بواسطة Katty Alhayek | نوفمبر 21, 2017 | Roundtables, غير مصنف
Katty Alhayek (KA): What are the main challenges today for reconstruction efforts and rebuilding the future of Syria?
Rabie Nasser (RN): The Syrian Center for Policy Research identifies the main challenges for the reconstruction efforts categorize as first, the surviving of political tyranny and increasing compromises that accept the hegemony of subjugating powers. The political oppression was a core root of the social movement and during the conflict the pre-conflict political oppression aggravated to political tyranny and fundamentalism. Those internal and external powers which abuse authority and violated all human and social rights and norms cannot build an inclusive reconstruction that is needed to address the Syrian catastrophe. Second, the identity politics is a major challenge to reconstruction process as it degrades the social cohesion; in this regard, justice and legitimate institutions are a core part of building the trust between people and with the institutions to create the space to social relation recovery. Third, the injustice and deprivations including deaths, injuries, torturing, kidnapping, forced displacement, poverty, difficult living conditions, among others; increased the inequity among the population which is a major and urgent challenge that need enormous institutional capacities, well designed policies, and material resources. Fourth, the expanding of conflict economy and conflict related crony elite which contribute to destruct to a large extent the economic resources, relations, and institutions; and reallocate the remaining resources to fueling conflict and subordinating society. Those four challenges form a well established system that created incentives on local, national and international levels, which makes tackling it an exceptionally difficult cause.
KA: Syrian children’s health and education were significantly affected by the ongoing war; how do you think the investments in reconstruction efforts should address children’s well being, and the so-called “lost generation,” specifically in the worst affected areas of the country?
RN: The Syrian society is young in that children below 18 years old consists almost half of the population and the conflict affected harshly their lives as around 13 per cent of the conflict related deaths is children. Since 2012 around half of the school age children did not enroll in the education system including the child refugees. Moreover, the quality of education has deteriorated in terms of quality and conditions. The dispersion of families and loss of breadwinners, in addition to poor living conditions, lack of access to health, and the suffering of malnutrition, trauma, and the loss of normal life of children are some examples of the burden on the new generation of Syrians. Furthermore, the refugee children are growing up in different environments, cultures, languages, values, living conditions which creates substantial challenges to reintegrate them in the Syrian society.
The burden of conflict is not equally distributed across the Syrian children, which increases the inequity between children in terms empowerment and opportunities. Countering the challenges, apart from the humanitarian, support needs inclusive institutions that address the deprivations of the most vulnerable groups of Syrians and this depends to a large extent on the way of exit from the armed conflict.
KA: Foreign funding and investment plays a crucial role in post-conflict reconstruction efforts. How do you see the role of foreign investments in the future of Syria and which countries do you think might be the key players?
RN: The total economic losses until the end of 2015 reached USD 255 billion, which is equivalent to around five times of the GDP in 2010. This enormous loss included the destruction of the infrastructure and reduction in the economic activities according to SCPR. The loss includes the severe deterioration of economic foundations such as population, human capital, institutions, and resources. Furthermore, the conflict economy reshaped the system of incentives and reallocated the resources and opportunities to the influential powers within the armed conflict. Therefore, the challenges of funding of reconstruction are related to the volume of the losses, and the complicated new conflict economy actors and incentives, and the hegemony of warlords over the Syrian economy.
The corner of funding is related to the shift in institutions to overcome conflict and build efficiency, just and inclusive institutions that rebuild trust between Syrians and between them and the political institutions. The space for society is crucial to participate in designing the reconstruction and the identification of the path for peace that overcomes the conflict’s impact and roots. Legitimate and inclusive institutions can create the environment to attract external funding and unitize it in line with the Syrians priorities. The other part of funding is covered by the Syrians’ participation in the process that will decrease the costs and increase the benefits for them and reduce the potential burden of depending only on the external funding.
However, if the political oppression and conflict economy elite prevail after the end of the conflict, the Syrian economy will be attracting many foreign investors due to the huge opportunities created by the destruction regardless of the inclusivity, justice, and sustainability. In this scenario, the participation of the Syrian society will be at a minimum and inequality will surge with the elite’s control of the opportunities. Finally, the countries and investors who will contribute depends on the scenarios and nature of institutions in the post-conflict period.
KA: Can you share with us what are your future projects?
RN: As a researcher in the Syrian Center for Policy Research, I am working on the Alternative Development Paradigm for the future of Syria which is an initiative by almost 50 experts who are working on developing policy options for the Syria challenges in line with the Syrian context. Additionally, the center is working on assessing the socioeconomic impact of the conflict in regular basis.
