
The support for a federal state is a key issue today for trying to challenge the division among Arabs and Kurds today and re-establish trust and confidence between these parties. The demand for a federal system in Syria is a demand of the quasi majority of Kurdish parties in the country, despite their political differences and rivalries. To this day, the majority of the Syrian opposition, even some democratic and leftist sectors, reject the demands of the far majority of the Kurdish people in Syria, or reduce it to a question of providing simply citizenship.
This is very problematic and unfortunately not new. We must remember that Kurds in Syria suffered decades of political, social and cultural repression and Arabization policies in the northern regions of Syria imposed by the Assad regime and other oppressive measures since the independence of the country. Not to mention the silence of a large part of the opposition during the Kurdish uprising in Syria in 2004, while accusing some Kurds of serving foreign projects to weaken Syria.
That is why we must support the right of self-determination of the Kurdish people in Syria and elsewhere, which does not mean necessarily the creation of an independent state, but that they decide their own future. Similarly, the support of the self determination of the Kurdish people does not mean being uncritical of the policies of the leadership of the PYD or any other Kurdish political party. I personally criticized the human rights violations by PYD armed forces in Syria against civilians or repressive policies against other Kurdish activists. I did the same regarding Barzani authoritarian and corrupt rule in Kurdistan in northern Iraq.
Just as when we say we support the self determination of the Palestinian People, we don’t support Fatah or Hamas. And on this issue, just few words, I have always considered the liberation and emancipation of the Palestinians as part of our struggle as well. Our destinies are linked.
As I mentioned in the article of federalism, to eliminate from the discussions the Kurdish issue, under the assumption that it allows more unity within the opposition and less problems has proven, and is still the case, a recipe for division and lack of confidence between the various components of the Syrian people.
The recent Kurdish referendum in Northern Iraq has demonstrated, once again, the failure of the models of the capitalist, chauvinist and centralized nation-states of the region, which have consistently repressed, erased, and/or denied the plurality of their societies by affirming the supremacy and/or domination of an ethnic group over others, a religious sect over others or both at the same time.
Therefore, to repeat the same mistakes of the past or present federalism (or decentralization) as division is the recipe for defeat.
In my article on federalism, I also promoted a federal system in order to provide more tools and power to local population to manage their affairs, on one side, and in trying to correct regional social injustices, on the other. For example, the Jazirah region produced two thirds of the country’s grains (and 70% of wheat) and three quarters of its hydrocarbons, but had the highest level of illiteracy rate and poverty. Such an option would also strengthen participation from local population in decision making processes.
However, the implementation of a federal state is not a guarantee per se to achieve an inclusive and democratic system. Indeed, we also need to struggle for a secular political framework encouraging the participation from below of the popular and working classes and in which democratic and social rights of all Syrians without gender, ethnic and religious discriminations are guaranteed. This means notably guaranteeing popular and working classes with the rights to organize politically in their workplaces (through independent trade unions and peasant unions for examples), society, and neighborhoods, to defend their interests.
I would therefore argue that a federalist project for Syria is a step forward and a necessary condition to build a new, progressive, secular and democratic Syria, but of course on its own its not sufficient.
KA: What other projects are you working on now, in regard to Syria?
JD: I am finishing my second PhD, but this time in History, entitled “Revolution and Counter- Revolutions in Syria, origins and developments”. It’s a holistic and materialist analysis of the roots and developments of the Syrian revolutionary process and the various challenges and counter-revolutionary actors it had to face. I hope then to publish my PhD into a book. It’s an important project for me not only on an academic perspective, but I would argue politically as well, to nurture discussions and debates among progressives and democrats in Syria and to try to learn from the lessons of the revolutionary process and the mistakes committed. In the seventies and eighties, Syria witnessed strong popular and democratic resistance with significant strikes and demonstrations throughout the country with mass followings, unfortunately this memory was not kept and was not well-known by the new generation of protesters in the country in 2011, even among leftists and democrats. The Syrian revolutionary process that erupted in 2011 is on the contrary one of the most documented. This memory will remain and will not only be there to look at the past, but seizing this past to build on future resistance. The political experiences that have been accumulated since the beginning of the uprising will not disappear.
I have also other projects relating to Syria, including issue of citizenship or the struggle against sectarianism.
Again and more generally I try through these works and projects to help as part of my effort to participate in the struggle for a democratic, secular, federal and social Syria without any discriminations and in solidarity with other people in struggles.
Joseph Daher is a Swiss-Syrian socialist activist and academic. He is the author of Hezbollah: Political Economy of Lebanon’s Party of God (2016, Pluto Press). He is the founder of the blog Syria Freedom Forever. He was awarded a doctorate from the School of Oriental and Asian Studies (SOAS) in 2015 in Development. He resides in Switzerland, where he teaches at the University of Lausanne and is finishing a thesis in history on the origins and developments of the Syrian uprising.
بواسطة Katty Alhayek | نوفمبر 21, 2017 | Roundtables, غير مصنف
Katty Alhayek (KA): What are the main challenges today for reconstruction efforts and rebuilding the future of Syria?
Rabie Nasser (RN): The Syrian Center for Policy Research identifies the main challenges for the reconstruction efforts categorize as first, the surviving of political tyranny and increasing compromises that accept the hegemony of subjugating powers. The political oppression was a core root of the social movement and during the conflict the pre-conflict political oppression aggravated to political tyranny and fundamentalism. Those internal and external powers which abuse authority and violated all human and social rights and norms cannot build an inclusive reconstruction that is needed to address the Syrian catastrophe. Second, the identity politics is a major challenge to reconstruction process as it degrades the social cohesion; in this regard, justice and legitimate institutions are a core part of building the trust between people and with the institutions to create the space to social relation recovery. Third, the injustice and deprivations including deaths, injuries, torturing, kidnapping, forced displacement, poverty, difficult living conditions, among others; increased the inequity among the population which is a major and urgent challenge that need enormous institutional capacities, well designed policies, and material resources. Fourth, the expanding of conflict economy and conflict related crony elite which contribute to destruct to a large extent the economic resources, relations, and institutions; and reallocate the remaining resources to fueling conflict and subordinating society. Those four challenges form a well established system that created incentives on local, national and international levels, which makes tackling it an exceptionally difficult cause.
KA: Syrian children’s health and education were significantly affected by the ongoing war; how do you think the investments in reconstruction efforts should address children’s well being, and the so-called “lost generation,” specifically in the worst affected areas of the country?
