Syria in a Week (12 – 19 November 2018)

Syria in a Week (12 – 19 November 2018)

The following is a selection by our editors of significant weekly developments in Syria. Depending on events, each issue will include anywhere from four to eight briefs. This series is produced in both Arabic and English in partnership between Salon Syria and Jadaliyya. Suggestions and blurbs may be sent to info@salonsyria.com.

 

US Vote on Golan

16 November 2018

The United States has, for the first time, voted against an annual resolution at the United Nations that condemns Israel’s occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights, in a move that contradicts with previous US administrations’ abstentions. A UN General Assembly committee approved the resolution with one hundred and fifty-one countries voting in favor for the non-binding resolution and fourteen abstentions, while only Israel and the United States voted against it.

The US Ambassador to the United States Nikki Haley said that the resolution is “useless” and “plainly biased against Israel,” justifying the US objection to the resolution by citing Iran’s military role in Syria. “The atrocities the Syrian regime continues to commit prove its lack of fitness to govern anyone. The destructive influence of the Iranian regime inside Syria presents major threats to international security,” she said.

Israel captured most of the Golan Heights from Syria in the 1967 war. It annexed the territory in 1981, a move not recognized internationally. The resolution considers Israel’s decision to occupy and annex the Golan “null and void,” and calls on Israel to rescind that decision. Israel’s Ambassador to the United Nations Danny Dannon welcomed the new US position, considering it as “another testament to the strong cooperation between the two countries.”

US President Donald Trump’s administration has taken a strong stand in favor of Israel, defying UN resolutions by moving the US embassy to Jerusalem and cutting financial aid to the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and the Palestinians.

The US ambassador to Israel, David Friedman, said in September he expected Israel to keep the Golan Heights “in perpetuity,” alluding to the possibility that his country might officially recognize the Golan as Israeli territory. However, national security advisor John Bolton said during his visit to Israel in August that this issue was not under discussion. Syria and Israel are still officially at war, although the truce line remained calm for decades until the Syrian conflict in 2011.

Ahead of the vote, US diplomat Samantha Sutton said the US position on the status of the Golan Heights had not changed, but added that the resolution was out of touch with the situation on the ground. “This resolution does nothing to address the increasing militarization of the Golan and the serious threats that confront Israel from Iran and Hezbollah’s presence in the area,” said Sutton. The resolution was adopted by the assembly’s fourth committee on decolonization. On the other hand, Syrian Ambassador to the United Nations said the Golan is Syrian and will go back to Syria “through peace or war.”

 

Three Objectives

13 November 2018

The US Envoy to Syria James Jeffrey repeated the US administration’s objectives from its presence in Syria which are defeating ISIS, removing Iranian forces, and reaching a political solution. In a press brief in Washington, Jeffrey said that the first objective was explicitly stressed more than once by President Donald Trump, and most recently at the UN General Assembly in September. Additional objectives of the administration in Syria include a ceasefire and the formation of a constitutional committee for the future stage.

Jeffrey said that the political process, which the UN Envoy Staffan de Mistura has been working on to end the conflict in Syria, is an irreversible process that seeks self-determination of the Syrian people with the help of the UN, in order to ease the conflict, which includes the ousting of all Iranian-led forces from Syria. Jeffrey did not say how Iranian forces would be forced to leave Syria, but he said that the Syrian government would pressure Iran to withdraw its troops from the country. This is the understanding reached with Russia during Bolton’s trip to Moscow last month and the meeting between President Trump and President Putin in Helsinki last summer. US forces will not directly confront Iranian forces on Syrian territory. Jeffrey expected that the US economic sanctions on Iran will contribute to this decision.

 

Chemical Confrontation

17 November 2018

Global powers are set to clash next week as the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) meets for the first time since it was rocked by allegations of Russian spying. The OPCW faces difficult talks over a new investigative team that will apportion blame for attacks in Syria. Moscow has warned the OPCW risks becoming a “sinking Titanic” over new powers which would also allow it to probe incidents like the Salisbury nerve agent attack on a Russian double agent. But the darkest shadow over the meeting will be the expulsion of four Russians accused by Dutch authorities in October of trying to hack into the OPCW’s computer system.

New OPCW director-general Fernando Arias who took over as chief earlier this year, will give the opening address at the meeting on Monday. He admitted in an interview with AFP on Monday that the OPCW was “going through a difficult moment” given recent events. However, Arias, insisted that the organization was “more needed than ever.” Arias clarified that “The main goal is to consolidate the organization and think that more than twenty-one years of success has to be preserved.”

Key member states including Russia, the United States, Britain, and France will all be able to have their say during the OPCW meeting, as will all one hundred and ninety-three countries involved in the body.

In recent years, OPCW role expanded to cover the investigation of a wave of chemicals attacks in the Syrian civil war, as well as the March 2018 Salisbury attack and the 2017 killing in Malaysia of a half-brother of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.