Rabie Nasser is a co-founder of the Syrian Center for Policy Research, working as researcher in macroeconomic policies, inclusive growth, poverty, and crisis socioeconomic impact assessment. He obtained a B.A. in Economics from Damascus University 1999. In 2000 he obtained a Diploma in Financial and Monetary Economics from Damascus University. He has MSc in Economics from Leicester University, UK. Before joining The Syrian Development Research Center, Nasser worked for the State Planning Commission as Chief Economist and Director General of Macroeconomic Management Directorate in 2004 and 2005. Then, he worked as an Economic Researcher in Arab Planning Institute in Kuwait. Then he was a senior researcher working between 2009-2011 for the Syrian Development Research Center that conducts studies, evaluations, and applied research.
بواسطة Katty Alhayek | نوفمبر 21, 2017 | Roundtables, غير مصنف
Katty Alhayek (KA): You published recently an article titled “Will China Get the Lion Share in Syria Reconstruction?,” in which you argue that China is set to play a bigger role in the reconstruction efforts in Syria. Can you elaborate more on that and what are the opportunities that you think might help Beijing’s future involvement in Syria?
Eugenio Dacrema (ED): First of all, it must be said that the Syrian post-conflict reconstruction is emerging as a very difficult undertaking, and unfortunately not only because of the huge destruction caused by the conflict. The problem, right now, is primarily to pinpoint the sources of funds, taking into account that, depending on the estimations, from 100 to 200 billion dollars will be necessary. Furthermore, the conditions of the final settlement that are emerging (with Assad in power and no involvement of the opposition) don’t help.
It is, basically, a question of resource availability and political will. Actors who would have the political will in most cases lack resources, and those who have resources lack the political will to support the reconstruction under Assad’s uncompromising rule. Take, for example, the case of Russia and Iran, the two parties that until now have supported Assad’s military effort the most. For different reasons, both lack the economic resources to invest heavily in Syria’s post-conflict reconstruction. On the contrary, other actors such as the rich Gulf monarchies, who were among the biggest sponsors of the opposition, would hardly give significant amounts of money to the regime to reconstruct the country. The same can be said of the US, which is also reducing significantly its foreign aid programs. This leaves basically two actors endowed with significant resources and who may have the political will to invest heavily in Syria: The European Union (and its member states) and China. The EU needs stabilization in its Mediterranean neighborhood and needs the flow of refugees to stop and possibly to reverse. To achieve this, the right conditions in Syria must be created to allow refugees from the EU and Syria’s neighboring countries to come back. This may lead the EU to set some sort of conditionality on the provision of its aid in order to force the regime to create such conditions. However, I think there are many signs showing that this last outcome, the return of most of the refugees, is not welcome by the regime. Many of the refugees left especially because of Assad’s political and military actions, and the regime knows that, although a few were materially part of the armed uprising, many of them sympathize for the opposition. Several polls conducted among refugees in Lebanon or Germany (these are the ones I know of) demonstrate it. In sum, the regime needs funds to reconstruct, the EU may provide a good part of them, but at conditions that the regime may strongly dislike.
On the contrary, China may emerge as a provider of funds with no political constrains. China has been quietly on the side of the regime since the beginning. Although this news did not often reach the main outlets, China has sent military advisors to the Syrian army, nominated a special envoy for the Syrian crisis (the second in China’s history after the one for Sudan), and, more recently, participated in the first economic fair in Damascus after 2011 with a big delegation. This year Chinese representatives have discretely taken contacts with organizations and NGOs operating in Syria to establish partnerships and collaborations. Finally, the Chinese authorities publicly promised the first 2 billion dollars for the reconstruction, and many signs suggest that this may represent just the beginning. The rumor is that the Chinese leadership may decide to include Syria in its One Belt One Road plan to connect China to Europe and the Mediterranean through infrastructures and new maritime and land ways. Syria may become a hub for Chinese products and trades on the Mediterranean, and the Syrian government seems to be interested. The Syrian embassy in Beijing has been very active in the last months.
KA: In this article you also discuss a set of obstacles that could limit the Chinese role in Syria-related investments and reconstruction. What are these obstacles and to what degree they can affect Beijing’s plans in Syria?
ED: Sure, there are also several obstacles. First of all, it would not be the first time that China supports a bloody dictatorship. It has been the case, for example, in Sudan in 2007, when, to protect its investments in the local oil industry, China devoted a lot of political and diplomatic capital to protect internationally the Omar al-Bashir regime. However, this policy backfired, creating huge problems to China’s international image and not resulting in a stabilization of the country, which split a few years later.