RN: The Syrian society is young in that children below 18 years old consists almost half of the population and the conflict affected harshly their lives as around 13 per cent of the conflict related deaths is children. Since 2012 around half of the school age children did not enroll in the education system including the child refugees. Moreover, the quality of education has deteriorated in terms of quality and conditions. The dispersion of families and loss of breadwinners, in addition to poor living conditions, lack of access to health, and the suffering of malnutrition, trauma, and the loss of normal life of children are some examples of the burden on the new generation of Syrians. Furthermore, the refugee children are growing up in different environments, cultures, languages, values, living conditions which creates substantial challenges to reintegrate them in the Syrian society.
The burden of conflict is not equally distributed across the Syrian children, which increases the inequity between children in terms empowerment and opportunities. Countering the challenges, apart from the humanitarian, support needs inclusive institutions that address the deprivations of the most vulnerable groups of Syrians and this depends to a large extent on the way of exit from the armed conflict.
KA: Foreign funding and investment plays a crucial role in post-conflict reconstruction efforts. How do you see the role of foreign investments in the future of Syria and which countries do you think might be the key players?
RN: The total economic losses until the end of 2015 reached USD 255 billion, which is equivalent to around five times of the GDP in 2010. This enormous loss included the destruction of the infrastructure and reduction in the economic activities according to SCPR. The loss includes the severe deterioration of economic foundations such as population, human capital, institutions, and resources. Furthermore, the conflict economy reshaped the system of incentives and reallocated the resources and opportunities to the influential powers within the armed conflict. Therefore, the challenges of funding of reconstruction are related to the volume of the losses, and the complicated new conflict economy actors and incentives, and the hegemony of warlords over the Syrian economy.
The corner of funding is related to the shift in institutions to overcome conflict and build efficiency, just and inclusive institutions that rebuild trust between Syrians and between them and the political institutions. The space for society is crucial to participate in designing the reconstruction and the identification of the path for peace that overcomes the conflict’s impact and roots. Legitimate and inclusive institutions can create the environment to attract external funding and unitize it in line with the Syrians priorities. The other part of funding is covered by the Syrians’ participation in the process that will decrease the costs and increase the benefits for them and reduce the potential burden of depending only on the external funding.
However, if the political oppression and conflict economy elite prevail after the end of the conflict, the Syrian economy will be attracting many foreign investors due to the huge opportunities created by the destruction regardless of the inclusivity, justice, and sustainability. In this scenario, the participation of the Syrian society will be at a minimum and inequality will surge with the elite’s control of the opportunities. Finally, the countries and investors who will contribute depends on the scenarios and nature of institutions in the post-conflict period.
KA: Can you share with us what are your future projects?
RN: As a researcher in the Syrian Center for Policy Research, I am working on the Alternative Development Paradigm for the future of Syria which is an initiative by almost 50 experts who are working on developing policy options for the Syria challenges in line with the Syrian context. Additionally, the center is working on assessing the socioeconomic impact of the conflict in regular basis.
Rabie Nasser is a co-founder of the Syrian Center for Policy Research, working as researcher in macroeconomic policies, inclusive growth, poverty, and crisis socioeconomic impact assessment. He obtained a B.A. in Economics from Damascus University 1999. In 2000 he obtained a Diploma in Financial and Monetary Economics from Damascus University. He has MSc in Economics from Leicester University, UK. Before joining The Syrian Development Research Center, Nasser worked for the State Planning Commission as Chief Economist and Director General of Macroeconomic Management Directorate in 2004 and 2005. Then, he worked as an Economic Researcher in Arab Planning Institute in Kuwait. Then he was a senior researcher working between 2009-2011 for the Syrian Development Research Center that conducts studies, evaluations, and applied research.
بواسطة Katty Alhayek | نوفمبر 21, 2017 | Roundtables, غير مصنف
Katty Alhayek (KA): You published recently an article titled “Will China Get the Lion Share in Syria Reconstruction?,” in which you argue that China is set to play a bigger role in the reconstruction efforts in Syria. Can you elaborate more on that and what are the opportunities that you think might help Beijing’s future involvement in Syria?
Eugenio Dacrema (ED): First of all, it must be said that the Syrian post-conflict reconstruction is emerging as a very difficult undertaking, and unfortunately not only because of the huge destruction caused by the conflict. The problem, right now, is primarily to pinpoint the sources of funds, taking into account that, depending on the estimations, from 100 to 200 billion dollars will be necessary. Furthermore, the conditions of the final settlement that are emerging (with Assad in power and no involvement of the opposition) don’t help.
It is, basically, a question of resource availability and political will. Actors who would have the political will in most cases lack resources, and those who have resources lack the political will to support the reconstruction under Assad’s uncompromising rule. Take, for example, the case of Russia and Iran, the two parties that until now have supported Assad’s military effort the most. For different reasons, both lack the economic resources to invest heavily in Syria’s post-conflict reconstruction. On the contrary, other actors such as the rich Gulf monarchies, who were among the biggest sponsors of the opposition, would hardly give significant amounts of money to the regime to reconstruct the country. The same can be said of the US, which is also reducing significantly its foreign aid programs. This leaves basically two actors endowed with significant resources and who may have the political will to invest heavily in Syria: The European Union (and its member states) and China. The EU needs stabilization in its Mediterranean neighborhood and needs the flow of refugees to stop and possibly to reverse. To achieve this, the right conditions in Syria must be created to allow refugees from the EU and Syria’s neighboring countries to come back. This may lead the EU to set some sort of conditionality on the provision of its aid in order to force the regime to create such conditions. However, I think there are many signs showing that this last outcome, the return of most of the refugees, is not welcome by the regime. Many of the refugees left especially because of Assad’s political and military actions, and the regime knows that, although a few were materially part of the armed uprising, many of them sympathize for the opposition. Several polls conducted among refugees in Lebanon or Germany (these are the ones I know of) demonstrate it. In sum, the regime needs funds to reconstruct, the EU may provide a good part of them, but at conditions that the regime may strongly dislike.
On the contrary, China may emerge as a provider of funds with no political constrains. China has been quietly on the side of the regime since the beginning. Although this news did not often reach the main outlets, China has sent military advisors to the Syrian army, nominated a special envoy for the Syrian crisis (the second in China’s history after the one for Sudan), and, more recently, participated in the first economic fair in Damascus after 2011 with a big delegation. This year Chinese representatives have discretely taken contacts with organizations and NGOs operating in Syria to establish partnerships and collaborations. Finally, the Chinese authorities publicly promised the first 2 billion dollars for the reconstruction, and many signs suggest that this may represent just the beginning. The rumor is that the Chinese leadership may decide to include Syria in its One Belt One Road plan to connect China to Europe and the Mediterranean through infrastructures and new maritime and land ways. Syria may become a hub for Chinese products and trades on the Mediterranean, and the Syrian government seems to be interested. The Syrian embassy in Beijing has been very active in the last months.
