بواسطة Jamal Saeed | نوفمبر 24, 2017 | Roundtables, غير مصنف
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لم تشهد سورية حالاً أشد دمامة من الذي تعيشه الآن، منذ تكونها ككيان سياسي حتى اليوم. ما يحدث اليوم يتجاوز ضياع فرصة أو احتمال قيام دولة مواطنة مدنية بدستور وقوانين عصرية يخضع لها ويحتمي بها جميع السوريين. ما يحدث اليوم يجسد هزيمة جديدة لمشروع “الالتحاق بالعصر“، سواء انتصر النظام أو الميليشيات الإسلامية.
لاحظ معي أن دعاة قيام الدولة المدنية الديمقراطية، على قلتهم، قد تشتتوا بفعل القمع الذي لم يبخل به أي من أمراء الحرب بما في ذلك النظام بطبيعة الحال. واضح للجميع كما أعتقد أن النفوذ على وفي سورية موضع تقاسم بين نظام دكتاتوري مهلهل تدعمه (وتشاركه النفوذ) ميليشيات دينية فاشية (إيرانية ولبنانية وعراقية بوجه خاص) لها طابع مذهبي، ناهيك عن الميليشيا المحلية وقوى إقليمية ودولية، وميليشيات معارضة يغلب عليها طابع التطرف الديني الفاشي والعداء للديمقراطية، تتلقى بدورها الدعم بل والأوامر من قوى إقليمية ودولية تحت طائلة إيقاف الدعم. وفي الوقت الذي يحقق فيه النظام وحلفاؤه انتصارات عسكرية، يشارك حلفاء النظام وعلى نحو مباشر في حكم سورية بل يسهم بعض الحلفاء في فرض العديد من القرارات المتعلقة بحاضر ومستقبل سورية، إلى حد يغيب فيه السوريون في أي موقع كانوا، بما في ذلك النظام طبعاً، حتى عن نقاش حاضرهم ومستقبلهم في العديد من اللقاءات الدولية التي تنعقد بهذا الخصوص.
لم تتجاوز الدكتاتورية المهلهلة بنيتها، ولا أعتقد أنها ستفعل، وبالتالي لن تستجيب لمصلحة البلاد في التغيير الديمقراطي السلمي، أما أغلب تيارات المعارضة فقد غلب عليها تبني الحلول العنفية والعسكرية التي فرضها حملة السلاح ومن يساندهم، وتمت تنحية أو شل فاعلية القوى التي تحمل مشروع التغيير الديمقراطي، بالقمع المباشر حيث مورس القتل والاعتقال والتهجير من قبل النظام ومن قبل التيارات الجهادية. وتحول المجتمع السوري إلى ساحة سوريالية لإعادة إنتاج المآسي والقمع العاري بأبشع صوره من القصف بالأسلحة الفتاكة إلى التجويع والتركيع والموت تحت التعذيب، إلى الذبح بالسواطير، والتفنن في إدارة التوحش ومختلف أشكال احتقار وامتهان الكائن البشري. ولا يخفى على أحد كيف التحق بعض دعاة التغيير لإقامة دولة مدنية عصرية بالنظام، وبعضهم الآخر بالقوى الجهادية، ولم يفتقر أي منهم إلى الديماغوجيا لتسويغ موقفه الداعي إلى المزيد من القتل! وشكل ذلك كله مناخاً لانتشار الوباء الطائفي واستثماره وتعويمه.
نحن أحوج ما نكون إلى العقلانية، بصفتها بديلاً للعنتريات الفارغة أو للأحكام والأفكار السلفية، وعلى وجه العموم لا أرى مكاناً للعقلانية في صفوف الحركة الدينية التي هيمنت على المعارضة، بقوة السلاح والجهل والانحطاط، ولا في صفوف النظام الذي يفصّل العقلانية أو الدين –أو ما شئت – على مقاس ديمومة تسلطه.
