بواسطة BBC | أغسطس 9, 2017 | News, Reports
“Former war crimes prosecutor Carla Del Ponte has announced she is quitting a United Nations commission investigating human rights abuses in Syria because it ‘does absolutely nothing’.
She has served on the UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria for nearly five years.
Syria’s civil war has left more than 300,000 people dead and displaced millions.
Ms Del Ponte, a former Swiss attorney general, made her name probing war crimes in Rwanda and the ex-Yugoslavia.
‘I am frustrated, I give up,’ Ms Del Ponte told the Swiss newspaper Blick. “I have written my letter of resignation and will send it in the next few days’.
She added that “everyone in Syria is on the bad side. The [Bashar al-] Assad government has perpetrated horrible crimes against humanity and used chemical weapons. And the opposition is now made up of extremists and terrorists”.
Later, she told a panel discussion at the Locarno Film Festival: ‘I am quitting this commission, which is not backed by any political will.
‘I have no power as long as the [UN] Security Council does nothing. There is no justice for Syria.’
The brief of the commission is to investigate human rights violations and war crimes in Syria since the conflict began in March 2011.
It has released about a dozen reports but investigators have never gained access to Syria itself, instead relying on interviews, photos, medical records and other documents.
Ms Del Ponte says she has never seen such crimes before, not in the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda.
She and the other commission members have repeatedly called on the Security Council to refer the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court.
In a statement, the commission thanked Ms Del Ponte for her contributions to its work “and for her personal efforts and interventions to support the cause of justice”.
It wished her well ‘in all her future endeavours, particularly as a tireless advocate for the cause of accountability and bringing perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity to justice’.”
[This article was originally published by the BBC.]
بواسطة Michael Young | يوليو 31, 2017 | News, Reports
[Journalist Ibrahim Hamidi examines how the conflict over Syria’s borders is being shaped by outside powers.]
“Ibrahim Hamidi is a senior diplomatic editor covering Syrian affairs at the Al-Sharq al-Awsat newspaper in London. For a long time, he was the Damascus bureau chief of the Al-Hayat newspaper, before leaving Syria after the outbreak of the uprising in 2011. Hamidi has considerable experience in Syrian affairs, and has broken a number of highly significant stories on the conflict there. Diwan met with him in early July to discuss the ongoing tensions in Syria for control over the country’s borders, in particular the growing regionalization of the conflict. This led Hamidi to describe the war as ‘no longer a war by proxy, but a direct one between regional and international powers on Syrian territory.’
Michael Young: Recently, an understanding was reached involving the United States, Russia, and Jordan for the creation of a safe zone in southern Syria, near the border with Jordan. This was confirmed by the United States and Russia at the G20 summit last week. You recently wrote an article underlining that Iran, which has allied militias in the area, was excluded from the understanding. Where is the understanding now, and how likely is it to be implemented over Iranian opposition?
Ibrahim Hamidi: Everybody who has met officials from the Drumpf administration has came out with the assessment that Washington’s priority in Syria is combating the Islamic State and reducing the influence of Iran. When chemical weapons were used in Khan Sheikhoun in Idlib governorate last April, the administration said that the Syrian regime was responsible and stressed that it would never work with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.
A statement by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson on July 5 outlined Drumpf’s goals in Syria very clearly: “First, parties in Syria must ensure stability on the ground … Secondly, parties must work through a political process to achieve a settlement that charts a way forward for the Syrian people. Lastly, Russia has a special responsibility to assist in these efforts.” Tillerson called on all sides, “including the Syrian government and its allies, Syrian opposition forces, and Coalition forces carrying out the battle to defeat [the Islamic State], to avoid conflict with one another and adhere to agreed geographical boundaries for military deconfliction and protocols for de-escalation.”
Washington informed the Russians that it was not concerned with the Astana agreement for establishing deconfliction zones in Syria, or even with the Geneva process on Syria. It stressed that the American concern was purely military—gaining control of territory in eastern Syria and cooperating with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to expel the Islamic State from Raqqa, and with the Free Syrian Army (FSA) to do the same in Syria’s south.
Washington was seemingly convinced that its two objectives—the defeat of the Islamic State and the reduction in Iranian influence—could be achieved through military control over southern and eastern Syria. This is where Moscow came in to suggest cooperating with the U.S. in southern Syria in the creation of a deconfliction zone there, especially that President Donald Drumpf was also interested in creating “safe zones” in that part of the country aimed at reducing the refugee problem and combating terrorism. Talks ensued between Russian and U.S. officials in Amman, Jordan, and one of Washington’s conditions for cooperation was pushing Iran and its Revolutionary Guards, along with Hezbollah, away from both the Jordanian-Syrian and Israeli-Syrian borders, to a distance of 30–50 kilometers.
The Americans set up a military base in Tanf, close to the intersection of the Syrian, Iraqi, and Jordanian borders, infuriating the Iranians and prompting them to increase pressure on both the U.S. and Russia by sending more pro-Iranian militias to Deraa in southern Syria. Not only that, but the Iran-sponsored militias went into the countryside of Quneitra, the principal town on the Golan Heights, and starting fighting at a distance of 3 kilometers from the ceasefire line between Syria and Israel.