The meeting will discuss how to implement the new powers that member states agreed on at a special meeting in June to let the OPCW attribute blame for attacks.  Arias said the that the OPCW was setting up a “very small but very strong team that will be in charge of identifying the perpetrators in Syria”, involving around nine or ten members. The head of the team had already been picked and it would start work early next year, with a mandate to go back and try to point the finger for all chemical attacks in Syria since 2013. The OPCW is due soon to release a full report on a chemical attack in the Syrian town of Douma in April. An interim report said chlorine was detected but not nerve agents. Russia and Iran, which are closely allied to Syria, have strongly opposed the new powers, saying they risk making the OPCW too political.

 

Fifth Iranian University

16 November 2018

After the universities of al-Mustafa, al-Farabi, Azad Islami, and Faculty of Islamic Schools, Iran is getting ready to open the fifth Iranian university in Syria. The Iranian Minister of Science, Research, and Technology Mansour Gholami said that Iran intends to open a branch of the governmental university Tarbiat Modares in Syria.

According to the official Iranian news agency IRNA: “The university seeks to provide education for Syrian students in their country.” Gholami said that the reason for establishing this university is to prepare and graduate university professors. Additionally, the university will provide an opportunity for Syrian students to complete their graduate and post-graduate studies. According to Gholami: “Many Syrian students head to Iran for their post-graduate studies …We’re hoping to receive a larger number of students.” Unprecedentedly, the University of Hama has announced signing three agreements of scientific cooperation with three Iranian universities (Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Amirkabir University of Technology, and Al-Zahra College for Women.)

 

Turkish Warning and Opposition Preparations

17 November 2018

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan conveyed to his US counterpart Donald Trump Ankara’s expectation that the United States would end its support for the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG). Turkey considers the YPG as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is classified by the two countries as a terrorist organization.

Sources from the Turkish presidency said on Saturday that Erdogan also discussed in a telephone call with Trump on Friday the importance of close cooperation between Turkey and the US in the fight against all terrorist organizations. The sources added that the two presidents welcomed the new joint military patrols as part of the roadmap in the Syrian city of Manbij. They also discussed completing the process as soon as possible.Turkey and the US launched their third joint patrol in Manbij on Thursday as part of the roadmap signed between the two countries on 4th June, which provides the exit of YPG militants and joint supervision over security and stability until a local administration council is formed.

Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar said it is unacceptable for the US to provide arms and ammunition to the YPG. On the other hand, al-Hamzeh brigade, one of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) factions, is getting ready to participate in a potential Turkish military operation east of the Euphrates, where the Kurdish-Arab Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) take control with support from the US army.

The Turkish news agency Anatolia and Russia Today’s website said that the brigade is comprised of some six thousand and five hundred Arab, Turkman, and Kurdish fighters. The brigade was formed in 2015 to fight ISIS and has provided support for the Turkish forces in the Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch operations. “We are now taking preparations for a potential military operation against the YPG east of the Euphrates and we are training our soldiers for it,” said Saif Abo Bakr, a leader of one of the groups affiliated with the brigade which is undergoing military training in the Syrian city of I’zaz, according to Anatolia. “We do not have any problem with our brother Kurds there (east of the Euphrates). On the contrary, we will save them from the oppression of terrorism,” he added. Abo Bakr also said that the goal of the brigade, given that it is one of the FSA factions, is to save the people east of the Euphrates from the oppression of the terrorist PKK, stressing the importance of the preparations for the potential operation. “This terrorist organization is practicing oppression and pressure on the people in the area it occupies,” he added. “Before the Olive Branch operation, we provided support for our Kurdish brothers fleeing from the terrorists’ oppression, and we contributed to the formation of the Soqour al-Akrad brigade, which includes around one thousand and two hundred fighters.

On Friday, Turkish Vice President Fuat Oktay said that his country “will transfer the success achieved in the Syrian region of al-Bab to east of the Euphrates as well.” On 24 March, Turkish Forces and the FSA took control of Afrin through the Olive Branch operation after sixty-four days of its onset. In the Euphrates Shield operation, Turkish Forces and the FSA also took control of vast areas in the northern countryside of Aleppo, including the cities of al-Bab and Jarablus, from ISIS between August 2016 and March 2017, which allowed thousands of Syrians to go back to their homes.

 

Last ISIS Pocket

17 November 2018

On Saturday, the Syrian government forces took control of the last ISIS pocket which is located in Tolool al-Safa area, between the governorates of Sweidaa and Damascus Countryside, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR).

After bloody attacks on Sweidaa and its eastern countryside in July, which left more than two hundred and sixty civilians dead and thirty kidnapped, ISIS retreated to this rugged terrain famous for its steep cliffs and numerous caves. “Government forces took control on Saturday of Tolool al-Safa after ISIS militants retreats towards the Syrian desert in the east,” the head of the SOHR Rami Abdul Rahman told the AFP.

This area was subject to airstrikes for four months, which were intensified in recent weeks after government forces mobilized military reinforcements in the area and fought fierce battles against ISIS militants. Abdul Rahman estimated the number of ISIS fighters in the area to be between seven hundred and one thousand, likely to have withdrawn “under an agreement with the government forces that besieged them for weeks and targeted their positions with intensive airstrikes.”

