بواسطة Syria in a Week Editors | أكتوبر 9, 2018 | Media Roundups, Syria in a Week
The following is a selection by our editors of significant weekly developments in Syria. Depending on events, each issue will include anywhere from four to eight briefs. This series is produced in both Arabic and English in partnership between Salon Syria and Jadaliyya. Suggestions and blurbs may be sent to info@salonsyria.com.
Change in Discourse: Temporary or Permanent?
Will the fate of the settlement in Idlib be different from those in other areas that preceded it in the Syrian war, especially with all actors insisting on their strategies and Russia and the Syrian government affirming their goal in having the Syrian army regain control over all the country? Will the Russian-Turkish negotiations determine the “price” for the agreement on Idlib’s fate, including their position regarding the Kurdish issue in Syria?
Russian “Keenness”: No Major Operations in Idlib
2 – 3 October 2018
Reuters
Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Wednesday that the de-escalation zone in Idlib was effective and that there are no plans for major military operations in the area. “And that means, no large scale military actions are expected there … Military action for the sake of military action is unnecessary,” he said. However, Putin added that Moscow wants to see all foreign troops withdraw from Syria eventually, including Russian forces. He also said that the presence of US forces in Syria is “a breach of the UN charter.”
It is noteworthy that the Syrian government, through a statement by Foreign Minister Walid Moulem, confirmed that Turkey is capable of carrying out its obligations under the Idlib agreement.
Turkish Keenness … Withdrawal and Elections
2, 4, 6 October 2018
Reuters
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said on Thursday that Turkey would not leave Syria until the Syrian people hold elections. “Whenever the Syrian people hold an election, we will leave Syria to its owners after they hold their elections,” Erdogan said at a forum in Istanbul. He also said that Turkey is not experiencing difficulty in conducting talks with radical groups in Idlib, the last major area still under the control of armed opposition.
Erdogan pledged to strengthen Turkish observations posts in Idlib.
The Turkish role was manifested in armed opposition groups withdrawing their heavy weaponry from the demilitarized zone agreed upon by Turkey and Russia in north-west of Syria. The National Front for Liberation said in a statement that the process of withdrawing heavy weapons had begun, but the fighters would remain in their positions within the demilitarized zone. Opposition forces in northern Syria said on Tuesday that Tukey had confirmed that Russian forces would not deploy in the area.
On the other hand, Erdogan said on Monday that Turkey is seeking to secure the area east of the Euphrates in northern Syria by eliminating the Kurdish People’s Protection Units, in continuation of the Turkish strategy towards the Kurds.
Iranian Keenness … Response to Ahwaz in Boukamal
2 October 2018
Reuters
Iranian “rage” over the Ahwaz attack burst in Syria as Iran said that the missile attack it carried out in Syria on Monday had killed forty “top leaders” in ISIS.
Iran fired six missiles at targets in Boukamal and Hajin regions in eastern Syria, in retaliation for the attack on a military parade in Iran on 22 September that killed twenty-five people, nearly half of them members of the Revolutionary Guard.
Israeli Keenness
3, 4, 5 October 2018
Reuters
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on Sunday he will meet Russian President Vladimir Putin soon to discuss security coordination over Syria, amid friction with Moscow over Israel’s air operations.
On Tuesday, Russia said it had upgraded Syria’s air defenses with the S-300 missile system, after accusing Israel of indirect responsibility for the downing of a Russian spy plane by Syrian forces as they fired on attacking Israeli jets last month. There have been no reports of Israeli air strikes in Syria since the Russia plane was shot down.
The French foreign ministry said on Friday that Russia’s deployment of the S-300 system in Syria risks fueling military escalation and hindering prospects for a political solution to the seven-year civil war.
General Joseph Votel, who oversees US forces in the Middle East, said that the deployment seemed to be an effort by Moscow to help shield “nefarious activities” by Iranian and Syrian forces in the country.
German Keenness Against Chemical Weapons
3 October 2018
Reuters
German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas said on Wednesday that his country and the United States agreed on the need to do everything possible to prevent the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Maas comments came after a meeting with his US counterpart Mike Pompeo in Washington. He also said that Pompeo understood the scope of the political debate in Germany concerning the potential participation in any US-led military response in the event of a chemical attack.
Aid Keenness and Economies of War
4 October 2018
Reuters
The Unites States Agency for International Development and the British Department for International Development found out that Bab al-Hawa border crossing in north-western Syria is being used by extremist groups to collect taxes from aid trucks. Therefore, they directed their partners to stop all use of the border crossing starting from 26 September.
Tahrir al-Sham, the main Islamic group in Idlib governorate, is designated a terrorist organization by the United Nations, the United States, and Turkey. Bab al-Hawa is the only official border crossing connecting Turkey to the Idlib governorate, where an estimated 2.1 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance. Around two thousand and two hundred and eighty-four trucks carrying aid went through the crossing in the first eight months of this year, according to David Swanson of the United Nation’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
US Keenness for the Kurds!
