بواسطة Hashem Osseiran | أكتوبر 11, 2017 | Cost of War, غير مصنف
“Turkey’s discussions with al-Qaida-linked militants ahead of its deployment in Syria’s Idlib province indicate that a wide-scale offensive against the militant group may not be Ankara’s primary objective, according to Charles Lister of the Middle East Institute.
BEIRUT – Turkey on Saturday announced the start of its second major cross-border military operation in Syria, and Turkish troops are now preparing to deploy alongside Syrian opposition groups in a province controlled largely by al-Qaida-linked militants.
The campaign aims to enforce the so-called de-escalation zone agreement in territory currently held by the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) alliance in Idlib province, but phase one of the Turkish-led operation may not involve an all-out confrontation with the militant group, according to Charles Lister of the Middle East Institute. While later phases may see more concerted action against the extremists, for now, a negotiated settlement seems to have taken shape, he told Syria Deeply.
“I am told that HTS and Turkey reached a final agreement to establish a Turkish protected buffer zone from the Idlib border village of Atme through Darat Izza to Anadan into western Aleppo,” Lister said. “From what I’m told, HTS agreed at most to leave these areas and agreed at minimum not to interfere with Turkey’s operations in that zone.”
Syria Deeply spoke with Lister, who has spent the past week meeting with Syrian opposition groups in southern Turkey, about Ankara’s strategy in Idlib, the sentiment among participating rebel groups and what this upcoming operation could mean for the Syrian war.
Syria Deeply: Do we know which opposition groups are part of the Turkish-led alliance?
Charles Lister: So far, it seems to be largely a combination of Euphrates Shield forces and a collection of FSA [Free Syrian Army] groups from Idlib, who were previously victims of HTS aggression. Groups like the Free Idlib Army, the remnants of the 13th Division brigade, and potentially some former members of the Hazzm Movement. But my impression is that this is really a Turkish-led campaign and that opposition group involvement will only be secondary. They will primarily be there for support.
Syria Deeply: What is the scope and aim of the Turkish-led operation?
Lister: So far, I don’t think there is any intention to go as far south as Idlib city. I think this would require a much more significant military operation than what Turkey is able and willing to do. At the moment, I think we are looking at phase one, which is for Turkey to pursue its own interests: to protect its borders, deter Kurdish threats, minimize further refugee flows and eventually […] establish some territory in Syria that refugees in Turkey could move back into. In a sense, what we are looking at is Turkey trying to secure its own internal national security interests and to potentially contribute toward further stabilizing at least some parts of Idlib.
Turkey and some of the opposition’s secondary intention in this first phase is to establish a Turkish protected area in northern Idlib, which can be used to start a slow and gradual campaign to undermine HTS. Some of Turkey’s long-term partners in Syria, groups like Failaq al-Sham and Ahrar al-Sham, are on board with this strategy. They don’t want to enter a full-scale confrontation with HTS. Instead, they want to more methodically undermine the extremist wings of HTS, particularly to try to encourage defections and divisions within HTS to make it a more manageable competitor rather than an adversary.
From what I’m told, Turkish intelligence has been working on this for some time already, in cooperation with opposition groups previously close to HTS. A spate of recent assassinations are apparently linked to this subversion campaign and, perhaps more importantly, so are a number of recent audio leaks of HTSinternal communications.
Syria Deeply: What is the sentiment among rebel groups in Idlib?
Lister: Every single group that I have met with [in Turkey] over the past week, which spans all the Euphrates Shield groups, all the main FSA groups across Syria, Failaq al-Sham, Nour al-Din al-Zinki brigades and Ahrar al-Sham, have expressed support for Turkey’s intentions in Idlib. The one key area of difference is that groups within the Euphrates Shield and within the FSA seemed more determined to initiate a conflict with HTS, whereas groups like Failaq al-Sham, Zinki and Ahrar al-Sham strongly opposed the idea of a full-scale confrontation because they thought it might potentially strengthen HTS. They advocated instead for a slow and methodical campaign of undermining HTS from the inside.
But, these groups unanimously agreed on [their] suspicion, opposition and hostility toward HTS and particularly toward [HTShead Abu Mohammad] al-Julani. Over the three or four years that I’ve met with all of Syria’s opposition, this was the first time not a single group expressed some element of defense or support of HTS.This definitely struck me over the past few days. Al-Julani appears to have burned a lot of the bridges he built earlier in the conflict but he does still hold several advantageous cards.
Syria Deeply: HTS militants allegedly escorted a Turkish reconnaissance unit into Idlib on Sunday, implying that there have been talks between Turkey and HTS. Have there been any negotiations and do we know what their focus was?