KA: In this article you also discuss a set of obstacles that could limit the Chinese role in Syria-related investments and reconstruction. What are these obstacles and to what degree they can affect Beijing’s plans in Syria?
ED: Sure, there are also several obstacles. First of all, it would not be the first time that China supports a bloody dictatorship. It has been the case, for example, in Sudan in 2007, when, to protect its investments in the local oil industry, China devoted a lot of political and diplomatic capital to protect internationally the Omar al-Bashir regime. However, this policy backfired, creating huge problems to China’s international image and not resulting in a stabilization of the country, which split a few years later.
China has perfected its “dictatorship policy” in the last years. Beijing won’t provide any significant investment without guarantees that can be summarized in one word: stability. The Chinese would be reluctant to put on the table significant financial and diplomatic assistance for a regime that cannot prove itself able to guarantee long-term stability. And, in my opinion, the Assad regime can hardly comply with this condition. Although it is retaking control of most of the country, its grip is loose and its military and political power still too weak in comparison with the number of enemies and complications on the ground and abroad it has still to face. Although the main military confrontations may come to an end relatively soon, Syria under Assad risks a few more years of instability, which may impair significant Chinese economic interventions.
Finally, it is also worth saying that a big Chinese presence in Syrian affairs may also be opposed by Russia and Iran. They know that once the main military operations are over money may become much more influential than guns, and this may jeopardize their control on the Syrian regime in favor of China.
KA: You co-authored a piece with Annalisa Perteghella titled “EU Should Play Major Role in Syria Reconstruction.” Here, you discuss how different scenarios for ending the Syrian war might result in different reconstruction plans with various influences of international donors. Why do you think the European Union is the major international donor that can contribute significantly to the reconstruction of Syria? More importantly, why you dismiss the role of international powers such as Russia and regional power such as Iran and the Gulf monarchies?
ED: As I said before, there are two main requirements for the participation in the Syrian reconstruction: resources and political will. Russia and Iran are both going through a difficult economic phase. Low oil prices damaged heavily both their economies. Russia is also facing the effects of the European sanctions and years of economic mismanagement, while Iran is trying slowly to reorganize its economy after the end of the heaviest sanctions. Not only do these two countries not show any willingness to invest significantly in the reconstruction, but they are also starting to collect repayment for their support from the regime. They both obtained big shares of the Syrian natural resources, de facto jeopardizing the future reconstruction efforts. In fact, such resources are key for financing future reconstruction projects and now big shares of the profits deriving from them will go in Moscow and Teheran’s coffers.
I don’t rule out that other regional powers, such as Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf monarchies, would invest in the reconstruction. But, like the European Union, they would do that under certain conditions. They aim to obtain some settlement in favor of the opposition (or at least their protegees among the opposition), which is something that the regime and its allies (in particular Iran) would hardly concede. A role apart may be played by Qatar which, although having been a big sponsor of the opposition, is currently re-aligning its regional stance away from the other Gulf monarchies and closer to Iran.
The key in this matter can be also summarized in one world: decentralization. If some sort of real decentralization is realized, especially in the areas that have been governed by the opposition for years, and the external aid can flow directly to these local entities without passing through Damascus, then it is possible that other regional powers such as the Gulf monarchies or Turkey participate significantly in the reconstruction effort. The same can be said of the European Union. Decentralization is one of the few solutions that provide some guarantees to the returning refugees and may be one of the main conditions imposed by the EU for its aid.
KA: Can you share with us what are your future Syria-related projects?
ED: I think that it is important to keep in mind that everything that is discussed in these days regarding the Syrian reconstruction will matter only in its initial phase. The reconstruction of Syria will be a long endeavor, even bigger and more complicated than the Lebanese one, and will probably be measured in decades. Along this long period many things can change and the final outcome may be something completely different from anything we can imagine now. It is likely that in the end we will see some sort of involvement from all the actors, including the EU, the Gulf monarchies and Turkey, even without significant concessions from the regime. The reconstruction business is too huge and each country’s national industrial sector will push its government to get a share, although smaller than the one they would have got under the right conditions.
I think that what can be said right now with relative self-confidence is that the first phase of the reconstruction is going to be slow and, for this reason, unfortunately will not provide much relief for the Syrian population that has already endured the pain of six years of conflict. The problem is that the actors on the field, especially the Syrian regime, are once again paying much more attention to their political survival and short-term interests than to long-term plans for a homogeneous and sustainable reconstruction of the country. For example, one key element that may change forever the economic shape of the country is whether the materials for the reconstruction projects, such as cement and steel, will be produced in Syria or imported from elsewhere. Obviously, it would be much better for the Syrian economy in the long term if the regime would first channel resources to rebuilding at least part of the national industry to make it part of the reconstruction effort. The point is that we see now few signs of this kind of long-term thinking. Even the possible sources of funds are scrutinized primarily according to the danger they may represent for the power of the regime, and only secondarily according to the actual support they can provide. Much more attention is devoted to guarantee compensations for the loyal sectors of the society, for foreign allies, and to keep at bay possible future opponents and their potential supporters who are now refugees abroad.
Eugenio Dacrema is an Arabic-speaking PhD candidate at the University of Trento, Italy, and a research associate at the Italian Institute for International Studies (ISPI). He lived in Syria from 2009 to 2010 where he worked for the Italian embassy. In 2016 and 2017 he was visiting scholar at the American University of Beirut and at the George Washington University. Dacrema is a regular contributor to several Italian and international newspapers and writes advisory reports for the Italian Parliament.
بواسطة Media Roundup Editors | نوفمبر 1, 2017 | Media Roundups
[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Syria and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Media Roundup Editors or of Salon Syria. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week’s roundup to info@SalonSyria.com by Monday night of every week.]
Inside Syria
Why We Decided to Stay in Damascus (19 October 2017) Many anti-regime activists remain living in Damascus realize. A fundamental difference between them and other activists who have fled the country is that they all see Syria in a vastly different place from where it was seven years ago.
The Tragic Legacy of Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently (21 October 2017) David Remnick talks with a member of the group Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently, whose underground citizen journalists have documented life under ISIS rule.
US-backed fighters take control of Syria’s largest oilfield (22 October 2017) Analysts questioned whether the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) would be allowed to keep control of the country’s most lucrative oil field.
Syrian regime traps 400,000 civilians in east Ghouta (23 October 2017) At least 400,000 civilians have been blockaded and trapped by the Syrian regime on eastern Ghouta region near the capital, Damascus, leaving them struggling with malnutrition.
Health Crisis Looms Over Eastern Ghouta (24 October 2017) Hasan Arfeh tackles the medical situation in Damascus’ Eastern Ghouta under the current suffocating siege.