يكابد السوريون اليوم، في سياق العنف العاري الذي يشهده المجتمع، مختلف أشكال القهر :السجن والموت والفقد والجوع والفقر والتشتت واللجوء والضياع.
وسورية الآن ساحة حرب دولية يتصارع من أجل النفوذ فيها وعليها قوى إقليمية ودولية، ضمن خارطة معقدة للتناقضات، فلكل ميليشياته وقواه وشروطه. وتتناقض المصالح والتوجهات ضمن الحلف الواحد: فالإيرانيون لا يريدون ما يريده الروس، والأميركيون لا يأبهون كثيراً للمخاوف التركية من تشكل دولة أو قوة كردية متاخمة لهم. أعتقد أن الحرب في سورية ستنتهي في المدى المنظور مخلفة بعض الجيوب التي ستستمر في ممارسة العنف، الأمر الذي سيسوغ ويتماشى مع استمرار الدكتاتورية.
بكثير من الأسى أقول إن كل شيء في سوريا أضحى منتهكاً أو معرضاً للانتهاك وخصوصاً الإنسان. يمكنك أن تتحدث عن انتهاكات تكابدها الغابات ومختلف الكائنات الحية الأخرى وعن انتهاكات طالت الجمادات من بيوت وآثار وحجارة بكر! أما الحديث عن السيادة الوطنية فقد أضحى مزحة أو جزءاً من هذه الكوميديا الشديدة السواد.
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تبدأ خطوات الحل الأنجع، وأظنه بعيد المنال، بوقف الحرب على أن تضمن ذلك قوة عسكرية دولية تحت مظلة الأمم المتحدة، وعلى أن لا يكون هناك أي نفوذ لأي دولة أو ميليشيا خارجية داخل سورية، ويتم بعد ذلك مباشرة تشكيل حكومة انتقالية تتكون في ظلها جمعية تأسيسية وتجري انتخابات برلمانية حرة ونزيهة، ويتم وضع دستور مدني عصري يفصل الدين عن الدولة. سورية من أحوج البلدان ربما لدستور يقوم على أن في التعددية غنى وفي الأعراق والأديان والقوميات والثقافات حدائق لا بنادق، دستور لا يكرس سيطرة عرق أو دين أو قومية، ودولة قانون تساوي بين السوريين بصرف النظر عن الاعتبارات الدينية والعرقية والقومية والجندرية. إن البديل الوحيد للانتقامات والمظلوميات التاريخية هو دولة القانون. وأرى أنه لا بد من “العدالة الانتقالية” ولا بد من تحقيق الشرط السياسي والاجتماعي الذي يخلص سوريا من مفاهيم وشعارات الإبادة أو الاجتثاث والتعصب الديني أو القومي أو العرقي. أحياناً أرى أن الحل الواقعي يبدو مثل حلم بعيد المنال ولكني لا أرى حلاً آخر. فالتقسيم أو المحاصصة الطائفية أو الإخضاع بالقوة ليست إلا تأجيل للعنف وإعادة إنتاج له.
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لا أعتقد أن سوريا ستشهد الاستقرار قريباً، يلوح في الأفق انتصار النظام، ويلوح في الأفق أيضاً الكثير من العنف بدوافع مركبة: ثأرية وانتقامية تخدم وتغذى في المحصلة من قبل أصحاب مصالح محددة. ولا أظن أن العنف سيأخذ بالضرورة شكل حرب جيوش بل أرجح أن تشهد البلاد حرب عصابات.
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على المثقفين أن يشكلوا كتلة بعيدة عن الاصطفاف وراء الدكتاتورية أو القوى الدينية ويعملوا ما بوسعهم لتكريس ضرورة قيام دولة المواطنة المدنية الديمقراطية بصفتها الحل الذي يمكن أن ينهض بسورية من الحضيض الذي تعيشه وتنظف المستقبل من طاعون الانتقام والتعصب الديني والقومي . عليهم كما أرى ممارسة مختلف أشكال النشاط المتاح في سورية وفي الشتات لتكريس الاهتمام بسورية واحدة تعددية وديمقراطية.
