الجنوب السوري: تسوية ام تصعيد؟

الجنوب السوري: تسوية ام تصعيد؟

سباق محموم على الجنوب السوري بين التصعيد العسكري من جهة، وترتيبات دولية – إقليمية من جهة ثانية. قوات الحكومة استأنفت قصف ريف درعا بـ«البراميل المتفجرة» ما دفع آلاف المدنيين إلى التوجه إلى الحدود الأردنية، لكن الاتصالات الدبلوماسية لا تزال قائمةً على أمل الوصول إلى ترتيبات بناء على الاتفاق الأميركي – الروسي – الأردني.

اتجاه الاتصالات هو القمة المحتملة بين الرئيسين الأميركي دونالد ترمب والروسي فلاديمير بوتين خلال الجولة المرتقبة لترمب إلى أوروبا. هو سيشارك في قمة «حلف شمال الأطلسي» (ناتو) في بروكسيل في 10 و11 الشهر المقبل ثم يزور لندن. وهناك طرح عقد القمة في فيينا. ويقوم مستشار الأمن القومي الأميركي جون بولتون بزيارة إلى لندن الاثنين قبل التوجه إلى موسكو لاختبار مدى إمكانية عقد قمة ترمب – بوتين.

وسيكون اتفاق «خفض التصعيد» في الجنوب أحد المواضيع المطروحة على الأجندة الأميركية – الروسية خصوصاً أن الرئيسين كانا باركا كل خطوة من الاتفاق العام الماضي. وأمس، وجهت واشنطن رسالة نصية إلى قادة فصائل الجنوب فيها: «نحن في حكومة الولايات المتحدة الأميركية نعمل حالياً للحفاظ على وقف إطلاق النار من خلال القنوات الدبلوماسية، ونبذل جهوداً جبارة في سبيل تحقيق ذلك. نتوجه إليكم الآن لنؤكد على ضرورة عدم الرد على الاستفزازات، لأن القيام بذلك لا يؤدي سوى إلى تسريع السيناريو الأسوأ للجنوب السوري وتقويض جهودنا. فكروا بعائلاتكم وأبناء شعبكم وافعلوا كل ما في وسعكم من أجل حقن الدماء».

وتابعت الرسالة: «النظام من دون أدنى شك، يحاول استفزازكم بالأرتال والتصريحات لإيجاد ذريعة لمهاجمة الجنوب، ولا يمكن أن نعطيه هذا العذر. وفي حين أن فصائل الجنوب تحتفظ بحقها في الدفاع عن النفس، فإننا نشدد على أن عليها أن تحرص بشدة على منع أي هجمات استباقية عبر خط التماس بينما نعمل دبلوماسياً لإيجاد حل للوضع في الجنوب. وختاماً، نقدر عالياً صبركم وصمودكم وتعاونكم في هذا الوقت الصعب».

وعلى عكس التصريحات العلنية من الخارجية الأميركية التي تضمنت تحذير دمشق بـ«رد صارم» على الهجوم الجنوبي، تحض الرسالة العملياتية الآتية من الميدان قادة الفصائل على «ضبط النفس». إذ إن المسؤول السياسي في السفارة الأميركية في عمان، كان بعث في مارس (آذار) الماضي رسالة إلى «جبهة الجنوب»، فيها: «ما يحدث في الغوطة الشرقية مأساة ووصمة عار على مرتكبي هذه الهجومات البشعة كما أنه يثير للقلق الدولي الشديد. وللأسف، فإن النظام السوري وروسيا لا يتعاونان من أجل وقف العنف في الغوطة وتخفيف الألم عن المدنيين بل العكس».

وتابعت: «نتفهم شعوركم بالغضب الشديد لما يحدث، وأنكم تودون تخفيف معاناة أهلكم السوريين في الغوطة، لكن اتفاق الجنوب هو معاهدة شبه ثابتة بفضل تعاونكم وبفضل الإرادة الأميركية في الحفاظ عليها، ولو على منطقة واحدة للمعارضة المعتدلة لتكون ربما في المستقبل الطريق للحل الشامل في سوريا. إن إشعال حرب الآن ضد النظام في الجنوب سيعطي للنظام وروسيا الذريعة المطلوبة لأن يقتل المزيد من المدنيين واحتلال المزيد من الأراضي وكسر الهدنة التي من خلالها نستطيع أن نفاوض الروس من أجل الحل… نحضُّكم على ضبط النفس، والتفكير ملياً في أهلكم من المدنيين، وعدم إعطاء الذرائع للنظام لقصفكم والقضاء على آخر معقل للمعارضة المعتدلة في سوريا».

تفاق ثلاثي

جرى الإعلان عن وقف النار جنوب غربي البلاد في 7 يوليو (تموز) لعام 2017، بواسطة وزير الخارجية الأميركي الأسبق ريكس تيلرسون في أعقاب الاجتماع الذي ضم الرئيسين الأميركي دونالد ترمب والروسي فلاديمير بوتين في قمة العشرين في مدينة هامبورغ. ودخل الاتفاق حيز التنفيذ الفعلي بعد يومين من ذلك الاجتماع.

وجاء إعلان وقف النار بعد أشهر من المفاوضات ين الدبلوماسيين الأميركيين والروس والأردنيين، الذين واصلوا ضبط تفاصيل الاتفاق عبر اجتماعات لاحقة. وفي أغسطس (آب) الماضي، وافقت أميركا وروسيا والأردن على إنشاء مركز عمان للمراقبة بهدف الإشراف المشترك على وقف إطلاق النار في سوريا. وفي 8 نوفمبر (تشرين الثاني) وقعت الأطراف الثلاثة المذكورة على مذكرة مبادئ لإضفاء الطابع الرسمي على شروط الاتفاق المبرم. وتم التصديق على مذكرة المبادئ تلك عبر بيان لاحق صادر عن الرئيسين ترمب وبوتين اللذين اجتمعا على هامش مؤتمر التعاون الاقتصادي لآسيا والمحيط الهادي في نوفمبر في فيتنام.

وبحسب تقرير لـ«مجموعة حل الأزمات الدولية» أول من أمس، أسفر خفض التصعيد عن هدوء تام استمراراً للصمت المطبق منذ عام 2015، ذلك عندما أبرم الأردن اتفاقاً مع روسيا في أعقاب التدخل العسكري الروسي في سبتمبر (أيلول). وتخلل هذا الهدوء الجنوبي بعد أعمال العنف خلال الفترة السابقة على خفض التصعيد، إذ اندلع قتال عنيف لمدة شهور في عاصمة محافظة درعا التي تحمل الاسم ذاته قبل أن ينتهي إلى طريق مسدود ثم توقف أعمال العنف مجدداً. وفي تلك الأثناء، كان المعتقد أن هذه النتائج تؤكد على استحالة مواصلة التقدم العسكري لأي من الأطراف المتناحرة، ومن ثم إثبات مبرر آخر قوي لخفض التصعيد المخطط له.

عملياً، أدَّى خفض التصعيد إلى تجميد أعمال العنف على خطوط الجبهة الجنوبية الغربية، ثم إنشاء منطقة عازلة خالية من المقاتلين الأجانب المدعومين من قبل إيران. وعلى طول خط منطقة خفض التصعيد، من المفترض للمنطقة العازلة أن تمتد بطول 5 كيلومترات من خط الاتصال بين القوات الحكومية السورية وقوات المعارضة، وبطول 10 كيلومترات من الحدود الأردنية وحتى خط الهدنة الذي يلامس مرتفعات الجولان المحتلة من قبل إسرائيل. وناقشت الأطراف المعنية خفض التصعيد توسيع منطقة الـ5 كيلومترات إلى 20 كيلومتراً في المرحلة الثانية من المفاوضات، وغير أنها لم تضع اللمسات النهائية بالنسبة لذلك الترتيب، كما أن الأطراف المعنية التزمت أيضاً بالانسحاب النهائي للقوات الأجنبية من تلك المنطقة.

لحظة القرار… وخسائر

بعد سيطرة قوات الحكومة على غوطة دمشق وريف حمص، بقيت ثلاثة جيوب: (شمال شرق) حيث يوجد التحالف الدولي ضد «داعش» بقيادة أميركا، (شمال غرب) حيث تقيم قوات تركية بموجب اتفاق آستانة، (جنوب غرب) حيث ليس هناك وجود عسكري داعم للمعارضة. وبات توقع أن قوات الحكومة ستذهب إلى هذه المنطقة وقال الرئيس بشار الأسد إن دمشق أمامها خياران في التعامل مع الجنوب الغربي من البلاد: «إما المصالحة، أو التحرير بالقوة». وأرسل النظام بالفعل قوات إلى الجبهات الجنوبية، بما في ذلك الوحدات المعاونة. وكانت هذه التعزيزات كافية لدفع وزارة الخارجية الأميركية إلى الإعراب بتاريخ 25 مايو (أيار) عن قلقها من التقارير الواردة بشأن العمليات العسكرية الوشيكة لنظام الأسد في جنوب البلاد.

بحسب تقرير مجموعة «حل الأزمات الدولية»، لا يزال هناك وقت متاح من أجل التوصل إلى حل تفاوضي من شأنه تفادي وقوع هجوم عسكري مدمر ومفعم بالمخاطر الكبيرة. وقد تكون الظروف مواتية في هذه المرحلة: إذ أبدت روسيا حساسية واضحة إزاء المصالح الإسرائيلية والأردنية، كما أعربت عن الرغبة في جذب الولايات المتحدة نحو ترتيب سياسي يصب في صالح الأهداف الروسية في سوريا. إذ هددت إسرائيل بشن الهجمات العسكرية في حالة اقتراب العناصر الموالية لإيران من مرتفعات الجولان المحتلة، وهي الأعمال العسكرية التي قد تسبب تهديداً للنظام الحاكم السوري وتعصف ببعض المكاسب العسكرية المحققة لدى دمشق وموسكو من التدخل العسكري الروسي في سبتمبر العام 2015. كما يبقى احتمال قائم (وإن كان طفيفاً) بشأن التدخل العسكري الأميركي ردّاً على هجمات النظام السوري، استناداً على الأقل إلى بيانات وزارة الخارجية الأميركية في 25 مايو و15 يونيو (حزيران).