MY: The United States blocked the advance of Syrian regime forces and allied Shi‘a militias toward its positions in Tanf in May. However, that did not prevent pro-Iran militias from reaching the border with Iraq. Do you feel that the incident showed a U.S. desire to prevent a land connection between Iraq and Syria, or was it simply a limited effort by the U.S. to defend its troops and allies in and around Tanf?
IH: Iran ordered its militias to maneuver around the U.S. base in Tanf, connecting with Syrian regime troops to its north, toward Albukamal, while the Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Units in Iraq did the same in Mosul, connecting with the Iraqi army. This is where Russia started to play a mediating role between Iran and the United States, setting up a new base for itself east of Damascus. When the U.S. bombed pro-Iran militias in the desert in May, Moscow hammered out an agreement between Washington and Tehran, specifically outlining the spheres of influence of each party. The U.S. subsequently withdrew from the Zakf base north of Tanf and Iran responded positively by dismantling some of its military checkpoints from the vicinity of the border town, to a distance of 55 kilometers. This was the first real territorial swap, or agreement, between the Americans and Iranians in Syria, brought about through direct Russian mediation.
MY: Recently, Hezbollah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah said in a speech that a future war with Israel could draw in fighters from Iran, Iraq, and elsewhere. Wasn’t this acknowledgment that Iran seeks to create a land connection between Iran and Lebanon. And, if so, how will this play out against a U.S., Jordanian, and Israeli refusal to see pro-Iran groups deployed near the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights?
IH: I agree with you. Clearly Iran wants to preserve its lifeline to Hezbollah, via Iraq and Syria. There are three such vital lifelines for Hezbollah: one runs through the Damascus-Baghdad highway, the second through Damascus International Airport, and the third through the port of Tartous, which is used to transport Iranian arms to Hezbollah.
Some in the West believe that Iran will accept foregoing the Damascus-Baghdad highway and surrendering its presence in the Golan in exchange for accepting an Iranian sphere of influence that stretches from Damascus to the Syrian-Lebanese borders. I see the recent statements of Hassan Nasrallah as testimony of a readiness to accept territorial swaps in principle, in exchange for spheres of Iranian influence, in the hope that this would guarantee Hezbollah’s political and geographic presence in Syria’s future.
MY: Will the U.S. seek to use its forces and allies in Tanf to eventually push the Islamic State out of Deir Ezzor, Albukamal, and Mayadin? Or is this unrealistic?
IH: A race is underway to overrun the Islamic State capital of Raqqa, carried out on the one side by the U.S.-led Coalition and the SDF, and on the other by Syrian government troops and the Russians. The ancient city on the Euphrates would represent the jewel in the crown of the war on terror, which each party is trying to claim for itself.
For now, the Coalition and the SDF have the advantage after U.S.-backed forces took the nearby city of Tabqa and its military base, and are now positioning themselves to march on the oil-rich city of Deir Ezzor on the Euphrates. The U.S. set up the Tanf and Zakf military bases for that purpose, and it is probably thinking of establishing a new one in Shadadi in the countryside of Hasakeh, east of the Euphrates. It hopes to mount an attack against Deir Ezzor with the help of the SDF and the FSA after securing Raqqa. Meanwhile, Syrian government troops, backed by Iran and Russia, seek a similar victory in Deir Ezzor. A quid pro quo might emerge between all sides: the U.S. would be allowed to take Raqqa in exchange for allowing the Russians to take Deir Ezzor—but without pro-Iran forces involved.
MY: If you had to compare Iran’s and Russia’s influence in Syria, which of the two has the greater influence?
IH: The Russians currently have three military bases in Syria—in Tartous, Latakia, and now in the countryside around Damascus. They also have military police stationed in Aleppo, in addition to advisers and experts working with the regime at government headquarters in the Syrian capital. Iran has militias spread all over the country and has already succeeded in creating a “shadow regime” in Syria. For now the Iranians and Russians depend on each other. Moscow is not prepared to send more troops onto the battlefield so long as Iran is doing the job. And even when it did so in Aleppo, it handpicked them from Chechnya rather than Russia proper. It will tap into other resources in the future, perhaps bringing in troops from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The Russians have tried, however, more than once actually, to distance themselves from Iran. But that is easier said than done.
One of the reasons why the U.S. suggested a “safe zone” in southern Syria was to test Russia’s willingness and ability to distance itself from Iran. There is little doubt that the longer the battles continue, the greater Iran’s influence will become. Iran is so entrenched in the Syrian battlefield that it could still wield tremendous influence, whether the war continues or whether a political settlement is reached. Even if a joint military council were created between the regime and the armed opposition, Iran would still have a say in what happens through the participation of the militias it controls.
MY: Some have assumed that Russia can be used to limit Iran’s reach in Syria. Is this realistic?