Lister: As far as I am aware, there have been around three or four meetings, including one that took place yesterday (Sunday). In yesterday’s meeting, HTS and Turkey reached a final agreement to establish a Turkish protected buffer zone from Atme through Darat Izza to Anadan into western Aleppo. From what I’m told, HTSagreed at most to leave these areas and agreed at minimum to not interfere with Turkey’s operations in that zone.The idea here would be to replicate what Euphrates Shield looked like at the beginning of the Euphrates Shield operation, which was also preceded by a full Nusra Front withdrawal from areas of Turkish operations.
Syria Deeply: Why would HTS agree to a deal with Turkey considering that it has been a vocal critic of the de-escalation zone agreement?
Lister: I think we need to draw a distinction between what HTS says for its public audience, and what is being done behind the scenes, which is much more murky and political. Al-Julani is not only fearful of an all-out confrontation with Turkey and the opposition, his biggest fear is something catalyzing internal defections from the original Nusra core of Syrian fighters now within the larger HTS alliance.
This core is almost entirely composed of local Syrians who have been recruited into the Nusra Front, which later rebranded into Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and later formed the HTS alliance. Throughout this process, the Nusra core has become even more heavily Syrian, which for al-Julani is an invaluable source of local credibility that protects his forces from attack by most rival opposition groups – as we have seen in 2017. If Turkey or any other opposition faction – working by themselves or together – managed to create an alternative reality somewhere in Idlib, I’m told al-Julani’s biggest fear is that some of those Syrians will jump ship and join them, thereby weakening al-Julani’s credibility on the ground and creating opportunities to isolate him from the revolutionary street. So his greatest fear is internal defections and I think this is why he has channeled so much energy into negotiating with Turkey to prevent a full-blown confrontation.
Syria Deeply: Reports circulated of a series of defections from HTS in the weeks leading up to the campaign, as part of a larger Turkish effort to isolate HTS in Idlib. Which groups have defected and what is the scale of defection?
Lister: The major big loss was the al-Zinki movement. I was told Turkey had some kind of role, potentially with some opposition support, in making this happen. But there have been some other smaller defections from within the HTS core – small HTS sub-factions and local units. The latter are more concerning to al-Julani than anything else, as they represent the partial or possible disintegration of Nusra’s core Syrian structure.
Syria Deeply: There has been a lot of focus on HTS being the primary target of this campaign. What about the Kurds?
Lister: For Turkey, the [Syrian Kurdish] YPG is just as much of a concern and perhaps an even more critical concern than HTS. The fact that Turkey is looking to establish a lookout post or a launching-pad base on Mount Barakat, which overlooks Kurdish-held Afrin, speaks to that.
At the moment, however, I don’t think there is a prospect for a military operation in Afrin. But there is a Turkish effort to exert some kind of influence and a potential deterrent threat on the area to discourage the YPG from moving further into opposition territories. Russia seems to have lent its support to this, which is intriguing.
Syria Deeply: Turkish officials, including the president and prime minister, said that Turkey will cooperate with Russia on the Idlib campaign. What does this mean for the FSA?
Lister: I was actually sitting with all the Euphrates Shield leadership when Erdogan gave this statement. None of them expected this apparent comment of Russian air support and they were all opposed to it. They were genuinely incensed by the idea that Russia could be providing them with support from the air. Let’s see how that plays out. If Russia does provide air support, I think that may cause some problems.
Syria Deeply: Could it be a deal breaker?
Lister: It could potentially be a deal breaker. All the armed groups, who don’t already have a presence in Idlib, would lose credibility there if they entered into an alliance with Russia. It’s pretty well known that the Russians have been bombing Idlib on and off for a long time. So I think active Russian military involvement could be a deal breaker. But I’m not sure if that is going to end up being the case.
The answers have been edited for length and clarity.”
[This article was originally published by Syria Deeply.]
بواسطة Olivia Alabaster | أكتوبر 11, 2017 | Cost of War, غير مصنف
“Transitional justice is the only way forward for a lasting peace after the inevitable outcome, activists and lawyers say.
It is a narrative that regional and world powers have begun to accept: the Syrian war is over, and Bashar al-Assad has won. After six years of conflict, and half a million dead, what little military will remains – on either side – is focused on defeating the remnants of Islamic State.
But a counter-narrative is being pushed by those opposition members in far flung capitals: regardless of the military outcome, transitional justice must be served, and democracy will eventually prevail.