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إن استبدال الهوية الدينية أو المذهبية أو القومية أو العرقية بهوية المواطنة هو السبيل الوحيد أمامنا نحن السوريين ولا بد من خلق سياق قانوني وثقافي واجتماعي يجعل هذا الاستبدال أصيلاً وعميقاً، ولا أرى أن هذا الاستبدال ممكن في ظل هيمنة القوى الدينية أو في ظل هيمنة الدكتاتورية العسكرية. أعتقد أن تخليص الدولة والمجتمع من مقومات ومقدمات الدكتاتورية العسكرية أو الفاشية الدينية هو الخطوة التي لا بد منها للانتقال من ضيق ودمامة التشنج الطائفي إلى رحابة التعددية في مجتمع مدني لا يتم فيه قبول الآخر فحسب، بل يتم التعامل والتعاون معه في شتى الميادين. عندما تكون حرية التعبير جزءاً من نسيج الدولة والمجتمع، وعندما لا يخضع تشكيل الأحزاب لإرادة العسكر أو المشايخ بل لقانون أحزاب عصري فعلي، وعندما تنشأ الأحزاب المدنية القائمة على خدمة برامج اجتماعية واقتصادية محددة وتحل محل الأحزاب الدينية التي تبشر بأنها ستفرض بالعنف ما لا تقبله الحياة المعاصرة، سيحل الصراع السلمي تحت قبة البرلمان محل الصراع العنفي في الساحات والشوارع وسيكون لصناديق الاقتراع معنى. عندها ستناقش الآخر برنامجاً لبرنامج ، بالأحرى عندها لن يكون الآخر هو ابن الطائفة أو القومية الأخرى بل من يؤيد مشروعاً اقتصادياً أو اجتماعياً أو كونياً يختلف عن مشروعك.
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لدي العديد من المخاوف فالقوى الفاعلة في الوقت الراهن لا تزرع سوى المزيد من الدمار الذي يطال الناس وبيوتهم وشوارعهم وأشجارهم (أكتب الآن والصواريخ تتساقط على نحو عشوائي على بلدة سلمية وعلى بعض مناطق الغوطة الشرقية على ذمة مواقع التواصل الاجتماعي) لا أعتقد بالتالي أن من يزرع الشوك سيحصد القمح أو الورد. إن الحضور المباشر لقوى مختلفة، ومصالح متناقضة على الساحة السورية، وانتشار ميليشيات دينية فاشية مؤيدة للنظام أو معارضة له، لا يبشر بالخير.
لا يزال النظام يمجد الخضوع، ولا أظنه سيتجاوز ذلك. ما معنى تمجيد التجانس في خطاب رأس النظام؟ المواطنة تقوم على التعددية لا على التجانس! لا أرى أن الحل بمعناه الدائم والأصيل يمكن أن يتم ويستمر بمعزل عن قيام دولة المواطنة وبمعزل عن التحول من “رعايا” إلى “مواطنين” على حد تعبير أستاذنا طيب الذكر أنطون مقدسي. عندها يمكن أن نكون محكومين بتطلعاتنا إلى المستقبل. ما لم نتمكن من تحقيق ذلك سنبقى أسرى أسوأ ما في ماضينا مثل رايات ” ثارات الحسين” وفتاوى ابن تيمية المذهبية، وتجليها المعاصر في شعارات مثل “عندك ناس بتشرب دم“، وغير ذلك من الدعوات الوقحة للعنف.
لقد اجتمع السلاح مع الانحطاط الثقافي والأخلاقي، وأضحى تسويغ جرائم القتل الجماعي أمراً عادياً.