IH: I know that some people are betting on a “Russian Syria” rather than on an Iranian one, but I think this is difficult to achieve. The Iranians have invested plenty of money, arms, and manpower in Syria, and will not walk away so easily. Some are speculating that the Iranians will milk the Russian presence in Syria, just as they did that of the Americans in Iraq. This is something else that would be difficult to achieve, due to the different nature of the two conflicts. However, it is worth keeping an eye on such a possibility.
MY: How do you see the struggle for influence over Syria’s borders playing out in the coming six months?
IH: As the war approaches its seventh anniversary next March, I think that the country that many Syrians hoped to create when they took to the streets—one that was secular, united, and democratic—has become an illusion. The Syrian people no longer are deciding on their own future. Their fate is fully in the hands of others. There are eight U.S. military airports and bases in Syria at present, and these are likely to increase, in addition to three major Russian military airports. The Turkish, Jordanian, and Israeli armies are all present in Syria today, in addition to the U.S.-led Coalition against the Islamic State. This is no longer a war by proxy, but a direct one between regional and international powers on Syrian territory. Having said that, neither side will be able to turn the military situation fully to its advantage, but each is capable of preventing the others from a full and clean victory.
Tillerson said something notable on July 5, following a cabinet-level meeting on Syria at the White House on June 30. He called upon all parties “to adhere to agreed geographical boundaries.” Therefore, effectively, we are seeing the rapid transformation of Syria into pockets of foreign influence—American, Russian, Iranian, Jordanian, Turkish, and Israeli. Iran has secured its share stretching from Damascus to Lebanon, and through a security and military belt around the Syrian capital. The Russians control a zone in western Syria, as well as the skies west of the Euphrates, while the Americans control everything east of the river. These zones of influence will remain, although we hope that their status remains temporary until a comprehensive accord is reached—a Dayton Agreement for Syria.”
[This article was originally published by Carnegie Middle East Center.]
بواسطة Aron Lund | يوليو 26, 2017 | Cost of War, News, غير مصنف
The results are in: nerve gas has again been used in Syria. On June 29, international inspectors from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) officially concluded that the nerve agent known as sarin was used on April 4 in the city of Khan Sheikhoun in northwestern Syria. This was a war crime, a breach of international laws banning chemical weapons, and a direct challenge to the OPCW and the Chemical Weapons Convention, which Syria joined under American pressure in September 2013.
Though the United States has pointed its finger at President Bashar al-Assad’s government as responsible for the attack, the inspectors’ report did not identify the guilty party—nor was it intended to. However, a separate investigation known as the Joint Investigative Mechanism, or JIM, is now working to do exactly that. Yet it is far from certain that the investigators will succeed in identifying a perpetrator, and even if they do, effective follow-up of their conclusions is likely to be blocked in the UN Security Council.
Still, the Khan Sheikhoun investigation matters, because the use of chemical weapons resonates far outside of Syria. Challenges to the global norm against gas warfare tend to provoke international responses in ways that the daily churn of conventional war crimes in Syria do not, and the past four years of peacemaking and great-power diplomacy were strongly influenced by the disputes over Assad’s chemical weapons program. Very likely, Syrian politics will continue to be yanked in unpredictable directions by the chemical weapons crisis—and this autumn, all eyes are on the JIM investigation into the attack at Khan Sheikhoun.
The OPCW Fact-Finding Mission
A treaty-based organization of 192 member countries, the OPCW has been active in Syria since the creation in 2013 of a joint UN-OPCW mission that stripped President Bashar al-Assad’s government of some 1300 tons of chemical weapons. Western nations now claim the Syrian government secretly retained part of its stockpile, which Assad denies. The OPCW has not yet ruled on whether Damascus is trying to cheat the inspectors, but it has complained of troublesome gaps in the Syrian narrative and is currently investigating the issue.
Toward the end of the UN-OPCW joint disarmament mission in 2014, OPCW Director General Ahmet Üzümcü struck a deal with the Syrian Foreign Ministry to also send an OPCW Fact Finding Mission to the country to investigate allegations of continued chemical attacks with chlorine gas. It was a group of OPCW investigators working through that mechanism that was called upon to investigate the incident in Khan Sheikhoun when reports broke of a nerve gas attack there on April 4. It has been hard work—indeed, nearly impossible.
Although the Fact-Finding Mission operated both out of Damascus and on the Turkish border, its members were unable to gain access to the actual crime scene in Khan Sheikhoun. The city is located in a war-torn, rebel-held region of northwestern Syria that is controlled by hardline Islamist insurgents, including groups with strong links to al-Qaeda. It is extremely dangerous for non-Syrian aid workers or journalists to visit the region, and for a team of OPCW scientists to travel there seems almost out of the question—particularly since the guilty party, whoever that is, would have an evident interest in whipping up violence against them.
Though the OPCW did make preparations for a visit, it did not end up happening. Neither did the group go to the Shayrat air base from which the United States has said the attacks were launched. Such a trip would probably have been safe, but it would not be likely to provide much information pertinent to the Fact-Finding Mission’s mandate which (per the terms agreed with the Syrian Foreign Ministry) does not allow the OPCW to investigate who carried out an attack with chemical weapons—the investigators are only allowed to determine if it happened.