5,600 ‘have returned home’ from ISIL-held areas (24 October 2017) Thousands of foreign ISIL supporters have returned to their home countries after leaving Syria and Iraq over the past two years.
Exclusive: Death certificate offers clues on Russian casualties in Syria (27 October 2017) An official document seen by Reuters shows that at least 131 Russian citizens died in Syria in the first nine months of this year.
Inside Rukban Camp, One of Syria’s Most Desperate Settlements (27 October 2017) Rukban camp for internally displaced persons near the border with Jordan is rapidly deteriorating. International humanitarian groups are close to being overwhelmed, despite local NGOs and rebel groups trying to help out as well.
Convoy rolls into Damascus suburbs with aid for 40,000: U.N. (30 October 2017) A convoy from the United Nations and Syrian Arab Red Crescent entered towns in the besieged Damascus suburb of eastern Ghouta on Monday, bringing aid to 40,000 people for the first time since June 2016.
Regional and International Perspectives
Turkey gearing up to destroy Al-Qaeda’s offshoot in Syria (12 October, 2017) Wresting control of Idlib province from Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham would allow Turkey to effectively surround the Kurdish-held Afrin canton, writes Paul Iddon.
Saving America’s Syrian Ceasefire (20 October 2017) Sam Heller writes: “Whatever problems the south now faces in terms of a breakdown of law and order, they seem likely to explode if the salaries are abruptly cut off and thousands of armed rebels suddenly need to do their own fund-raising.”
Drumpf says end of Islamic State ‘caliphate is in sight’ after Raqqa’s fall (21 October 2017) US to back talks to end Syrian violence, allow refugees to return and effect political transition: Drumpf.
Kurdish fight for women’s rights faces challenges in Syria (21 October 2017) Wladimir van Wilgenburg claims that in northern Syria, the Kurds are trying to implement women’s rights, but this could prove difficult among the Arab population.
Why does Israel keep attacking Syria? (23 October 2017) Zena Tahhan writes “There have been almost routine attacks in the form of rocket fire – as well as assassinations and air raids carried out exclusively by Israel – that have intensified since the war in Syria began in 2011.”
Who will pay for the reconstruction of Raqqa? (23 October 2017) James Denselow writes “Raqqa residents cannot yet think of returning because those responsible for destroying it do not seem that willing to foot the bill for its reconstruction.”
NSA Document Says Saudi Prince Directly Ordered Coordinated Attack By Syrian Rebels On Damascus (24 October 2017) The NSA document shows “how deeply these foreign powers would become involved in parts of the armed uprising, even choosing specific operations for their local allies to carry out.”
Russia vetoes extension of mission probing chemical weapons use in Syria (24 October 2017) Russia cast a veto at the United Nations Security Council preventing the renewal of the mandate for a mission that investigates the use of chemical weapons in Syria.
But what was so appealing about ISIS? (30 October 2017) What happened before, during and after the Tunisian revolution that made the Islamist morbid utopia seem possible and attractive?
Dark Victory in Raqqa (6 November 2017) Kurdish revolutionaries, including many women who joined the Syrian Democratic Forces, helped the U.S. expel the Islamic State from its capital city.
Policy and Reports
Amid War, Women Are Starting to Make a Mark on Syrian Politics (17 October 2017) The conflict in Syria has shifted traditional roles within communities and more women are starting to play roles in politics at all levels. But their overall influence remains minimal, leaving Syria’s destiny in the hands of men.
Syria: playing into their hands (October 2017) In this study, David Keen explores how both the Syrian regime and international actors fuelled violence and fundamentalism in the Syrian war.
Syrian Refugees in Lebanon (21 October 2017) The Syrian refugees in Lebanon suffer because they have not been granted refugee status and therefore have no access to their fundamental rights.
1,100 children suffering malnutrition in Syria’s Ghouta: UNICEF (23 October 2017) UNICEF says that more than 1,100 children are suffering from acute malnutrition in the besieged rebel-held Eastern Ghouta area.
Syria, the uprising and the media scene (26 October 2017) The Syrian revolutionary process is a more thoroughly documented uprising than has ever been seen before in history, notably thanks to these democratic media.
Syria’s Khan Sheikhoun chemical massacre: proof beyond doubt who is to blame (28 October, 2017) The UN confirmed this week widely-held suspicions that the Syrian regime carried out a chemical attack on an opposition village in Idlib province.
Statement of the Syrian non-governmental institutions on the situation in the eastern Ghouta (30 October, 2017) In this statement, the League of Syrian Network and over 36 other organizations express concerns about the humanitarian situation in Eastern Ghouta where around four hundred thousand people are suffering from a tight siege.
Education in Syria Needs More Than Short-Term Solutions (30 October 2017) Kinana Qaddour writes “The importance of evolving how local communities and implementers interpret education needs to better reflect local dynamics is something that education stakeholders should prioritize sooner rather than later.”
Syrian war: All you need to know about the Astana talks (30 October 2017) Representatives of the Syrian government and some armed opposition groups are meeting in the Kazakh capital, Astana, for talks aimed at implementing a lasting ceasefire agreement.
Documentaries, Special Reports, and Other Media
Agriculture and Food Sovereignty in Syria (4 October 2017) A multi-coloured bus is picking up children from the Zaizoun refugee camp in Daraa, southern Syria. This ‘bus of joy,’ also called ‘the olive bus,’ is a service set up by a local organisation named ‘olive branch.’ Olives are one of the most important agricultural products in Daraa, with 6.5 million trees farmed on close to 30,000 hectares.
Syria heroes The White Helmets win Good Housekeeping Women of the Year award (16 October 2017) The women of The White Helmets – a group of volunteers who work to save lives in war-torn Syria – were the recipients of the Good Housekeeping Women of the Year award at a ceremony in London recently.
Syrian journalist wins UK award for Aleppo hospital film (24 October, 2017) Syrian video journalist Waad al-Kateab was awarded with Britain’s Rory Peck award for her coverage inside east Aleppo’s last functioning hospital, al-Quds, in November 2016.
Jihad Abdo: The movie star who fled Syria to deliver pizza in Hollywood (25 October, 2017) Jihad (‘Jay’) Abdo was once a prominent actor in the Arab world before he fled to America for a life of poverty – and a fledgling Hollywood career.
The fear and loathing of Syrian refugees in Lebanon (28 October, 2017) Over a million Syrians have fled to Lebanon since the war began but their reception has grown increasingly hostile. Ayman Mhanna, Kareem Chehayeb, Diana Moukalled, and Walid Abboud discuss this situation.
An emotional homecoming for Syrian hostages who escaped Islamic State (29 October, 2017) Twenty six Syrian hostages who escaped from their Islamic State captors receive an emotional homecoming in the central province of Homs.