The Syrian official news agency SANA said that army units advanced in Tolool al-Safa after “controlling” the highest hills in it. The units continue “to clear the liberated areas from ISIS remnants after eliminating a large number of them.”

Controlling this pocket comes days after Damascus announced the liberation of seventeen abducted women and children kidnapped by ISIS during the bloody attack on 25 July on the Druze-majority Sweidaa. ISIS had abducted thirty people, killing two of them, while an elderly woman died in captivity. Six hostages were freed last month under an agreement with the Syrian government to exchange prisoners. Three other civilians were killed before liberating the remaining hostages on the 8th of November.

In the past two years, ISIS suffered successive defeats in Syria. It is currently restricted to small pockets in the outskirts of Deir Azzor governorate and the Syrian desert east of Homs.

 

Coalition Casualties

17 November 2018

Forty-three people, mostly civilian family member of ISIS militants, were killed on Saturday in airstrikes by the US-led international coalition on the last jihadist pocket in Deir Azzor east of Syria. The pocket, which is comprised of several town and villages, has been targeted by coalition airstrikes for several weeks in support for an attack by the Kurdish-Arab SDF against ISIS in the region.

Head of the SOHR Rami Abdul Rahman told the AFP that thirty-six civilians, including seventeen children and twelve women from ISIS family members, were killed in coalition airstrikes that targeted Abo al-Hasan village, near the town of Hajjin in Deir Azzor. Seven other people were killed in these strikes but the SOHR could not determine “whether they were civilians or jihadists.” “This is the highest toll of deaths resulting from coalition airstrikes since the SDF launched their offensive” in the area on the 10th of September, according to the SOHR.

The coalition intensified its targeting of this pocket, leading to the deaths of dozens of ISIS family members. Thirty-eight people, including thirty-two civilians, were killed on Tuesday in similar attacks that targeted the town of al-Sha’feh. Since the onset of the offensive, the SOHR has reported the deaths of two hundred and thirty-four civilians including eighty-two children as a result of airstrikes by the coalition, which often denies intentionally targeting civilians in its strikes against jihadists. “The avoidance of civilian casualties is our highest priority when conducting strikes against legitimate military targets,” coalition spokesman Sean Ryan told AFP. He added that “the coalition takes allegations of civilian casualties seriously and investigates each one thoroughly.”

The SDF resumed its offensive against ISIS on Sunday after suspending it for ten days in response to the Turkish shelling of Kurdish positions in northern Syria. The SDF has not achieved any significant advances since the onset of its operations after ISIS recaptured all the positions that the SDF had advanced to in September.

The coalition estimates the number of ISIS militants in this pocket at around two thousand. The battle against ISIS “is still a difficult battle, and was made worse by ISIS’s use of civilians as human shields in areas such as Hajjin,” Ryan said. “They (ISIS fighters) take over places of worships and other areas like hospitals and use them as headquarters for planning,” he added.

ISIS often resorts to using civilians as human shields when it is besieged and battles come close, in an attempt to limit airstrikes against its positions and headquarters. The coalition has carried out one hundred and fifty airstrikes in the area between 4 and 10 November, according to Ryan. In addition to coalition airstrikes and shelling, the area has witnessed confrontations between ISIS militants and the SDF.

SDF commander Redur Khalil said Saturday that operations were ongoing. “There has been an advance on the ground in the past days but it is a careful advance due to fields of landmines, trenches, tunnels and barricades set up by ISIS,” he told AFP.

The SDF has brought in around one thousand and seven hundred fighters in the last two days from areas it controls to the last besieged ISIS pocket, in an attempt to eliminate the presence of fanatics east of the Euphrates.

 

Minor Amendments and Major Controversy

14 November 2018

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad made amendments to the controversial Law No. 10, which pertains to property ownership, allowing more time for owners to prove their ownership after the law stirred fears of refugees and their hosting countries.

Law No. 10, adopted in the 10th of April, gave the Syrian government the right to develop rural areas which were destroyed in the war or the areas that were constructed without official approval or title deeds.

The law had initially given people only thirty days to prove ownership of property and to apply for compensation, starting the date of officially announcing the development of an area. Aid agencies said that this time frame would be impossible for all refugees to meet.

On Sunday, Assad issued Law No. 42 that extends this period to one year and adds other amendments, which include granting owners more time to submit objections to the ordinary judiciary, after judiciary committees end their work stipulated in the law. Property owners who are already registered in the property registry do not have to prove their ownership.

Local authorities in Syria have not announced which areas that would be developed under Law No. 10, thus the effect of these procedures has not been tested yet. In the ongoing seven-year war in Syria, half of the twenty-two million population have fled their homes and around five million sought asylum abroad. In the chaos of war, many government buildings were destroyed, in addition to the property registry. Many refugees and displaced people lost their ID cards or property ownership documents, which means that it could take them a long time to prove property ownership.