China has perfected its “dictatorship policy” in the last years. Beijing won’t provide any significant investment without guarantees that can be summarized in one word: stability. The Chinese would be reluctant to put on the table significant financial and diplomatic assistance for a regime that cannot prove itself able to guarantee long-term stability. And, in my opinion, the Assad regime can hardly comply with this condition. Although it is retaking control of most of the country, its grip is loose and its military and political power still too weak in comparison with the number of enemies and complications on the ground and abroad it has still to face. Although the main military confrontations may come to an end relatively soon, Syria under Assad risks a few more years of instability, which may impair significant Chinese economic interventions.
Finally, it is also worth saying that a big Chinese presence in Syrian affairs may also be opposed by Russia and Iran. They know that once the main military operations are over money may become much more influential than guns, and this may jeopardize their control on the Syrian regime in favor of China.
KA: You co-authored a piece with Annalisa Perteghella titled “EU Should Play Major Role in Syria Reconstruction.” Here, you discuss how different scenarios for ending the Syrian war might result in different reconstruction plans with various influences of international donors. Why do you think the European Union is the major international donor that can contribute significantly to the reconstruction of Syria? More importantly, why you dismiss the role of international powers such as Russia and regional power such as Iran and the Gulf monarchies?
ED: As I said before, there are two main requirements for the participation in the Syrian reconstruction: resources and political will. Russia and Iran are both going through a difficult economic phase. Low oil prices damaged heavily both their economies. Russia is also facing the effects of the European sanctions and years of economic mismanagement, while Iran is trying slowly to reorganize its economy after the end of the heaviest sanctions. Not only do these two countries not show any willingness to invest significantly in the reconstruction, but they are also starting to collect repayment for their support from the regime. They both obtained big shares of the Syrian natural resources, de facto jeopardizing the future reconstruction efforts. In fact, such resources are key for financing future reconstruction projects and now big shares of the profits deriving from them will go in Moscow and Teheran’s coffers.
I don’t rule out that other regional powers, such as Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf monarchies, would invest in the reconstruction. But, like the European Union, they would do that under certain conditions. They aim to obtain some settlement in favor of the opposition (or at least their protegees among the opposition), which is something that the regime and its allies (in particular Iran) would hardly concede. A role apart may be played by Qatar which, although having been a big sponsor of the opposition, is currently re-aligning its regional stance away from the other Gulf monarchies and closer to Iran.
The key in this matter can be also summarized in one world: decentralization. If some sort of real decentralization is realized, especially in the areas that have been governed by the opposition for years, and the external aid can flow directly to these local entities without passing through Damascus, then it is possible that other regional powers such as the Gulf monarchies or Turkey participate significantly in the reconstruction effort. The same can be said of the European Union. Decentralization is one of the few solutions that provide some guarantees to the returning refugees and may be one of the main conditions imposed by the EU for its aid.
KA: Can you share with us what are your future Syria-related projects?
ED: I think that it is important to keep in mind that everything that is discussed in these days regarding the Syrian reconstruction will matter only in its initial phase. The reconstruction of Syria will be a long endeavor, even bigger and more complicated than the Lebanese one, and will probably be measured in decades. Along this long period many things can change and the final outcome may be something completely different from anything we can imagine now. It is likely that in the end we will see some sort of involvement from all the actors, including the EU, the Gulf monarchies and Turkey, even without significant concessions from the regime. The reconstruction business is too huge and each country’s national industrial sector will push its government to get a share, although smaller than the one they would have got under the right conditions.
I think that what can be said right now with relative self-confidence is that the first phase of the reconstruction is going to be slow and, for this reason, unfortunately will not provide much relief for the Syrian population that has already endured the pain of six years of conflict. The problem is that the actors on the field, especially the Syrian regime, are once again paying much more attention to their political survival and short-term interests than to long-term plans for a homogeneous and sustainable reconstruction of the country. For example, one key element that may change forever the economic shape of the country is whether the materials for the reconstruction projects, such as cement and steel, will be produced in Syria or imported from elsewhere. Obviously, it would be much better for the Syrian economy in the long term if the regime would first channel resources to rebuilding at least part of the national industry to make it part of the reconstruction effort. The point is that we see now few signs of this kind of long-term thinking. Even the possible sources of funds are scrutinized primarily according to the danger they may represent for the power of the regime, and only secondarily according to the actual support they can provide. Much more attention is devoted to guarantee compensations for the loyal sectors of the society, for foreign allies, and to keep at bay possible future opponents and their potential supporters who are now refugees abroad.
Eugenio Dacrema is an Arabic-speaking PhD candidate at the University of Trento, Italy, and a research associate at the Italian Institute for International Studies (ISPI). He lived in Syria from 2009 to 2010 where he worked for the Italian embassy. In 2016 and 2017 he was visiting scholar at the American University of Beirut and at the George Washington University. Dacrema is a regular contributor to several Italian and international newspapers and writes advisory reports for the Italian Parliament.