On the other hand, the limited mandate made for a much easier investigation. Piecing together exactly what happened by a remote investigation that depended on partisan accounts would be hard, but giving a yes or no answer to the question of whether a chemical weapon was used is a more straightforward endeavor. And, as it turned out, it was one of those rare issues where Syrian loyalists and opposition members could agree.
As documented in the Fact-Finding Mission’s report, the inspectors received evidence and testimony from a wide range of Syrian and non-Syrian sources, including opposition groups, Assad’s government, and foreign nations on both sides of the conflict. While they found striking and irreconcilable discrepancies in testimony provided by witnesses contacted through the Syrian opposition and those contacted through the Syrian government, both sides said they had found evidence of nerve gas use and offered environmental samples from Khan Sheikhoun that tested positive for sarin. “When all the evidence and information from all available sources is put together, there is no disagreement that Sarin was used as a chemical weapon in Khan Shaykhun,” OPCW Director-General Ahmet Üzümcü told the OPCW Executive Council when it convened to discuss the report on July 5.
Even Russia, which has been hostile to the OPCW investigations ever since they produced evidence that helped incriminate Assad’s government for chlorine attacks committed in 2014 and 2015, agreed with Üzümcü’s assessment. “After reading the [Fact-Finding Mission] report on Khan-Shaykhun, one thing is clear: sarin or a similar agent was used there,” said Russian OPCW representative Alexander Shulgin according to an official transcript of his remarks. “This is confirmed, among other things, by analysis of the samples obtained from the site of the incident by the Syrian authorities. However, the main question remains unanswered—who, under what circumstances, and in what manner used this toxic substance.”
The Joint Investigative Mechanism
The circumstances of the Khan Sheikhoun incident remain poorly understood. Although many have already drawn their conclusions about who was behind the release of toxic gas on April 4, it will be very difficult to clear up lingering question marks to the extent that a firm international judgment can be delivered. Doing so will be the responsibility of a separate group of international investigators known as the Joint Investigative Mechanism. A joint UN-OPCW project, it works independently of the OPCW’s Fact-Finding Mission, essentially picking up where the latter’s work ends.
From its creation in 2015 through 2016, the JIM was under the leadership of the Argentinian diplomat Virginia Gamba. In late April 2017, her place was taken by Guatemalan diplomat Edmond Mulet, who is assisted by the two other members of the JIM’s Leadership Panel: Malaysian diplomat Judy Cheng-Hopkins, who runs the political component of the JIM from offices in New York, and the Swiss chemical weapons expert Stefan Mogl, who will handle the JIM investigation’s technical side at the OPCW labs in the Netherlands. Mulet, Cheng-Hopkins, and Mogl are assisted by a team of twenty-three additional staff with relevant expertise, a JIM spokesperson tells me. Several members of the staff have previous experience of working in Syria. For example, Mulet has involved Åke Sellström, the Swedish chemical arms expert who ran the UN’s first chemical weapons investigation in Syria in 2013.
The investigators are well aware of the difficult task they face, and that their investigation needs to remain untainted by political arguments and pressures. “The notion that this was Assad lives in everybody’s mind and in the world of propaganda,” Sellström told a Swedish reporter earlier this year. “But to be able to convict someone in a judicial process you will need to produce evidence of who actually did it and secure it in such a way that it can stand up to legal scrutiny in, for example, the International Court of Justice in The Hague.”
How the JIM Came to Be
Unlike the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission, which exists because of an agreement between the OPCW and the Syrian government, the JIM owes its existence to the United Nations. The unanimously adopted UN Security Council resolution 2235 created the JIM in August 2015 in response to previous OPCW Fact-Finding Mission reports documenting the continued use of chlorine gas as a weapon.
The fact that Russia voted for the creation of the JIM surprised many observers at the time, even if it took long and hard negotiations to get Moscow to agree. The Russian government had been dismissive of the Fact-Finding Mission reports, which (although they were not allowed to draw conclusions from that material) had included evidence that seemed to point in the direction of Assad’s government. For example, some witness testimony and video footage indicated that chlorine-filled munitions had been dropped by helicopter. Many had therefore assumed that Moscow would veto any attempt to clarify who was behind the attacks, and were surprised when the Russian government voted in favor of the JIM at the Security Council in August 2015, thereby allowing the resolution to be unanimously adopted.
The chemical weapons expert, arms control consultant, and former senior OPCW official Ralf Trapp was not among those surprised. “There was an interest certainly on the Russian side to get attribution into the picture,” Trapp told me in an interview in May. “If you recall, the final Sellström report from December 2013 contained some reports of sarin having been used against government troops. Also, Russia did its own investigation in 2013 and attributed sarin use to terrorists,” he said, referring to an incident in Khan al-Asal where the Syrian government had demanded a UN investigation.