نحن أمام احتمالات عديدة، وأتمنى أن لا تصدق النبوءات السوداء التي تبدو واقعية ولها حظ في التحقق. آمل أن تبقى سوريا كياناً واحداً وأن تصبح التعددية من علامات الغنى الاجتماعي والثقافي لا عباءات تخبئ أحقاداً وقذائف تنشر الرعب وتوسع دائرة الجرائم.
بواسطة Katty Alhayek | نوفمبر 21, 2017 | Roundtables, غير مصنف
Katty Alhayek (KA): Recently, you published an article titled “Militias and crony capitalism to hamper Syria reconstruction,” how do you define “crony capitalism” in this context and what challenges it poses to future reconstruction efforts in Syria?
Joseph Daher (JD): Crony capitalism can be defined generally as when owners of big businesses use their links with the state and the government to gain a decisive advantage over their competitors.
In the region of the Middle East and North Africa, Crony capitalism has been strengthened by the patrimonial nature of the state in which the centers of power (political, military and economically) within a regime are concentrated in one family and its clique, just as in Syria with Assad’s family.
In Syria’s patrimonial regime, you have had the development of a form of crony capitalism in the last decades dominated by a rent seeking alliance of political brokers (led by Assad’s mother’s family) and the regime-supportive bourgeoisie. In other words, the circles close to the ruling family exploit their dominance to amass considerable fortunes. The main sectors of the economy in Syria, prior to the uprising, were dominated by businessmen with direct connections to the regime. This form of crony or mafia capitalism, in which economic opportunities were dependent on loyalties to the regime, alienated and marginalized some elements of the bourgeoisie that were not connected to the regime and therefore did not constitute a strong element of support for the regime. No deal or large venture was actually possible without crony capitalists linked with the regime.
Rami Makhlouf, the cousin of Bashar al-Assad, represented the mafia-style process of privatization led by the regime. His economic empire was vast including telecommunications, oil and gas, as well as construction, banks, airlines, retail, etc. Makhlouf was also the main shareholder of Cham Holding Company, the second largest holding company in the country, while holding more than 300 licenses as an agent for big international companies. The personal fortune of Rami Makhlouf was estimated at close to 6 billion dollars. At the beginning of 2011, the British magazine “World Finance” actually extolled Makhlouf’s visionary leadership and his outstanding contribution to the Syrian economy, calling him a symbol of the positive change at work in the country. According to different sources, he controlled directly or through indirect means nearly 60 percent of the Syrian economy, thanks to a complex network of holdings.
The Crony capitalists have been the heart of the regime coalition and its main supporters. At the beginning of the uprising, the crony capitalists first mobilized people to demonstrate in favor of the regime, and private media, owned by them, tried from the first days of the uprising to undermine the message of the protesters by defaming the protest movement and promoting the regime’s propaganda. Moreover, they played an important role in the development of pro regime militias by funding them to make up for the lack of manpower in the regime’s army.
The “business” of reconstruction is in this perspective no different from other sectors of the economy: The main contracts will benefit businessmen linked to the regime and will reward foreign allies for their assistance with a share of the market. There are already some early examples of this happening and in other sectors of the economy as well.
The reconstruction process will help the regime and crony capitalists consolidate their political and economic power, while also rewarding foreign allies for their support by granting them a sizable share of the market. As such, reconstruction will consolidate and even reinforce the patrimonial nature of the state.
The Decree 66, enforced in September 2012, allows for example the government to “redevelop areas of unauthorized housing and informal settlements [slums].” This policy will allow for the transfer of assets to private companies and regime cronies free of taxes. It will also provide the legal and financial framework for reconstruction by allowing for the destruction and expropriation of large parts of the country and the dispossession of a number of people. In addition, whenever there have been expropriation projects in Syria, compensation has been extremely low. It’s a very clear dispossession of the lower strata. This is a transfer of public assets, tax-free, to private companies and it will be a big boost to regime cronies. Secondly, the reconstruction process will also help the regime crackdown on dissent in certain areas. The government can leverage this decree to use reconstruction as a punishing measure against the part of the population known for their opposition to the regime. This is the case with the two large informal districts of Damascus (the first in the Mezzeh district and the other in a large area extending from Qadam to Daraya) and Baba Amro neighborhood in Homs, which are being rebuilt while the majority of its population is outside of Syria or in other areas of the country. In both cases, the most probable scenario is the replacement of these hostile Sunni impoverished constituencies by middle and wealthy higher classes, from various religious backgrounds, including Sunnis, less willing to oppose the government.