وفي غياب الاتفاق سيكون البديل المفتَرَض هو شن هجوم عسكري سوري واسع النطاق مدعوم من روسيا وستكون نتائجه هي الأسوأ بالنسبة لكل الأطراف المعنية بالصراع. وسيكون الهجوم كارثيّاً بالنسبة لسكان جنوب غربي البلاد.

وبصرف النظر عن سكان الجنوب السوري أنفسهم، فإن مؤيدي قوات المعارضة السورية هم الأكثر عرضة للخسارة. وتجازف إسرائيل بإهدار جميع الضمانات الدائمة والمنهجية بشأن الوجود والدور الإيراني الذي كان بوسعها التفاوض عليه مسبقاً، مهما كانت حالة عدم اليقين أو ضعف التأثير الذي تعتبره حيالها، بحسب التقرير. والأردن معرَّض بصور خاصة إلى التدفقات العارمة لجموع اللاجئين التي تسبب زعزعة استقرار البلاد والناجمة عن الهجوم العسكري السوري الوشيك في جنوب البلاد.

وعلاوة على ما تقدَّم، وبالنظر لما وراء خفض التصعيد المؤقت، يحتاج الاقتصاد الأردني إلى عقد الروابط السياسية والتجارية القوية والمنتظمة مع سوريا. ومن شأن المصالح الأردنية والإسرائيلية – وبالتالي مصالح الولايات المتحدة – أن تلقى أفضل استفادة ممكنة عبر الانتقال السلمي ومنظم للسلطة في جنوب غربي سوريا، وليس عن طريق المواجهات العسكرية المريعة التي قد تتيح للمتطرفين الفرصة بالعودة إلى واجهة الأحداث، وتشجيع النظام السوري الحاكم على الاعتماد على الميليشيات ذات الصلة بإيران، وجلب إسرائيل إلى آتون الصراع ناهيكم عن الولايات المتحدة كذلك.

وقال التقرير: «لدى النظام السوري وحلفاؤه ما يخسرونه أيضاً من الأعمال العسكرية في جنوب البلاد. سيتحقق النصر العسكري وفق تكاليف باهظة من الناحية المادية والبشرية وتدمير المزيد من البنية التحتية في البلاد، وإنهاك الآلة العسكرية والمدنية في الوقت الذي تحاول فيه سوريا إعادة البناء».

في المقابل، إن من شأن الاتفاق المسبق على نزع «عسكرة استيلاء النظام السوري على جنوب غربي البلاد أن يقلل، ولكن ليس بالكامل، من احتمال شعور إسرائيل بالقلق حيال ما تتصور أنه الدور الإيراني الذي يدفعها إلى التدخل ضد النظام السوري وحلفائه، الأمر الذي قد يشعل صراعاً إقليمياً موسَّعاً في المنطقة. للحرب المفتوحة ديناميتها غير الخاضعة للتحكم والسيطرة، لا سيما على طول خط الهدنة شديد الحساسية سياسيا في مرتفعات الجولان»، بحسب التقرير.

وفي الأثناء ذاتها، يُعتَبَر الأردن شريكاً سياسياً واقتصادياً ضرورياً بالنسبة إلى سوريا، وإن أسفرت أعمال العنف عن موجات جديدة من اللاجئين السوريين الذين يعملون على زعزعة استقرار الأردن، أو يثيرون القلاقل والاضطرابات في مدن وقرى شمال الأردن ذات الصلة بالروابط العائلية مع جنوب غربي سوريا. وأفاد التقرير: «وإن لم تحصل إسرائيل على ضمانات كافية قبل التفاوض من روسيا بشأن الدور الإيراني في إطار الدولة السورية المستعادة، فإن ذلك الأمر يثير مخاطر قيام إسرائيل بالأعمال العسكرية المدمرة في وقت لاحق. الأمر الذي يعني الجنوب الغربي السوري الأقل استقرار، وبالتالي سوريا الأقل استقراراً كذلك».

استقرار مؤقت

في ظلِّ الاتفاق المتفاوض عليه بشأن الجنوب الغربي السوري، يمكن لجميع الأطراف الوفاء بالحد الأدنى الممكن من احتياجاتها، أو على أدنى تقدير تفادي سيناريوهات أسوأ الحالات المعنية بكل منها. وفي هذا السياق، ينبغي على رعاة خفض التصعيد في الجنوب السوري إعادة المفاوضات الثلاثية إلى مرحلة ما وراء إطار عمل مركز عمان للمراقبة المشار إليه، ذلك باستخدام اتفاق خفض التصعيد القائم والعمليات ذات الصلة به باعتبارها وسيلة الوصول إلى اتفاق أكثر تطوراً واستدامة. وتبدو الخطوط العريضة للاتفاق واضحة بصورة نسبية، حتى وإن كانت التفاصيل، بما في ذلك التوقيت وآليات التنفيذ، لا تزال قيد التفاوض حتى الآن. أولاً، ورغم كل شيء، تحتاج كل الأطراف إلى إسناد مبدأ خفض التصعيد والمحافظة على وقف إطلاق النار.

يُمكن للحل المؤقت بشأن المحافظة على خفض التصعيد أن يكون بمثابة اقتراح من جانب الأردن: الانتقال لما بعد وقف إطلاق النار المبدئي بهدف التركيز على «الاستقرار». ويستلزم النموذج الأردني للاستقرار، والمعرف على نطاق واسع، وجود برمجة برعاية دولية تعيد الخدمات العامة والأداء الاقتصادي الاعتيادي في المناطق الخاضعة لسيطرة المعارضة، وتسهيل التجارة عبر خطوط التماس، وكذلك التجارة عبر الحدود مع الأردن، والارتباط التدريجي بين مؤسسات الخدمات المحلية وأجهزة الدولة السورية. ومن شأن ذلك أن يشمل أيضاً مجموعة موسعة من أصحاب المصالح الدوليين، بما في ذلك دور أكبر لروسيا، إن كان يهدف فقط إلى طمأنة موسكو بشأن منطقة الاستقرار، وأنه لا يُقصد من ورائها أن تكون مقدمة لترتيبات إقليمية أكثر ديمومة تماثل التقسيم.

وتكون النتيجة هي التكامل الإداري والاقتصادي التدريجي في هذه المناطق ضمن المناطق الأوسع التي يسيطر عليها النظام السوري. وقال التقرير: «ينبغي على الأطراف الثلاثة التفاوض بشأن شروط إعادة فتح معبر نصيب وتأمين الطريق الممتد لمسافة 18 كيلومتراً من المعبر الحدودي وحتى مدينة درعا تحت إشراف ورعاية النظام السوري. ومن شأن إعادة فتح نصيب أن يكون أوضح الأدلة على الالتزام المتجدد من جميع الأطراف بشأن خفض التصعيد الثلاثي».

أما بالنسبة إلى دمشق، فإن «الاستقرار» على المدى القريب قد يكون بطيئاً وأقل إرضاء من الزحف العسكري المنتصر عبر مناطق الجنوب الغربي. ومع استمرار المفاوضات، رغم كل شيء، فإن أفضل الخيارات المتاحة بالنسبة لدمشق هو التحلي بالصبر والسماح للأردن بصياغة المنهج الأفضل دراسة والأوعى إدارة، بحسب «الأزمات الدولية».

ماذا عن الحل؟

أفاد تقرير «الأزمات الدولية» بأن الخطوط العريضة للاتفاق «واضحة بصورة نسبية: عودة الدولة السورية إلى كامل مناطق الجنوب الغربي، وعودة الجيش السوري إلى الحدود السورية، وإقامة منطقة عازلة موازية لخط الهدنة في الجولان وتكون منطقة خالية من القوات الموالية لإيران، وإعادة العمل باتفاقية الفصل بين القوات الإسرائيلية السورية لعام 1974، بما في ذلك إعادة نشر قوات الأمم المتحدة لمراقبة فض الاشتباك. ومن حيث التفاصيل، فهناك مساحة جيدة للتفاوض. وتشتمل المفاوضات على توقيت وآليات الاتفاق، ولكن هناك أيضاً تساؤلات مثل: ما الذي تعنيه عبارة: عودة الدولة السورية؟».

كان الحد الأدنى لشروط دمشق بشأن «المصالحات» السابقة هي: عودة رموز الدولة السورية، عودة الشرطة المدنية السورية، التي يحتمل أن تضم مواطنين محليين، خروج المتطرفين وغيرهم ممن يرفضون الاتفاق، أو ممن تعترض دمشق على وجودهم، دمج قوات المعارضة المحلية في الوحدات العسكرية النظامية السورية، كمجموعات كاملة في بعض الأحيان، تسوية الأوضاع القانونية للسكان المحليين، بما في ذلك تسجيل التجنيد بفترة سماح قابلة للتفاوض، وعودة الحكم المحلي والإدارة البلدية، مع موظفين من الموالين للنظام، وفي بعض الحالات مع الأعضاء السابقين في المجلس المحلي المعارض، الذين يخدمون تحت إمرة حاكم المحافظة.

كانت هذه هي الشروط المستخدمة سابقاً في الجيوب المحاصرة في الداخل السوري، من دون وجود راعٍ حقيقي معاكس للتفاوض في مواجهة دمشق وحلفائها. وبالنظر إلى الالتزام المتواصل من قبل الرعاة الثلاثة لخفض التصعيد حيال الاتفاق والأهمية الاستراتيجية التي يمثلها الجنوب الغربي السوري لكل من الأردن وإسرائيل، فإن مساحة التفاوض بشأن الشروط في الجنوب الغربي قد تكون أرحب.