2 & 3 October 2018
Reuters
Kurdish officials said that a series of visits by US diplomats to Syria in the last two months to renew preparations to discuss the future of the country indicate a long-term commitment. US forces are seen as a shield against Turkish attacks from the north and any attempt by the Syrian government to seize the region’s wheat and oil fields.
The number of US diplomats in Syria has doubled as ISIS fighters near a military defeat, US Defense Secretary James Mattis said on Tuesday. “Our diplomats there on the ground have been doubled in number. As we see the military operations becoming less, we will see the diplomatic effort now able to take root,” Mattis said.
بواسطة Syria in a Week Editors | سبتمبر 25, 2018 | Media Roundups, Syria in a Week
The following is a selection by our editors of significant weekly developments in Syria. Depending on events, each issue will include anywhere from four to eight briefs. This series is produced in both Arabic and English in partnership between Salon Syria and Jadaliyya. Suggestions and blurbs may be sent to info@salonsyria.com.
Idlib: The “Jihad” is in the Details
Analysis from Salon Syria
24 September 2018
The Russian-Turkish agreement on Idlib has serious challenges and complexities in its implementation, although it does have some positive aspects. This leads to the belief that the Sochi agreement will only help in stabilizing the situation in Idlib for a few months because it merely postpones the battle and does not prevent it.
The agreement, made public after a meeting between President Vladimir Putin and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Sochi on 17 September, is comprised of ten points, including: keeping the de-escalation zone according to the May Astana agreement, fortifying the twelve Turkish observation posts, a fifteen to twenty kilometers demilitarized zone, and the ousting of all terrorist groups in this zone by 15 October, after the withdrawal of heavy weapons before 10 October.
It also stipulates that the Russian and Turkish armies will conduct joint patrols in the safe zone, in addition to “guaranteeing the free movement of local residents and goods, and restoring commercial and economic ties,” and the opening of Aleppo-Lattakia and Aleppo-Hama roads before the end of the year.
However, it also contains numerous ambiguous points, which leads to the belief that “the devil is in the details”:
1- The manner by which the fanatics would be “ousted”, especially that this has to be done in two to three weeks. Will this be carried out through “segregation”, “displacement”, or through “military action” and who will actually do this?
2- Difficulty in separating between Tahrir al-Sham, which includes Fat’h al-Sham (previously Nusra) and includes ten thousand members, and the National Front for Liberation which includes thirty thousand members. Add to that the fact that Tahrir al-Sham refused the agreement and criticized Turkey, likening Ankara’s position in Idlib to that of the UN in Srebrenica, which suffered a massacre in the nineties of the previous century. There is also difficulty in separating foreign fighters affiliated with al-Qaeda, who number more than two thousand, from the rest of Syrian fighters.
3- One of the circulating ideas is to move those who refuse the settlement from the “safe zone” to Turkish-controlled areas in northern Syria and the possibility of moving others to Kurdish-majority areas. But, how will this be carried out in such a short time?
4- The plan includes the opening of the major roads between Aleppo and Hama and between Aleppo and Lattakia. Who will protect these roads? Who will deploy observation points? This also applies for “commercial” points between opposition areas in Idlib and government areas.
5- Syrian sovereignty will symbolically return to the north, including the flag and some institutions. But what about the military presence of Damascus?
6- Some people believe that the Russian and Turkish armies along with the armies of other countries will launch an offensive against fanatics who refuse the settlement, especially because Moscow has a plan to eliminate two thousand foreign fighters. How would this be reflected in the position of the rest of the opposition factions? What would the Islamic factions’ response be?
The Russian and Turkish armies continue their consultations and exchange of security information. Turkey has also sent military reinforcements and special units to the twelve observation points in northern Syria, in addition to the possibility of carrying out covert assassinations.
Implementing the agreement constitutes a difficult test for Moscow and Ankara. At the same time, Damascus and Tehran are betting on the failure of the settlement option in order to resume the military option and drag Moscow into a military resolution similar to what happened in previous places… and the return to the postponed battle of Idlib.
“This is not a peace deal. It is an aversion of a whole-scale-war deal,” the head of the United Nations Humanitarian Taskforce for Syria Jan Egeland said in Geneva. “I see a great potential for a lot of fighting … We are concerned for the civilians in these areas, so it is not over,” he added.
International Legitimacy for the Sochi Deal
21 September 2018
French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian said that Turkey asked France to “support” the Russian-Turkish agreement on Idlib in the UN Security Council, according to an interview with Le Monde newspaper published on Saturday.
Le Drian said that the international pressure and warning of a looming humanitarian crisis in Idlib had proven effective.
He stressed the role played by France, especially after the failure of the Astana-sponsoring countries in reaching an agreement in Tehran. He referred to “Turkey’s request for France to act in the Security Council to support the agreement (reached by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan) with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Idlib.”
After a summit at the Sochi resort on Monday, the Russian and Turkish presidents announced a deal to establish a “demilitarized zone” in Idlib on 15 October, averting an offensive by the Syrian government on Idlib governorate, which is populated by more than three million people.