As for refugees abroad, granting legal power to relatives or friends takes at least three months under Syrian law, even if all the correct documents are present. It also needs a security pass, which could pose a problem for those who fled areas that were under armed opposition control and were later retaken by the government forces.

Refugee hosting countries have expressed their concern over Law No. 10, saying that it could prevent refugees from going back if they were to lose their property in Syria.

Syria Turning Points: External Leverage and Its Limits

Syria Turning Points: External Leverage and Its Limits

Looking back at seven years of Syrian civil war, it is striking how many pivotal moments have been the result of foreign intervention and external meddling. 

That is not to say events since 2011 have played out according to a foreign script. Portraying Syria’s civil war as a process masterminded by foreigners would be unfair to Syrians – and, given the state of Syria, probably also to the foreigners. In reality, although many outside powers have tried to rearrange the Syrian battlefield, most of their grand ambitions have sunk without rescue into Syria’s swamp of competing factions.

But although local realities have fixed the conflict’s terms and frustrated many meddling outsiders, Syrians have had little power over their fate. Once it was clear that President Bashar al-Assad would not bend to the demands of his opponents and that those opponents had waded so far into the struggle that they could no longer see a way back, events began to unfold according to their own infernal logic.

In that spiral of state breakdown and social polarization, what one side felt to be a desperate act of survival would be perceived by the other as unconscionable escalation and met in kind. The structural makeup of the warring sides largely determined their behavior from 2011 onward, with many little situational upsets and gambles but few big-picture surprises – except for those that came from outside Syria’s borders.

In retrospect, some such interventions stand out as especially important. Most have of course been thoroughly dissected.

For example, the 2013 chemical weapons crisis has gained near-mythical significance in both Syrian and US politics, becoming a strange sort of shibboleth. But though the events of that summer and autumn were undeniably important, it is hard to shake the impression that President Barack Obama’s decision to settle for a Russian-inspired deal instead of firing missiles into Syria did more to disperse the fog of politics from existing circumstances than to break new ground.

 Had Obama opted to pull the trigger anyway, for a one-off display of overwhelming dominance, Assad’s regime would likely have received one more disfiguring scar, the conflict would have taken a few extra spins, and the question of Syria’s chemical weapons program would have lingered as an equal or greater problem than it is today.

But there is little reason to assume that the conflict’s fundamentals would have evolved along radically different paths. Given the way the regime worked and the opposition did not, Obama had no credible path to victory on terms compatible with US politics – he knew it, and was trapped by that understanding.

In some sense, the 2013 crisis was like Assad’s December 2016 retaking of eastern Aleppo: a devastating turning point for the opposition and its backers, but also, ultimately, an unsurprising outcome of the war’s configuration at that moment.

Less obvious, but no less important, were the roads not taken.

In June 2012, the late Kofi Annan, who at the time served as a joint envoy of the UN secretary-general and the Arab League, summoned a group of major international players to sign off on basic principles for a peaceful solution in Syria. What came out of the Geneva I meeting could not have ended the war – the actual plan was idealistic claptrap. But if a UN-guided framework for international talks had been brought forward with appropriate caution and a stringent focus on more achievable goals – like trying to limit civilian suffering, preventing regional spillover, and hashing out mutually acceptable red lines – Annan’s gambit might have succeeded in routinizing conflict management habits more effective than the angry shouting matches that were to follow.

A display of early diplomatic pragmatism and collaboration on second-order issues might have spared Syrians some of the heartbreak that followed. Or maybe the opportunity would have been squandered by clashing agendas and over-ambitious diplomats.

We will never know, because Russian-US collaboration instantly broke down in a clutter of irreconcilable statements, partly, it seems, due to the strains on the White House in election season. Not until 2015 were Syria’s main foreign actors brought into the same room again, in very different circumstances: then, as a result of the reality-check provided by a Russian military intervention.

Unlike the United States, Russia did have a stand-alone partner that it could work with on the ground toward an end state that would be ugly but acceptable to Moscow. That combination allowed for the deployment of untrammeled military power in Assad’s favor, which made all the difference.

The Russian intervention in September 2015 became one of the Syrian war’s decisive turning points. Ever since President Vladimir Putin’s air force went to work against the rebellion, it has slowly and brutally transformed the battlefield.

The intervention also wrought changes on the regional and international stage. Being browbeaten by Russia was what finally forced Turkey to shift its position, in mid-2016, to seek some form of understanding with Assad’s allies. That, too, was a game changer.

History writes itself in a terrible hand, which can take time to decipher. But it seems clear that Syria is now in a new and different phase of the war, which looks to be an endgame of sorts. Barring a regional war or a dramatic upset inside the Syrian, Russian, or Iranian regimes, all of which are structurally unsound in their own ways, the battle for Damascus is over: Assad has won.

What is left is a mostly Russian-piloted contest over Syria’s economic future and independence, including the refugee crisis and the fate of three remaining border enclaves: the US-controlled areas in Tanf and the northeast, and the Turkish-run northwest. Will these areas revert to central government control, or stay propped up by external patronage in a frozen conflict? Again, foreigners will call the shots.