من شأن الاتفاق المتفاوض عليه أن يكون مرضياً إلى حده الأدنى بالنسبة لدمشق وحلفائها إذا ما أراد النظام السوري الامتناع عن شنِّ الهجوم العسكري على جنوب غربي البلاد. ولكن ينبغي للاتفاق أن يكون مناسباً إلى أقصى درجة بالنسبة إلى قوات المعارضة وغيرهم من السكان في المناطق الخاضعة لسيطرة المعارضة، وفي حدود ما هو معقول ومقبول. وقال: «من المتوقَّع ألا يرحب كثير من المواطنين السوريين داخل جنوب غربي البلاد، الخاضع لسيطرة المعارضة، بعودة الدولة السورية التي يقودها النظام الحاكم، تحت أي شروط كانت. ومع ذلك، فإن الاتفاق الذي لا يفي بتطلعاتهم ولكن يمكنه، إلى أقصى درجة ممكن، استيعاب وتهدئة مخاوفهم، من شأنه الحد من المقاومة المسلحة وإراقة المزيد من الدماء بلا طائل».

عودة رقيقة

وتحدث التقرير عن نماذج عدة لـ«عودة الدولة» خلال السنوات السبع الماضية بين «الدولة الرقيقة» أو «العميقة». إذ هناك بعض السوابق لـ«المصالحات» التي تنصُّ على انتشار الشرطة العسكرية الروسية، واستبعاد أجهزة النظام الحاكم الأمنية، لفترة مؤقتة على الأقل. وضمن ترتيبات «الدولة الرقيقة»، فإن الفصائل المحلية المسلحة، والشرطة المدنية السورية، وفرقة من الشرطة العسكرية الروسية، يمكنها المشاركة في المحافظة على الأمن والنظام. والوجود الروسي مهم نسبيّاً من أجل تسهيل عودة أجهزة الدولة السورية، وردع محاولات الاعتداء والانتقام، وطمأنة كل من السكان المحليين والبلدان المجاورة. وسوف تكون النتيجة شكلاً من أشكال الإدارة الذاتية تحت السيطرة الرسمية للدولة السورية، والبناء نحو مزيد من اندماج وتكامل الجنوب في ظل الدولة.

وعلى الاتفاق أن يشمل فرض الحد الأدنى من القيود على الحركة المدنية والوصول التجاري إلى هذه المناطق، الأمر الذي من شأنه تنشيط الاقتصاد المحلي ويُسهِم في التعافي الاقتصادي الوطني السوري وإعادة بناء البلاد. وينبغي إتاحة الخيار أمام المعارضة والرجال في سن الخدمة العسكرية لتلبية متطلبات الخدمة الإلزامية في مناطقهم، سواء في الجيش الوطني السوري، أو القوات المعاونة، أو الشرطة المدنية المحلية، أو الأدوار الاقتصادية المدنية الحيوية في الزراعة أو التعمير، وليس في الوحدات العسكرية المنتشرة في ميادين بعيدة لقتال قوات المعارضة الأخرى.

وقال التقرير: «في سيناريو المصالحة، سوف تستفيد المصالح الأردنية وكثيراً في حالة دمج الشركاء السابقين إداريّاً ضمن الدولة والوحدات المسلحة المحلية الخاضعة لسيطرة الحكومة في دمشق، بدلاً من مواجهة القوة العسكرية الغاشمة، أو (الإخلاء) القسري الذي يدمر التركيبة السكانية والنسيج الاجتماعي في هذه المناطق. وسوف يستفيد الأمن الأردني من الجنوب الذي يعيش سكانه ضمن عائلاتهم وعشائرهم في مجتمع جنوبي سلمي وصحي نسبيّاً، وبالتالي يكونون أقل عرضة للاستمالة من قبل المجرمين، والمتطرفين، أو الجماعات الموالية لإيران. وبالنسبة إلى المعارضة والمدنيين المعارضين أيضا، من المهم ألا يتم اقتلاعهم من منازلهم ومجتمعاتهم للعثور على مأوى في إحدى المناطق السورية الأخرى الفقيرة والنائية والخاضعة لسيطرة المعارضة».

لكن التحدي هو «مدى رغبة روسيا والقيادة السورية، أو مقدرتهما، على إبعاد العناصر الموالية لإيران من الجنوب الغربي للبلاد المتاخم لخط الهدنة في مرتفعات الجولان تحت أي ترتيب يمكن التوصل إليه. من شأن التهديد بشن الهجمات الإسرائيلية الجديدة أن يُثني إيران وحلفاءها المحليين عن دخول مناطق الجنوب الغربي السوري، لا سيما في الوقت الذي تتعرض فيه إيران للضغوط السياسية والاقتصادية الجديدة والمكثفة على الصعيد الإقليمي».

وخلص التقرير إلى أن «الصراع منخفض الكثافة بين إسرائيل وإيران سيستمر لبعض الوقت، في سوريا وعلى صعيد المنطقة بأسرها، لكن القتال لأجل الجنوب الغربي السوري يجب ألا يكون الشرارة التي تشعل أتون الصراع والحرب المفتوحة. هناك أساس واضح لاتخاذ القرار بشأن الحل التفاوضي غير العنيف في الجنوب السوري. ولكن مثل هذه التسوية تتطلب دفعة دبلوماسية قوية من جميع الأطراف. بدلاً من السماح للوضع بالانحراف عن مساره، ينبغي عليهم استغلال الفرصة السانحة واستخدام الوقت المتبقي في الوصول إلى اتفاق مشترك».

تم نشر هذا المقال في «الشرق الأوسط»

محاصصة «الضامنين» للدستور السوري… وغضب في دمشق من سوتشي

محاصصة «الضامنين» للدستور السوري… وغضب في دمشق من سوتشي

لم تغير مشاركة دمشق بوفد من نحو 1200 شخص ولا مقاطعة «الهيئة العليا للمفاوضات» المعارضة لـ«الحوار الوطني السوري» في سوتشي من نتائج المؤتمر، ذلك أن التفاوض الفعلي كان يجري في غرف وممرات جانبية بغياب السوريين، إذ إن الدول «الضامنة» الثلاث، روسيا وإيران وتركيا، اتفقت مع الأمم المتحدة على صيغة البيان الختامي، وعلى أن تقوم كل دولة بترشيح 50 عضواً إلى اللجنة الدستورية على أن يباركها زيادة أو نقصاناً المبعوث الدولي ستيفان دي ميستورا، الأمر الذي هو أشبه بـ«محاصصة ثلاثية» للدستور السوري المستقبلي.

دمشق التي لم تستطع تحمل مسؤولية إفشال «سوتشي» الذي رعاه الرئيس فلاديمير بوتين قبل انتخابات الرئاسة في 18 مارس (آذار) المقبل، «غاضبة» من نتائج المؤتمر، وكان أحد التجليات أن جميع وسائل الإعلام الرسمية وموالين لدمشق نشروا البيان الختامي من دون مقدمته وخلاصته السياسية وحرفوا الوثيقة الرسمية المتفق عليها بيان «الضامنين» الثلاثة.

بحسب المعلومات المتوفرة لـ«الشرق الأوسط»، فإن نتائج «سوتشي» أنجزت قبل بدء المؤتمر ذلك أن مفاوضات ماراثونية جرت بين وزير الخارجية الروسي سيرغي لافروف والأمين العام للأمم المتحدة أنطونيو غوتيريش نهاية الأسبوع الماضي بعد قرار «هيئة المفاوضات» المعارضة مقاطعة المؤتمر، إذ إن الأمم المتحدة ربطت مشاركتها بسلسلة من الشروط بينها أن يقتصر المؤتمر على جلسة واحدة من دون تشكل لجان مؤسساتية وتكرار سيناريو «مسلسل اجتماعات آستانة»، وأن يقرر المبعوث الدولي مرجعية وأسماء وآليات عملية اللجنة الدستورية واختيار أعضائها من قائمة تقدمها الدول «الضامنة» الثلاث، إضافة إلى إقرار المبادئ السياسية الـ12 التي كان أعدها دي ميستورا، ورفض رئيس وفد الحكومة بشار الجعفري البحث فيها في الجولتين السابقتين من مفاوضات جنيف.

المفاجأة الإيجابية، كانت أن ما تم الاتفاق عليه بين الأمم المتحدة وموسكو تحقق. جرت محاولات لتغيير مسودة البيان المتفق عليه لكنها لم تنجح، خصوصاً عندما لوح دي ميستورا بالانسحاب صباح الافتتاح. بالتالي، لم تؤثر عملياً الاعتراضات والمطالبات من أعضاء الوفد القادمين من دمشق، ومقاطعة ممثلي الفصائل المسلحة وعودتهم من مطار سوتشي إلى أنقرة، إذ إن الوفد التركي تكلف الحديث باسم المعارضة، فيما تحدثت طهران وموسكو باسم دمشق.
لوحظ أن وكالة الأنباء الإيرانية (إرنا) و«وكالة الأنباء السورية الرسمية» (سانا) نشرتا أمس البيان الختامي لـ«سوتشي» وفق تفسيرهما، إذ إن البيان خلا من المقدمة والخلاصة التي تتحدث عن آلية تشكيل اللجنة الدستورية. وأفادت «سانا» بأنه «تم الاتفاق على أن تكون النسبة في لجنة مناقشة الدستور الحالي ثلثين تدعمهم الحكومة، وثلث للأطراف الأخرى، لمناقشة الدستور الحالي حيث تتكون اللجنة من 150 عضواً هم مندوبون لمؤتمر الحوار الوطني السوري – السوري، ويتم اختيار الرئيس ونائبه وأمين السر من تكوين اللجنة». وبحسب تفسير «سانا»، يتخذ أعضاء اللجنة «القرار بالأغلبية حول ضرورة المساعدة من خلال الخبراء بطريقة تقديم المشاورات إلى أعضاء اللجنة».