In recent weeks, the Syrian government brought in reinforcements to the outskirts of Idlib, which borders Turkey. Dozens of civilians were killed as a result of bombardment by Syrian forces and airstrikes by Russian planes, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR).
The UN and human rights groups warned that the Syrian government offensive would cause a “blood bath” in Idlib and “the worst humanitarian crisis” in the current century.
The Turkish-Russian agreement could be adopted “through a resolution or a statement by the Security Council,” a French diplomatic source said, adding that the issue is still under discussion in New York.
The United Nations will hold its seventy-third general assembly in New York next week. The issue of Idlib is expected to dominate the discussions.
Al-Assad Between Two Cables of Condolences
19 September 2018
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad sent a cable of condolence to his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin two days after the downing of a Russian plane in the Mediterranean, however, he sent a cable of condolence to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani only two hours after an armed attack in Ahwaz, Iran.
“On behalf of the Syrian people and by my name, we express our deep condolences to the friendly Russian people over the fall of the Russian military jet on the Mediterranean, causing the martyrdom of the Russian heroes who were doing their noble duties along with their colleagues of the Russian military forces in the fight against terrorism in Syria,” the President said in the first cable published by the Syrian news agency SANA.
“This regrettable incident was a result of the Israeli usual revelry which always uses the dirtiest means to achieve its low purposes and carry out its aggression in our region,” Assad added.
“We are completely confident that such a tragic event will not dissuade you or us in continuing the fight against terrorism,” Assad said.
Syrian air defense systems brought down a Russian military plane carrying fifteen Russian personnel during the course of responding to Israeli bombing on the coastal city of Lattakia on Monday.
On 22 September, the cable for the Iranian president said: “I extend to you and the friendly people of Iran, on the behalf of the people of the Syrian Arab Republic and on my own behalf, deepest condolences for the innocent victims, and condemn in the strongest terms this cowardly and criminal terrorist act.”
Assad praised Iran’s position “against terrorism in Syria and expressed his hope that “supporters, financers, and proponents of terrorism will understand that this danger threatens mankind as a whole, urging them to reconsider their positions.”
The attack, which was adopted by ISIS and an Ahwazi-Arab group, targeted a military parade in the city of Ahwaz in southwest of Iran, left twenty-nine dead and more than fifty injured, according to an official tally. The attack came on the national day for armed forces, which is celebrated on 22 September in memory of the day Baghdad declared war on Tehran (1980-1988).
“Media War” Between Russia and Israel
24 September 2018
The Israeli army refused the conclusions of the Russian Ministry of Defense regarding the downing of a Russian plane west of Syria, in what resembles a “media war” between Moscow and Tel Aviv.
The Russian army said that “misleading” information from the Israeli air force caused the downing of the Russian plane in Syria, denouncing the “adventurism” of Israeli pilots.
Russian military spokesman Igor Konashenkov presented the findings of the investigation in the downing of the Ilyushin-20 plane that was carrying fifteen soldiers by a Syrian air defense missile which was accidentally fired on 17 September.
Moscow accused Israeli pilots of using the bigger Ilyushin as a cover, resulting in Syria’s Soviet-era S-200 air defense system interpreting the Russian plane as a target.
Israel denied this version of events and its air force commander flew to Moscow to clarify the situation.
An Israeli military official confirmed on Friday that operational procedures agreed to with Russia in Syria are still in place after the death of fifteen Russian soldiers whose plane was shot down on Monday, hinting that Israel maintains the freedom to move in neighboring countries.
An Israeli delegation led by the air force chief General Amikam Norkin visited Moscow on Thursday in an attempt to calm down the situation and clarify the circumstances of how Syrian air defense mistakenly brought down a Russian military plane when Syrian forces were responding to an Israeli airstrike.
An army statement said that the “two sides stressed the importance of national interests and the continued implementation of the de-confliction system.”
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that he dispatched General Norkin to Moscow to “preserve the cooperation between our two countries,” among other things.
Russian Defense Ministry said on Tuesday that Syrian air defense shot down an IL-20 Russian plane on Monday as it was flying over the Mediterranean, thirty-five kilometers from the Syrian coast, on its way back to Hmeimeim base in Lattakia governorate.
The Israeli army said in a statement that General Norkin presented “the situation report for that night … from all aspects.”
The Russian Defense Ministry initially accused Israeli fighters of “using the Russian plane as a cover, thus putting it in the line of fire of Syrian air defense.”
However, Israel denies this, and its army affirmed that the Russian plane was far from Syrian positions targeted by the Israeli airstrike. It added that “when the Syrian army fired the missiles that hit the plane, Israeli jets had already returned to Israeli airspace.”
Putin sought to defuse the situation, saying in a Kremlin statement that the “matter is most likely a chain of tragic and accidental circumstances.” He urged the Israeli side not to allow such incidents to occur once more.
However, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad pointed accusations at Israel on Wednesday and said in a cable of condolence to Putin that “this regrettable incident was a result of the Israeli usual revelry.”
