بواسطة Syria in a Week Editors | يوليو 10, 2019 | Syria in a Week, غير مصنف
The following is a selection by our editors of significant weekly developments in Syria. Depending on events, each issue will include anywhere from four to eight briefs. This series is produced in both Arabic and English in partnership between Salon Syria and Jadaliyya. Suggestions and blurbs may be sent to info@salonsyria.com.
Germany Welcome
8 July 2019
Despite the explicit rejection of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) – member of the ruling coalition in Germany – to the United States’ demand to send German ground troops to Syria, there is preliminary openness to Germany’s role in the Syrian mission on other levels.
Fritz Felgentreu, a defense affairs expert in the party’s parliamentary bloc, told the German newspaper Rainersche Post on Monday that continuing to support the elimination of ISIS is in Germany’s interest, “however, we certainly cannot send soldiers to Syria for legal reasons.”
The United States asked Germany to support the war against ISIS remnants by sending ground troops to help the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces in north-east Syria.
The US Special Envoy to Syria James Jeffrey and the International Coalition Against ISIS want the German government to send training troops, logistic experts, and technicians from the German army.
Iraq Wants a Settlement
8 July 2019
Iraqi President Barham Salih called on Sunday for a political settlement to the Syrian crisis to end the suffering of the Syrian people.
During a meeting with US Special Envoy to Syria James Jeffrey and US Ambassador to Iraq Matthew Tueller, the Iraqi president stressed “the importance of finding a political settlement for the situation in Syria and ending the suffering of our Syrian brothers and helping them confront terrorism, while emphasizing that our priority is protecting Iraq’s security, stability, and sovereignty.”
Jeffrey reiterated “the United States’ keenness to strengthen its relations with Iraq in all areas and its desire to expand joint cooperation and coordination on emerging issues at the regional and international levels.”
Airstrikes Against Idlib
7 July 2019
At least twelve civilians, including three children, were killed on Sunday as a result of government strikes on areas in northwest Syria, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR).
Idlib and neighboring areas, which are controlled by Tahrir al-Sham (previously Nusra) and home to three million people, have been subject to an escalation of bombardment for more than two months accompanied by fierce battles concentrated in the northwestern countryside of Hama.
The SOHR registered the death of six civilians as a result of shells fired by government forces while they were working in farms in the village of Qastoon in the northwestern countryside of Hama.
It also reported the death of a child as a result of airstrikes on the village of al-Ziyadiyeh in the countryside of Hama.
Four other civilians, including a man and his child, were killed in an airstrike on the countryside of Ma’eret al-No’man in the southern countryside of Idlib.
A child was killed in a missile attack on a farm in the village of Jadariya in the western countryside of Idlib.
This toll comes after the SOHR said that twenty civilians had been killed, including six children, as a result of Syrian-Russian shelling of the area since late Friday.
Since the beginning of the escalation in late April, at least five hundred and forty civilians have been killed as a result of Syrian and Russian airstrikes and bombardment, in addition to eight hundred and fifty-nine people from jihadist factions and seven hundred and forty-eight people from government forces and allied militants, according to the SOHR.
The bombardment and shelling have damaged at least twenty-five medical facilities and forty-five schools in the southern countryside of Idlib and northern countryside of Hama, according to the United Nations.
Oil Tanker Seized
7 July 2019
Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghachi said on Sunday that the Iranian oil tanker intercepted by British authorities in Gibraltar was not destined to Syria, contrary to what authorities in London confirm.
In a press conference in Tehran, Araghachi said that the Grace 1 tanker was carrying “Iranian oil” and that “contrary to what the British government alleges, the tanker was not heading toward Syria… it was going somewhere else,” without saying where the vessel was going.
“The name of the Syrian port mentioned by the British (Banias) does not have a dock capable of receiving such a large tanker.”
Araghachi said that the vessel “is a super tanker able to haul two million barrels… and therefore it cannot pass through the Suez Canal,” to go to the Mediterranean.
British forces had earlier arrested the Iranian vessel near Gibraltar, south of Spain, in an operation considered by Tehran as an act of piracy.
According to authorities in Gibraltar, the ship was seized in British waters in an area claimed by Spain as part of its kingdom.
Iran called for the “immediate” release of the ship, however, British courts ruled that it can be seized until 19 July.
A Gulf Guest to Assad
7 July 2019
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad received on Sunday Oman’s Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yusuf bin Alawi bin Abdullah.
Developments on the regional and international fronts were discussed during the meeting, especially attempts to obliterate Arab historical rights in light of the current crises and difficult circumstances in the area, Syrian news agency SANA said.
Al-Assad and bin Alawi also discussed the political and economic challenges imposed on the whole area and how to confront them in various arenas.
Return to al-Qsair
7 July 2019
A local Syrian official said on Sunday that around one thousand people from the city of al-Qsair in the western countryside of Homs have returned to their city after being displaced for more than seven years.