كما لوحظ أن «سانا» عدلت في البيان الختامي، إذ ذكرت أنه «شدد على أهمية المحافظة على الجيش والقوات المسلحة، وأن يقوم بواجبه وفقاً للدستور بما في ذلك حماية الحدود الوطنية والشعب من التهديدات الخارجية ومكافحة الإرهاب حماية للمواطنين، حيثما يتطلب ذلك. وإن تركز المؤسسات الأمنية والاستخباراتية على الحفاظ على الأمن الوطني وتعمل وفقاً للقانون»، علما أن وثيقة المؤتمر الرسمية لـ«سوتشي» نصت على «بناء جيش قوي يقوم على الكفاءة ويمارس بواجباته وفق الدستور»، وأن تعمل «أجهزة الاستخبارات والأمن القومي لحماية أمن البلاد وفق مبادئ سيادة القانون وحماية حقوق الإنسان بحسب نصوص الدستور والقانون، ويجب أن يكون استخدام القوة مقتصراً على تفويض من مؤسسات الدولة ذات الصلة».

وعكس هذا الموقف «غضباً» في دمشق من نتائج المؤتمر الذي سعى مسؤولون إلى وضع «خطوط حمراء» له قبل سفر المشاركين من العاصمة السورية إلى المنتجع الروسي، مقابل صمت إيراني ونشر مجتزئ للبيان الختامي. وقال مسؤول غربي إن طهران «فاجأت الحاضرين بقبول البيان في سوتشي»، قبل أن يشير إلى نشر وسائل إعلام إيرانية تفسير دمشق للبيان.
كما أن مساعد وزير الخارجية الإيراني للشؤون السياسية الخاصة حسين جابري أنصاري التقى شخصيات من المعارضة السورية في سوتشي وسط أنباء عن استعدادات إيرانية لعقد مؤتمر مماثل لـ«سوتشي» في طهران.

في المقابل، أعربت أنقرة عن الارتياح لنتائج المؤتمر عبر اتصال الرئيسين فلاديمير بوتين ورجب طيب إردوغان. كما أن الخارجية التركية أصدرت بيانا بنتائجه و«الطريقة البناءة». وقال مسؤول تركي: «أهم نتائج المؤتمر الدعوة إلى إنشاء لجنة دستورية واختيار مجموعة تتألف من 150 مرشحاً لهذه اللجنة، إذ قدم الوفد التركي الذي منح تفويضاً بتمثيل جماعات المعارضة التي لم تحضر المؤتمر، قائمة تضم 50 مرشحاً بالتشاور مع المعارضة». ومن المقرر أن يشكل دي ميستورا اللجنة دستورية «تبحث عن التمثيل النسبي للمعارضة»، وأنقرة «سترصد عن كثب عملية إنشاء اللجنة الدستورية كضامن للمعارضة».

عليه، تترقب دول غربية شاركت كـ«مراقب» المرحلة المقبلة ومدى وفاء موسكو بنتائج المؤتمر وممارسة نفوذها على دمشق وطهران اللتين تريدان شراء الوقت إلى ما بعد انتخابات بوتين في 18 مارس، كي تقدم موسكو رسميا قائمة الـ150 مرشحاً إلى دي ميستورا كي يبدأ عمليه في اختيار 45 – 50 عضواً للجنة من قائمة «الضامنين» وخبراء وسياسيين من خارجها.

وبدأت عواصم غربية تبحث كيفية المواءمة بين «الوثيقة الخماسية» التي صاغتها واشنطن وحلفاؤها، وتضمنت تفاصيل المرجعية السياسية للعملية الدستورية، وصلاحيات الرئيس ورئيس الوزراء، وطابع النظام السياسي السوري من جهة، ووثيقة سوتشي التي رعتها موسكو و«الضامنين» التركي والإيراني من جهة ثانية، على أن تكون الورقة المبنية الجديدة من الوثيقتين مرجعية سياسية لعمل اللجنة الدستورية.

تم نشر هذا المقال في «الشرق الأوسط»

2017..The Syrian Opposition Deterioration

2017..The Syrian Opposition Deterioration

“Enab Baladi’s Investigations Team

Despite the Syrian regime’s control of Aleppo neighborhoods at the end of 2016, the most pessimistic pro-Syrian revolution did not expect its significant relapse by the end of 2017.

There was a loss of land and a loss of opportunities to control the areas relinquished by the withdrawing ISIS, to the conflicting parties. In addition, opportunities were lost through adapting policies in conferences that have gone into insignificant details and ignored the main issues, and through conflicting factions at a time the influential countries have started interfering overtly in the control of its agents.      

On the ground … al-Assad is the biggest winner

The influence map in Syria has witnessed major changes in 2017, most of which were in favor of the Syrian regime and the Kurdish forces while the opposition factions areas were clearly shrinking.

The ISIS withdraws eastwards

The eastern region of Syria was the most eye-catching area in the general Syrian scene. The control of the “Syrian Democratic Forces” (SDF) over the city of Raqqa, the capital of the Islamic State, was the most prominent military event which was followed by operations in Deir ez-Zor governorate and its control by the regime and the Kurdish forces.

A series of ISIS withdrawals also resulted in the Kurdish forces control of large areas of the eastern region of Syria starting from the city of Raqqa, which   fell under their control in no more than six months.

The Kurdish Forces reached the province of Deir ez-Zor thanks to a military plan which was internationally prepared by the Washington-led coalition. They took control of the eastern bank of the Euphrates River, to compete with the al- Assad forces that went into battles against the ISIS through Hama, Homs, and Aleppo countryside and the Syrian desert and expelled the ISIS from the entire Euphrates West Bank.

Thus, the ISIS’s control over some of the enclaves in the western Abu Kamal countryside and some small areas on the Syrian-Iraqi border has receded.

It is likely that the total collapse of the ISIS in Syria will be announced in February 2018, according to the military analyst Colonel Hatem al-Rawi who expected that a Russian-Iranian competition may come to the fore after the announcement.

Al-Rawi told Enab Baladi that the map of the eastern region has become clear. The right bank of the Euphrates River is going to settle under American control through SDF. This is reinforced by the fact that the Kurdish forces have not resorted to violence with the war-weary people of the region who have sought peace even temporarily.

On the left bank, however, al-Rawi considered that the Popular Mobilization of Iraq was unable to enter Syria, which is a big blow against Iran and the Syrian regime. He pointed out that migration affects most of the western countryside of Deir ez-Zor, which caused instability in areas controlled by the Assad forces.

The “de-escalation” agreement adopted by Russia and Turkey in early May 2017 cannot be ignored, too, as it resulted in directing military operations against the ISIS, and temporarily freezing the rest of the fronts.

Negotiations delineate the borders of Idlib

Idlib and the surrounding areas to the northern and eastern Hama countryside witnessed a series of changes during the year 2017, because of the continued state of instability after being controlled by Tahrir al-Sham militarily, economically and at the level of services, following clashes against Ahrar al- Sham Islamic movement.

The control map hasn’t changed in the first months of 2017, as the Assad forces shifted their military weight to fight against the ISIS. The northern and eastern Hama countryside Front witnessed attack and retreat operations which were launched by the factions through small-scale battles and taking control of some sites for few hours then retreating.

However, these circumstances changed after the signing of the “Astana 7” agreement in October, which drew the boundaries of factions’ control, and the division of Idlib into three parts currently being implemented through operations of the Assad forces backed by Iran and Russia.

The recent Russian statements indicate that the year 2018 will be devoted to the war on “Fatah al-Sham” and that there will be transformations that may be accepted by the region, amid fear of exceeding the limits set in “Astana 7,” which dictates the withdrawal of factions from areas east of the railway and Abu Dahour military airport.

The Assad forces have begun fighting on more than one axis, north and east Hama and south of Aleppo, seeking to penetrate deep into the province after the introduction of large military reinforcements which ended the fights in  the province of Deir ez-Zor.

According to Colonel al-Rawi, Iran and the al-Assad regime are working to undermine and neutralize the Turkish role in the province of Idlib, as Turkey is the only body capable of dismantling the complex situation between the “Tahrir al Sham” and the “Free Army” in Idlib.

As for Russia, stability has become necessary in order to speed up the investment of its privileges.

Al-Rawi does not see the decline of the opposition in the province. He says that “at best I do not think that the Assad forces have a chance of achieving significant progress.”

He explained that these developments coincide with the silence of the US, which may turn the table and neither Russia nor Iran are able to rebel or disobey.”

In reference to the “easing of tension ” in Idlib, which is supposed to be implemented in 2018, the agreement divided the province into three geographical areas, one is run by Russia while Turkey controls the second which is near its borders, and the third is demilitarized, as was confirmed to Enab Baladi by sources in the leadership of the “Free Army”.

According to the sources, the area east of the railway line, on the Aleppo-Damascus line, will be demilitarized and gun-free with no control of Russia protected factions. It will instead be run by local councils, while the second zone extends between the railway and the highway, and the third will be subject to Turkish influence.

Caution alerts of new battles in the south

The Syrian south has undergone no “significant” development in Daraa and Quneitra governorates, except for an international-backed “easing of tension” agreement, which led to a cessation of clashes between the opposition factions and the al-Assad forces, as well as progress made by the military factions in Daraa. It controlled the “strategic” al-Manshia neighborhood after battles that lasted for months and that were announced by Al-Bonyan Al-Marsous operations room.

While the fronts in the western countryside of Daraa collapsed in favor of the “Khalid ibn al-Walid Army,” accused of allegiance to the ISIS, which controlled the areas of Tasil, Saham al-Jawlan, Jalin, Muzayra, Adwan, Tal al-Jomoua, Tel Ashtra.