Russia is considered the most prominent Assad ally, and has been offering broad diplomatic, political, and economic support to him since the onset of the conflict in 2011. Its military intervention, which started three years ago, has also contributed to Damascus regaining the lead on various fronts.
In a rare move, the Israeli army acknowledged it had conducted the airstrike, and confirmed targeting a facility for the Syrian army that delivered systems used in manufacturing precise weapons to Lebanese Hezbollah.
Hezbollah responded through its Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah who said in a televised speech on Wednesday night: “it is not true that what is being bombed in Syria is meant to be transported to Hezbollah in Lebanon,” accusing Israel of “lying” and “working on preventing Syria from acquiring missile capabilities.”
Israel acknowledged this month that it conducted two hundred airstrikes in Syria in the last eighteen months against mostly Iranian targets, in an unusual confirmation of such military operations. Since the onset of the conflict in Syria in 2011, Israel has repeatedly bombed Syrian army targets and others for Iran and Hezbollah.
“There has been no change in the non-engagement mechanism (between Israel and Russia) after this unfortunate incident. The non-engagement mechanism and operational procedures remain the same and have not changed,” an Israeli official said. “Non-engagement” refers to the exchange of information between the two countries and reducing the possibility of confrontations.
This mechanism between Israel and Russia was adopted in 2015 after Russian forces intervened in favor of Syrian forces in order to avoid a confrontation between the Russian and Israeli armies in Syria.
However, this coordination witnessed the most serious incident as of yet when Syrian air defense mistakenly hit a Russian reconnaissance plane in response to an Israeli airstrike on a military facility, which led to the death of the fifteen-member crew.
Hezbollah Will Stay “Until Further Notice”
19 September 2018
On Wednesday, Secretary General of Hezbollah Hassan Nasrallah confirmed that his fighters will stay in Syria until further notice, despite the calmness on the fronts after reaching the Russian-Turkish agreement on Idlib, the last stronghold of opposition factions. Nasrallah denied what Israel announced regarding its targeting two days earlier of a Syrian army facility during the transportation of missile systems to his party in Lebanon, accusing it of “lying”.
“We will stay there after the settlement in Idlib and calmness in Idlib … we will stay there until further notice,” Nasrallah said in a televised speech in front of thousands of his supporters in the southern suburb of Beirut, his party’s stronghold, on the eve of Ashura commemoration.
“The calmness on the fronts and the decline of threats will, of course, affect the current number (of fighters),” he said, adding that the increase or decrease of the number is associated with “the responsibilities and the scope of threats and challenges.”
The Iranian-backed Hezbollah has been publicly fighting alongside the Syrian army since 2013. Its intervention has helped in resolving numerous battles in Damascus’s favor. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights estimated the number of Hezbollah deaths in Syria at one thousand six hundred and sixty-five.
Nasrallah’s remarks come two days after a Russian-Turkish agreement to establish a “demilitarized” zone in Idlib governorate, northwest of Syria, in a step that would spare this area from a large-scale offensive. “What happened is a step towards the possibility of a political solution, and this is a good and acceptable thing; and depends on the results and strict implementation of the terms of the agreement,” Nasrallah said.
“Based on the settlement in Idlib, if things go well and are implemented in a suitable manner, we can assume that Syria is going towards great calm, and there will be no effective fighting fronts,” he added.
Syrian government forces, backed by their allies, have regained control of vast areas in the last two years. They now control about two thirds of the country.
On the other hand, Nasrallah accused Israel of “working on preventing Syria from acquiring missile capabilities,” after the bombing of the coastal city of Lattakia on Monday night.
“It is not true that what is being bombed in Syria is meant to be transported to Hezbollah in Lebanon,” he said replying to the Israeli army’s declaration that it targeted a facility for the Syrian army that was delivering systems used in manufacturing precise weapons to Lebanese Hezbollah.
During its response to the Israeli airstrike, Syrian air defense systems shot down a Russian plane near Lattakia, according to Moscow, resulting in the deaths of “fifteen Russian personnel.”
Nasrallah acknowledged in his speech on Wednesday that Israeli airstrikes “in some place were related to the transportation of weapons.” However, he said that “many” of them “were not related to this issue at all,” affirming that Israel is “preventing the establishment of the Syrian army as a true military force” in Syria.
بواسطة David Lesch | سبتمبر 3, 2018 | Cost of War, غير مصنف
He rocked back in his chair, looked up at the ceiling, closed his eyes, spread open his arms, and exclaimed in a triumphant tone, “I would be a hero.” This is how Syrian President Bashar al-Assad responded in the fall of 2008 to a question I asked him in a one-on-one meeting about engineering the return of the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. It was one of those authentic moments that was unscripted. Creating the comfort level necessary for Assad to respond in this fashion took years of meetings.
His response was not surprising. The Golan Heights is an emotional issue with Syrians. Ever since it was occupied by Israel in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, its return has been ingrained in most Syrians as the sine qua non of Syrian policy. I have witnessed Syrians, especially the older generation, from cabinet level ministers to cab drivers burst into tears in front of me when discussing the issue. They fail to recognize that it was the radical wing of their Baathist government at the time that was partly responsible for generating the tensions that ignited the conflict.