 

[Other roundtable submissions can be found here]

Syria Turning Points: The International and the Local

Syria Turning Points: The International and the Local

The Syrian conflict has witnessed seven years of overwhelming violence and death. An endless cycle of confrontation and ceasefire, punctuated by repeated aborted negotiation attempts, have all further complicated and prolonged what we have come to understand as the Syrian Civil War. Every aspect of the conflict, becomes either embroiled in discussion or debate, results in no action, or adds to the hardships faced by the Syrian population.  Throughout the conflict, scholars and experts have debated the idea of turning points or critical junctures.

When examining the idea of critical turning points, it is imperative that we consider events not just at the macro-level. What cannot be overemphasized is the fact that each of these turning points, while changing the broader trajectory of the conflict, also had very real, life-altering consequences for local communities. Through merging the idea of the local into the discussion of the macro, we gain a better understanding of the reality of some of the critical junctures within the Syrian conflict.

While there are many potential turning points, I identify three critical turning points in the Syrian conflict. They are as follows: the militarization of the Syrian uprising in early 2011, Obama’s failure to uphold his red-line declaration in 2013, and the 2015 commencement of Russian military intervention. Each of these situations altered the trajectory of the conflict dramatically, not just on a macro-level, but for local communities.

The militarization of the peaceful protests that began in March 2011 transformed the Syrian uprising into a bloody, violent full-scale military conflict. When the protests began in March 2011, Syrians across the country raised their voices in protest against the repression and tyranny of the Assad regime. In response, the government forces employed violence, cracking down on protesters. These events would escalate into more violence from the regime as well as the protesters. This initial event would usher the uprising in a direction that would leave a mark on Syrian history forever. The militarization of the opposition changed Syria from a country facing civil unrest to a country ensnared in conflict. Moreover, the escalating level of violence led to the formation of various opposition groups. These groups would develop different identities, sponsors, and alliances; resulting in a myriad of armed groups which would subsequently fractionalize the opposition and result in further fighting and violence. From this point on, the Syrian uprising had transformed into a civil war.

The escalation from protests to conflict altered the way the international community viewed Syria, but more importantly, it changed and disrupted the lives of Syrians. The militarization of the conflict would lead to the regime tightening its grasp on state services, leading to access challenges for Syrians. The fighting across the Syrian geography would disrupt daily life, prevent children from attending school, create financial problems for families, or lead Syrians to flee their homeland. These disruptions in daily life would be further exacerbated when the international system began to intervene and to strengthen certain parts of the armed opposition.

The second turning point was the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons and President Obama’s subsequent failure to uphold his red-line declaration in 2013. In August 2013, Assad and his forces used Sarine gas near Damascus, killing more than fourteen hundred civilians. The US intelligence assessment asserted that the regime used chemical weapons as a method to push Syrian opposition forces back from rebel-held territory when government forces were unable. With the failure of President Obama and the United States to provide any actionable response, the Assad regime became even less fearful of any foreign intervention. The regime action and the US inaction altered the geopolitics surrounding the Syria conflict. Given the lack of direct military action or an escalation in support to rebel groups by the United States, other countries such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia also began to disengage. The stalled support created a feeling of abandonment within the armed opposition. The lack of intensified engagement by the United States, prompted bolder action by the Assad regime, Iran, and eventually Russia. However, beyond the macro-level implications, this event also had large ramifications for the Syrian population. The chemical weapons attack signaled that Syrians’ fears would not be limited to airstrikes or gunfire, but would have to also include weapons such as sarine gas.

The third critical turning point that altered the conflict on both the macro and micro level was  Russian military intervention. In September 2015, Russia launched airstrikes that were reported to target ISIS, however US intelligence reports argued that the airstrikes targeted key Assad opponents, including US-backed units. On an international level, the Russian-intervention altered the geopolitical dynamics. The Russian intervention solidified the alliance between Assad, Iran, and Russia, but also further demonstrated the lack of heightened support by Western actors. Moreover, as a result of this inaction, it became even more apparent to opposition groups and the Syrian population that they could not expect help or aid from the United States or other western countries. Rather, it would be the Russians who would ultimately guide how the Syrian conflict would unfold and negotiations for the conflict’s termination. Russian actions under the  intervention have attempted to restrict the number of Russian casualties, but has led to higher civilian casualties due to less discriminate military tactics. The attempt to restrict Russian casualties raises the level of violence and the number of threats for Syrians. Now they must prepare for a bombing or chemical weapon attack from their own government, as well as attacks from a world superpower.

Following these events and so many other daily tragedies, the Syrian population has remained isolated from the international community. These three critical turning points have contributed to further deterioration of daily life for Syrians and altered geo-politics in the region. While the Assad regime has escalated its attacks through chemical weapons, international powers have delineated new rules and retained new spheres of influence. The failure of US engagement in the conflict, both militarily and diplomatically, along with the Russian-Syrian alliance has allowed for Russia, Iran, and Syria to largely control the results of the Syrian conflict. With the United States continuing its inaction to implement change or alter the status quo, other countries have also taken a less direct approach. As a result, the Syrian conflict continues as the Syrian population faces even more hardship.