More generally, the regime’s continuous policies in the socio-economic and political spheres will probably strengthen social and regional inequalities throughout the country, deepening problems in terms of development that were already present before the beginning of the uprising in 2011. We could add that the absence of independent trade unions and democratic rights for workers to defend themselves will probably lead to many cases of exploitation, irregularities, and lack of good conditions on working places for workers in the reconstruction process. The increasing reliance of private crony capitalist and foreign actors in this process will reinforce these problems.
Therefore, the absence of democracy and social justice, which were at the roots of the uprising, are still very much present and were even deepened.
Unfortunately, as I mentioned in the article, the absence of a structured and independent democratic, inclusive and social Syrian political opposition, which appealed to the popular classes and social actors such as the independent trade unions will prevent or render difficult the transformations of various struggles to come into connected and organized political battles challenging the regime on a national scale.
KA: In your article, you indicate that any reconstruction efforts in Syria needs massive foreign funding. You referred that Iranian, Russian and Chinese capital might not be enough. How do you see the future of foreign investment in Syria reconstruction projects and do you think Western states and Gulf monarchies will be more involved giving the political changes regionally and internationally?
JD: The states that will benefit are definitely the countries allied to the Assad regime, particularly Iran, Russia and China. India and Brazil might also benefit from the reconstruction drive. Assad and Syrian officials have repeatedly declared that companies from allied countries will be rewarded, while European and American companies will first need to have their governments apologize for supporting the opposition before benefiting. Damascus has also adopted a similar position towards Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey for the current period. Assad in his speech in August 2017 went as far as to declare that the regime will not “let enemies, adversaries, and terrorists, through any means, accomplish through politics what they failed to accomplish on the battlefield and through terrorism”.
On the other side, the so called “Friends of Syria” group, Western countries, Turkey, and Gulf Monarchies, in a side event in New York in September during the U.N. General Assembly) declared that “recovery and reconstruction support for Syria hinges on a credible political process leading to a genuine political transition that can be supported by a majority of the Syrian people.”
The European Union had announced a similar position in April 2017, in arguing that they will be ready to assist in the reconstruction of Syria only when a comprehensive, genuine and inclusive political transition, negotiated by the Syrian parties in the conflict on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015) and the 2012 Geneva Communiqué, is firmly under way. It is therefore hard to see or expect in the near future a high involvement of these states in the reconstruction process, except funding rather small-scale, local projects in areas outside the regime’s control and without the regime’s participation or consent. This is actually already the case for Turkey in some areas controlled by its armed forces and proxies for example in Jarablus and al-Bab, and for some Western institutions and states also providing some financial assistance, including support for local governance and for the rehabilitation of basic services, to regions under the domination of the PYD or some opposition held areas. These projects are however isolated and limited and can’t replace a wide reconstruction process.
Changes on the international and regional political scenes can however occur rapidly as we witnessed on several occasions, so the doors are never completely closed one would say. For example recently, Saudi Arabia’s Gulf affairs minister, Thamer al-Sabhan, visited Raqqa on September 19 after the capture of the city by Syrian Democratic Forces (an Arabic, Kurdish and Assyrian military alliance dominated by YPG, the arm branch of the Kurdish PYD), supported by US led international coalition, to meet with the civil council established six months before under the leadership of SDF and composed of local dignitaries and discuss the reconstruction of the city. No concrete plans were however set.
KA: Last year, you wrote an article discussing federalism as a political option in Syria? What was the goal of this article? How do you see federalism as a future solution for Syria in light of recent political developments?