The last months of 2017 have witnessed many conflicts. Al- Assad forces and their supporting militias entirely took control of the area of ​​Beit Jinn in the south-western Damascus countryside under an agreement with the military factions that guaranteed their departure to the Syrian north and the city of Daraa.

The agreement came after battles initiated by al- Assad forces on the region with Iranian participation similar to the scenario followed in other areas west of Damascus, such as khan al-Shih, Zakiya, Knaker, Barada valley, Al- Zabadani, and Madaya.

It seems that the battles of the Beit Jinn farm are the beginning of a series of conflicts that al-Assad forces are seeking to implement by controlling the influence of the factions south of Damascus, and opening the Triangle of Death fronts again and moving deep into the opposition areas in the western countryside of Daraa.

The crowd and reinforcements brought by al-Assad forces to various areas of Daraa countryside confirm that the south is facing a new military phase, which is similar to the circumstances of 2015, which witnessed the largest military record in the region since the beginning of 2011.

According to military analyst Colonel Abdullah al-Assaad, Iran is seeking to be more influential than Russia in the south, despite its already controlled   military base in the Muthbain village near the city of Al-Sanamayn, and the sensor networks in Jordan.

Al-Assaad explained to Enab Baladi that Iran does not aim to reach the Israeli border with the Golan as it seeks to reach the border with Jordan and is currently focusing on As-Suwayda eastern countryside which it has recently controlled.

Unclaimed new Ghouta map

The most prominent military event in the eastern Ghouta of Damascus was the control of the al-Assad forces over the Barza and al-Qaboun neighborhoods, thus cutting off all supply routes and tunnels, which were the main food and military outlet of the opposition control areas east of Damascus.

The first months of 2017 witnessed attack and retreat battles between Jaysh al-Islam faction and the Syrian regime from the eastern side of the Ghouta. The situation remained unchanged, except for a slight advance of al-Assad forces, followed by an utter cessation of confrontations.

After March, Damascus Jubar neighborhood came to the scene after the operation that the opposition factions launched (Al-Rahman Legion (Failaq al-Rahman), Tahrir al-Sham, Harakat Ahrar al-Sham), under the slogan of “O slaves of Allah, be firm.” The operation reached through to the Aabaseen square and took control of the surrounding areas to the Panorama complex on the highway which leads to the center of the capital Damascus.

These battles were considered as decisive. Less than a month after they ended and the factions withdrew from the new sites, al-Assad forces began an opposite operation to take control of the Jubar neighborhood and the surrounding neighborhoods, to separate them from the rest of the cities of Ghouta. However, they failed to advance because of tunnels and booby-trapped buildings.

The opposition hit another location when it took control over vehicles management spots in the city of Harasta, through a battle launched by Ahrar al-Sham, in November. The opposition made use of this battle to claim military advances, starting from Harasta and reaching Arbain city.

Al-Ghouta is waiting for a new military and interior map through the agreements, which opposition factions are secretly making with the Russian side and the Syrian regime and which resulted into the exit of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham to northern Syria.

According to Enab Baladi’s obtained information, Failaq al-Rahman is negotiating the opening of a road between Harasta and its held areas in Ghouta and de-escalation in Jubar and the Middle Sector, as well as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s exit from the region.

Jaysh al-Islam is also negotiating securing aid and opening a road to Duma, in addition to the commitment to de-escalation and confronting Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in Ghouta.

On the table… Russia is a Godmother and the opposition is undergoing an adaptation process”

Twelve months of long negotiations have not achieved a consensus shift between the opposition and the regime, along with the influential countries in the conflict, while Russia imposed itself as the Godmother of the political solution, amid the repetition of the same scene in the eight versions of the Geneva negotiations and Astana talks.

The ninth version of the Geneva negotiations, which will be held on 21 January, will mark the beginning of 2018. Analysts believe critical. It will be then followed by the Sochi Conference, which will be held on 29 and 30 January, amid Russian attempts to resurrect al-Assad regime, while the opposition insists on pursuing the solution according to the statement of “Geneva 1” and Security Council resolution N2254.

At a time when al-Assad’s fate is still a conflicting matter heads are turning towards the Russian city, which overlooks the Middle East and Europe from the black Sea, and which has hosted official meetings and international conferences, most recently a tripartite meeting of the presidents of Ankara, Moscow, and Iran in November 2017.

The Fourth edition of Geneva negotiations has been limited to a four-file discussion identified by the UN envoy to Syria, Staffan de Mistura. It was expected negotiations will progress within six months; however, they generally remained just words on paper until the end of the year.

While the first file discusses issues related to the establishment of a non-sectarian and inclusive rule, the second discusses issues related to setting a schedule for drafting a new constitution, the third discusses all matters related to the holding of “free and fair” elections after formulating a constitution and the fourth examines strategic solutions for counterterrorism and confidence-building measures.

The opposition is accused and sticking to Geneva

The latest statement made by Nasr Hariri, the head of the delegation of the Supreme Commission for Negotiations, which included all the platforms of the opposition, during meetings at the Riyadh II Conference in November 2017, has put emphasis on “the usefulness of attending the Geneva negotiations” to expose the regime and its crimes to International society despite the absence of actual results. ”

He also referred to how “catastrophic” Sochi Conference was, considering that achieving political transition “is the only solution to save Syria,” despite the expansion of the Syrian regime military operations on the battlefield and of its sphere of influence and control in the internationally approved de-escalation areas, which reveals that he is still pursuing its policies away from settlement.

The opposition is waiting for explanations about Sochi. In an interview with Enab Baladi Firas al-Khalidi, a member of the Supreme Commission for Negotiations stated ” no one can withdraw the negotiations from Geneva.”  He stressed that “it is clear that the negotiations are taking place under United Nations umbrella.”

Al-Khalidi pointed out that “in case the news that have been broadcasted about Sochi were meant to dilute the issue then this is unacceptable.” He added that “if the Russians were able to provide guarantees that the conference will intend to implement the political transition and resolution 2254 under the auspices of the United Nations, not to dilute the issue, then we will deal with it positively.”

Sochi Conference is a Russian game

Russia ignored the negotiations which had been held about Syria and began to promote for the Sochi conference as a key point in the political solution. In mid-December 2017, Reuters quoted an opposition official which it described as “major” saying that the United States and other countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan and Turkey, which had supported the opposition before, have agreed upon Russia’s vision.

Abundance of conferences around Syria

The political file in Syria has witnessed a series of conferences and meetings, starting with the Geneva 1 conference in June 2012, which resulted in various recommendations, foremost of which was the setting of the bullet points of the transition process in Syria.

The second version of the negotiations came in January 2014, followed by the first and second Moscow conferences in 2015, then the first and second Vienna conferences at the end of the same year, to the third edition of Geneva in early 2016.

2017 witnessed the beginning of the first version of Astana talks in January which was sponsored by Russia, Turkey, and Iran.

The fourth version of Geneva talks was held in February 2017, followed by Geneva five in March, followed by negotiations on the sixth version in May, up to the last two versions in July and November.

Astana talks were recurrent, the first of which occurred at the beginning of the year, the second in February and the third, in which the opposition did not participate, was held in March. The opposition withdrew from the fourth version of talks in May.

July 2017 witnessed the fifth edition of Astana, while Astana six was held in September, reaching the seventh and eighth editions in November and December.

The opposition official attributed this position to the fact that “the whole world is fed up with what is going on in Syria,” while changes in the positions of some countries have shown that the resurrection of al-Assad is a possible option, although they did not tackle the issue publicly.

“There is more than a question mark about some of the opposition’s concessions or its acceptance of some international requirements,” said Sabra, who was chief negotiator of the opposition delegation to Geneva, to Enab Baladi. He called for the necessity of “distinguishing between the opposition and the revolution.”

According to Sabra’s vision, “the negotiating body says that it is forced to adopt political realism, as a result of changing international attitudes and thus linked its position to the States’ positions.” He pointed out that “in case the countries, which are controlling the body, wanted it to go to Sochi then it will go, regardless of popular rejection, considering that it has set itself to express the demands of States and not the Syrians.”

According to him what the Russians want from Sochi is the first meeting, which he described as “a carnival media show which will be attended by fifteen hundred people to choose an already selected committee which includes one-hundred to one-hundred and fifty people to write the draft constitution.”

Sabra said that after the meeting, the Russians will tell the United States and the United Nations that they accepted that the formed committee will meet in Geneva during the negotiations, providing that it will examine the second and third files, which are being discussed already, namely the Constitution and the elections. Thus, in this case Astana will be dedicated to the discussion of the fourth file and the issues of confidence-building measures.

Sabra believes that the opposition is heading toward “a dangerous slide which will put an end to t and to the Syrian revolution. He added that ” our friends in the Supreme Negotiating Body are aware of this, and what we have said since the beginning of 2017 is that we must cooperate together to stop it, but they chose to follow the current path.”

“Russia aims at changing the levels and the parties of the conflict in order to drag the regime, which committed crimes in Syria and destroyed its past, present, and future, above the level of that conflict,” said Sabra. He also stated that this was crystal clear through the statements of the head of the delegation, Bashar Jaafari, during Geneva eight negotiations.”

Jaafari accused the UN envoy, Staffan de Mistura, of “making mistakes and trespassing his powers as a mediator between the negotiating parties.” when he announced the end of negotiations for the regime the end of the first phase of the eighth version of the Geneva negotiations, then submitted to Russian pressure and attended the second phase.

In Sabra’s opinion, “some in the Supreme Commission are aware of what they put themselves into, but unfortunately they are adapting their positions to what suits the countries which nationalities they are holding.” He pointed out that “de Mistura put it in Geneva and addressed the opposition members as if he was saying ‘you are a member in the opposition holding a nationality. I know the policies of the country which gave you that nationality and it agrees to hold the Sochi conference’.”