“It needed investigation, and you couldn’t quite tell what the outcome would be,” Trapp told me, noting the murky nature of the conflict and the fact that, as opposed to sarin, attacks that involve chlorine gas are not technically difficult to arrange. “I think the Russians went along, thinking they could influence the outcome in such a way that there would be a finding of terrorist use of chemical arms, or that they could at least throw enough question marks at the conclusion,” Trapp said. “In many of these investigations it is very difficult in advance to know what the result will be.”
Others see Russia’s approval of the JIM as a cynical bid to gain time. “I think it was a way of postponing the inevitable,” argued a person associated with the Syrian chemical arms inspections who spoke to me earlier this year. “You keep playing the game until a time comes when you feel that now we can perhaps get away by changing the goalposts, but you can’t disrupt the game. Blocking the JIM would immediately have raised the question of why—why can’t you allow an independent investigation? Maybe they also thought that the UN, given its habit of always playing safe, would come up with something safe and wishy-washy. It could very easily have ended up that way.”
Blocking the JIM would immediately have raised the question of why—why can’t you allow an independent investigation?
In fact, it took less than a year for the JIM to find itself on a collision course with Moscow. In summer 2016, the JIM determined that Assad’s forces was guilty of using chlorine on at least two occasions, later adding a third. Russia refused to accept the results, and since then Russian diplomats and state media outlets have showered the UN and OPCW investigations with complaints—some quite reasonable, but some clearly in bad faith.
The affair led to a showdown in the Security Council in February 2017, in which Russia and China vetoed a draft resolution backed by a majority of the council membership. The draft would have drawn on the JIM reports, previous UN resolutions, and a 2013 Russian-American agreement to impose Chapter VII sanctions on the Syrian government. This was where Moscow drew the line, apparently preferring to veto any resolutions that would run counter to Assad’s interests rather than negotiate for milder sanctions or engage substantively with the JIM’s conclusions. The veto tore up a series of Russian-American deals and international arrangements over how to regulate the Syrian chemical weapons issue, which had been gradually and consensually put in place from 2013 to 2015. It also made the United States and the EU move unilaterally to impose sanctions outside the UN framework, in addition to those already in place. Indeed, by stripping away Security Council enforcement, the Russian-Chinese veto paradoxically seems to have contributed to the U.S. decision to strike Assad’s forces in response to the Khan Sheikhoun attack a few weeks later without even attempting to engage Russia or awaiting a JIM investigation (though U.S. President Donald Drumpf likely had other motives, too, for wanting to flaunt his military strength).
There is no reason to believe Russia has altered its position since then. In other words, though the JIM’s investigations into alleged chemical weapons use in Syria will continue, it is unlikely that its conclusions will be acted upon—at least not if they indicate that the nerve gas attack in Khan Sheikhoun was carried out by Bashar al-Assad’s forces. And it is far from certain that the investigation will get even that far. Although the JIM’s final report on Khan Sheikhoun is scheduled for release in October, there are a lot of bumps on the road from here to there.
“A Highly Politicized Environment”
At a press conference after his presentation to the UN Security Council, JIM head Edmond Mulet warned about the threats facing his investigation.
“We find ourselves in a highly politicised environment,” Mulet said, complaining that that governments were taking sides based on political arguments and were constantly interfering to tell his investigators how to work. “I appeal to all, as I did right now in the Council, to let us perform our work in an impartial, independent and professional manner.”
While Mulet’s criticism of international pressures seemed to be aimed at both sides of the dispute, he also subtly noted that his mission was running into resistance from the Syrian government in the Khan Sheikhoun case. Commenting on the persistent demands of the Syrian and Russian governments that inspectors must visit Khan Sheikhoun and the Shayrat air base, he said that the JIM team would certainly try, though it ultimately depended on “security concerns and security issues.” However, Mulet then took the opportunity to highlight the Syrian government’s reluctance to provide information about events on April 4. Before the JIM could consider a visit to either site, he said, Damascus would have to respond to the JIM’s pre-inspection questions, which it had thus far failed to do. “I need information about the flight logs in al-Shayrat, the movements around al-Shayrat,” the JIM leader said. “I need the names of the people we will be interviewing—military commanders and government officials—and also some information that the Syrian government could provide to us in order to conduct our work.”
According to a diplomatic source, Mulet was even more blunt in his presentation to the Security Council, where he reportedly accused Damascus of not cooperating in a satisfactory manner. According to Foreign Policy, Mulet told the Security Council that the Syrian Foreign Ministry had refused to issue a visa for the JIM’s liaison officer in Damascus, thereby preventing the inspectors from deploying to work in Syria. This seems to be correct: a JIM spokesperson confirmed in an e-mail that there was still no liaison in place in Damascus at that point, and Foreign Policy’s account is corroborated by other sources.
The delay caused by the lack of a visa is no small matter. Time is of the essence, not merely because it gets harder to investigate the Khan Sheikhoun massacre as memories fade and evidence is corrupted, but also because the JIM’s mandate runs out in November—just weeks after the scheduled release of the JIM’s final Khan Sheikhoun report. At that point, the JIM’s continued operations will be at the mercy of a Russian veto.