Nevertheless, a UN-monitored ceasefire between Israel and Syria in the Golan, brokered by the United States in 1974, became one of the success stories of UN peacekeeping, as nary a shot was fired in either direction across the border until the Syrian civil war broke out in 2011. However, this ceasefire did not prevent Israel and Syria from fighting each other by proxy, primarily in Lebanon. Despite this, there have been multiple occasions since the early 1990s Madrid peace process in which Syria and Israel have come tantalizingly close to a peace agreement.
Assad’s response to me was interesting in another way. It came within the context of our discussion of a potential quid pro quo, i.e. with the return of the Golan, the Syrian government would significantly degrade, if not totally abandon, its relationship with Iran, including Hizbullah in Lebanon. This was something at the time that Assad was seriously willing to consider. He understood the purely strategic nature of the Syrian-Iranian alliance forged by his father, one that provided strategic depth for Syria following the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1979. Otherwise, the two governments are practically polar opposites: one is a Persian Islamic republic and the other has been at the vanguard of secular Arab nationalism, which is the DNA of the ruling Baath party.
Even if Assad was truly serious about that grand bargain back then, this sort of quid pro quo will be significantly more difficult today. Along with the Russians, Iran and Hizbullah have been the most active supporters of Assad in the civil war, without whom the Syrian regime would probably no longer exist. Naturally, as Assad has improved his position, Israeli concerns in the conflict have shifted from wondering what chaos would ensue on its border should the Syrian regime fall to attempting to minimize the Iranian presence as much as possible. The Israelis have been intensely negotiating with Moscow, the new power broker in Syria, in an attempt to get the Russians to reduce Assad’s reliance on Iran, all the while forcefully making their point by carrying out military strikes against Iranian and Hizbullah positions in the country. This is, to say the least, a volatile situation.
Under these circumstances, it is understandable that Israel would not want to even consider negotiations with Damascus regarding the Golan. Why would it do so in such a strategically ambiguous environment and with a regime that is still, despite recent success, not entirely secure in power? After all, Israel captured the Golan in 1967 in order to prevent Syria from enjoying the strategic high ground and to gain control of tributaries that feed into the Jordan River, the life blood of Israel. As such, some Israeli officials, wanting to hold on to this territory indefinitely, have been urging the Trump administration, fresh off of its recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, to recognize Israeli sovereignty over the Golan, something Israel did in 1981.
This would be a mistake on many levels. First, many fear that with a US imprimatur, Israel could be encouraged to annex the West Bank and East Jerusalem, thus closing what little chance remains for a two-state solution with the Palestinians. Secondly, it would set an unhealthy precedent by which countries unilaterally absorb occupied territory without negotiation or international consent. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it would obviate the possibility of a peace accord with Syria for the foreseeable future. This could be an opportunity lost. For Assad, standing over a fractured and bleeding country, getting the Golan Heights back would be just the sort of slam dunk victory he needs in order to begin to rebuild his legitimacy with the Syrian people. With its “better the devil you know” mentality, Israel appears to have accepted Assad in power. Currently, it is allowing Syrian troops to re-establish authority along their side of the Golan. Going even further than that, returning the Golan under tight and reversible conditions could provide Damascus with the wherewithal for that which the Israelis most want: security.
The current ruling class in Syria is probably the last one where the loss of the Golan so completely framed their weltanschauung—and they are not getting any younger. On the other hand, the majority of the Syrian population is less than thirty years old. For them the civil war will forever rule their political psychology. And this generation, steeped in social media and the use of proxy servers, cannot be as brainwashed by government-controlled media or educational fiat as Syrians were in the past. The Golan could be seen by this younger generation as a bygone and misdirected obsession of their parents. Other things, such as the material and emotional rebuilding of the country, may be more important to them.
If a return of the Golan is delayed too much longer, any likely deal will be less generous to the Syrians. In turn, Assad will not be able to generate the internal support necessary to reduce the Iranian footprint. As much as the Russians might try, if diminishing Iran’s presence is not led by the Syrian government, it is unlikely to happen. Before the civil war, Assad showed on numerous occasions a willingness to counter Iran on important issues. It will be harder to do so now, which is why he needs lightning to strike. Assad’s views on this are worth exploring for both the Israelis and Americans. Certainly, any Syrian-Israeli agreement would asymmetrically demilitarize the Golan area in Israel’s favor, the parameters of which were agreed upon in the 1990s. With Assad remaining in power, this new approach to Syria could be a risk worth taking for Israel, but it can only do so if the Golan is there for the giving.
بواسطة Syria in a Week Editors | أغسطس 7, 2018 | Media Roundups, Syria in a Week
The following is a selection by our editors of significant weekly developments in Syria. Depending on events, each issue will include anywhere from four to eight briefs. This series is produced in both Arabic and English in partnership between Salon Syria and Jadaliyya. Suggestions and blurbs may be sent to info@salonsyria.com.