At the political level, the opposition member believes Russia to be incapable of achieving a real settlement, for it is besieged by NATO at home, and this goes beyond the sound political logic of being weak at home and strong in Syria,” he said. Sabra added that “Russia cannot invest in its military achievement for a long time at the political level.”

The Russian “game” aimed at spreading the possibility of Farouk al-Sharaa’s presidency of Sochi and, according to Sabra, this serves the establishment of a “popular dialogue conference headed by the ruling authority, and this is not only a confirmation of Bashar al-Assad position as a president, but also to legitimize all his previously committed crimes. ”

According to analysts, international discontent over the Syrian issue manifested in de Mistura statement, in which he told the opposition that the states no longer support you. Sabra pointed out that the UN envoy had put it clearly since March 2017. He said “he was returning from Amman after participating in the Arab foreign ministers’ summit, then he told us that the countries do not want to remove Bashar al-Assad, so you have to be realistic and intelligent. ”

According to Sabra, “no politician or military official who claims to defend the revolution can say that he is forced to provide concessions because states changed their position and stopped their support.” He considered that “this is unacceptable because it reduces the Syrian people’s sacrifice to a mere tool to protect the gun or its political status.”

A member of the former opposition delegation to Geneva hoped that the Commission would consider the Syrian people’s opinion and express their voice.

A year of “fake” economic promises

2017 may be described as a “year of promises” made by the Syrian regime government, headed by Imad Khamis, as a result of the promises made by his ministers to improve the citizens’ situation, increase their salaries, boost production, improve the Syrian lira, and reduce prices.

But the first half of 2017 did not witness any concretization of these promises. The year began with a fuel crisis, in addition to the rationing of electricity, which sometimes reached eighteen hours a day. This raised the citizens’ anger and resentment before the countries that supported the regime, on top of them Iran, started exporting fuel to Syria.

This was accompanied by an increase in the prices of basic foodstuffs and vegetables due to weak domestic production, according to the assistant Minister of Internal Trade and Consumer Protection in the Syrian regime, Jamal Shuaib, in May last year, which has financially affected the citizens. In June, Damascus Center for Research and Studies (DCRS), which is close to the regime, estimated that sixty-seven percent of Syrians live in extreme poverty, while some believe that the percentage is even higher.

However, the last few weeks of the year witnessed a decline in some prices, in light of the stability of the average income of the citizen at thirty-five thousand Syrian liras, and the contradictory statements by the regime officials about a future increase, linking it to an increase in the state’s production of its resources.

At the level of the Syrian lira, the exchange rate has been stable at five hundred and thirty liras for months, before starting to decrease during the past two months to four hundred liras, which gave hope to the citizens who expected that traders would reduce prices, but to no avail, as it turned out that the decrease in the exchange rate is a speculation between the major traders and the bank.t then re-increased up to four hundred and sixty liras during the last weeks of the year.

On the other hand, 2017 can also be called the military and political “support bill” for Russia and Iran, as it witnessed the signing of high-value economic contracts in various fields (oil, gas, electricity, wheat, energy, telecommunications, agriculture, industry, livestock …) and became the year in which the two countries started gaining the credits of supporting al-Assad by obtaining economic advantages in Syria and depriving Syrians of such privileges for future decades.

Ghouta out of de-escalation zones

The opposition-controlled areas were divided according to their geographical location. The areas that are close to the borders with neighboring countries such as Jordan and Turkey experienced economic improvement, especially after the de-escalation agreement.

The southern region witnessed a relative peaceful atmosphere following the Russian-US agreement in early July, which led to the revival of markets in some sectors such as foodstuffs and clothing trade, as well as the thriving of the construction sector, household appliances, and solar power generation sectors as a result of the increase of the Syrian refugees’ return from Jordan to Syria.

While the city of Idlib has witnessed market activity through Bab al-Hawa Crossing Border with Turkey, which is the commercial center of ​​the region, especially in recent months.  Cities and towns of the northern countryside of Aleppo, which are supervised by Turkey witnessed an economic mobility as well.

The crossing borders of the northern countryside of Homs have witnessed a limited movement that led to revitalizing the commercial movement, securing the local market needs of foodstuffs and price stability as well as encouraging the residents’ return to their houses in the city.

However, prices have risen again because of the return of restrictions on these crossing borders, after the failure of the de-escalation agreement between the factions and civil activists.

In Ghouta, things are different. Although the agreement included lifting the siege which was imposed by al-Assad’s forces on it and the introduction of basic necessities, without any impediments or taxes, the region was subjected to a tightening of the siege and inflation in prices, before the agreement between the trader Mohieddin al-Manfosh and the Syrian regime on the introduction of foodstuffs and goods, through which the regime’s profits are estimated by about $ 20 million, according to Enab Baladi.

Kurds are trying to reach self-sufficiency

The expulsion of ISIS from large areas in the north-east of Syria in favor of the Syrian Democratic Forces supported by the US opened the door to talks about reconstruction with the support of Gulf countries including Saudi Arabia.

While the area under Kurdish control, in Al-Hasakah, Raqqa, and Deir ez-Zor, are trying to reach self-sufficiency by relying on natural resources, the most important of which are oil and agriculture, as the agricultural economy currently accounts for about seventy-five percent of the region’s economy map.

Al-Jazira region also includes oil and gas fields of strategic importance, including Rmelan, Al-Shaddadah, Jibsa, and As-Suwayda which have been controlled by the “People’s Protection Units” in mid-2012 as well as the new wells that were seized in 2017 in the eastern countryside of Deir ez-Zor.

Huge waves of displacement… Do not come back

At the time when the Syrian regime’s government has been talking about the return of some refugees and displaced people with the stable security conditions, as it put it, the year 2017 has witnessed huge waves of displacement as a result of the military operations carried out by the regime and its allies, as well as the Kurdish forces’ advanced move in ISIS-controlled areas in northern and eastern Syria.

The official statements were not enough to create a positive atmosphere for the return of refugees and displaced people, as they were contradicted by other officials’ statements, most notably the dead commander, Issam Zahreddine, who vowed those who wanted to return that he would not forgive them. His famous saying “a piece of advice from this beard… do not come back” became a memorable adage.

The siege on Al-Zabadani and Madaya, which has lasted for years, ended in February 2017, when al-Assad’s forces and the Lebanese party Hezbollah displaced a large number of residents and combatants of the area to Idlib and the nearby town of Bloudan, thus, the opposition lost one of its most popular huts in the vicinity of Damascus after Darayya.

After thirty-six days of battles, the regime took control over the Barada river, which led to the displacement of fifteen hundred people, in January 2017.

Al-Waer Neighborhood in Homs has witnessed a huge wave of displacement that affected 80% of its population, following an agreement to displace opposition combatants and the civilians who wish to.

According to Enab Baladi sources, the number of displaced people ranged from twenty to twenty-five thousand people, while no more than five thousand of the neighborhood’s population remained there. The last group of displaced people left on May 21, thus, the Russian military police and al-Assad’s forces have directly entered the neighborhood and took full control of the city of Homs.

Eleven groups left Al-Waer, seven of them went to the eastern countryside of Aleppo, three others went to Idlib Governorate, while the last group went to the northern countryside of Homs.

The first groups started leaving the neighborhood on March 18. They were followed by other groups who left the neighborhood on an almost weekly basis. The correspondent of Enab Baladi, who left with the residents, reported difficult conditions the displaced people have experienced during the completion of their moving procedures to the north of Syria.

In October, the military operation led by the Syrian Democratic Forces and backed by the US-led coalition forces to regain control over Raqqa from ISIS, has ended.

The military operations against ISIS led to nearly four hundred and fifty thousand displaced people who left their houses, out of a total of four hundred and seventy thousand people who were living in Raqqa before the start of the liberation battle, according to a report by the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR).

At the time of the last chapters of the attacks of al-Assad and Russian forces on the ISIS-controlled western countryside of Deir ez-Zor on 6 September 2017, the “allies” followed the method of continued heavy bombing which extended to the eastern countryside of Deir ez-Zor and which SNHR considered as a major cause of the civilians’ displacement.

This attack led to the displacement of two hundred and fifty thousand people to other areas in Deir ez-Zor, which have been witnessing clashes between the Syrian Democratic Forces and ISIS, and thousands of them remained homeless and helpless in the banks of the Euphrates River.

The SNHR documented ten air strikes it believes are Russian at crossings used by civilians to cross the two banks of the Euphrates by boat.

In November, the regime started a battle in the northern and eastern countrysides of Hama, and the southern countryside of Idlib, with the declared goal of opening the Damascus-Aleppo International Highway which goes through these areas.

The battles led to the displacement of thousands of civilians and more than eight hundred families in the second half of December, according to Enab Baladi information provided by Malhib Hussein, the head of the local council of Hawa, in the east of Hama Governorate.

Activists have estimated that thousands of residents of Tal Agher, Wadi Chahrour, Nasiriyah, Tel Amara, and Hawa have been displaced. According to Hussein, some villages have been totally deserted, while civilians have remained in other villages in the hope of the battles’ cessation.”

 

[This article was originally published by Enab Baladi.]

Syria at a Crossroads: “A Peace to End All Peace”?

Syria at a Crossroads: “A Peace to End All Peace”?

The intensity of fighting between the Syrian regime forces and both moderate and Islamic opposition factions has diminished thanks to the ceasefire agreements in several geographical areas. This has derived from the Astana peace process sponsored by Russia, Turkey, and Iran, as well as a ceasefire brokered by the US and Russia in southwest Syria.

The deals stemming from the Astana Agreement in May 2017 led to the ratcheting-up of the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) in eastern Syria, which led to the fall of Raqqa to the international coalition – led by the US and the Syrian Democratic Forces, and dominated by the Kurdish People’s Protection (YPG) Units. In the city of Dir Azzour, ISIS faced the same destiny at the hands of Russia, Syrian regime forces, and its allies from Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah. In light of these critical milestones, the justification Washington and Moscow have provided for continued participation in the Syrian war must end. Syria is now at a crossroads: either the country heads towards permanent and long-term peace, or it enjoys short-term peace that destabilizes the region in the long-run.