“Nine hundred and sixty-nine people from four hundred and forty-two families returned to their homes in al-Qsair. These families lived in Hissyeh, al-Braij, and al-Qalamon after their displacement, which has lasted more than seven years,” Tony Kasuhah, a member of the city council in al-Qsair, told a German news agency.
Kasuhah said that another patch of the city’s inhabitants would be returning in the upcoming days after rehabilitating basic services in the city.
A source in the Syrian opposition said that the return of the city’s inhabitants was “ceremonial and a media stunt on part of the Syrian government,” adding that “most of those who returned are employees in the Syrian government and were forced to return to send a message to the world that the government is working on bringing displaced people back to their areas.”
Al-Qsair, located near the border with Lebanon, is considered one of the major cities in the governorate of Homs. It has a population of around fifty thousand people and more than eighty villages are associated with it.
“Pressuring” Syrians in Lebanon
5 July 2019
Human Rights Watch on Friday condemned the Lebanese authorities’ order to tear down cement rooms built by Syrian refugees in unofficial camps, considering it “illegitimate pressure” on them to return to their county.
The Lebanese army started on Monday to demolish cement rooms in the camps in eastern Lebanon, after the authorities gave refugees living in the border town of Arsal a deadline to demolish the room that are considered “illegitimate” by the authorities and raise the fears of officials that these camps may turn into permanent settlements.
“This crackdown on housing code violations should be seen for what it is, which is illegitimate pressure on Syrian refugees to leave Lebanon,” Human Rights Watch refugee rights director Bill Frelick said.
“Many of those affected have real reasons to fear returning to Syria, including arrests, torture, and ill-treatment by Syrian intelligence branches,” he said
The demolition order affects around thirty-five thousand Syrian refugees living in various areas in Lebanon, according to the UN High Commission for Refugees. Between twelve thousand and five hundred to fifteen thousand of them live in Arsal, including at least seven thousand and five hundred children, according to human rights groups, which said earlier that less than half of the rooms that should have been demolished in Arsal were actually brought down by the refugees themselves.
Lebanese authorities estimate the number of current Syrian refugees in Lebanon at around one and a half million, whereas data from the UN refugee agency puts the number at less than one million.
Explosion in Sweida
3 July 2019
Five civilians were killed on Wednesday in a suicide explosion in the predominantly Druz city of Sweida south of Syria, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR).
“The suicide explosion used a motorcycle and targeted a street in the Qanawat area northeast of Sweida city… this resulted in the death of five civilians and the injury of thirteen others,” head of the SOHR Rami Abdul Rahman told the AFP.
The official Syrian news agency SANA said that “a number of martyrs” fell in the explosion and posted photos showing a burned motorcycle and blood stains on the ground.
This is the first suicide attack in the governorate after the large-scale attack about one year ago on 25 July, which was claimed by ISIS and left more than two hundred and sixty people dead.
At the time, ISIS kidnapped thirty Druz women and children, most of whom were freed after three and a half months of their kidnap. ISIS executed a number of the abductees as well.
200 Corpses in a Cemetery in Raqqa
2 July 2019
A specialized local team in northern Syria found at least two hundred corpses, some of them believed to belong to victims of ISIS, inside a new mass grave in Raqqa city, a local official told the AFP on Wednesday.
Yaser al-Khamis, head of the first response team in Raqqa, said, “the grave includes dozens of holes, each one has five corpses.” He also mentioned finding the corpses of five people wearing orange uniforms, which is what the radical group forced its hostages to wear. The SOHR confirmed the same number of corpses inside this graveyard.
New Strikes
2 July 2019
Syria on Tuesday accused Israel of committing “state terrorism” after Israeli airstrikes which targeted several military positions and killed fifteen people including six civilians, according to the SOHR.
“Israeli authorities are increasingly practicing state terrorism,” the Syrian foreign ministry said in a statement carried by the official SANA news agency.
“The latest heinous Israeli aggression falls within the framework of ongoing Israeli attempts to prolong the crisis in Syria,” it added.
Israeli missiles targeted late Sunday military positions near Damascus and in the governorate of Homs. Damascus said its air defenses downed a number of these missiles, without specifying the targeted positions. The SOHR, however, said the missiles hit several military positions where Iranian and Hezbollah fighters are deployed, including a center for scientific research and a military airport.
بواسطة Rami Nasarallah | نوفمبر 22, 2018 | News, غير مصنف
اعتلى شعار إسقاط الأسد مطالب الثورة السورية بعد أسابيع قليلة من انطلاقها، دون أن يتحقق بعد سنوات سبع من المطالبة به، وفي الوقت الذي وصلت البلاد فيه إلى عين الكارثة على مستوى الدولة كمؤسسات وعلى مستوى المجتمع، ما هي النتائج التي يمكن الحديث عنها أو توقعها على طريق تحقيق هذا الهدف، لكي يبقى الإصرار عليه قائماً رغم كل شيء؟
يمكن اليوم التماس نتائج الصراع حول كرسي الأسد بادياً في دمار عدد كبير من المدن والبلدات وتشريد ساكنيها، بالإضافة إلى انهيار كبير في الاقتصاد الضعيف أساسا، والذي يبدو أنه لم يعد يقو على النهوض مجدداً.