 

[Other roundtable submissions can be found here.]

Syria in a Week (8 October 2018)

Syria in a Week (8 October 2018)

The following is a selection by our editors of significant weekly developments in Syria. Depending on events, each issue will include anywhere from four to eight briefs. This series is produced in both Arabic and English in partnership between Salon Syria and Jadaliyya. Suggestions and blurbs may be sent to info@salonsyria.com.

 

Change in Discourse: Temporary or Permanent?

Will the fate of the settlement in Idlib be different from those in other areas that preceded it in the Syrian war, especially with all actors insisting on their strategies and Russia and the Syrian government affirming their goal in having the Syrian army regain control over all the country? Will the Russian-Turkish negotiations determine the “price” for the agreement on Idlib’s fate, including their position regarding the Kurdish issue in Syria?

 

Russian “Keenness”: No Major Operations in Idlib

2 – 3 October 2018

Reuters

Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Wednesday that the de-escalation zone in Idlib was effective and that there are no plans for major military operations in the area. “And that means, no large scale military actions are expected there … Military action for the sake of military action is unnecessary,” he said. However, Putin added that Moscow wants to see all foreign troops withdraw from Syria eventually, including Russian forces. He also said that the presence of US forces in Syria is “a breach of the UN charter.”

It is noteworthy that the Syrian government, through a statement by Foreign Minister Walid Moulem, confirmed that Turkey is capable of carrying out its obligations under the Idlib agreement.

 

Turkish Keenness … Withdrawal and Elections

2, 4, 6 October 2018

Reuters

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said on Thursday that Turkey would not leave Syria until the Syrian people hold elections. “Whenever the Syrian people hold an election, we will leave Syria to its owners after they hold their elections,” Erdogan said at a forum in Istanbul. He also said that Turkey is not experiencing difficulty in conducting talks with radical groups in Idlib, the last major area still under the control of armed opposition.

Erdogan pledged to strengthen Turkish observations posts in Idlib.

The Turkish role was manifested in armed opposition groups withdrawing their heavy weaponry from the demilitarized zone agreed upon by Turkey and Russia in north-west of Syria. The National Front for Liberation said in a statement that the process of withdrawing heavy weapons had begun, but the fighters would remain in their positions within the demilitarized zone. Opposition forces in northern Syria said on Tuesday that Tukey had confirmed that Russian forces would not deploy in the area.

On the other hand, Erdogan said on Monday that Turkey is seeking to secure the area east of the Euphrates in northern Syria by eliminating the Kurdish People’s Protection Units, in continuation of the Turkish strategy towards the Kurds.

 

Iranian Keenness … Response to Ahwaz in Boukamal

2 October 2018

Reuters

Iranian “rage” over the Ahwaz attack burst in Syria as Iran said that the missile attack it carried out in Syria on Monday had killed forty “top leaders” in ISIS.

Iran fired six missiles at targets in Boukamal and Hajin regions in eastern Syria, in retaliation for the attack on a military parade in Iran on 22 September that killed twenty-five people, nearly half of them members of the Revolutionary Guard.

 

Israeli Keenness

3, 4, 5 October 2018

Reuters

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on Sunday he will meet Russian President Vladimir Putin soon to discuss security coordination over Syria, amid friction with Moscow over Israel’s air operations.

On Tuesday, Russia said it had upgraded Syria’s air defenses with the S-300 missile system, after accusing Israel of indirect responsibility for the downing of a Russian spy plane by Syrian forces as they fired on attacking Israeli jets last month. There have been no reports of Israeli air strikes in Syria since the Russia plane was shot down.

The French foreign ministry said on Friday that Russia’s deployment of the S-300 system in Syria risks fueling military escalation and hindering prospects for a political solution to the seven-year civil war.

General Joseph Votel, who oversees US forces in the Middle East, said that the deployment seemed to be an effort by Moscow to help shield “nefarious activities” by Iranian and Syrian forces in the country.

 

German Keenness Against Chemical Weapons

3 October 2018

Reuters

German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas said on Wednesday that his country and the United States agreed on the need to do everything possible to prevent the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Maas comments came after a meeting with his US counterpart Mike Pompeo in Washington. He also said that Pompeo understood the scope of the political debate in Germany concerning the potential participation in any US-led military response in the event of a chemical attack.

 

Aid Keenness and Economies of War

4 October 2018

Reuters

The Unites States Agency for International Development and the British Department for International Development found out that Bab al-Hawa border crossing in north-western Syria is being used by extremist groups to collect taxes from aid trucks. Therefore, they directed their partners to stop all use of the border crossing starting from 26 September.