The First Scenario: “A Peace to End All Peace”

When the Ottoman Empire collapsed 100 years ago, Britain and France rushed to conclude the Sykes-Picot Agreement to split the Empire’s legacy in the Arab region, thus starting prolonged instability, which the region continues to suffer from. In his great book, A Peace to End All Peace, historian David Fromkin documented the period that coincided with World War I, the traces of which still exist 100 years later. The US and Russia seem to be rushing into a solution in Syria – an in Iraq as well for that matter. There is a worrying parallel between what the US and Russia are doing today, and the French and British models of the 20th century. This is especially the case in Syria if temporary solutions that do not address people’s substantive concerns are suggested. A short-sighted agreement would invariably cause new types of struggles and rebellion to emerge, thus leaving the Syrian crisis insoluble.

Southern Syria

Washington believes that it achieved a breakthrough when an agreement was concluded  between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Hamburg in July 2017 to free the “truce areas” in the south of Syria – mainly Daraa, Kenitra, and As-Suwaida – from non-Syrian troops. This means that Iranian and Hezbollah-backed militias will have to retreat from that area, strengthening Moscow’s conviction that it pushed Washington into military cooperation between their two armies in spite of the great tension between them.

The deals stemming from the Astana Agreement in May 2017 led to the ratcheting-up of the fight against ISIS in eastern Syria.

The ceasefire deal covering southern Syria included provisions to establish a control center in Amman; enable the rebel forces to maintain their heavy and medium-range weapons; identify front lines; initiate trade exchange with the areas controlled by the regime; form an opposition local council; and be prepared for the refugees’ return from Jordan and for the existence of displaced persons near the borders. However, a few months into the deal, Russia failed to achieve the agreements’ provisions, due to the gap between US and Russian delegations over how far Hezbollah and Shiite militias should be from the Jordan and Israeli borders.

On the sidelines of the Asia Pacifica Economic Cooperation (APEC) meetings in Da Nang, Vietnam, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov, reached an agreement, which was signed by Trump and Putin on 11 November 2017. The agreement included elements highlighting the importance of de-escalation in southern Syria, near the Jordanian-Israeli border, as a temporary step to maintain the ceasefire and deliver humanitarian assistance. Having reviewed the progress from the agreement the two presidents singed in Hamburg on 8 July 2017, Tillerson and Lavrov welcomed a new memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed between the US, Russia, and Jordan in Amman on 8 November to put the July Astana agreement into action.

This MoU is expected to further strengthen the ceasefire agreement’s success in the “reduction of foreign forces and foreign combatants levels before ultimately freeing the area from them in order to ensure more sustainable peace in the region.” “Foreign forces” is a reference  to the Iranian and Hezbollah militias which are deployment between Damascus and Jordan and  occupied Golan. The US wants Hezbollah and Shiite militias to withdraw from Jordan and Israel. The control center in Amman, which was established under the Trump – Putin agreement will undertake the task of achieving these provisions and overseeing the implementation of the deal.

However, the likelihood of  military escalation in the south of Syria stems from the fact that Israel is dissatisfied with the agreements’ results because it restricted its aircraft’s ability to shell targets of Hezbollah or of any Iranian organizations near Golan or southern Syria. This is separate from Israel’s conviction that Russia will not be able to push Iranian groups a “sufficient distance,” meaning that it would resume air-strikes near Damascus and other parts between the Syrian capital and occupied Jolan. This may foreshadow a confrontation with regional and international dimensions.

Recently, the Israeli army carried out large-scale military maneuvers near the Syrian border, which were intended to send a message to Moscow necessitating that Hezbollah and Iran must be kept away from the border. The media announced that Iran will establish a military base between Damascus and Golan. After the US-Russian agreement in November, the Israelis announced that they need to have a free hand in shelling any Iranian targets in Syria. The Israeli stance will be one of the factors of escalation in Syria amidst Iran’s strengthened presence. This coincided with the talks of building permanent Iranian military bases at a time when the US and Israel were hoping that Russia’s presence would weaken Iran’s role in Syria.

The Opposition Factions Fighting

The opposition factions fighting is one of several challenges in southern Syria. First, there is fighting between factions and warlords. Nearly 35,000 opposition combatants that used to be backed by the Military Operation Center (MOC) led by the CIA will be left unpaid at the end of 2017. At the same time, they are required to fight ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra loyalists in the south, thus starting a new chapter in which they combat extremist factions instead of the regime’s forces.

How long will the Russian veto be respected by Damascus and Tehran?

According to the de-escalation agreement, the Free Syrian Army (FSA) factions are required to fight ISIS and its ideology – politically and militarily – and expel the Tahrir al-Sham group (which includes Jabhat al-Nusra) after a grace period. This, however, means that a fratricidal struggle is likely to happen between factions that were once fighting together against the regime forces. Without a doubt, the factions’ dominations of the borders between Syria and Jordan and the dwindling external support may cause the warlords’ role to become more visible in view of the taxes they collect on services and trade.

In Ghouta, near Damascus, where a truce prevails under Russian-Egyptian auspices, a similar trend is developing as fighting is escalating between factions and warlords. Fighting had taken place in Damascus and eastern Ghouta before the Jaish al-Islam group joined the truce in Duma, afterwhich the Failaq al-Rahman group in Jobar and eastern Gouta acted similarly. Tahrir al-Sharm has not yet joined the agreement.

The August 2017 Russian-Egyptian agreement provided for the following: The First Party (the FSA) shall be committed to preventing the existence of Tahrir al-Sham group in the territories under its control in the de-escalation area; the FSA shall emphasize its stance against ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra and their hardline ideology in any area under its control; in the case of Jabhat al-Nusra Front affiliates being ready to leave for Idlib – either with or without their families – safe exit guarantees shall be offered by the Second Party. These provisions also apply to the truce in Homs countryside, which was also signed under the auspices of Russia and Egypt.

The Regime Forces Attack

The Syrian regime’s forces are determined to regain control of de-escalation areas when opportunities arise. Damascus’ military solution plan has not changed; it is looking for a suitable opportunity to pounce on opposition areas so as to “bring everyone back under the full authority of the government,” and consider “the truce as an opportunity for reconciliation with it,” as Syrian government officials said recently. Furthermore, Damascus refuses to have a local opposition council, contrary to Moscow’s stance and the truce agreement’s provisions.

The Russian Ministry of Defense deployed nearly 1,000 troops of its Russian (Chechen) military police to the de-escalation areas since May 2017 including the Quneitra, Deraa, Ghouta, and Homs countryside. The troops served as a barrier and frustrated the ambitions of Damascus, which lacks human resources. However, in view of its increased confidence in Damascus, over time these troops may challenge the cross-lines, and Russia may submit to Damascus with a view to “extending the government’s control over the country and maintaining Syria’s unity according to United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254,” according to statements from Damascus.[1]

Idlib: Between War and Isolation

In Idlib, there are nearly two million civilians and over 50,000 combatants from hardline and moderate Islamic factions, including over 10,000 in the Tahrir al-Sham group. Washington believes there are nearly 10,000 combatants  from Al Qaeda, considering that Jabhat al-Nusra is part of Al Qaeda.

The Russian-Turkish plan is aimed at deploying Turkish military observers in Idlib and  around Efrin (north of Aleppo) to isolate al-Nusrah and allow local, civil councils, and moderate opposition factions to remain in Idlib

It is clear that relations between Damascus and the Kurds are heading towards either negotiations or war.

However, another battle in Syria could emerge in the future. Tensions have increased between Tahrir al-Sham and other Islamic factions to the extent that bloody clashes may break out in the coming months. Indications of such tensions were visible when a clash broke out between the Noureddin el-Zinki movement and the Tahrir al-Sham group in the Aleppo countryside. A third war is also possible, as Iran is pushing the regime’s forces and its supporting militias to fight in Idlib. During his visit to Idlib, Ali Akbar Velayati, the advisor of  the Supreme Leader  Ali Khamenei, declared the need to attack Idlib and Raqqa. Tehran, Damascus, and Hezbollah all had planned to attack Idlib, but Russia managed to prevent it. An important question to consider is how long the Russian veto will be respected by Damascus and Tehran. Furthermore, Turkey announced that it would not allow passage between the areas controlled by the Kurdish YPG – which Ankara considers a terrorist organization – and the Mediterranean Sea, in order to prevent the establishment of a Kurdish province in northern Syria and southern Turkey. Hence, it is expected that some Syrian factions will fight the Kurdish forces in the near future.

Idlib is the second zone established by Turkey in cooperation with Russia. The first zone was in northern Aleppo when Turkey backed the Euphrates Shield campaign whereby the opposition factions dominated nearly 2,000 kilometers. In fact, Operation Euphrates Shield hindered the process of linking two territories established by the Kurdish Democratic Association, the political arm of the YPG. These two territories are Jazeera, near Kobani and east of the Euphrates River and Afrin, north of Aleppo and on the western side of the river.

Ankara and the Kurds

Ankara’s concern about the advancement of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), comprising mainly of the YPG, is heightened for three main reasons. First, the Kurds are advancing with American weapons and a cover from the international coalition led by the US. Second, the Syrian Kurds are considered an extension of the Turkish Kurds in southern Turkey. Third, Syrian Kurdish gains and achievements as well as the separatist aspirations of Iraqi Kurdistan that came under American-Russian pressure may shift the geopolitical aspiration to Turkey.