Competing narratives: The fall of Raqqa (29 October, 2017) Bassam Haddad, Christa Salamandra, AbdAlaziz Alhamza, Omar Al Ghazzi, and Lina Khatib discuss how did international news media cover the capture of Raqqa from ISIL.
Maps
Mapped: The Last Islamic State Stronghold in Syria (4 October 2017) The Islamic State has retreated to a remote tribal region. Taking it back won’t be easy.
Mapped: ISIL’s territorial loss in northern Iraq (18 October 2017) Since the fall of Mosul in July, ISIL has been losing territory in northern Iraq.
Syria: Who controls what? (29 October 2017) A map of the Syrian civil war that shows who controls what after years of fighting.
Syrian Army approaches Al-Qaeda stronghold in east Hama – map (30 October 2017) The Syrian Arab Army (SAA) launched an important offensive in the eastern countryside of the Hama Governorate early last week.
Arabic Links:
هل سيحصل أكراد سوريا على الفدراليّة في ظلّ الأسد؟ The Iraqi Kurdistan independence referendum continues to make waves in Syria as the country’s Kurds believe they can negotiate with the government about establishing a federal Syrian state.
The English version of this article can be found here: Syrian Kurds focused on federalism
التعمير بعد تدمير: كيف يستغل النظام دمار الممتلكات وتشريعات الأراضي Future potential donors should use any leverage they may have to undo as many as possible of the Syrian regime’s policies, which transfer public assets to regime cronies, and ensure a fairer and more balanced reconstruction.
The English version of this article can be found here: Destruct to Reconstruct: How the Syrian Regime Capitalises on Property Destruction and Land Legislation
انتهى داعش .. أسئلة لا بد منها Mohamad Dibo discusses the end of ISIS and how combating terrorism became the top priority in Syria.
عامان يُمهّدان لاحتلال قد يمتد إلى نصف قرن This is an analysis of the direct Russian military intervention in Syria and its future.
أبو علي صالح.. اعتقال متكرّر The Syrian regime arrested again Abu Ali Saleh, a peaceful opposition activist who is known for his humanitarian efforts.
عوامل بقاء نظام الأسد حتى الآن في الحرب السورية: منظور تاريخي This study explores the historical and economic survival factors of the Assad regime.
جمعية لبنانية تدخل النور على حياة اللاجئين السوريين For the first time in three years, Haela and her four children can finally enjoy fresh air and some natural light in their small one-room apartment in Ouzaii, a sprawling slum area in the south of Lebanon’s capital Beirut.
The English version of this article can be found here: Eco-friendly renovation brings light to Syrians in Lebanon
الجماعات المتمرّدة تدرس خياراتها في شرق سوريا Armed opposition groups from Syria’s eastern province of Deir ez-Zor are working on how to retake their city from the Islamic State before the Syrian regime does without having to ally with the Kurdish forces.
The English version of this article can be found here: Rebel groups weigh options in Syria’s east
سُم في الهواء الطلق This investigative report highlights the crisis of inhalation Damasus’ polluted air which is increasingly contaminated with the waste of electric generators.
“التنمر الإلكتروني” في أوساط السوريين: فهم خاطئ أم أسلوب حياة؟ Farah Youssef discusses the hostile online environment on Syrian social media and what she calls “photoshop crimes.”
كيف مهّد الجيش السوريّ طريقه إلى الرقّة؟ The Syrian regime army took control of Hama’s eastern countryside from the Islamic State, which opened a road toward eastern Syria and areas controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
The English version of this article can be found here: How the Syrian army is working to gain control of road to Raqqa
[This article is published jointly in partnership with Jadaliyya.]
بواسطة Media Roundup Editors | أكتوبر 19, 2017 | Media Roundups
[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Syria and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Media Roundup Editors or of Salon Syria. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week’s roundup to info@SalonSyria.com by Monday night of every week.]
Inside Syria
Director-General praises Dr Maamoun Adbulkarim’s commitment as Director General for Antiquities and Museums of Syria between 2012 and 2017 (4 October, 2017) UNESCO Director General Irina Bokova commended Dr. Maamoun Abdulkarim at the end of his 5-years’ mandate as Head of the Directorate General for Antiquities and Museums of Syria (DGAM). She praised his unfailing commitment, tenacity and outstanding contribution to the safeguarding of cultural heritage in Syria since 2012.
‘We’re staying out of it’: Syrian Arab Army soldiers in Suwayda defy military command (4 October, 2017) After serving for three years in the Syrian Arab Army, from 2012 to 2015, Abu Sari was ready to go home.
Conservation completed on Lion of Al-lāt statue from ancient city of Palmyra, damaged by ISIL (5 October, 2017) The 2000-year old statue Lion of Al-lāt, that once watched over the ancient city of Palmyra in Syria, stands proudly once again, thanks to UNESCO’s Emergency Safeguarding of the Syrian Cultural Heritage project.
Syria’s reconstruction: Winners and losers (10 October 2017) There is a growing debate about reconstruction in Syria in Western and regional policy circles. The European Union has been closely studying options for reconstruction, while some Western (and non-Western) governments are positioning themselves so that they can play a role in the reconstruction process.
Turkey’s Operation in Idlib May Not Bring All-Out War With al-Qaida (10 October 2017) Turkey’s discussions with al-Qaida-linked militants ahead of its deployment in Syria’s Idlib province indicate that a wide-scale offensive against the militant group may not be Ankara’s primary objective, according to Charles Lister of the Middle East Institute.
Sarin gas attack-linked Syria air base to be visited by UN investigators (11 October 2017) UN team will visit Syria’s Shayrat airfield, which was targeted by US after Khan Sheikhun sarin gas attack
US-backed rebels withdraw from eastern desert with no clear mission ahead (12 October, 2017) The capture of new desert territory appears to illustrate a major shift of military control in Syria’s east that is months in the making, despite rebel assertions that they withdrew in order to protect the nearby Rukban displacement camp located within the American-run military zone.
Inside ISIS’ Dysfunctional Schools (13 October, 2017) Kinana Qaddour reports on how ISIS educational system evolved over the years and its failure to function (or even exist) in most ISIS-controlled areas.
After fall of Mayadeen, Syrian Arab Army expands campaign against Islamic State in Deir e-Zor (16 October, 2017) The capture of Mayadeen is part of a wider regime offensive to drive IS from the province, where both US-backed Kurdish-majority forces and pro-government fighters continue to capture towns and villages previously controlled by the militant group in the Deir e-Zor countryside.
What next for Raqqa? (16 October, 2017) The truth is that Western countries want to fight ISIS, especially foreign fighters, that may present risks to their own societies in the future. But what happens to the civilians that get crushed in the process, seems to be no one’s responsibility.