UNDOF Returns Under Russian Umbrella
4 August 2018
The UN peacekeeping force has carried out a patrol for the first time since 2014 in a key crossing point between the Syrian Golan Heights and the occupied part of these heights after coordination between Russia, Israel, and Syria, said a UN spokesperson on Friday.
Thursday’s patrol at the Qonaitera crossing point was the first since the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) withdrew in 2014 after al-Qaeda affiliated militants took control over the area.
Syrian government forces, backed by Russia, have regained control of territory near the Golan Heights in recent weeks.
“The patrol to the Qonaietra crossing point is part of UNDOF’s ongoing efforts to return incrementally to the area of separation,” said UN spokesman Farhan Haq.
He said that the mission held talks with both Syrian and Israeli forces ahead of the patrol. Syrian forces and Russian military police conducted “simultaneous” patrols in the area, said Haq.
After the Russian army’s declaration that it intends to deploy eight military observation posts in Golan, a UN spokesperson said that any Russian presence would be “separate and distinct from that of UNDOF.”
The UN is seeking the full return of the force to the Syrian side.
Currently, more than half of UNDOF’s nine hundred and seventy-eight troops are deployed on the so-called Bravo (Syrian) side.
UNDOF has carried out more than thirty patrols in the northern and central parts of the disengagement zone since it resumed its activities on the Syrian side in February.
UNDOF was established in 1974 to observe the cease-fire line that separates Israelis from Syrians in the Golan Heights.
Russian Deadline for Idlib
4 August 2018
Moscow gave Ankara until the Russian-Turkish-French-German summit scheduled for 7 September to resolve the issue of Idlib, informed sources told Asharq al-Awsat newspaper.
Ankara pressed opposition factions in northern Syria to unite and form the National Front for Liberation, which includes seventy thousand fighters, according to informed estimates. This comes as part of a plan to set a deadline for Tahrir al-Sham, which includes factions such as Fat’h al-Sham (previously Nusra), to dissolve itself so that Syrians would be able to join within the new bloc and “find a mechanism” for foreign militants to “exit.”
On the other hand, government forces continue their push for a military operation in Idlib. They have bombarded opposition positions, but are cautious in getting near the twelve Turkish observation points deployed in Idlib near the countryside of Hama, Lattakia, and Aleppo.
Around three million people live in Idlib, half of which are displaced from other areas. The Turkish side was able to get a deadline from Russia during the Sochi meeting last week in order to “resolve” the issue of Idlib before the Turkish-Russian-French-German summit on 7 September.
A Kurdish Rifle for Druze
4 August 2018
The leader of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) Siban Hamo told Asharq al-Awsat newspaper that his forces are ready to head for Sweidaa to “protect” its Druze citizens from ISIS and liberate its eastern countryside from ISIS elements.
“ISIS launched barbaric attacks on our people in Sweidaa. The pain of the Druze is the same pain we felt in Kobane and Afrin. We do not distinguish between these attacks and the attacks on our people in Sweidaa. The YPG stands ready to send forces to Sweidaa to liberate it from terrorism,” said Hamo.
Negotiations collapsed between ISIS and dignitaries from Sweidaa to release kidnapped women and children that ISIS is holding. Hammoud al-Hinawi, a Druze sheikh, refused ISIS’s demands. “[ISIS] demanded, through mediators, that their elements be transferred from the Yarmouk basin in the western countryside of Daraa to a desert area in the eastern countryside of Sweidaa and that Syrian government forces retreat from villages in the desert of Sweidaa in exchange for the release of thirteen women kidnapped from the villages of Shreihi, al-Shabki, and Rami” in Sweidaa countryside, Sheikh al-Hinawi told a German news agency.
Attacks and suicide bombings left around two hundred and fifty people dead in Sweidaa, in the fiercest ISIS operation in years on this Druze majority area. Since then, residents of Sweidaa have been on high alert to confront ISIS and repel it from the administrational borders of the governorate. Attacks may come from the desert east of the city or Yarmouk basin in the west.
After sending military reinforcement to Sweidaa governorate, Damascus is preparing for an offensive on two fronts: the first towards the eastern countryside of Sweidaa and the other towards the area of Lajat in the western countryside of Sweidaa, north of the city of Daraa.
A Syria “Offer”: From Russia to the United States
4 August 2018
On Saturday, the Russian army said that it sent a message to the United States in the previous month that included a proposal for cooperation in the reconstruction of Syria and the return of refugees to their country, confirming media reports about this matter.
Chief of the Russian Army General Staff Valery Gerasimov sent a letter to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joseph Dunford stating Moscow’s readiness to cooperate with Washington on clearing mines in the war-torn country and helping refugees return to their homes.
“It is disappointing that the US side is unable to comply with an agreement not to publish the content of the communications until after both sides agree,” the Russian Defense Ministry said in a statement.
Moscow urged the UN Security Council last week to help in reviving the Syrian economy and the return of refugees, at a time when its ally Damascus was waging a campaign to regain territory in the seven-year conflict.