“It’s not about who wins. It’s about how we release the detainees, and ending torture, and finding out where the missing people are,” said Mazen Darwish, a Syrian civil rights activist who himself was released from prison in 2015.
More than 106,000 people have been arrested or disappeared in Syria since the war broke out, according to Human Rights Watch.
“I’m not happy, whoever wins militarily,” he said, speaking to MEE from Brussels.
But, he added: “The most important thing is about the ordinary individual civilians who have suffered. As civil society, we need to guarantee that sustainable peace is achieved.”
The need for peace
The lawyer and president of the Syrian Centre for Media and Freedom of Expression was in Belgium to stress the urgent need for accountability in the conflict, but before that would be possible, he said, the violence needed to end.
“Firstly, the most important thing is the need for peace,” he said.
“I don’t believe any transitional justice could take place during the conflict, and nor can any political transition take place” while the violence is ongoing.
While a de-escalation deal, brokered by Russia and Turkey in Kazakhstan in July, had seen a reduction in overall violence, September became the deadliest month in the conflict this year, with at least 3,000 dead, including more than 900 civilians.
“The victims have to be given a chance to get accountability and see a process of justice,” Darwish said.
“Only then can a political process follow.”
Last month, for the first time, a Syrian soldier was sentenced in Stockholm for crimes committed in the war, a global first.
A scattering of convictions across Europe have already seen rebel fighters and IS members sentenced for their part in the conflict.
High-ranking officials in hiding?
Nerma Jelacic, a deputy director at Commission for International Justice and Accountability, welcomed the Stockholm development, but said European intelligence agencies should be looking for higher-ranking officials.
“It was quite welcome as it was the first time that someone from the regime has been tried for his crimes,” she told MEE.
“But our hope is that not only the low-level or direct perpetrators be brought to justice, but those who have command responsibility – those of the higher rank, that’s what we need to see.
“We might not see the president standing trial,” she said, “but it might be possible to find some high-ranking officials residing in Europe,” and currently living under the radar.
Darwish said the time is ripe for a renewed focus on the crimes of the war, from every side.
“This is a chance to keep the focus and keep these kinds of crimes under the spotlight… the international community and even Staffan de Mistura want to hide and forget everything that happened. It is not realistic.”
Last month de Mistura, the UN’s Syria envoy, said that the opposition should accept that they had lost the war.
“Will the opposition be able to be unified and realistic enough to realise they did not win the war?” he asked, adding that “For the opposition, the message is very clear: if they were planning to win the war, facts are proving that is not the case. So now it’s time to win the peace.”
Darwish gave a damning indictment of the various peace talks on Syria over the years – parallel but often conflicting tracks, each sponsored by different parties, have run in Geneva, Cairo and Astana.
“Everything that has happened in Geneva and elsewhere up until now has just given the killers time to kill civilians,” he said, adding that UN resolutions condemning the violence also achieved nothing.
“If the international sides are serious in finding a solution to the conflict in Syria, they would start with criminal cases,” Darwish said.
As Syria does not recognise the International Criminal Court, war crimes can only be investigated if Damascus decides voluntarily to accept the court’s jurisdiction, or if the UN Security Council asks the ICC’s prosecutor to open an investigation – a move blocked by Russia and China in 2014.
But such cases in Europe fall under the definition of “universal jurisdiction”, whereby grave international crimes can be prosecuted by any country, even if the crimes were committed elsewhere.
These cases, are, according to HRW, “an increasingly important part of international efforts to hold perpetrators of atrocities accountable, provide justice to victims who have nowhere else to turn, deter future crimes, and help ensure that countries do not become safe havens for human rights abusers.”
Obstacles remain, though, and a case pursued in Spain earlier this year investigating members of the Syrian security services for murder collapsed after a panel within the High Court ruled that it did not have jurisdictionover the case, and that a Spanish connection was necessary. The legal team pursuing the case say they are appealing the decision.
Collecting the evidence
Husam Alkatlaby, in Brussels with Darwish, has spent years preparing for just this moment, and as director of the Violations Documentations Centre (VDC), has been overseeing the collation of such evidence.
And what the evidence shows, he said, must have a direct bearing on what any future government in Syria looks like.
“The government is responsible for the majority of the crimes, so from our point of view, there should be no place for them in the future,” Alkatlaby said, adding that this should also rule out “any other parties who committed crimes.”
Last December, the UN General Assembly established an International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) on international crimes committed in the Syrian Arab Republic, tasked with collecting the necessary evidence for any future trials.
And while this might not take the form of an ICC investigation, Jelacic, from the Commission for International Justice and Accountability, said that alternative courts could receive UN Security Council approval to try cases, such as an international court, in the Rwandan example, or a hybrid court comprising Syrian and international experts – the Cambodian example.