Drought Not the Only Environmental Problem in Syria Before 2011 (17 October, 2017) It is misleading to view the case of the Syrian drought as an example of climate-induced conflict. There were many socio-economic and political factors at play at the same time, and it is unrealistic to try to identify a single root cause of the uprising.
Regional and International Perspectives
Qatar’s Pragmatic Syria Gamble (4 October, 2017) Doha’s policy is aligned with the West, and not the ideals of the Islamic State or Al Qaeda.
Syria’s destruction revives a dream of rebuilding Lebanon’s railway (5 October, 2017) Firms from the Gulf and China are eyeing investments that seek to capture some of the $200bn needed to rebuild Syria. A railway from Lebanon’s ports to Syria’s cement-hungry cities might encourage them. But even if the war ends it will take years before work on a new rail network can begin.
EU Officials Urging Syrian Opposition to Accept Assad Remaining (9 October, 2017) Zaman al-Wasl reports that European officials are pursuing normalization with Assad through the diplomatic and security fields.
Hezbollah leader says US actions aiding Islamic State in Syria (8 October, 2017) Comments come after US official says president is considering sanctions on Iran for its support of Hezbollah.
Turkey intervenes in Syria: What you need to know (9 October, 2017) After months of speculation, Turkey has launched an intervention – with the help of rebels it supports – in northwestern Syria. But what exactly is Turkey hoping to do, and how will the jihadis who control the province react, not to mention the civilians who have taken shelter there?
‘People no longer care’: Damascus accepts Assad victory as fait accompli (9 October, 2017) Shortages have eased, rebel attacks have reduced – and desire for change has evaporated as many in Syria’s capital just want the killing to end.
Crushed but for 120 minutes united: qualifier lets Syrians forget war (11 October, 2017) The national team’s progress into a World Cup play-off was a chance to focus on something other than division and destruction.
Idlib city in state of lawlessness as hardline rebel coalition’s police force fails to maintain order, residents say (11 October, 2017) Hundreds of residents of opposition-held Idlib city closed their businesses and took to the streets in a city-wide general strike this week, amid what residents and local business owners described … as lawlessness and ineffective rebel policing.
C.I.A. Study of Covert Aid Fueled Skepticism About Helping Syrian Rebels (14 October, 2017) The still-classified review, one of several C.I.A. studies commissioned in 2012 and 2013 in the midst of the Obama administration’s protracted debate about whether to wade into the Syrian civil war, concluded that many past attempts by the agency to arm foreign forces covertly had a minimal impact on the long-term outcome of a conflict.
How Assad’s Enemies Gave Up on the Syrian Opposition (17 October, 2017) There is no longer any serious international support for the opposition’s original raison d’être, the idea that still animates its members and leaders: namely to rid Syria of the Assad dynasty.
Policy and Reports
Did some media play into ISIS’s hands? (2 October 2017) Some conservative outlets hyped the terror group’s claim that it was responsible for the Las Vegas shooting.
Jordan Says Hosting Syrian Refugees Has Cost $10 Billion (10 October 2017) Authorities in Jordan estimated at more than $10 billion the cost of hosting thousands of refugees displaced from neighboring Syria since the civil war broke out there in 2011.
The Arabic version of this article can be found here: كلفة استضافة اللاجئين السوريين في الأردن تجاوزت عشرة مليارات دولار
Documentaries, Special Reports, and Other Media
نورا الصفدي خرطبيل في المشهد (October 3, 2017) An interview with Noura Ghazi Safadi, a Syrian human rights lawyer, who shares the story of her husband, a well-known internet activist, Bassel Khartabil who was executed by the Syrian regime.
The agony of absence: Wives of disappeared detainees face uncertainty, social pressures (9 October, 2017) “For friends and families, disappeared detainees exist in a space between life and death. Prolonged absence forces a difficult choice—assume loved ones to be dead and move on with life, or wait, perhaps for years, in the hope that they are still alive.”
‘‘How can I support this team?’ Divided loyalties for Syrians haunted by civil war (10 October, 2017) Like the country itself, feelings about Syria’s national football team, who play Australia tonight, are complex.
Syrian women will sing Big Ben’s missing bongs to remember loved ones ‘disappeared’ by Assad regime (10 October 2017) An estimated 200,000 have been jailed or disappeared by the Assad regime since 2011.
Maps
MOSCOW PRESSES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN (10 October, 2017) Moscow’s expanding footprint in Tartous underscores the Kremlin’s intent to use its positions on the Syrian coast to establish Russia as a permanent regional power and challenge the Unites States and NATO in the longterm.
What is left of ISIL in Iraq?(11 October 2017) More than three years since its dramatic capture of Mosul, ISIL is a group in rapid decline, despite the ongoing threat of attacks.
SYRIA SITUATION REPORT: SEPTEMBER 27 – OCTOBER 10, 2017
Syrian Civil War Map (15 October 2017) A map of the Syrian civil war that shows who controls what after years of fighting.
MAPPED: The battle against ISIL (15 October 2017) In the past year and a half, ISIL’s territory has been shrinking steadily.
Arabic Links:
«التتريك» يزدهر في الشمال: لواء إسكندرون جديد Turkey pursues a policy of turkification as part of the Shield of Euphrates operation in Syria.
حميرة: “أنا أشحد”.. ولهذه الأسباب يرفض الخليجيون تمويل أعمالي Fouad Humeira, a well-known Syrian scriptwriter, reveals the reasons that forced him to stop writing and how a production company in the Gulf refused to finance his work for sectarian reasons.
“التعليم العالي” تنفي رفع الاعتراف بالشهادة السورية Higher Education Minister Atef Naddaf refutes rumors about Syrian degrees obtained from Syrian universities as being unrecognized internationally.
ماذا لو اشتكت لاجئة من العنف ضدها؟ What if a refugee woman filed a complaint for being subjected to violence?
مع استمرار التعديات عليها غابــات اللاذقيــة تضيــع بيــن التحطيــب والتفحيــم .. فمــن يوقــف الحــرائق؟Fires destroy many forest areas in the countryside of Lataki.
من “زهرة الصحراء” إلى “شوكة الصحراء” … أسماء الأسد مرة أخرى!Asma al-Assad, A Rose in the Desert, as Vogue magazine described her once, remarketing her image through her frequent appearances and visits to the poor in Syria.
طعن بالسكين .. محاولة اغتيال المخرج السوري محمد بايزيد في اسطنبول Syrian film director Mohamed Bayazid was subjected to an assassination attempt by unknown assailants in Istanbul.
باص الحرية يبدأ رحلتهActivists drove a ‘Freedom Bus’ around the British capital to draw attention to tens of thousands of detained and missing people in Syria.