The investigators now have less than four months left to study the vast material collected by the Fact-Finding Mission, conduct additional investigations inside Syria or abroad, compile and analyze the results, test their conclusions, and write their report. To those who believe Syrian authorities ordered the Khan Sheikhoun attack, deliberate delays like these are an indication that the Russian and Syrian governments are trying to stall the investigation in order to get closer to the mandate deadline. Of course, Russian diplomats reject this. The Syrian government has not responded to requests for comment.
Fears of an October Surprise
There’s certainly a risk that the inspectors will stumble on the finish line, and there are also those who fear that the guilty party will try trip them up. The JIM is a relatively small mission and it arrives late in the game. In interviews, several diplomatic sources and chemical inspection experts have told me that the JIM will be forced to lean heavily on evidence already collected by the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission.
Given the Fact-Finding Mission’s near-exclusive reliance on remotely provided samples, witnesses brought to their attention by parties to the war, and open-source evidence, there’s clearly a potential for manipulation. Much of the evidence collected by the OPCW came from opposition-connected organizations, including the Syrian American Medical Society (SAMS), the Syrian Civil Defense (SCD, also known as the White Helmets), and the Chemical Violations Documentation Center in Syria (CVDCS), but the Syrian government also contributed witnesses and samples at later stages. The OPCW was wary of relying on any one side, but the convergence of evidence from both sides played an important role for the Fact-Finding Mission’s decision to wrap up its investigation and file the report on June 29.
If an actor who fears being exposed by the JIM were to suddenly reveal new information that spectacularly discredits evidence planted at previous stages of the investigation, or throws out a major new lead that the JIM members will lack time to pursue under their current mandate, it could disrupt the JIM’s work, damage the credibility of its report, or at the very least undercut public faith in the Khan Sheikhoun investigation. Such machinations might sound outlandish, but they have occurred before in international investigations that implicated Syria. And while a scandal of this kind wouldn’t stop the JIM from ruling on the issue, it could certainly force the investigators to rework their conclusions in the last minute, weakening their argument and causing a crisis of confidence in the results, which would in turn be exploitable by whomever ends up being fingered as the guilty party.
A New Showdown in the Security Council?
What would happen if the JIM report concludes that Bashar al-Assad’s government was behind the attack? It wouldn’t lead to another U.S. air strike. As described above, the United States has already attacked Assad’s forces in response to the Khan Sheikhoun incident, without waiting for the JIM investigation to point out the perpetrator. “Independently, the US has obviously made its own determination, and our immediate reaction was the strike on the Shayrat air field,” a U.S. State Department official told me last month. If Assad is identified by the JIM, too, “the UN Security Council would be a possibility and additional sanctions are an available venue.”
However, the Security Council isn’t likely to be a functioning instrument for those states who want to punish the Syrian government for chemical weapons use. While Western governments are likely to pursue a Security Council resolution anyway, simply to force Russia (and possibly China) to suffer the discomfort of using its veto powers in defense of nerve gas, UN action clearly couldn’t lead anywhere without Moscow’s acquiescence.
The Security Council isn’t likely to be a functioning instrument for those states who want to punish the Syrian government for chemical weapons use.
More likely, therefore, Western states would end up responding to a JIM identification of the Assad government by unilaterally imposing their own sanctions on Syria and/or Russia. Coming under American or EU economic sanctions is not a pleasant experience, but such a move would likely have a little direct impact given that both countries have already been subject to Western sanctions for many years. Indeed, Damascus did not bat an eye when Washington and Brussels rolled out new sanctions orders in connection with the Russian-Chinese veto this spring, and again after Khan Sheikhoun.
Another possible venue would be to use a JIM identification to encourage or strengthen a war crimes prosecution. The UN General Assembly, where Russia does not hold veto powers, recently created a special mechanism to gather evidence against both the Syrian government and its enemies, which is intended to facilitate future war crimes trials. Of course, the Syrian government is unlikely to cooperate with any foreign or international war crimes process, so this, too, would be mostly a symbolic measure.
In the seemingly less likely event that the JIM were to conclude that Syrian rebels or some other actor were behind the Khan Sheikhoun incident, it would be an even bigger upset, since it would for the first time mean that Russian-Syrian-Iranian claims about rebel false-flag operations had gained the support of independent investigators. It seems safe to assume that Assad’s allies would then quickly forget their criticism of the investigators’ methodology and move to the Security Council, in the hopes of forcing the United States or its allies to cast a veto similar to the Russian-Chinese one in February 2017.
In short, any firm identification of the perpetrator of the Khan Sheikhoun killings could trigger another battle in the UN Security Council. But there may never be such an identification. The June 29 Fact-Finding Mission report gave very little reason to think that the perpetrator of the Khan Sheikhoun massacre can be pinpointed with any certainty.
The JIM will of course conduct additional investigations. Importantly, the JIM inspectors have more freedom to shape their mission and pursue leads than the Fact-Finding Mission, which was constrained by its narrow yes-or-no mandate. If its liaison visa is ever approved, it is also possible that the JIM will be able to conduct in-country inspections in ways that the Fact-Finding Mission was never able to do. But realistically speaking, the most important element of an investigation—a visit to the crime scene in Khan Sheikhoun—may simply be too dangerous to try, not least because the only thing we know with certainty is that at least one party to the conflict has an interest in turning such an expedition into a violent tragedy.