وانعكس انهيار الاقتصاد على عامة الشعب دون أن يهز النظام بشيء، فاليوم يقبع الشعب السوري في ظل اقتصاد منهار بدأت خصخصته واستلابه للخارج قبل اندلاع الثورة بكثير، وهو الذي أوصل الشعب إلى حدٍّ معيشيٍّ لا يطاق ودفعهم للتحرك بوجه النظام القائم. لكن وفي المقابل لا وجود لنهج اقتصادي مغاير لدى المعارضة، بل إن برنامجها مكمل لتلك السياسة الاقتصادية التابعة، وبذلك يغدو الطرفان خارج مطالب الشعب ولا فرق فيمن يستلم السلطة بينهما.
ومن ناحية أخرى وصلت الخدمات إلى أسوأ مستوياتها على كافة الأصعدة الصحية والتعليمية والغذائية، وتسببت ندرة المحروقات بانتشار التحطيب الذي قضى على مساحات خضراء واسعة، يُضاف لهذا ظهور جيل يفتقد للتعليم وعدد كبير من المعاقين والمصابين جسدياً وبأزمات نفسية، ناهيك عن النتائج المباشرة من القتلى والجرحى والمعتقلين والمهجرين.
وسط الفوضى أيضاً، انتشرت العصابات وساد الإنفلات الأمني، كما تهشم الجيش السوري وانكشفت نقاطه ومراكزه وأسلحته، وباتت مقراته فريسة سهلة لإسرائيل.
في المقابل، لم تحقق المعارضة أي هدف مما طمحت له، سواء على الصعيد العسكري أو السياسي أو الإعلامي، على العكس من ذلك، كشف الوقت تشتت خطابها وتوالي انقساماتها وانشطاراتها، مبتعدةً عن صياغة أية برامج واضحة، ومكتفية برشق النظام بخطابات تكشف عجزها وابتعادها عن الواقع السياسي، مثلما ابتعدت عن واقع من عوَّل عليها من الشعب في البداية، وتركتهم لمصيرهم في شتات العالم ومخيماته دون تحمل أية مسؤولية تجاههم. وفي ظل هذا، تستمر الحرب في حصد أرواح الأبرياء وتشريدهم، وزيادة أزمات من بقي منهم، دون حسيب أو رقيب.
وفي الوقت الذي يفلت النظام من أفعاله بحجة الحرب، لا تملك المعارضة أية قوة لمواجهة طغيانه، ولا حتى للدفع نحو المحاسبة. خاصة في ظل الوضع السياسي القائم والاتفاقات الدولية التي لا قدرة للمعارضة على تجاوزها، ناهيك عن عدم مشاركتها في رسمها.
ورغم الاتفاق الدولي على بقاء الأسد، ماتزال المعارضة مصرّة على رحيله كشعار بات أشبه بالرومنسي وضعت فيه كل ثقلها، متناسية أن رحيله هو تكتيك أو خطوة للوصول إلى التغيير. بدورها تفتقد المعارضة لأية استراتيجية واضحة وممنهجة لمستقبل سوريا الاقتصادي والاجتماعي والسياسي، وبذلك خسرت التكتيك والاستراتيجية، وباتت تابعة بالمطلق للخارج وما يمليه عليها.
في الداخل السوري، انتزع السوريون هامشاً لهم من الحرية من النظام والحرب، و طوروا أساليب تعايشهم مع الواقع وفهمه، وباتوا ينتظرون نهاية الصراع بين جهتين لا تمثلان طموحهم، ويتفق الأغلبية -بمواقفهم المختلفة- على ضرورة الخروج من عنق الزجاجة، باستثناء القلة المستفيدة من استمرار الحرب.
ولهذا فإن استمرار عمل العديد من مؤسسات الدولة -رغم رثاثتها وفسادها- يحفظ حداً أدنى من روابط النسيج المجتمعي وتنظيمه، وبذلك فإن إسقاط الأسد قد يودي بآخر خيطٍ يقي البلاد من الإنزلاق نحو الهاوية التي وصلت إلى حدودها. ولا يعني هذا أن الأسد هو ضامن وحدة البلاد، بقدر ما هو المقبض الذي يمسك ما تبقى منها في الوقت الحالي.
فانهيار الوضع القائم اليوم في سوريا يعني الذهاب نحو عراق جديد تعيشه لعشرات السنين، تفسح فوضاه المجال للدول المتدخلة لنهبها. ويؤدي استمرار الصراع دون الوصول لاتفاقية لاستمرار العمل خارج القانون وبشكل منفرد، في حين أن الوصول لأية اتفاقية ستعيد النظام لمظلة القانون وتلزمه به.