منذر مصري يكتب: من أجل ماذا خرج الشعب السوري؟Monzer Masri criticizes Syrian opposition figures who forgot why Syrians revolted against the regime.
دروس البوسنة لسوريا: لا يمكن لمجرمي الحرب أن يكونوا جزءاً من الحل Syria Untold interviews Dr. Goran Šimić, a Professor of Criminal law and Transitional justice at the International University of Sarajevo, about justice and reconciliation in post-conflict societies, as well as similarities between Bosnia and Syria.
The English version of this article can be found here: Bosnia’s Lessons for Syria: War Criminals Cannot Be Part of the Solution
بواسطة Media Roundup Editors | أكتوبر 5, 2017 | Media Roundups
[This is a roundup of news articles and other materials circulating on Syria and reflects a wide variety of opinions. It does not reflect the views of the Media Roundups Editors or of Salon Syria. You may send your own recommendations for inclusion in each week’s roundup to info@SalonSyria.com by Monday night of every week.]
Inside Syria
Countryside Dwellers and City Dwellers… About the Syria that we Know very well (10 September 2017) “Munira says that countryside dwellers have started to feel they are proud of their belonging to their small towns and villages only after the revolution.”
As War Rages, Tabqa Schools Offer Hope to Syrian Children (12 September 2017) “Local officials face numerous challenges as they struggle to get students back into the education system while the war continues, but several Tabqa schools are set to reopen for Syrian children this week, just months after the city was liberated from ISIS.”
Hundreds of Isis defectors mass on Syrian border hoping to flee (12 September 2017) Several dozen former fighters have already crossed into southern Turkey in recent weeks as terror group loses territory.
Turkey deploys 80 military vehicles near Syrian border (17 September 2017) Deployment comes after Russia, Turkey, and Iran agreed to send ‘de-escalation’ forces to Syria in the coming weeks.
SOHR: Israeli warplanes hit near Damascus airport (22 September 2017) The air raids reportedly struck sites controlled by the Lebanese armed group Hezbollah, says UK-based activist group.
Syrians vote in Kurdish-led regions of north (22 September 2017) Syrians voted in an election organized by the Kurdish-led authorities of northern Syria, the start of a three-phase process to set up new governing institutions that aim to shore up regional autonomy.
Syria to consider granting Kurds greater autonomy (26 September 2017) Discussions on extended powers for Syrian Kurds to begin once Assad government defeats ISIL, foreign minister says.
British film-maker killed by Isis militants in Syria (27 September 2017) Mehmet Aksoy, from London, was working as a press officer for Kurdish forces in Raqqa when military base was attacked
Behind the story: Meet the journalists who risk the wrath of all sides to cover Syria’s south (27 September 2017) Five journalists, two from Suwayda province, two from Daraa and one from Quneitra, who cover the Syrian conflict on the ground at great personal risk share their stories and talk about challenges they faced.
Suwayda residents, citing weak government authority, turn anew to tribal laws to resolve civil, criminal matters(27 September 2017) “Residents of regime-held Suwayda province in Syria’s south are turning to centuries-old tribal practices to combat lawlessness, solve familial disputes and handle marriages in the absence of an effective civil authority, residents and local leaders on the ground tell Syria Direct.”
Joshua Landis: Syria on track ‘to go back to what we had before’ (28 September 2017) In this interview, Joshua Landis says that the way forward is an economy revitalized by regional transportation, trade routes and tourism.
‘New Baghdadi tape’ posted by Islamic State group (28 September 2017) Islamic State militants have released what appears to be an audio recording of their leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
Rare Islamic State victory in rural Homs splits displaced families apart (2 October, 2017) If confirmed, the capture of Qaryatayn is a rare victory for IS as the group’s forces suffer major losses in eastern Syria’s Raqqa and Deir e-Zor provinces, amid separate campaigns by US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces and the regime to eradicate the group from its remaining territory.
Deadly bombing hits Damascus police station (3 October, 2017) ‘Terrorist explosion’ in al-Midan area kills more than 10 people, including civilians and police, in continued violence.
Syrian Soldier Is Guilty of War Crime, a First in the 6-Year Conflict (3 October, 2017) “For the first time, six years into a war that began with Syria’s secret police accused of torturing teenagers and has escalated in brutality ever since, a member of the Syrian military has been convicted of a war crime.”
Regional and International Perspectives
The best weapon to de-radicalise Isis returnees? Our own humanity (15 September 2017) Extremists coming back from Syria must not be seen as one-dimensional, Bond-movie bad guys. Our task is to remember that perpetrators can be victims.
US funding cuts and the impact on Syrian refugee women (20 September 2017) How the US went from all to nothing at a maternity clinic in the world’s largest Syrian refugee camp.
Exclusive: Turkey to deploy troops inside Syria’s Idlib – Erdogan (22 September 2017) Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan said on Thursday Turkey will deploy troops in Syria’s northern Idlib region as part of a so-called de-escalation agreement brokered by Russia last month.
Has the Syrian opposition lost the war? (23 September 2017) Journalist Patrick Cockburn and Syrian American Council adviser Mohammed Ghanem offer differing views on the Syrian war.
Moscow clashes with EU over aid to Syria (23 September 2017) Russia clashed with the EU over Syria, accusing the bloc of politicizing aid by linking reconstruction funds to a political transition that would end the war.
Evicted Refugees in Lebanon Have Nowhere Left to Run (28 September 2017) Lebanon wants to evict 12,000 refugees who live near an air base where foreign military assistance is delivered. The evictions, which began in spring and recently resumed after a short respite, have left refugees more vulnerable amid rising demands they return to Syria.
Expert Views: Is Jordan Headed Toward Detente With Damascus? (29 September 2017) Syria Deeply’s expert community weighs in on a possible rapprochement between Amman and Damascus and the drive in some quarters for improved relations between the two states.
Do Russians care about Syria? (30 September 2017) Two years into the Russian intervention in Syria, we ask what Russians think of the war.
Saudi king heads to Russia, with oil, investment and Syria on agenda (3 October, 2017) The leaders of Saudi Arabia and Russia, the world’s biggest oil exporters, are expected to discuss cooperation on oil production and differences over Syria and Iran on Thursday during the first visit to Moscow by a reigning Saudi Monarch.
Policy and Reports
EU launches “Brussels process” for Syria, Mogherini announces at UNGA (21 September 2017) The EU is ready to contribute to the stabilisation and early recovery of areas where violence has decreased, and will hold a second conference on Syria in Spring 2018. In parallel, the EU continues to support the Geneva talks with the aim of a credible and inclusive agreement.
The socio-economic roots of Syria’s uprising (21 September 2017) While the outbreak of revolution in 2011 took many by surprise, the pre-conditions for such an upheaval had accumulated for decades.