Quite possibly, therefore, the JIM could announce in October that while the investigators have found strong leads that point hither or thither, their conclusion is that too many doubts remain to say anything certain about the identity of the perpetrator.
And, to be honest, a murderer getting off the hook—wouldn’t that be the most Syrian ending of all?
Notes
For a background to the creation of the Fact-Finding Mission, see Aron Lund, “Red Line Redux: How Putin Tore Up Obama’s 2013 Syria Deal,” The Century Foundation, February 2017, https://tcf.org/content/report/red-line-redux-putin-tore-obamas-2013-syria-deal. To see all Fact-Finding Mission reports, see the OPCW website, https://www.opcw.org/special-sections/syria/fact-finding-mission-reports.
[This article was originally published by The Century Foundation.]
بواسطة Ali Ayd | أبريل 6, 2016 | News
يدير ديوان التعليم في تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية “داعش” الآن شخص لقبه “ذو القرنين”. وذو القرنين هذا مصري من الصعيد يحمل شهادة الدكتوراة في التربية.
بداية، كيف تسنى لذي القرنين هذا أن يجمع بين شهادة دكتوراة وفق العلوم الحديثة، التي لم تكن موجودة في زمن “السلف الصالح”، وبين لقبه المرعب الذي لا يصلح سوى لمحارب اعتاد لون الدم. لعلها مصادفة، أو تعاقب مراحل، أو قدر إذا شاء بعضنا!
في ما يشبه الخطف خلفاً، بدأنا من ذي القرنين، لكننا في الحديث عن التعليم، عموماً، لن نضطر للعودة إلى بداية بعيدة في عالمنا العربي، فتعميم المدارس، والتوسع العمودي والأفقي فيها، حدث قريب العهد لا يرقى إلى أبعد من عقد الخمسينيات من القرن الماضي.
لابد من مثال، وسيكون هذا عن مكان أدَّعي أنني أعرفه، أولاً، وأقصد مدينة الرقة منذ نهايات سبعينيات القرن الماضي. وثانياً، أتاحت لي الظروف أن أخوض تجربة خاطفة كمعلم في النصف الثاني من تسعينيات القرن الماضي، ولمدة شهرين فقط.
أكثر ما أذكره كان علاقتي الطيبة مع الأطفال في الصفوف الرابع والخامس والسادس، وعلاقتي الحذرة مع مدير المدرسة.
علمت الأولاد والبنات اللغة العربية والرياضيات والعلوم العامة (بيولوجيا)، وكنت أتنقل بين الصفوف، متبادلاً الأماكن مع المعلمات المجازات من معهد إعداد المدرسين، إذ كنت المعلم الوحيد بين ست معلمات. تلك المعلمات فضلن تعليم المواد “السهلة”، من الموسيقا، والخط، إلى الرياضة، كما فضلن تعليم الأولاد الصغار في الأول والثاني والثالث الابتدائي. وهي في رأيي الصفوف الأصعب.
علاقتي مع المدير كانت تقتصر على تقديم دفتر التحضير في وقت ما من اليوم الدراسي، ليضع ملاحظاته، ويصحح لي ترتيب الخطوات في الدروس. الأمر المتكرر الذي اختلفنا عليه كل يوم، هو وضعه علامة بالقلم الأحمر على جملة “أن يفهم الطالب”، ليكتب إلى جانبها “أن يُعرِّف الطالب”. حاولت أن أشرح له خطأ عبارته، فلم يفاجئني بأنهم تعلموا ذلك في المعهد، ويطبقون ما تعلموه على التلاميذ الصغار.
بالطبع، لم يختبرني أحد عندما تقدمت بطلب تعييني كمعلم وكيل إلى مديرية التربية في الرقة، طلبوا فقط صورة من شهادتي الثانوية، وكتبت في الطلب أني طالب في كلية الاقتصاد.
هكذا أصبحت معلماً، وتسلمت مسؤولية تعليم الأولاد، أو أن مصير الأولاد أصبح في يد مجهول تقدم ليصبح معلماً دون مؤهلات، أو اختبارات. وعلى هذا النحو يجري تعيين آلاف المعلمين الوكلاء الذين يلقنون الأولاد في مراحل مبكرة ما قد يبقى في أذهانهم إلى الأبد.
الأبد نفسه لم يكن يعنيه من أمري سوى اتجاهي السياسي، عندما زار المدرسة مسؤول حزبي في المزرعة/ القرية، ليتأكد من خلفية القادم المجهول، وليطمئن أنني لن ألقن الأولاد والبنات أفكاراً تشوش على فكر حزب البعث العربي الاشتراكي الذي يتلقاه الأولاد والبنات في مرحلة طلائع البعث خلال المرحلة الابتدائية.
“أن يُعرِّف الطالب”، و”أن لا يكون للمعلم اتجاه حزبي مخالف”، تلك الثنائية كانت كافية ليطمئن القائمون على المدرسة أنهم يقومون بعملهم على أكمل وجه.