إذا، الوقت المتاح حالياً لا يعني إلا مزيداً من الانتهاكات المجانية، وما نفع تسجيل المعارضة ومنظماتها للانتهاكات بعد حدوثها؟ أليس الأولى منع قتل الناس بدلاً من المحاسبة على قتلهم لاحقاً؟
إن إنهاء الحرب سيدفع السلطة الحاكمة -أياً كانت- إلى ترسيخ الاستقرار في البلاد، ومنح حدود جديدة للحركة، وهو شرط ضروري للشركات القادمة للاستثمار، وبالتالي فإن كسب الوقت في ترسيخ الاستقرار سيتيح لعامة الناس لملمة جراحها وإعادة بناء نفسها، أفضل من الوقوف عند شرط لا مجال لتحقيقه في هذا الظرف الدولي. وعليه سيتيح الوضع الجديد للشعب القدرة على التجمع السياسي من جديد من أجل ترسيخ التغيير المطلوب مع الزمن.
يقول غرامشي “القديم يموت والجديد لم يولد بعد، وبين هذا وذاك تنمو الوحوش” وإن كان غرامشي يقصد الانتقال من نظامٍ اقتصاديٍّ إلى آخر، لكن كلامه ينطبق على واقعنا أيضاً، ويبقى إطالة أمد نمو الوحوش رهناً بوعي الحرية والتي لا يمكن لها أن تتواجد خارج العقل والإرادة واستيعاب أن طريق التغيير طويل ومعقد، يبدأ بشجاعة القول، ويستمر بعقلانية التفكير.
بواسطة Aron Lund | أكتوبر 25, 2018 | Roundtables, غير مصنف
Looking back at seven years of Syrian civil war, it is striking how many pivotal moments have been the result of foreign intervention and external meddling.
That is not to say events since 2011 have played out according to a foreign script. Portraying Syria’s civil war as a process masterminded by foreigners would be unfair to Syrians – and, given the state of Syria, probably also to the foreigners. In reality, although many outside powers have tried to rearrange the Syrian battlefield, most of their grand ambitions have sunk without rescue into Syria’s swamp of competing factions.
But although local realities have fixed the conflict’s terms and frustrated many meddling outsiders, Syrians have had little power over their fate. Once it was clear that President Bashar al-Assad would not bend to the demands of his opponents and that those opponents had waded so far into the struggle that they could no longer see a way back, events began to unfold according to their own infernal logic.
In that spiral of state breakdown and social polarization, what one side felt to be a desperate act of survival would be perceived by the other as unconscionable escalation and met in kind. The structural makeup of the warring sides largely determined their behavior from 2011 onward, with many little situational upsets and gambles but few big-picture surprises – except for those that came from outside Syria’s borders.
In retrospect, some such interventions stand out as especially important. Most have of course been thoroughly dissected.
For example, the 2013 chemical weapons crisis has gained near-mythical significance in both Syrian and US politics, becoming a strange sort of shibboleth. But though the events of that summer and autumn were undeniably important, it is hard to shake the impression that President Barack Obama’s decision to settle for a Russian-inspired deal instead of firing missiles into Syria did more to disperse the fog of politics from existing circumstances than to break new ground.
Had Obama opted to pull the trigger anyway, for a one-off display of overwhelming dominance, Assad’s regime would likely have received one more disfiguring scar, the conflict would have taken a few extra spins, and the question of Syria’s chemical weapons program would have lingered as an equal or greater problem than it is today.
But there is little reason to assume that the conflict’s fundamentals would have evolved along radically different paths. Given the way the regime worked and the opposition did not, Obama had no credible path to victory on terms compatible with US politics – he knew it, and was trapped by that understanding.
In some sense, the 2013 crisis was like Assad’s December 2016 retaking of eastern Aleppo: a devastating turning point for the opposition and its backers, but also, ultimately, an unsurprising outcome of the war’s configuration at that moment.
Less obvious, but no less important, were the roads not taken.
In June 2012, the late Kofi Annan, who at the time served as a joint envoy of the UN secretary-general and the Arab League, summoned a group of major international players to sign off on basic principles for a peaceful solution in Syria. What came out of the Geneva I meeting could not have ended the war – the actual plan was idealistic claptrap. But if a UN-guided framework for international talks had been brought forward with appropriate caution and a stringent focus on more achievable goals – like trying to limit civilian suffering, preventing regional spillover, and hashing out mutually acceptable red lines – Annan’s gambit might have succeeded in routinizing conflict management habits more effective than the angry shouting matches that were to follow.
A display of early diplomatic pragmatism and collaboration on second-order issues might have spared Syrians some of the heartbreak that followed. Or maybe the opportunity would have been squandered by clashing agendas and over-ambitious diplomats.