In July, Moscow also presented proposals to the Unites States regarding the return of refugees from Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon, and Egypt, which included the offer of international financial support.
Distance to Israel: Forty or Eighty-five Kilometers?
3 August 2018
A senior military official in Tel Aviv refuted Russia’s claim that Iran withdrew its forces eighty-five kilometers from the disengagement border in the occupied Golan. He said that these forces are present in the vicinity of Damascus and are currently forty kilometers away from the border with Israel.
The Israeli official refused to confirm or deny the Israeli army’s responsibility for bombing three Iranian position in Khan al-Sheeh, Qatana, west of Damascus on Friday morning. He stated his government’s position in that “Iran should leave all of Syria and cease military activity there, whether it is activity by the Revolutionary Guard or militias affiliated with it.”
“Clearly, this withdrawal needs time and will happen gradually. Iranians began to show serious signs and steps for withdrawal. However, they will not hesitate to fool the world, including their Russian allies, and get around agreements and breach commitments. This will force us to increase surveillance and provide evidence for their breaches,” he said.
“We will leave Syria if we feel that it is able to achieve relative stability,” the spokesperson for the Iranian Foreign Ministry Bahram Qasimi said on Saturday.
On Thursday, Israel said it would stop offering treatment for those injured in the Syrian war after the Syrian army regained southern Syria.
Modest Breakthrough: Between Damascus and the Kurds
2 August 2018
The visit by the Kurdish-Arab delegation of the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) to Damascus revealed the depth of the gap between the two sides and the false impressions of each side towards the other.
As for the SDC, it came to Damascus with a belief that the US-led international coalition against ISIS will remain in north-east of the Euphrates. Therefore, the SDC’s delegation raised the stakes: first, the return of services such as electricity, health, water, and education in areas controlled by the SDC, which constitute one third of Syria’s area of one hundred and eighty-five thousand square kilometers, and then reaching a formula that serves the “common interest” in investing oil fields that represent ninety percent of Syrian production and gas that represents half the national production.
According to the visiting delegation, success in “confidence-building measures” would lead to the second phase that includes the “Syrian government’s” control over border crossings with Iraq and Turkey and the deployment of security forces. The third phase would then address the nature of governance, whether that is a decentralized system or local administrations.
On the other hand, Damascus seemed not to be in a rush. Damascus was talking about “red lines”: control over all land border crossings, including those with Iraq and Turkey and under the control of the SDC, raising the official flag over all border crossings and public institutions, and the refusal of any “separatist step.” Damascus was not ready to talk about decentralization or self-administrations. Moreover, it is convinced that Law Number 107, which addresses local councils of the Ministry of Local Administration, is sufficient to take care of Kurdish concerns, in addition to some concessions regarding Kurdish rights in language, celebrations, and services.
Obviously, Damascus is relying on three things in its strict position: the recent military gains near Damascus, Homs, and southern Syria, the Russian aerial support and Iranian land support, and betting that the United States would leave Syria and that time is on Damascus’s side.
With this gap, the sole “achievement” of the meetings was the lifting of a ban by Damascus on technicians to fix electricity generating turbines in Tabaqa Dam on the Euphrates river and a ban on employees to visit health facilities. The formation of a joint committee was very slow.
“Revolution Icon”: In a Temporary Tomb
3 August 2018
Syrian opposition actress May Skaf, known as the “revolution icon,” was buried in the Paris suburb of Dourdan on Friday. Hundreds of friends, relatives, and Syrian opposition activists attended the burial.
Her son Joud said that his mother’s tomb in France is only temporary “until we all go back to Syria after it has been liberated from the Assad regime.” He said that May (49 years) died suddenly on 23 July. Medical reports showed that she died of a brain stroke and rupture in one of the brain’s veins.
Syrian novelist Dima Wannous, the late May’s cousin told alarbiya.net that May “was very depressed in the previous four months because of the situation in Syria, the Iranian-Russian occupation of her country, the continuation of Syrian bloodshed, and the increase in numbers of victims dying every day.”
May was one of a few professional artists who supported the Syrian revolution from the beginning. “I will not lose hope. I will not lose hope. It’s called the great Syria not the Assad Syria,” she wrote one day before her death.
بواسطة Syria in a Week Editors | يوليو 24, 2018 | Media Roundups, Syria in a Week
The following is a selection by our editors of significant weekly developments in Syria. Depending on events, each issue will include anywhere from four to eight briefs. This series is produced in both Arabic and English in partnership between Salon Syria and Jadaliyya. Suggestions and blurbs may be sent to info@salonsyria.com.
Kurdish Bridges with Damascus
16 July 2018
The Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), the political wing of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), said that it is considering establishing a platform that represents people living in areas under its control in northern Syria in preparation for potential negotiations with the Syrian government.
The SDF is a coalition that is comprised of Kurds and Arabs and receives considerable support from the United States.
On Monday, the SDC held a two-day conference in Tabaqa city in northern Syria. Two hundred and forty people attended the conference, including officials from Kurdish-controlled areas, as well as representatives from the “internal” opposition, the activities of which are overlooked by the Syrian government.