German justice handed 27,000 images of ‘torture and killings by Assad regime’ (22 September 2017) More than 27,000 images of torture and killings allegedly perpetrated by the Assad regime in Syria have been handed to German prosecutors who are investigating possible abuses, a rights group said on Friday.
Intolerable Living Conditions in “al-Rukban Camp” on the Jordanian-Syrian Border (25 September 2017) “Tens of Thousands of Displaced Persons have Difficulty Accessing Potable Water and Health Care”
Syria: Coalition Airstrikes Killed Dozens Near Raqqa (25 September 2017) Human Rights Watch said in a report that two aerial attacks near Raqqa, Syria in March killed at least 84 civilians, including 30 children, and raise concerns that US-led coalition forces fighting the ISIS did not take adequate precautions to minimize civilian casualties.
Post-ISIS Governance in Jarablus: A Turkish-led Strategy (26 September 2017) Turkey’s capacity to ensure the sustainability of its successes against ISIS depends largely on improving governance in Jarablus.
Will the U.S. Abandon the Kurds of Syria Once ISIS is Destroyed? by Landis, Itani, Simon (1 October 2017) Joshua Landis, Faysal Itani, Steven Simon shares their perspectives on whether the United States would stand by the Kurds of north Syria once ISIS is destroyed.
Jordan: Syrian Refugees Being Summarily Deported (2 October 2017) Human Rights Watch said in a report that Jordanian authorities have been summarily deporting Syrian refugees – including collective expulsions of large families.
The Arabic version of this report can be found here: الأردن: ترحيل مستعجل للاجئين سوريين
Documentaries, Special Reports, and Other Media
Campfire songs in a war zone: Syria’s girl scouts earn their stripes (19 September 2017) Arabic could become the fourth official language of the world Girlguiding movement, as Syria’s girl scout network wins international recognition
We felt so lucky to foster a young refugee. Don’t let Parsons Green tarnish a proud tradition (20 September 2017) Fostering a teenager from Syria has been a privilege and given us a new perspective on our lives. I hope this horrific attack does not deter future carers.
Syrian opposition activist and her journalist daughter murdered in Turkey (22 September 2017) 60-year-old Orouba Barakat and 22-year-old daughter Halla were found overnight in their apartment in Istanbul’s Uskudar neighbourhood.
How One Syrian Fought to the Death for a Free Internet (27 September 2017) Della Ratta says. “We should take it very seriously when the international community is dealing with Bashar al-Assad like he’s not doing what he’s doing, which is killing his people and executing people like Bassel. It’s a very sad story but it deserves to be told. Otherwise an entire chapter of this situation in Syria will be lost.”
Fatal Attraction: The Islamic State’s Politics of Sentimentality (28 September 2017) “The ability of the Islamic State (IS) to gain virtual and literal ground in terms of recruitment throughout the world is very much linked to its politics of sentimentality.”
5 amazing ways #MeWeSyria is helping young Syrian refugees (1 October 2017) The work that #MeWeSyria is doing to support and facilitate young Syrians in telling their stories is a fundamental part of the effort to bridge the gap between educational and emotional needs.
The 13-year-old Syrian refugee who became a prizewinning poet (1 October 2017) A year after learning to speak English, Amineh Abou Kerech has won this year’s Betjeman prize. She tells us how she found her voice.
Review: ‘The Impossible Revolution’ in Syria (3 October 2017) Lebanese writer Joey Ayoub reviews Yassin Al-Haj Saleh’s The Impossible Revolution: Making Sense of the Syrian Tragedy.
Maps
Mapping the Battle Against ISIS in Deir Ezzor (26 September 2017) Syria Deeply examines the pitched battle for Deir Ezzor, including advances by both the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Assad government against the so-called Islamic State in the oil-rich province.
The city fit for no-one (26 September 2017) A collection of maps and visuals that shows aspects from inside Raqqa, the ruined ‘capital’ of the Islamic State group
Mapping out Syria’s remaining battles (26 September 2017) Battles intensify as fighting in Syria now focused on three key areas.
Syria’s civil war explained from the beginning (1 October, 2017) The Syrian civil war is the deadliest conflict the 21st century has witnessed so far.
Deir Azzour Tribal Mapping Project (2 October, 2017) Deir Azzour is in the strategic eastern region of the country, on the border with Iraq, and the governorate is approximately 500 kilometers (311 miles) from Damascus.
Arabic Links:
إصبعٌ على الكيبورد.. وآخرُ في عين الكارثة Ola Hosamow writes about the growing number of Syrian artists who use digital arts as an expression of the Syrian tragedy.
إزاحة رأس النظام السوري وتناقض التصريحات This article examines the contradictory statements made by Western officials towards whether Assad should stay in power or leave.
بعد اعتقال دام 4 سنوات ..”حازم الحريري” قتيلاً في سجون النظام Family of Hazim Alhariri was informed that Hazim (22 years old) was executed in 2014. Hazim was a Law school student at the University of Aleppo and a musician.
الوجود الكردي في سورية تاريخيًا واجتماعيًا Abdulbaset Sieda, a Kurdish-Syrian academic and politician, writes about the socio-historical existence of Kurds in Syria.
أغاني العرس الفلّاحي في العراق والشام Anas Al-Asaad analyzes peasant wedding songs in Syria and Iraq.
المثقف النذل Gassan Jebai criticizes Arab intellectuals who supported oppressive regimes against their own people.
نص المداخلة الشفهية لرئيس المركز السوري للإعلام وحرية التعبير مازن درويش، خلال جلسة “بناء أسس العدالة في سوريا” The intervention of Mazen Darwish, Director of the Syrian Centre for Media and Freedom of Expression (SCM), “Accountability High Level Event” at the United Nations General Assembly, 72nd session
The English version of this article can be found: here.
إطلاق سراح لاعب سوري بعد وساطة من عمر السومة؟ Upon a personal request made by Syrian football player Omar Somah, Mohammad Kunis, a Syrian football player, was released from the regime’s prison.
حمودة صباغ .. رئيسا لمجلس الشعب السوري Hammouda Sabbagh was elected as the new Speaker of the People’s Council of Syria.
ما بعد السيطرة على جسد المرأة Jad Al Karim Jebaei criticizes the patriarchal structures and Arab/Islamic culture which control the body and deny individual freedom.
المرأة السورية ومنظمات المجتمع المدني! Syrian Women’s Network organized a workshop in Gaziantep to empower Syrian women.
لقاء مع مالك جندلي An interview with Malek Jandali, a Syrian-American pianist and composer.
14 الجاري.. “يوم الغضب السوري” في العالم Syrian activists call for “a day of rage” worldwide on October 14.
[This article is published jointly in partnership with Jadaliyya.]