We will never know, because Russian-US collaboration instantly broke down in a clutter of irreconcilable statements, partly, it seems, due to the strains on the White House in election season. Not until 2015 were Syria’s main foreign actors brought into the same room again, in very different circumstances: then, as a result of the reality-check provided by a Russian military intervention.
Unlike the United States, Russia did have a stand-alone partner that it could work with on the ground toward an end state that would be ugly but acceptable to Moscow. That combination allowed for the deployment of untrammeled military power in Assad’s favor, which made all the difference.
The Russian intervention in September 2015 became one of the Syrian war’s decisive turning points. Ever since President Vladimir Putin’s air force went to work against the rebellion, it has slowly and brutally transformed the battlefield.
The intervention also wrought changes on the regional and international stage. Being browbeaten by Russia was what finally forced Turkey to shift its position, in mid-2016, to seek some form of understanding with Assad’s allies. That, too, was a game changer.
History writes itself in a terrible hand, which can take time to decipher. But it seems clear that Syria is now in a new and different phase of the war, which looks to be an endgame of sorts. Barring a regional war or a dramatic upset inside the Syrian, Russian, or Iranian regimes, all of which are structurally unsound in their own ways, the battle for Damascus is over: Assad has won.
What is left is a mostly Russian-piloted contest over Syria’s economic future and independence, including the refugee crisis and the fate of three remaining border enclaves: the US-controlled areas in Tanf and the northeast, and the Turkish-run northwest. Will these areas revert to central government control, or stay propped up by external patronage in a frozen conflict? Again, foreigners will call the shots.
[Other roundtable submissions can be found here]
بواسطة Syria in a Week Editors | سبتمبر 12, 2018 | Media Roundups, Syria in a Week
The following is a selection by our editors of significant weekly developments in Syria. Depending on events, each issue will include anywhere from four to eight briefs. This series is produced in both Arabic and English in partnership between Salon Syria and Jadaliyya. Suggestions and blurbs may be sent to info@salonsyria.com.
Idlib Countdown
8 September 2018
After the failure of the Russian-Turkish-Iranian summit in Tehran, the countdown for the governorate of Idlib, the last stronghold for the opposition which also includes fanatics, has started. This has raised concerns over a government offensive and the new humanitarian crisis that would follow.
Russian planes launched airstrikes on the headquarters of Tahrir al-Sham (previously Nusra) and Islamic Ahrar al-Sham in the governorate, leaving at least five dead, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR).
On Thursday, hundreds of civilians started to leave areas in Idlib in fear of an imminent attack. Displacement is focused in the southeastern countryside, which has been targeted for days by Syrian and Russian airstrikes and is expected to be the front for the first battles in case the offensive is initiated.
Eight international NGOs active in Syria called on “international leaders” meeting in Tehran and New York to “work together to avoid the worst humanitarian catastrophe since the onset of the conflict in Syria seven years ago,” which left more than three hundred and fifty thousand dead and millions of displaced people.
Russia, Iran, and Turkey are the sponsors of the Astana peace talks. These talks began after the Russian military intervention in the conflict in 2015, which was in effect a turning point in the conflict in favor of Bashar al-Assad’s government. These talks overshadowed the UN-led Geneva process. Before the summit, some media outlets mentioned the possibility of reaching an agreement on Idlib, however, the final statement said that the three presidents agreed to resolve the situation in Idlib “in a spirit of cooperation that has marked the Astana talk.”
“We have discussed concrete measures regarding a phased stabilization in the Idlib de-escalation zone, which stipulate… a possibility of making peace for those ready for dialogue,” Putin said after the summit, referring to militants willing to hand over their weapons. Erdogan and Rouhani called for the need to protect civilians, while UN Special Envoy to Syria Staffan de Mistura called for concrete measures at a UN Security Council session in New York on Friday.
“People should be granted safe passage to places of their own choosing if they want to leave,” de Mistura said through video conference. “We must allow the opening of sufficient number of protected voluntary evacuation routes for civilians in any direction: east, north, and south,” he added. De Mistura is scheduled to have talks next week in Geneva concerning the crisis in Idlib with representatives from Turkey, Russia, and Iran.
Government forces have been sending reinforcements to surrounding areas of Idlib, as artillery shelling has intensified in recent days on areas in the southeastern countryside with the participation of Russian planes. The UN says that displaced people constitute half of the governorate’s population, in addition to their presence in the adjacent governorates of Hama, Aleppo, and Lattakia.
Idlib: Fierce Airstrikes
9 September 2018
The governorate of Idlib was targeted by Russian airstrikes which were described as the “fiercest” since Damascus, along with its ally Moscow, threatened to launch an imminent attack on the region, according to the SOHR.
Russian planes carried out approximately sixty airstrikes in less than three hours on towns and villages in the southern and southeastern countryside of Idlib, as well as artillery and aerial bombardment with explosive barrels by government forces, leaving four civilians dead including two children, according to the SOHR.