JD : The article had the objective to promote the idea of federalism (or decentralization) in a progressive and secular framework in order to tackle a certain number of problems within Syria, including notably the Kurdish issue, social and regional inequalities and trying to encourage self-organization from below.
The Assad’s regime and the mainstream opposition, represented by the Etilaf, oppose a federalist option, preferring a rather authoritarian centralized state.
The main opposition body today in the negotiation (and mostly linked to the Etilaf), the High Negotiations Commission (HNC) for « the Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces », has actually failed in providing any democratic and inclusive message, quite on the opposite. In Autumn 2016, its vision within an Executive Framework for the Political Solution in Syria that was far from offering an inclusive and pluralistic citizenship or of Syria as we can see in its first article:
“Syria is an integral part of the Arab World, and Arabic is the official language of the state. Arab Islamic culture represents a fertile source for intellectual production and social relations amongst all Syrians of different ethnic backgrounds and religious beliefs as the majority of Syrians are Arabs and followers of Islam and its tolerant message which is distinctly moderate”.
This is of course exclusionary for all ethnic and religious minorities in the country, in addition to all people not identifying with these identities. This is without forgetting that the Etilaf has supported and supports the Turkish intervention in Syria against the Kurds in general and not only PYD.
The Etilaf and many of the personalities linked to it have also promoted a sectarian, racist (particularly against Kurds), and authoritarian discourses and behaviors. Similarly, when it comes to women, the Etilaf has completely neglected their large participation in the uprising, providing them with only “decorative positions” without any effective role in the decision making process.
The support for a federal state is a key issue today for trying to challenge the division among Arabs and Kurds today and re-establish trust and confidence between these parties. The demand for a federal system in Syria is a demand of the quasi majority of Kurdish parties in the country, despite their political differences and rivalries. To this day, the majority of the Syrian opposition, even some democratic and leftist sectors, reject the demands of the far majority of the Kurdish people in Syria, or reduce it to a question of providing simply citizenship.
This is very problematic and unfortunately not new. We must remember that Kurds in Syria suffered decades of political, social and cultural repression and Arabization policies in the northern regions of Syria imposed by the Assad regime and other oppressive measures since the independence of the country. Not to mention the silence of a large part of the opposition during the Kurdish uprising in Syria in 2004, while accusing some Kurds of serving foreign projects to weaken Syria.
That is why we must support the right of self-determination of the Kurdish people in Syria and elsewhere, which does not mean necessarily the creation of an independent state, but that they decide their own future. Similarly, the support of the self determination of the Kurdish people does not mean being uncritical of the policies of the leadership of the PYD or any other Kurdish political party. I personally criticized the human rights violations by PYD armed forces in Syria against civilians or repressive policies against other Kurdish activists. I did the same regarding Barzani authoritarian and corrupt rule in Kurdistan in northern Iraq.
Just as when we say we support the self determination of the Palestinian People, we don’t support Fatah or Hamas. And on this issue, just few words, I have always considered the liberation and emancipation of the Palestinians as part of our struggle as well. Our destinies are linked.
As I mentioned in the article of federalism, to eliminate from the discussions the Kurdish issue, under the assumption that it allows more unity within the opposition and less problems has proven, and is still the case, a recipe for division and lack of confidence between the various components of the Syrian people.
The recent Kurdish referendum in Northern Iraq has demonstrated, once again, the failure of the models of the capitalist, chauvinist and centralized nation-states of the region, which have consistently repressed, erased, and/or denied the plurality of their societies by affirming the supremacy and/or domination of an ethnic group over others, a religious sect over others or both at the same time.
Therefore, to repeat the same mistakes of the past or present federalism (or decentralization) as division is the recipe for defeat.
In my article on federalism, I also promoted a federal system in order to provide more tools and power to local population to manage their affairs, on one side, and in trying to correct regional social injustices, on the other. For example, the Jazirah region produced two thirds of the country’s grains (and 70% of wheat) and three quarters of its hydrocarbons, but had the highest level of illiteracy rate and poverty. Such an option would also strengthen participation from local population in decision making processes.