“One of the goals of this conference is the establishment of a platform to negotiate with the Syrian government,” said member of the presidential body Hikmat Habib, adding that this platform “will represent all self-ruled areas and areas controlled by the SDF. It will also include Raqqa, Deir Azzor, and Manbij.”
“We started to open doors for negotiations because Syrians make up most of these forces … If this does not happen, we will resort to liberating these areas by force because we do not have any other options, whether the Americans are present or not,” said al-Assad in a press interview late May regarding the SDF controlled area.
The SDC then announced its willingness and readiness to enter into “unconditional talks” with the government.
Reverse Displacement
20 July 2018
The issue of the towns of Kafriya and al-Fu’ah was completely closed at midnight Friday upon the implementation of the agreement between Syrian government forces and armed opposition with Russian and Turkish guarantees.
A security source told a German news agency that government authorities received the last batch of the two towns’ residents and captives from the village of Ishtabraq in Idlib countryside, while the armed opposition received the remaining detainees released by the Syrian government.
The source said that the exchange was thoroughly carried out at the Tallet al-I’ss crossing, twenty kilometers southwest of Aleppo, and the curtains were finally closed after a sixteen-hour-delay caused by the armed opposition.
The exchange process began Thursday morning and took place in several batches, as one hundred and twenty-two buses left the scene carrying around seven thousand people from the two towns’ residents and militants from Hezbollah and Iran.
The Humanitarian Issue Precedes the Political Issue
20 July 2018
Russia proposed cooperation with the United States to ensure the return of refugees to Syria, said the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) on Friday, days after the summit between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump.
“Specific proposals on how work could be organized to ensure that refugees can return home have been sent to the American side,” said a senior official in the MOD Mikhail Mizintsev in a statement. The proposals “take into account the agreements between the Russian and US presidents during their meeting in Helsinki” on Monday, he said.
Mizintsev said that Russia proposed the establishment of a joint plan regarding the return of Syrian refugees to areas they lived in prior to the conflict, especially those who fled to Lebanon and Jordan.
Moscow proposed the establishment of a working group that includes Russia, the United States, and Jordan based on the Russian-Jordanian coordination center in Amman, and the establishment of a similar group in Lebanon.
In New York, US State of Secretary Mike Pompeo said in a response to a question on this topic that presidents Putin and Trump in the Helsinki summit discussed “the resolution of the conflict in Syria and how we might get the refugees back,” especially those in Lebanon and Jordan. “It is important that at the right time, through voluntary mechanism, the refugees are able to return to their home country,” he said.
Russia, which has intervened in Syria since September 2015 in support of government forces, proposed to the United States the establishment of a joint group to finance the reconstruction of Syrian infrastructure, according to General Mizintsev. He added that “the American side is studying the Russian proposals.”
French Relief with Russian Wings
21 July 2018
On Friday, France and Russia provided humanitarian aid to eastern Ghouta, which was recaptured by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s government, for the first time since the onset of the conflict in Syria in 2011.
A Russian Antonov 124 military cargo plane carrying fifty tons of medical and other supplies provided by France landed in Hmeimeim Base in western Syria coming from Chateauroux airport in France, according to a statement from the Russian Ministry of Defense.
This is the first joint humanitarian operation between a Western country and Russia, which has militarily supported the Syrian president since 2015.
On Saturday, French President Emmanuel Macron and Russian President Vladimir Putin stressed the importance of “the humanitarian aspects in resolving the Syrian conflict, including the implementation of the French-Russian initiative,” according to a telephone call mentioned by the Kremlin.
Paris said that it received “guarantees” from Moscow that the Syrian government will not hamper the delivery of the aid, as it does with UN convoys, and that the aid and its distribution will not be used for political objectives.
The Last Displacement from the South
21 July 2018
Hundreds of militants and civilians arrived to areas controlled by opposition factions in northwestern Syria, after they were evacuated from al-Qonaiterah governorate in southern Syria.
The evacuation of militants from al-Qonaiterah governorate, which includes the Golan Heights occupied by Israel, came under an agreement brokered by Russia, an ally of the Syrian government, with opposition factions in the area.
The agreement, which followed a large-scale military offensive by government forces, effectively provides for the surrender of the factions, handing over light and medium weapons, the return of official institutions to al-Qonaiterah, and the evacuation of militants who refuse this agreement to northern Syria.
Official media said that the agreement provides for “the return of the Syrian Arab Army to positions it held prior to 2011,” which is when the Syrian conflict erupted in this area that is considered to be sensitive because of proximity to Israel.
The media also said that the militants were carrying individual machine guns and eating food provided to them before everyone, including women and children, boarded buses hired by a local non-governmental organization to take them to temporary camps in the governorates of Idlib (north-east) and Aleppo (north).
Syrian forces launched a large-scale offensive on 19 June to take back areas controlled by factions in southern Syria. They were able to take back more than ninety percent of Daraa governorate before they launched their offensive on al-Qonaiterah governorate.