Rami Abdul Rahman, head of the SOHR, told the AFP that the ongoing airstrikes are focused on headquarters of militant jihadist factions, some of which are empty and others are still operational. These strikes are considered the “fiercest” on northern Syria in the last month, as Russian and Syrian airstrikes have left fifty-three deaths, including forty-one civilians in the town of Orm al-Kobra in the western countryside of Aleppo near Idlib, according to Abdul Rahman.
These strikes come after the summit in Tehran that joined President Hasan Rouhani of Iran and President Vladimir Putin of Russia, who are allies with Damascus, in addition to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey, who supports the opposition.
Tahrir al-Sham (previously Nusra) controls most of Idlib, whereas other Islamic factions are deployed in the remaining areas. Government forces are present in the southeastern countryside.
Trilateral Differences in Tehran
7 September 2018
The presidents of Iran, Turkey, and Russia failed in overcoming their differences on the governorate of Idlib during the summit they held in Tehran yesterday. “Trilateral differences” emerged and prevented the establishment of a plan or ceasefire in northern Syria.
Iranian President Hasan Rouhani and Russian President Vladimir Putin stressed the need for their ally Damascus to regain control over the governorate of Idlib, which is home to three million people, half of which are displaced from other areas. “The legitimate Syrian government has the right to regain control over all its national territory, and it is obliged to do that,” said Putin.
On the other hand, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan cautioned that an attack on Idlib would lead to a “catastrophe.” The final statement of the summit did not include Erdogan’s call for a truce. After the summit, Putin and Erdogan separately met with the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
In the meantime, the UN Security Council held a session upon a call from the United States to discuss the situation in Idlib. UN Special Envoy to Syria Staffan De Mistura called for safe passages for civilians. The most prominent warnings came from the current president of the council, US Representative at the Security Council Nikki Haley, who stressed that “Iran and Russia will face serious consequences,” while other representatives cautioned from a “new humanitarian catastrophe” in Idlib.
Turkish Segregation in Northern Syria
6 September 2018
Ankara put forward a plan for the exit of armed factions from the Syrian governorate of Idlib, in an attempt to avoid a bloodbath that could follow a major offensive by Syrian government forces, according to a Turkish official newspaper on Friday.
The presidents of Russia, Turkey, and Iran met in Tehran on Friday to reach a solution for the seven-year Syrian conflict. Ankara, worried by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s forces’ attempt to regain the last stronghold of armed factions in Idlib, put forward a plan to avoid the offensive, according to Sabah newspaper. According to the plan, twelve armed groups, including Tahrir al-Sham, would lay down their arms and be evacuated from the governorate, the newspaper said, without revealing its sources.
The groups would be offered safe passage to a buffer zone, under the surveillance of the moderate opposition on condition they hand over weapons to a loose coalition of other rebel groups backed by Ankara, the newspaper continued. Foreign fighters in the group would be allowed to return to their home countries if they wish, Sabah said. But the groups who refuse to disarm and evacuate would be targeted by counter-terror operations.
As in other regions controlled by Ankara-backed rebels, Turkey will later train militants to ensure Idlib’s security. The plan will also secure the Russian Hmeimeim military base in Lattakia governorate, as well as mineral deposits in the region, the newspaper said.
Turkey, which has already listed Nusra and al-Qaeda as terror groups, added Tahrir al-Sham to the list last month. Ankara fears a major offensive on Idlib could spark an influx of refugees across its border, and warned a military solution would only cause a “catastrophe.” Turkey has been carrying out intensive negotiations with Russia for weeks. Analysts say Ankara could be prepared to accept a limited Russian-backed government offensive against extremist groups, even if it leaves the question of the long-term control of the governorate open for now.
A Test East of the Euphrates
8 September 2018
Eighteen members of Syrian government forces and Kurdish security forces (Assayish) were killed on Saturday in confrontations between the two sides in the northeastern city Qamishli, which they share control of, according to a statement from the Kurds and the SOHR.
Observers considered the confrontations as a “bloody test of strength,” as the government has two “security squares” in Qamishli and Hasakeh east of the Euphrates, which is under the US-backed Kurdish-Arab Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
The deaths included eleven Syrian military soldiers, who were on patrol when they reached a checkpoint for the Assayish in the city, and seven Kurdish fighters, in addition to injuries on both sides.
Assayish leadership said in a statement that its members opened fire in response to “the targeting by patrol soldiers of our forces using light and medium weapons. Our forces responded to this aggression, which left eleven government soldiers dead and two injured … Seven of our comrades were also killed with one injury.”
“A checkpoint for the Assayesh stopped a government military vehicle when it passed on a street in the city and asked its members to step out,” the SOHR said.
“When they refused to do this, shots were fired at the vehicle. Fierce clashes erupted between the two sides as they both brought in military reinforcement,” the SOHR added.