“A lot of IIIM’s work is based on data we have collected from 2012 until now,” Alkatlaby said, alongside evidence gathered from other civil society organisations. “And they are the most important partner here.”
It was time for the EU, and the global community, to stop seeing Syrian civil society groups as merely aid recipients, but as genuine partners, both Darwish and Alkatlaby said.
“We have asked the EU to put pressure on de Mistura to take civil society groups into consideration,” the VDC director said.
Currently, he added, “We think that de Mistura is far away from recognising the need for accountability and justice and looking at the families of those harmed in his policies.”
Despite the current prevailing narrative on Syria, and his own years in government detention, Darwish said he remained positive about what lies ahead for his country, and that there was good news to come soon.
“I’m still optimistic about the future, and moving towards democracy in the Middle East.”
“Even with all this suffering and crisis, in the end we will establish a new democratic country built on principles of dignity and human rights and freedom.”
This article is available in French on Middle East Eye French edition.”
[This article was originally published by Middle East Eye.]
بواسطة Noura Hourani, Marie Nelson, Kholoud Ahmad | أكتوبر 10, 2017 | Cost of War, غير مصنف
“AMMAN: For more than four years, Umm Malak has held on to the hope that her husband Hussein is still alive, sitting in a darkened cell somewhere in Syria.
Hussein, then 32, was arrested by Syrian regime forces on summer day in 2013 at a checkpoint in southern Damascus. A supermarket employee, he had been providing material support—food and supplies—to opponents of President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, his wife says.
The summer day he was arrested, Hussein left his house in the town of Aqraba, southeast of the Syrian capital. He, his wife and their three daughters began living there several weeks prior after fleeing regime bombardment of the rebel-held al-Hajar al-Aswad district just south of Damascus.
Hussein was heading to the family home in al-Hajar al-Aswad. He kept birds on the roof there, and periodically returned to give them food and water. That day, he planned to set them free. As bombings increased and the security situation in and around the capital deteriorated, he was not sure he would always be able to reach and care for them.
What Umm Malak knows about what happened next—as related to her later by a 15-year-old neighbor who witnessed the arrest—is that a masked man pointed out her husband to regime security forces at a checkpoint leading into al-Hajar al-Aswad. The men put Hussein in a car and took him away to an unknown location.
Umm Malak, 36, has received no news of her husband since she learned he was taken.
“My feelings tell me that he is still alive,” she tells Syria Direct from the apartment in Amman that a charity pays for her and her daughters to live in. The family shares the apartment with another Syrian refugee—a widow.
“I’ve searched and searched for him, but come up with nothing,” says Umm Malak. Some people in her situation pay lawyers and regime officials for confirmation of whether detained loved ones are alive or dead, but she hasn’t done so.
“It costs a huge amount of money, and there is no guarantee that the answer I received would be true,” she says.
Umm Malak’s friends and acquaintances talk, whispering that after more than four years with no news, it is unlikely that her husband is still alive. But without proof one way or the other, she holds on to hope.
For friends and families, disappeared detainees exist in a space between life and death. Prolonged absence forces a difficult choice—assume loved ones to be dead and move on with life, or wait, perhaps for years, in the hope that they are still alive.
For many women—the wives of the disappeared and detained—that choice is particularly fraught. To divorce an absent spouse—even one presumed dead—and remarry can bring accusations of betrayal and abandonment from extended family, in-laws and society. To remain alone and wait may demonstrate loyalty, but also brings increased scrutiny and judgment from society as a single woman or female head of household.
An estimated 92,000 detainees are currently held by Syrian government forces as of this year, according to the UK-based violations monitor Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR). Among them are more than 76,000 victims of enforced disappearance since March 2011, according to an August 2017 SNHR report.
Enforced disappearance, according to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, is the “arrest, detention or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or give information on the whereabouts of those persons.”
Since Syria is not a member state of the Rome Statute, the country is not within the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction.
What enforced disappearance means in Syria is that more than 76,000 people with lives and hopes and loved ones who were detained—at protests, at checkpoints, in their homes and on the street—have vanished.
The first news following a disappearance may take the form of a phone call from a prison official telling relatives that their loved one is dead, and asking them to come collect their identification documents.
Others eventually find them online, among the thousands of grim photos of the starved, beaten bodies of detainees smuggled out of Syria in 2014 by a military defector codenamed “Caesar.” Some look through the 28,000 grim images and still come up empty-handed, a bitter relief.