However, the implementation of a federal state is not a guarantee per se to achieve an inclusive and democratic system. Indeed, we also need to struggle for a secular political framework encouraging the participation from below of the popular and working classes and in which democratic and social rights of all Syrians without gender, ethnic and religious discriminations are guaranteed. This means notably guaranteeing popular and working classes with the rights to organize politically in their workplaces (through independent trade unions and peasant unions for examples), society, and neighborhoods, to defend their interests.
I would therefore argue that a federalist project for Syria is a step forward and a necessary condition to build a new, progressive, secular and democratic Syria, but of course on its own its not sufficient.
KA: What other projects are you working on now, in regard to Syria?
JD: I am finishing my second PhD, but this time in History, entitled “Revolution and Counter- Revolutions in Syria, origins and developments”. It’s a holistic and materialist analysis of the roots and developments of the Syrian revolutionary process and the various challenges and counter-revolutionary actors it had to face. I hope then to publish my PhD into a book. It’s an important project for me not only on an academic perspective, but I would argue politically as well, to nurture discussions and debates among progressives and democrats in Syria and to try to learn from the lessons of the revolutionary process and the mistakes committed. In the seventies and eighties, Syria witnessed strong popular and democratic resistance with significant strikes and demonstrations throughout the country with mass followings, unfortunately this memory was not kept and was not well-known by the new generation of protesters in the country in 2011, even among leftists and democrats. The Syrian revolutionary process that erupted in 2011 is on the contrary one of the most documented. This memory will remain and will not only be there to look at the past, but seizing this past to build on future resistance. The political experiences that have been accumulated since the beginning of the uprising will not disappear.
I have also other projects relating to Syria, including issue of citizenship or the struggle against sectarianism.
Again and more generally I try through these works and projects to help as part of my effort to participate in the struggle for a democratic, secular, federal and social Syria without any discriminations and in solidarity with other people in struggles.
Joseph Daher is a Swiss-Syrian socialist activist and academic. He is the author of Hezbollah: Political Economy of Lebanon’s Party of God (2016, Pluto Press). He is the founder of the blog Syria Freedom Forever. He was awarded a doctorate from the School of Oriental and Asian Studies (SOAS) in 2015 in Development. He resides in Switzerland, where he teaches at the University of Lausanne and is finishing a thesis in history on the origins and developments of the Syrian uprising.
بواسطة Katty Alhayek | نوفمبر 21, 2017 | Roundtables, غير مصنف
Katty Alhayek (KA): What are the main challenges today for reconstruction efforts and rebuilding the future of Syria?
Rabie Nasser (RN): The Syrian Center for Policy Research identifies the main challenges for the reconstruction efforts categorize as first, the surviving of political tyranny and increasing compromises that accept the hegemony of subjugating powers. The political oppression was a core root of the social movement and during the conflict the pre-conflict political oppression aggravated to political tyranny and fundamentalism. Those internal and external powers which abuse authority and violated all human and social rights and norms cannot build an inclusive reconstruction that is needed to address the Syrian catastrophe. Second, the identity politics is a major challenge to reconstruction process as it degrades the social cohesion; in this regard, justice and legitimate institutions are a core part of building the trust between people and with the institutions to create the space to social relation recovery. Third, the injustice and deprivations including deaths, injuries, torturing, kidnapping, forced displacement, poverty, difficult living conditions, among others; increased the inequity among the population which is a major and urgent challenge that need enormous institutional capacities, well designed policies, and material resources. Fourth, the expanding of conflict economy and conflict related crony elite which contribute to destruct to a large extent the economic resources, relations, and institutions; and reallocate the remaining resources to fueling conflict and subordinating society. Those four challenges form a well established system that created incentives on local, national and international levels, which makes tackling it an exceptionally difficult cause.