There were three empty government military pick-up trucks in the area where the clashes took place, and traces of bullets and blood on the ground were visible, the SOHR reported. A state of tension looms over the city as Kurdish security forces were put on high alert and called for additional military reinforcement, the SOHR noted.
Clashes between the two sides are a rare occurrence in the city where they share control. Government forces control the airport of the city and most Arab majority neighborhoods, whereas Kurdish forces control the larger part.
Bloody clashes between the two sides occurred in April of 2016 after a problem at one of the security checkpoints in the city. The clashes left dozens dead from both sides, in addition to civilian casualties.
Syrian government forces gradually withdrew from Kurdish majority areas as the conflict in Syria expanded in 2012, however, it retained governmental and administrational offices, as well as some military forces, especially in the cities of Hasakeh and Qamishli.
Syrian Kurds, who control around thirty percent of the county, initiated direct negotiations with Damascus in July. An agreement was reached regarding the formation of committees to advance the negotiations and place a road map that would lead to a de-centralized administration in the country. In the meantime, Damascus has reiterated its intention to restore control over all of its territory.
Washington: Sanctions and Threats
5 September 2018
The US Treasury Department said it has imposed sanctions on four individuals and five entities it accuses of facilitating transportation of oil shipments and financing to the Syrian government. A US envoy said that he sees “evidence that Damascus is getting ready to use chemical weapons in Idlib.” US Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin linked the sanctions to the imminent attack by Syrian government forces on Idlib, the last governorate controlled by the opposition in the north near the Turkish border.
Among the people hit by the sanctions is Mohammed al-Qatrji, whom the department describes as having facilitated commercial oil deals between the Syrian government and ISIS.
“Millions of innocent people in Idlib province are currently under the threat of an imminent attack from the Assad government, backed by Iran and Russia, under the pretense of targeting ISIS. At the same time, the Assad government has a history of trading with the terror group,” Mnuchin said. He also described the Syrian government as “murderous.”
The United States maintains a number of sanctions against the Syrian government, including a number of procedures that were imposed after the civil war erupted in 2011.
There is “lots of evidence” that chemical weapons are being prepared by Syrian government forces in Idlib region in northwest Syria, the new US representative for Syria said, warning any attack on the last big rebel enclave would be a “reckless escalation.”
“I am very sure that we have very, very good grounds to be making these warnings,” said Jim Jeffrey, who was named on 17 August as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s special adviser on Syria overseeing talks on a political transition in that country.
“Any offensive is to us objectionable as a reckless escalation … There is lots of evidence that chemical weapons are being prepared,” Jeffrey told a few reporters.
Jeffrey said an attack by Russian and Syrian forces, and the use of chemical weapons, would force huge refugee flows into southeastern Turkey or areas in Syria under Turkish control.
Chemical Weapons and Airstrikes, Once Again
8 September 2018
Chairman of the joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford said on Saturday that he is having “routine dialogue” with President Donald Trump about military options in case Syria ignores US warnings against using chemical weapons in an expected offensive on Idlib.
The United States has not decided whether to employ military force in response to a future chemical attack in Syria, Dunford said. “But we are in a dialogue, a routine dialogue, with the president to make sure he knows where we are with regard to planning in the event that chemical weapons are used,” he told a small group of reporters during a trip to India. Dunford later added: “He expects us to have military options and we have provided updates to him on the development of those military options.”
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has mobilized his army and allied forces on confrontation lines in the northwest, and Russian planes have joined in the bombardment of opposition militants there, in a prelude to a widely expected offensive despite objections from Turkey.
The White House warned that the United States and its allies would respond “swiftly and vigorously” if government forces used chemical weapons in Idlib.
Trump bombarded Syria twice because of its alleged use of chemical weapons in April of 2017 and April of 2018.
The commander of the French army also said that his forces are ready to hit Syrian targets if chemical weapons are used in Idlib.
Dunford declined to comment on US intelligence regarding potential Syrian preparation of chemical agents. When asked if there was a chance to avoid an attack on Idlib, Dunford said: “I do not know if there is anything that can stop it. It is certainly disappointing but perhaps not (surprising) that the Russians, the Turks and the Iranians were not able to come up with a solution yesterday.”
Dunford warned against the potential for a humanitarian crisis in Idlib and instead has recommended more narrowly tailored operations against militants there. “There is a more effective way to do counterterrorism operations than major conventional operations in Idlib,” he said.
بواسطة David Lesch | سبتمبر 3, 2018 | Cost of War, غير مصنف
He rocked back in his chair, looked up at the ceiling, closed his eyes, spread open his arms, and exclaimed in a triumphant tone, “I would be a hero.” This is how Syrian President Bashar al-Assad responded in the fall of 2008 to a question I asked him in a one-on-one meeting about engineering the return of the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. It was one of those authentic moments that was unscripted. Creating the comfort level necessary for Assad to respond in this fashion took years of meetings.