Many times, detainees who knew the person are released and give loved ones the news that their sister, brother, mother, son has died.
But thousands of others still do not know what has happened.
The “ongoing and daily agony” of these family members, according to an August 2016 SNHR report on detainee disappearances, is particularly deep for “wives, mothers and children who bear the greatest burden from an economic and social standpoint.”
Financially, this is because those who disappear may be the sole breadwinner for a family. Socially, the decision made by the wives of the missing to either wait—like Umm Malak—or divorce and remarry, is not just personal, but public, with social consequences.
“I have gone through a lot of suffering and condemnation from society,” says Umm Malak.
The experiences of two women who chose differently—Umm Malak, a single mother of three, and 24-year-old Naela Fayez, who obtained a divorce after hearing news of her husband’s death in prison and remarried—illustrate a few of those consequences.
Together, their stories illustrate some of the challenges faced by the wives of disappeared detainees, whichever path they take: to wait and hope, or divorce and remarry.
‘My right to keep living’
Naela Fayez knows her ex-husband Ali is dead, she says. Neither she nor any member of his family has seen his body—or any trace of him—since he was arrested in 2012 at a regime checkpoint in the south Damascus suburb of Babila.
Ali worked in construction and was on his way to work when he was detained and disappeared one morning, says Naela. He had attended local demonstrations against the government of Bashar al-Assad.
After her husband, the family’s sole breadwinner, went missing, Naela and her two young sons moved in with his relatives in Syria’s southern Daraa province. In 2014, with violence increasing and living conditions deteriorating in Syria, she fled with her sons to Jordan.
In 2015, Ali’s family in Daraa received a phone call from the al-Khateeb Branch of the Syrian regime’s State Security in Damascus. A voice told them to go to the branch and collect Ali’s documents. The family understood from this directive that he was dead, likely killed under torture. No one from the family risked going to collect the papers, fearing a trap.
Naela believes that Ali is dead, but with no body, no proof and no closure, his family refuses to accept that. Stories and rumors of detainees believed to be dead who return years later give them hope.
Even so, one year after that fateful phone call, and four years after her husband went missing, the now 30-year-old mother of two boys went to a sheikh in Jordan who gave her a ruling allowing her to remarry another Syrian—her cousin. She then did.
“In the end, I am a human being,” says Naela. “It is my right to keep living. I will not stay trapped and waiting.”
According to Islamic religious law, which governs the marriages of Sunni Muslims including Naela and Umm Malak, a wife may be granted a divorce if her husband is missing and presumed dead for between two and four years, depending on the school of thought.
The question of how and when a wife may divorce an absent, presumed-dead husband and perhaps remarry is becoming increasingly important as the war continues and the fates of tens of thousands of missing Syrians remain unknown.
In September 2017, the opposition Syrian Islamic Council, based in Turkey, issued a religious ruling defining procedures for separations and divorces for the wives of husbands who have been missing for a prolonged period.
The fatwa clarified that a woman may ask the court to issue a ruling as to the missing spouse’s death or absence and that she may remarry afterwards. However, should the missing husband return, any marriage in his absence would be annulled.
“If the husband is missing and nothing is known of his whereabouts, as in the case of a detainee, and he is thought most likely to be dead, then the wife must wait four years, then another four-month waiting period,” Abu Bakr, a religious judge in opposition-held Syria told Syria Direct earlier this year. “She may then remarry, without needing the permission of the court.”
The pro-regime newspaper Al-Watan reported this past January that some 4,000 requests for separation or divorce had been registered in the state Sharia Court by wives of missing husbands in 2016.
But although Naela’s second marriage was religiously and legally permissible, her ex-husband’s family accused her of disloyalty.
“They attacked me, accused me of betraying him,” she says. “They completely reject my new marriage.”
Prolonged conflict with her former in-laws about her remarriage and what would happen to the children—under Islamic law they were to stay with her, but the family wanted them—sparked problems with Naela’s new husband. Ultimately, he refused to raise her children.
In the end, Naela sent her children to live with their father’s family in Daraa and shortly afterward moved to Egypt with her new husband.
“My heart burns without my children,” she says.
‘No matter how long his absence’
Umm Malak says she will wait as long as it takes for her husband to return. If Hussein is still alive, he is now 36 years old.
“I will wait for my husband no matter how long his absence,” says Umm Malak. “I won’t accept raising my daughters with any man but him. I will not divorce him and become another executioner, while he is suffering terribly under torture.”
But although Umm Malak has not chosen to remarry, she still says she faces intense social pressures and scrutiny.