Tahrir al-Sham, the main Islamic group in Idlib governorate, is designated a terrorist organization by the United Nations, the United States, and Turkey. Bab al-Hawa is the only official border crossing connecting Turkey to the Idlib governorate, where an estimated 2.1 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance. Around two thousand and two hundred and eighty-four trucks carrying aid went through the crossing in the first eight months of this year, according to David Swanson of the United Nation’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

 

US Keenness for the Kurds!

2 & 3 October 2018

Reuters

Kurdish officials said that a series of visits by US diplomats to Syria in the last two months to renew preparations to discuss the future of the country indicate a long-term commitment. US forces are seen as a shield against Turkish attacks from the north and any attempt by the Syrian government to seize the region’s wheat and oil fields.

The number of US diplomats in Syria has doubled as ISIS fighters near a military defeat, US Defense Secretary James Mattis said on Tuesday. “Our diplomats there on the ground have been doubled in number. As we see the military operations becoming less, we will see the diplomatic effort now able to take root,” Mattis said.

Syria in a Week (17 September 2018)

Syria in a Week (17 September 2018)

The following is a selection by our editors of significant weekly developments in Syria. Depending on events, each issue will include anywhere from four to eight briefs. This series is produced in both Arabic and English in partnership between Salon Syria and Jadaliyya. Suggestions and blurbs may be sent to info@salonsyria.com.

 

Idlib at Sochi After Tehran

14 September 2018

Turkey launched a wide diplomatic campaign regarding the potential battle in Idlib. Turkey said that it has held talks with all sides in the Syrian conflict to prevent government forces from carrying out a full-scale attack on Idlib, which is under the control of the armed opposition.

A summit was held between the presidents of Russia and Turkey, who support rival parties in the anticipated battle. The summit comes after the failure to reach a ceasefire during the trilateral meeting in Tehran between Iran, Russia, and Turkey. However, the Idlib front witnessed a decline in the number of airstrikes, and militants in the Syrian opposition said that some government forces withdrew from front lines in northwest of Syria in recent days.

Turkey also held talks with foreign ministers of a number of countries and is having talks “with all parties in Syria” to reach a ceasefire in Idlib, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said. He reiterated Turkey’s call to carry out precise operations against fanatics, including Tahrir al-Sham, instead of launching a full-scale random attack. “We are ready to cooperate with everyone to fight terrorist organizations. But killing everyone – civilians, women, and children – like this in the name of fighting terrorist organizations is not right and is not humane,” he added. (Reuters)

Turkey reinforced a dozen military positions inside Idlib, which lies across its southern border and is controlled by Turkish-backed groups and jihadist fighters, in an attempt to deter the government offensive. Troops, armored vehicles, and equipment have been sent to the Syrian border. “We have a military presence there and if that military presence is damaged or attacked in any way, it would be considered an attack on Turkey and would therefore receive the necessary retaliation,” a Turkish security source said. A senior official in the Syrian opposition said that Turkey sent dozens of armored vehicles and tanks, in addition to hundreds of special forces troops to Idlib. A source in the opposition told Reuters that Turkey also increased its reinforcement to opposition forces in Idlib in recent days, including ammunition and rockets.

On the other hand, Interfax news agency reported Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov as saying that his country will continue to bomb military targets in the Syrian governorate of Idlib if there is a need, however, it will establish safe corridors for civilians to flee. During his visit to Berlin, Lavrov said that Russian air forces will destroy what he described as terrorist weapons manufacturing facilities in Idlib once they are observed, however, it will also encourage local reconciliation agreements. The official Russian news agency reported the Kremlin as saying that Putin discussed the situation in Idlib with members of Russia’s Security council on Friday and expressed his concern for the militant activities there. (Reuters)

The Kurds were not absent from the Russian-Turkish “negotiations” on Idlib. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said in a letter to The New York Times published on Thursday that the People’s Protection Units (YPG) might help the Syrian government in the offensive on Idlib. The YPG were a strong ally for the United States in its war on the Islamic State. However, Turkey considers them a terrorist organization and an extension of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party, which has been leading an armed rebellion against the Turkish state since the eighties. Ankara has repeatedly expressed its anger over US support for the YPG. (Reuters)

 

No Chemical Weapons or Refugees!

10 – 14 September 2018

Reuters

United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres on Tuesday appealed to Russia, Iran, and Turkey to “spare no effort to find solutions that protect civilians” in the Syrian governorate of Idlib and said it was “absolutely essential” a full-scale battle was avoided.

“This would unleash a humanitarian nightmare unlike any seen in the blood-soaked Syrian conflict,” he told reporters. “I understand that the present situation in Idlib is not sustainable and the presence of terrorist groups cannot be tolerated. But fighting terrorism does not absolve warring parties of their core obligations under international law,” said Guterres.

The UN cautioned that an offensive on Idlib would cause a humanitarian crisis in a region populated by three million people. Turkey, which already hosts three and a half million Syrian refugees, said that it cannot receive a new influx of refugees. The Turkish Presidential Spokesperson Ibrahim Kalin said that officials from Turkey, Russia, France, and Germany agreed during their talks in Istanbul on Friday that any attack on Idlib would have serious consequences and that a political solution must be reached. Kalin said that mass displacement of refugees from Syria would be a problem not only for his country but for the European Union as well. “We expect maintenance of Idlib’s current status, protection of civilians, and prevention of a humanitarian crisis there,” he told reporters.