His response was not surprising. The Golan Heights is an emotional issue with Syrians. Ever since it was occupied by Israel in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, its return has been ingrained in most Syrians as the sine qua non of Syrian policy. I have witnessed Syrians, especially the older generation, from cabinet level ministers to cab drivers burst into tears in front of me when discussing the issue. They fail to recognize that it was the radical wing of their Baathist government at the time that was partly responsible for generating the tensions that ignited the conflict.
Nevertheless, a UN-monitored ceasefire between Israel and Syria in the Golan, brokered by the United States in 1974, became one of the success stories of UN peacekeeping, as nary a shot was fired in either direction across the border until the Syrian civil war broke out in 2011. However, this ceasefire did not prevent Israel and Syria from fighting each other by proxy, primarily in Lebanon. Despite this, there have been multiple occasions since the early 1990s Madrid peace process in which Syria and Israel have come tantalizingly close to a peace agreement.
Assad’s response to me was interesting in another way. It came within the context of our discussion of a potential quid pro quo, i.e. with the return of the Golan, the Syrian government would significantly degrade, if not totally abandon, its relationship with Iran, including Hizbullah in Lebanon. This was something at the time that Assad was seriously willing to consider. He understood the purely strategic nature of the Syrian-Iranian alliance forged by his father, one that provided strategic depth for Syria following the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1979. Otherwise, the two governments are practically polar opposites: one is a Persian Islamic republic and the other has been at the vanguard of secular Arab nationalism, which is the DNA of the ruling Baath party.
Even if Assad was truly serious about that grand bargain back then, this sort of quid pro quo will be significantly more difficult today. Along with the Russians, Iran and Hizbullah have been the most active supporters of Assad in the civil war, without whom the Syrian regime would probably no longer exist. Naturally, as Assad has improved his position, Israeli concerns in the conflict have shifted from wondering what chaos would ensue on its border should the Syrian regime fall to attempting to minimize the Iranian presence as much as possible. The Israelis have been intensely negotiating with Moscow, the new power broker in Syria, in an attempt to get the Russians to reduce Assad’s reliance on Iran, all the while forcefully making their point by carrying out military strikes against Iranian and Hizbullah positions in the country. This is, to say the least, a volatile situation.
Under these circumstances, it is understandable that Israel would not want to even consider negotiations with Damascus regarding the Golan. Why would it do so in such a strategically ambiguous environment and with a regime that is still, despite recent success, not entirely secure in power? After all, Israel captured the Golan in 1967 in order to prevent Syria from enjoying the strategic high ground and to gain control of tributaries that feed into the Jordan River, the life blood of Israel. As such, some Israeli officials, wanting to hold on to this territory indefinitely, have been urging the Trump administration, fresh off of its recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, to recognize Israeli sovereignty over the Golan, something Israel did in 1981.
This would be a mistake on many levels. First, many fear that with a US imprimatur, Israel could be encouraged to annex the West Bank and East Jerusalem, thus closing what little chance remains for a two-state solution with the Palestinians. Secondly, it would set an unhealthy precedent by which countries unilaterally absorb occupied territory without negotiation or international consent. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it would obviate the possibility of a peace accord with Syria for the foreseeable future. This could be an opportunity lost. For Assad, standing over a fractured and bleeding country, getting the Golan Heights back would be just the sort of slam dunk victory he needs in order to begin to rebuild his legitimacy with the Syrian people. With its “better the devil you know” mentality, Israel appears to have accepted Assad in power. Currently, it is allowing Syrian troops to re-establish authority along their side of the Golan. Going even further than that, returning the Golan under tight and reversible conditions could provide Damascus with the wherewithal for that which the Israelis most want: security.
The current ruling class in Syria is probably the last one where the loss of the Golan so completely framed their weltanschauung—and they are not getting any younger. On the other hand, the majority of the Syrian population is less than thirty years old. For them the civil war will forever rule their political psychology. And this generation, steeped in social media and the use of proxy servers, cannot be as brainwashed by government-controlled media or educational fiat as Syrians were in the past. The Golan could be seen by this younger generation as a bygone and misdirected obsession of their parents. Other things, such as the material and emotional rebuilding of the country, may be more important to them.
If a return of the Golan is delayed too much longer, any likely deal will be less generous to the Syrians. In turn, Assad will not be able to generate the internal support necessary to reduce the Iranian footprint. As much as the Russians might try, if diminishing Iran’s presence is not led by the Syrian government, it is unlikely to happen. Before the civil war, Assad showed on numerous occasions a willingness to counter Iran on important issues. It will be harder to do so now, which is why he needs lightning to strike. Assad’s views on this are worth exploring for both the Israelis and Americans. Certainly, any Syrian-Israeli agreement would asymmetrically demilitarize the Golan area in Israel’s favor, the parameters of which were agreed upon in the 1990s. With Assad remaining in power, this new approach to Syria could be a risk worth taking for Israel, but it can only do so if the Golan is there for the giving.