As a single mother, Umm Malak says she is under a microscope, with community members scrutinizing every choice she makes. As the wife of a disappeared detainee, she is held to a high standard, any change in her life bringing “looks of suspicion and mistrust.”
“I am seen as a broken person, easily taken advantage of,” says Umm Malak, “especially by men.”
Fadel Abdul Ghany, the chairman of SNHR, emphasized the social impact of enforced disappearances on those left behind in the monitor’s August 2017 report.
“The mental, physical and emotional toll [that disappearance cases] have on the victims and their families make this crime a form of collective punishment against the community,” wrote Fadel Abdul Ghany.
As the years drag on, life continues. In Egypt, Naela lives with her new husband. In Jordan, Umm Malak raises her daughters as best she can under the gaze of prying, judging eyes.
Hanging over it all, Hussein’s absence is a deafening silence, an unfinished story about a country on fire and a man who left home to free his birds and disappeared into a void.
“My life is a prison of waiting,” she says.”
[This article was originally published by Syria Direct.]
بواسطة UNESCO | أكتوبر 6, 2017 | Cost of War, News
“The 2000-year old statue Lion of Al-lāt, that once watched over the ancient city of Palmyra in Syria, stands proudly once again, thanks to UNESCO’s Emergency Safeguarding of the Syrian Cultural Heritage project.
The limestone lion, also known as the Lion Statue of Athena, measuring 345 centimetres and weighing 15 tons, once marked and protected the entrance to the temple of Al-lāt. Since its discovery by Polish archaeologists in 1977, it has been a renowned fixture of the Museum of Palmyra. The statue suffered extensive damage in May 2015, when ISIL forces captured Palmyra, a UNESCO World Heritage site.
“It was an internationally known symbol of Palmyra, it was standing in front of the museum,” explained Polish restorer Bartosz Markowski, who undertook the two-month restoration. At the foot of the statue, between the lion’s legs, lies an antelope, a symbol of the protection that the strong owes to the weak. “It is an exceptional statue,” explains Markowski, “there are no more such statues in Palmyra.”
The Emergency Safeguarding of the Syrian Cultural Heritage project works to restore social cohesion, stability and sustainable development to Syria through the protection and safeguarding of Syria’s rich and unique cultural heritage.
This pioneering initiative, funded by the European Union with the support of the Flemish Government and Austria, and undertaken in partnership with the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property and the International Council on Monuments and Sites, protects and safeguards Syrian cultural heritage by providing technical assistance.
The project also works to monitor and document Syrian cultural heritage, develop capacity amongst Syrian experts and institutions, and mitigate the destruction and loss of Syrian cultural heritage through national and international awareness raising efforts.
An important achievement
“The restoration of the Lion of Al-lāt is an important achievement with a symbolic dimension,” said Hamed Al Hammami, Director of the UNESCO Regional Bureau for Education in the Arab States and UNESCO Representative to Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. Ha added “Itit is part of a broader project to protect the unique cultural heritage of Syria, which unfortunately remains at risk.”.
Following the a decision unanimously adopted during the 199th session of UNESCO’s Executive Board concerning the Organization’s role in “safeguarding and preserving Palmyra and other Syrian World Heritage sites,” UNESCO sent a Rapid Assessment Mission to Palmyra from 24 to 26 April 2016, supported through its Heritage Emergency Fund.
They discovered that the Museum of Palmyra had sustained considerable damage, statues and sarcophagi too large to be removed for safekeeping had been smashed and defaced; busts had been beheaded and were lying on the ground in ruin. The fragments of the Lion of Al-lāt were moved to Damascus to await restoration.
The Museum of Palmyra housed invaluable artefacts from the UNESCO World Heritage site of Palmyra. An oasis in the Syrian Desert northeast of Damascus, the city of Palmyra was one of the most important cultural centres of the ancient world from the 1st to the 2nd century.
Standing at the crossroads of several civilizations, the art and architecture of Palmyra married Greco-Roman techniques with local traditions and Persian influences. The Lion of Al-lāt is now on display again.
Emergency Safeguarding
The Emergency Safeguarding of the Syrian Cultural Heritage project works to restore social cohesion, stability and sustainable development to Syria through the protection and safeguarding of Syria’s rich and unique cultural heritage.
This pioneering initiative, funded by the European Union with the support of the Flemish Government and Austria, and undertaken in partnership with the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property and the International Council on Monuments and Sites, protects and safeguards Syrian cultural heritage by providing technical assistance.
The project also works to monitor and document Syrian cultural heritage, develop capacity amongst Syrian experts and institutions, and mitigate the destruction and loss of Syrian cultural heritage through national and international awareness raising efforts.”