The UN said it is preparing aid for around nine hundred thousand people who might flee in case the fighting intensifies. The opposition is accusing Russia and its allies of attacking hospitals and civil defense centers to force the opposition to surrender, in a replay of major military attacks on areas such as Aleppo and eastern Ghouta. The UN said that it has notified Russia, Turkey, and the United States of the GPS coordinates of two hundred and thirty-five schools, hospitals, and other civilian sites in Idlib, in hope the move will protect them from being attacked.

Four hospitals in Hama and Idlib have been hit by air strikes in the past week, constituting “serious attacks” that violate international law, Panos Moumtzis, UN regional humanitarian coordinator for the Syria crisis said. He called on all warring sides to ensure that civilians in Idlib were able to move freely in any direction to flee fighting or bombing, and for aid workers to have access to civilians. UN figures show that around thirty-eight thousand and three hundred people have fled Idlib this month. Thirty-three people were killed and sixty-seven others injured in aerial and ground bombardment from 4 to 9 September.

On Wednesday, French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drain warned that the indiscriminate bombing of Idlib could amount to war crimes. “The hypothesis of war crimes cannot be excluded … once one begins to indiscriminately bomb civilian populations and hospitals,” Jean-Yves Le Drian told parliament members.

Germany will make an autonomous decision on whether to participate in any military response to a future Syrian chemical weapons attack in line with international law and the German constitution, Foreign Minister Heiko Maas said on Wednesday. On Wednesday, German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen said that Germany and other countries have to do all they can to prevent the use of chemical weapons in Syria, adding that a “credible deterrent” was needed.

The United States, Britain, and France agreed that another use of chemical weapons by the Syrian government would result in a “much stronger response” compared to previous air strikes, President Donald Trump’s national security advisor John Bolton said on Monday.

On Wednesday, UN investigators said that they had documented three uses of banned chlorine gas by Syrian government forces that constituted war crimes, and urged major powers to help avert a “massacre” in the final battle for Idlib. In their latest report they said the attacks caused injuries in the Damascus suburb of Douma and in Idlib in the northwest in January and early February. They also said that they were still investigating a suspected chemical attack in Douma on 7 April that killed at least forty-nine people and wounded up to six hundred and fifty others.

 

Phosphorus Bombs

9 September 2018

Reuters

The Russian army said on Sunday that two US F-15 fighter jets dropped phosphorus bombs on Deir Azzour governorate in Syria on Sunday, TASS news agency and the official Russian news agency reported, an allegation the United States has denied.

The airstrikes targeted the village of Hajin and resulted in fires, but there was no information about casualties, the Russian army said. A Pentagon spokesperson denied that US planes dropped phosphorus bombs. “At this time, we have not received any reports of any use of white phosphorous… None of the military units in the area are even equipped with white phosphorous munitions of any kind,” said Commander Sean Robertson. Human rights groups have said that the US-led coalition against the Islamic State has used white phosphorus munition over the course of the Syrian conflict. The bombs can create thick white smoke screens and are used as incendiary devices. Human rights group criticize use of the munitions in populated zones because they can kill and maim by burning people to bone. (Reuters)

 

Nassib Border Crossing Talks

13 September 2018

Reuters

On Thursday, an official Jordanian source said that Syria and Jordan held the first technical talks to open a major border crossing in southern Syria, which was recaptured from the opposition last July. Syria hopes to reopen the vital border crossing to revive its shattered economy and rebuild territory under its control. The source told Reuters that the meeting took place on Wednesday on the Jordanian side of the border upon a request from Syria. He said that technical groups started talks concerning the required practical arrangements to reopen the border crossing from customs to security. “The meetings will continue to put a complete view of all the arrangements linked to reopening the crossings in the coming period,” the source added. (Reuters)

 

Elections During War!

16 September 2018

Enab Baladi

Elections for local administration councils were held on Sunday, 16 September, in Syria, in areas under government forces control. According to the official news agency SANA, voters can exercise their right to vote with their personal IDs.

More than forty thousand candidates are competing for eighteen thousand and four hundred and seventy-eight seats in all governorates, SANA said. According to the election decree, applications are submitted before a certain time ahead of the election day. Each governorate issues its own laws, and an election committee is formed on the national level for sub-councils (cities, towns, and municipalities). Governorates also specify the number of seats and electoral procedures. Nomination is open to all people. Two lists are issued, the first (previously known as the “Progressive Front List”) is for the Baathists and is currently called the “National Unity List”. The National Leadership of the Arab Baath Socialist Party is responsible for issuing this list. The other list contains independent figures, and gets only thirty percent of the total list of candidates.

These elections are the first of their kind since the decree of 2011. The last local elections after the onset of the Syrian revolution were the legislative elections in 2016 and the presidential elections in 2014.