KA: Syrian children’s health and education were significantly affected by the ongoing war; how do you think the investments in reconstruction efforts should address children’s well being, and the so-called “lost generation,” specifically in the worst affected areas of the country?
RN: The Syrian society is young in that children below 18 years old consists almost half of the population and the conflict affected harshly their lives as around 13 per cent of the conflict related deaths is children. Since 2012 around half of the school age children did not enroll in the education system including the child refugees. Moreover, the quality of education has deteriorated in terms of quality and conditions. The dispersion of families and loss of breadwinners, in addition to poor living conditions, lack of access to health, and the suffering of malnutrition, trauma, and the loss of normal life of children are some examples of the burden on the new generation of Syrians. Furthermore, the refugee children are growing up in different environments, cultures, languages, values, living conditions which creates substantial challenges to reintegrate them in the Syrian society.
The burden of conflict is not equally distributed across the Syrian children, which increases the inequity between children in terms empowerment and opportunities. Countering the challenges, apart from the humanitarian, support needs inclusive institutions that address the deprivations of the most vulnerable groups of Syrians and this depends to a large extent on the way of exit from the armed conflict.
KA: Foreign funding and investment plays a crucial role in post-conflict reconstruction efforts. How do you see the role of foreign investments in the future of Syria and which countries do you think might be the key players?
RN: The total economic losses until the end of 2015 reached USD 255 billion, which is equivalent to around five times of the GDP in 2010. This enormous loss included the destruction of the infrastructure and reduction in the economic activities according to SCPR. The loss includes the severe deterioration of economic foundations such as population, human capital, institutions, and resources. Furthermore, the conflict economy reshaped the system of incentives and reallocated the resources and opportunities to the influential powers within the armed conflict. Therefore, the challenges of funding of reconstruction are related to the volume of the losses, and the complicated new conflict economy actors and incentives, and the hegemony of warlords over the Syrian economy.
The corner of funding is related to the shift in institutions to overcome conflict and build efficiency, just and inclusive institutions that rebuild trust between Syrians and between them and the political institutions. The space for society is crucial to participate in designing the reconstruction and the identification of the path for peace that overcomes the conflict’s impact and roots. Legitimate and inclusive institutions can create the environment to attract external funding and unitize it in line with the Syrians priorities. The other part of funding is covered by the Syrians’ participation in the process that will decrease the costs and increase the benefits for them and reduce the potential burden of depending only on the external funding.
However, if the political oppression and conflict economy elite prevail after the end of the conflict, the Syrian economy will be attracting many foreign investors due to the huge opportunities created by the destruction regardless of the inclusivity, justice, and sustainability. In this scenario, the participation of the Syrian society will be at a minimum and inequality will surge with the elite’s control of the opportunities. Finally, the countries and investors who will contribute depends on the scenarios and nature of institutions in the post-conflict period.
KA: Can you share with us what are your future projects?
RN: As a researcher in the Syrian Center for Policy Research, I am working on the Alternative Development Paradigm for the future of Syria which is an initiative by almost 50 experts who are working on developing policy options for the Syria challenges in line with the Syrian context. Additionally, the center is working on assessing the socioeconomic impact of the conflict in regular basis.
Rabie Nasser is a co-founder of the Syrian Center for Policy Research, working as researcher in macroeconomic policies, inclusive growth, poverty, and crisis socioeconomic impact assessment. He obtained a B.A. in Economics from Damascus University 1999. In 2000 he obtained a Diploma in Financial and Monetary Economics from Damascus University. He has MSc in Economics from Leicester University, UK. Before joining The Syrian Development Research Center, Nasser worked for the State Planning Commission as Chief Economist and Director General of Macroeconomic Management Directorate in 2004 and 2005. Then, he worked as an Economic Researcher in Arab Planning Institute in Kuwait. Then he was a senior researcher working between 2009-2011 for the Syrian Development Research Center that conducts studies, evaluations, and applied research.