[This article was originally published by UNESCO.]
بواسطة Lizzie Porter | أكتوبر 6, 2017 | Cost of War, غير مصنف
“After months of defeats, Syria’s opposition is trying to unite under the umbrella of a national army to fight pro-government forces. But internal divisions, the geographic distribution of rebel groups and involvement of foreign powers undermine its chance of success.
BEIRUT, LEBANON – Dozens of Syrian opposition groups merged last month to form a unified army, at a time when rebel factions are increasingly divided and have suffered a string of defeats at the hands of pro-government and extremist forces.
Led by the opposition’s interim government in exile, the Unified National Army (UNA) aims to boost opposition forces both on the ground and in negotiations at the eighth round of peace talks set to start within the next month. However, experts and analysts warn that the move is not likely to alter the dynamics of a war that is now tilted in Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s favor.
Since January, rebel factions have lost territory to pro-government forces around Damascus, in the central Syrian province of Homs, and in southern Syria along the border with Jordan. In Idlib, the only opposition-held province in Syria, al-Qaida-linked militants have overtaken many Free Syrian Army (FSA)-affiliated groups.
The U.S. recently ended its support for rebels and, along with Saudi Arabia, allegedly told the opposition to accept that Assad will remain in power. Even the U.N.’s special envoy to Syria has questioned whether the Syrian opposition would “be able to be unified and realistic enough to realize they did not win the war.”
The Unified National Army
The Turkey-based Syrian Interim Government (SIG) and the Syrian Islamic Council (SIC), a group of Syrian Muslim clerics, proposed the merger in late August, and within a week, more than a dozen groups had joined, according to AFP.
Overall troop numbers are not available, but at least 44 FSA groups operating mostly in Aleppo and Idlib province have signed up to the UNA – including the Levant Front, 13th Division, Mutasim Brigade and the Nasr Army.
Two FSA factions in southeastern Syria have also signed up, but the Southern Front, a coalition of some 50 FSA groups based in Daraa and Quneitra provinces, said they want to see signs that the UNA will, in fact, be unified, before joining.
“We are waiting to see some productive steps, and if the brigades in the north really commit to the national army and take it seriously before we take a position on the initiative,” a Southern Front leader told Syria Deeply, requesting anonymity.
Jaish al-Islam, a hard-line militant group with a strong base in the Eastern Ghouta suburbs of Damascus, has also joined. As has Ahrar al-Sham – which was one of the strongest rebel groups in Idlib before the al-Qaida-linked Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) recently seized its positions.
In an attempt to give the force a real military structure, the SIG has sought to create a defense ministry that would preside over the UNA’s operations. They have also appointed Salim Idris, a defected Syrian army general, as chief of staff and General Mohammad Faris, also a defector, as defense minister.
The group’s funding has yet to be officially announced, but opposition delegates met with Qatar’s foreign minister in Doha last month, as part of a series of visits to “friendly and sisterly countries,” according to Nizar Haraki, the Syrian opposition’s ambassador to Qatar.
Jawad Abu Hatab, prime minister of the SIG, told Syria Deeply the opposition forces already had money. Better organization, rather than external funding, would be key to its success.
Objectives
The UNA has both military and diplomatic objectives, Abu Hatab said. Militarily, the UNA would form “one command” to help deploy the opposition’s military skills more effectively, he said.
“When we create a command that includes all of the opposition factions, we will have central decision making and we can use this power in the best way,” he said.
“We can develop them [the factions] from militias into a regular army that has a leader, and rules, and knows its rights and duties,” he said.
Diplomatically, military cohesion will help the opposition put up a united front at peace talks held in Geneva and Astana.
“The army will give some weight to the opposition, so it will be stronger in negotiations and impose its respect on the international community,” he said.
But even if the armed rebels unite, the opposition is still divided in its approach to resolution. Some elements insist Assad must step down as part of a peace deal, while others are more flexible about other solutions that would bring an end to the conflict.
Major Ahmed al-Hassan Abu al-Mundhir, head of the UNA’s political bureau, is part of the former. He insists that “toppling the criminal regime” is among the main aims of his fighting force.
Timing
Although SIG officials maintain that the idea of unified army dates back to at least 2015, Kyle Orton, an analyst at the Henry Jackson Society think-tank, said the suspension of covert CIA aid to U.S.-allied rebel groups and HTSdominance over Idlib are “important factors in having made this [the creation of the unified army] possible.”
Orton said that initiative also partially stems from the opposition’s need to differentiate itself from extremist elements such as al-Qaida and the so-called Islamic State.