اقتنع المسؤول الحزبي رغم نظراته المشككة بأني حيادي سياسياً، لكن المدير ظل على إصراره أن الطالب يجب أن يُعرِّف، وأنا لم أغير في قناعتي بأهمية المفهوم، وليعرِّف الطالب ما فهمه بالكلمات والطرق التي يرقى إليها عقله كلما اكتسب معلومة ما من أي مصدر كان.
بدأت الخطوات الأولى لانهيار التعليم في الستينيات، واكتمل الهدم في السبعينيات، بالرغم من التوسع الأفقي، وازدياد قدرة استيعاب المدارس، حيث اقتصرت شروط البنية التحتية للعملية التعليمية على البناء المدرسي النموذجي (المدارس متشابهة في كل أنحاء سوريا)، وعلى تجهيزات فقيرة لا تتعدى غالباً لوح الكتابة والطباشير، وإذا توافرت وسائل مساعدة، مثل الصور والخرائط، فإن ذلك يعتبر شيئاً متقدماً.
بداية الانهيار، كانت في منتصف سبعينيات القرن الماضي، مع استحكام التحالف بين الإيديولوجيا القومية لحزب البعث العربي الاشتراكي، والإيديولوجيا الإسلامية، بهدف إضعاف الشيوعيين. لم تنجح الخطة، بعد إعلان الإخوان المسلمين الحرب على نظام حافظ الأسد. واتسم عقد الثمانينيات بتعميم القمع على كل السياسيين والمثقفين الذين ينتقدون السلطة، وشمل القمع إلى الإخوان والشيوعيين حزب البعث اليميني، أي المتهمين بتأييد حزب البعث العراقي وصدام حسين.
وعندما استحكم نظام حافظ الأسد بالوضع السياسي في البلاد، وصمد في وجه الضغوط الإقليمية والدولية، استطاع تجييش البعثيين والانتهازيين، في معركته الداخلية، وكان أكبر الخاسرين هي العملية التعليمية، واقتصاد الناس، وذهب هذان كفرق عملة في سبيل تثبيت السلطة، و”التصدي للمؤامرات الخارجية”.
بالعودة إلى أسئلة الملف، سأحاول الإجابة عنها بشكل مباشر، بعد تلك المداورة:
ــ أكاد لا أذكر شيئاً من المناهج التي درستها، لأن ما كنت أحفظه في الصف الثالث، كتعاريف، كنت أنساه في السنة اللاحقة لأفرغ في دماغي مساحة لتعاريف جديدة. أذكر فقط معلمين جيدين حرضوني على القراءة في وقت مبكر. في النتيجة، تعلمت القراءة والكتابة في المرحلة الابتدائية، ومبادئ الحساب. وفي المرحلتين الإعدادية والثانوية تعلقت باللغة العربية، وكنت جيداً في الرياضيات، لكنني نسيت الأخيرة بشكل شبه كامل.
كذلك الأمر في المرحلة الجامعية، حيث درست الاقتصاد في جامعة حلب، وكنت طالباً كسولاً بإصراري على الفهم، فاصطدمت بطرق التدريس والمناهج المركبة على لازمة “أن يعرِّف الطالب”.
ــ نعم، غيرت تلك المناهج من نظرتي إلى الواقع، لكن بطريقة عكسية، أي من خلال رفضي للمفاهيم التلقينية التي تقدمها تلك المناهج، وبالتالي رفض الواقع الذي يتقدم ببطء شديد، أو يتأخر غالباً حتى بالمقارنة مع عقود سابقة كانت تعد السوريين بمستقبل أفضل للبلاد.
ــ لم تواكب المناهج التطورات العلمية في العالم، بل هي متخلفة حتى بالمقارنة مع المناهج في لبنان. وأقول ذلك كوني اطلعت على بعض مناهج الدراسة في لبنان.
ــ المناهج السورية في جوهرها “سلفية”، إذا جاز التعبير. فالتلقين أحد ثوابت الدين عموماً، والإسلام خصوصاً، وحافظت مناهج التعليم على هذا المنهج، في استمرار للشكل والمضمون، مع ادعاءات أن المناهج تراعي التطورات العلمية في العالم، لكن المقررات العلمية بقيت شبه ثابتة خلال نصف القرن الماضي، وما زال الطلاب يدرسون فيزياء نيوتين على اللوح، ومراحل انقسام الخلية من خلال صور ثابتة، وعروض الشعر العربي من خلال التقطيع الصوتي على اللوح.
ــ بالطبع، أدت تلك المناهج التلقينية إلى تنشئة أجيال أوقفت الزمن في البلاد، وحكمت الناس بالحديد والنار، وأنشأت أجيالاً من الخائفين. واستمر كتاب “الترغيب والترهيب” الإسلامي، بطبعاته المتعددة دون تنقيح، محتلاً موقع الكتاب الأكثر قراءة، حتى لمن لا يتقنون القراءة.
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[.This article is published jointly in partnership with
Jadaliyya]