“Previously, the rebels, for very good practical (not ideological) reasons, were averse to openly adopting an antagonistic position toward HTS,” he explained. “That is not less of a concern and instead, both politically and militarily, there is more incentive for rebels to differentiate themselves from HTS.”
However, by positioning itself against HTS, the UNA could run the risk of a fatal confrontation.
“Whether the [Unified] National Army could or would stand up to HTS is an open question,” Orton said. “If HTS demonstrates quickly, it can attack the [Unified] National Army without incurring collective rebel and/or Turkish reprisals, then the whole idea falls.”
The new rebel coalition will likely be focused on northern Syria and would be backed by Turkey, he added. Ankara has yet to comment publicly on the project.
“The [Unified] National Army would be in its essentials a Turkish-backed enterprise,” Orton said. “There might well be some funding from Qatar.”
Rebel Divisions
According to Sam Heller of the Century Foundation, the initiative “won’t be seen as a major new vehicle for support and influence.”
For Heller, this is partially because the idea of a single rebel army does not take into account the geographic distribution of the opposition in Syria.
Having lost their major stronghold of Aleppo last December, remaining rebel territory is divided into patches in Syria’s south, southeast and northwest. This makes the prospect of unification untenable.
The FSA-linked Martyr Ahmed al-Abdo brigades and Lions of the East are a prime example of this. Both groups have agreed to form part of the UNA.However, their bases are far out east in the Badia desert near the Iraqi border in areas isolated from rebel-held territory.
“There is a reality of a fragmented regional opposition versus an opposition united in principle,” Heller said.
For Fares al-Bayoush, a former officer with the FSA-linked Free Idlib Army, the UNA’s lack of military expertise, in comparison to that of the Syrian army, condemns it to failure.
“A military more than 50 years old is different from … an army still in its infancy,” he told Syria Deeply.
He also expressed skepticism over the possibility that rebel groups could unite under one umbrella, given the opposition’s history of divisions.
Divisions within Syria’s opposition groups are potentially the greatest roadblock for the success of the deal. Jaish al-Islam, for example, has been heavily involved in rebel infighting in Eastern Ghouta, primarily with FSA group Faylaq al-Rahman, over territorial control in the besieged area. Even within the FSA, there have been divisions throughout the conflict over coordination with Salafi rebel groups who extol more hard-line religious ideologies, such as Ahrar al-Sham.
“I have no intention of participating in this project,” Bayoush, who was a member of the opposition’s military delegation at the Astana talks in January, said. “The participants in the project lack seriousness, and it represents a repeat of previous errors, and it lacks longevity.”
Even Syrian civilians who have recently taken to the streets in protest, calling on the opposition to protect them from extremist elements, are not convinced that the UNA will work.
Qusay al-Hussein, from Maarat al-Numan in Idlib province, said, “[The UNA] is not expected to succeed, because at its most basic level it is not a national army: It is an army following foreign agendas, not national ones.”
[This article was originally published by Syria Deeply]
بواسطة BBC | أكتوبر 2, 2017 | Cost of War
September has been the deadliest month in Syria’s civil war so far this year, a monitoring group has said.
“The UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) said more than 3,300 people had died in September, including 995 civilians.
Of those civilian deaths, it said about 70% were caused by Russian, Syrian government, or coalition air strikes.
The group bases its casualty reports on information provided by a network of activists in Syria.
It counted 207 children among the civilian dead, along with some 790 pro-government fighters, more than 700 from so-called Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda affiliates, and some 550 rebels.
The SOHR says it is a non-political and independent monitoring group, though it does not publish its methodology or verification process.
Many of the deaths have occurred during the fighting between the country’s multiple factions and IS. But air strikes in Syria have continued as the jihadist group has lost most of its territory in the country.
An alliance of Kurdish and Arab fighters has mostly reclaimed the northern city of Raqqa, the group’s former de facto capital.
Its last remaining stronghold in Syria is the province surrounding the eastern city of Deir al-Zour.
Russian air forces are supporting the Syrian military in their attempts to fully retake the city.
A long-running siege of Deir al-Zour was broken by Syrian military forces in early September. In the aftermath, the SOHR said dozens of civilians had been killed in air strikes outside the city.
The Syrian Defence Forces – fighters which oppose Syrian President Bashar al-Assad but are also fighting IS – have also claimed to be hit by Russian and Syrian air strikes, a charge which Russia denies.
And last week, Human Rights Watch said a pair of air strikes by the US-led coalition in March had killed at least 84 civilians.”
[This article was originally published by the BBC.]