Ankara and Tehran joined forces to thwart President Masoud Barzani’s independence referendum, thus pushing the two countries to coordinate against western Kurdistan (northern Syria). In fact, such a measure is similar to an agreement in the late 1990s, which involved Ankara, Tehran, and Damascus imposing a no-fly zone in the face of the Kurds in northern Iraq. Furthermore, in spite of Washington’s reassurances that no political promises will be given to Syrian Kurds and that the American and European weapons will be withdrawn from the YPG once ISIS is defeated, the Turkish army may find itself in a position whereby it has to broaden its range of confrontation with the Kurds and cut deep into northern Syria just as happened a decade ago in Iraq.

Since 2012, Damascus has been turning a blind eye to the Kurds’gains on the gounds because they were not a priority. Yet, over time, and as confidence of the Syrian regime increased and the FSA retreated, a new fighting front between Damascus and the Kurds opened and Damascus began to turn a blind eye to the Turkish army’s bombing of the YPG.

This happened previously in Iraq years ago. Besides this, Damascus did almost nothing when the Turkish army backed Euphrates Shield factions to establish an enclave between Aleppo and the border.

In September 2017, 18 countries announced that they will not participate in Syria’s reconstruction efforts unless a political solution is reached as stated by Resolution 2254.”

Officials from Damascus had spoken of an upcoming war against the Kurds, a threat which was repeated by Iranian officials. It is clear that relations between Damascus and the Kurds are heading towards either negotiations or war, and an end to their “marriage of convenience” –which has been in place since 2011 – is looming. The regime forces did not fight the “Democratic Federation,” which is close to the Kurdistan Workers Party, chaired by Abdullah Öcalan. With the regime’s nearly 70,000 combatants and sophisticated weapons from the US and Europe, Damascus focused on fighting the FSA instead.

The US and Russia had agreed unofficially on spheres on influence, something that was confirmed by the agreement singed by Trump and Putin on 11 November 2017. The hotline between Moscow and Washington prevents the emergence of frictions in eastern Syria between the regime’s forces and Hezbollah (backed by the Russian army) on the one hand, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (backed by the international coalition), on the other.

The Democratic Union Party (PYD) – the political arm of the YPG – is aware that Washington betrayed the Iraqi Kurds in the 1970s and acted similarly with the Iraqi Shias in the 1990s – and with the Sunnis in recent years. Therefore, they are not excluding the possibility of the US betraying the Syrian Kurds further down the line after ISIS’ defeat. Some Kurdish officials believe it is in their community’s interest to slow down the fight against ISIS with a view to strengthenING their military presence on the ground under a federation to be established in northern Syria. However, other Kurdish officials are preparing for a “great battlefield” in the Euphrates Valley, considering that ISIS’ elements will gather again after they have escaped from Raqqa, Dir Ez Zour. Kurdish leaders want to keep US military presence in the east of Syria.

The confrontation is possible, especially given that Tehran seeks to test the Trump administration’s military determination to curb Iranian influence and block the way linking Tehran, Baghdad, Damascus, and Beirut. Iran was very keen to control Al Bukamal (north of the US al-Tanaf military base in eastern Syria) and encouraged factions within the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces to cut deep in southern Syria. Should this happen it may pave the way for a possible confrontation with between Damascus and the SDF, or Arab fighters will pull out from the SDF due potential tensions or struggles between Arab tribes and Kurds post-ISIS.

Militias and the Army

The regime-held areas are lacking natural resources. Considering that gas and oil in eastern Syria is under the control of the SDF and US allies, the reconstruction issue has become something akin to a battle. This is because Western countries declined to support such an endeavor without an acceptable political solution – let alone the fact that the regime’s allies in Russia and Iran lack the financial capacity to compensate the cost of destruction in Syria which has exceeded 220 billion dollars.

In a meeting held in New York in September 2017, 18 countries announced that they will not participate in Syria’s reconstruction efforts unless a political solution is reached as stated by Resolution 2254. This decision will cause major problems in regime-controlled areas.

It is interesting to note that when it comes to post-war reconstruction, there have been indications of other possible battles between war lords and new businessmen who emerged by taking advantage of the country’s war economy. Actors such as these are competing for a portion in the future of a country where corruption and crime rates soared dramatically and the administration efficiency declined.

It is also possible that there will be a war between Iranian backed militias and the regime forces. The former comprises both Syrian and foreign elements loyal to Tehran and whose total number exceeds 70,000. In an attempt to balance Iranian influence, the latter includes troops – known as the 5th Corpse – which Russia is trying to maintain by forming Russian-affiliated militias. Moscow decided to form the 5th Corpse particularly because of Putin’s decision not to send ground forces, retaining only the air force and observers from Chechnya. This decision meant that Moscow had to depend on the Tehran-backed militias, thus increasing the tension between the Shiite militias and the Sunni majority in Syria – unless Moscow establishes its own militias in Syria.

It is important not to forget existing sectarian tensions, particularly in Damascus and the areas located between the Syrian capital and the Lebanese border, as well as in the areas controlled by Hezbollah, Tehran’s ally in Lebanon. This is because of the increased presence of Iranian-backed militias that act in a sectarian manner amidst Iranian endeavors to carry out demographic changes unacceptable by a large portion of the Sunni population.

The Second Scenario: Top Down – Bottom up

There is a second complicated course that requires patience and persistence to reach a permanent solution in Syria. It entails a combination of meeting the Syrian people’s demands with major regional countries’ interests whereby Syria – which is at present being characterized by its geopolitical location among Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon, and Israel and, on a broader scale, among the Gulf region, Europe, Egypt, and the US – can become a center point for the confluence of interests, rather than a flashpoint as it has been over the past years.

The political process must be led by Syrians, as envisaged by Resolution 2254.”

The deal signed on 11 November 2017 by Trump and Putin covered the cooperation between the two countries’ armies to fight terrorism, defeat ISIS, maintain the no-clash agreement between the two parties, and withdraw the Iranian militias from the South. However, this is not sufficient for Syria and the Syrian people. There is a real need to focus on Provision 3 of the US-Russian agreement concerning the implementation of Resolution 2254, which calls for a ceasefire and political settlement. The agreement included provisions stating that Trump and Putin “had been informed of President Bashar al-Assad’s commitment to the Geneva process, constitutional reform and the elections as required and according to Resolution 2254.” The statement added that the two presidents “believe that this step must include full implementation of Resolution 2254 including constitutional reform, and free and fair elections under the supervision of the UN and according to the highest transparency standards with the participation of all Syrians, including those in diaspora.”

Of course, this Trump-Putin agreement includes another regression in Washington’s position on the Syrian regime. The first regression came with the launch of the Vienna peace process and the establishment of the International Syria Support Group – consisting of over 20 regional and Western countries headed by the US and Russia – after weeks of direct Russian military intervention in late September 2015. At that time, interest in the Geneva Communiqué, issued in 2012, waned gradually, with the Communiqué calling for the formation of a “transitional governing body with full executive powers.” Instead, Resolution 2254 was adopted unanimously in December 2015 and included three provisions: forming a non-sectarian representative system of governance; adopting a new constitution; and holding elections.

The agreement touches upon constitutional reform, which means that the current constitution shall be kept in place – even though the 2012 constitutional referendum took place under the shadows of war and in the absence of nearly six million Syrian refugees and seven million internally displaced persons. The agreement did not indicate to holding presidential elections, rather, it included an approval of President Assad’s position; after meeting with Russian special presidential envoy for Syria Alexander Lavrentiev in October, Assad said that he approves “amending the constitution and holding parliamentary elections.”

Yet, the important part of the elections is that Washington agrees to support the Geneva process under the UN auspices. The Trump administration was not a part of Astana because it objected to Iran’s attendance as a guarantor. Although the Trump administration attended as an observer, it was clear that it became more interested in the launch of the Geneva peace process, especially after the defeat of ISIS in eastern Syria was looming.

This trajectory may lay the foundation for a political process that leads to long-term stability. However, it requires a series of steps: American-Russian sponsorship; political determination to push negotiations forward; participation of major regional countries like Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia with a view to pressuring the opposition to reach understandings and political agreements; and Syria’s unity.

The launch of a political process requires the combination of two approaches: both a bottom-up approach and top-to-bottom. This means that the local councils that were formed in the four de-escalation areas and in the areas liberated from ISIS must participate in the political process. In addition, opposition forces must participate in negotiations with the regime to search for a political and military solution in Damascus. Here, the decentralization model seems to be suitable for Syria in the future: maximum localization or decentralization without dividing the country. It is important that local councils are based on geography, not demographics. According to Resolution 2254, this would maximize Syria’s unity.

Considering the existence of tens of thousands of combatants in both the opposition and the regime forces, it is necessary that a joint military council is formed to gradually guide coordination between combatants, the reformation of security apparatuses and the army, and the establishment of a timetable for disarming militias and removing foreign combatants from Syria.

The launch of a disciplined and gradual process with political and military dimensions must lead to more control over the de-escalation areas in order not to shift into spheres of influence of other countries. Such a procedure must ensure that pre-requisites for political work and a neutral climate are met in order for the Syrian people to decide their own destiny. Additionally, the political process must be led by Syrians, as envisaged by Resolution 2254.

Without a doubt, a solution as such would encourage European countries, the US, the Gulf states, and the regime’s allies all to participate in the reconstruction of Syria and make available 220 billion dollars required to revive the country. In addition, such a process would lay the groundwork for accountability and responsibility for the war crimes committed by different parties, and for addressing the real grievances harbored by hundreds of thousands – even millions – who were victimized by the war. There must be a process for reconciliation as well as for healing the wounds in the social fabric based on tolerance and accountability. History has taught us that a delay in addressing problems causes them to escalate. In fact, Mosul fell into the hands of ISIS years ago because of the delay in addressing the major Sunni component’s problems in Iraq.

The Syria we know has gone, and a new state is being born. So, Syrians must decide which country they wish to live in. Similarly, the neighboring countries have to decide whether their neighbor will be a fragmented failed state that remains a source of threats, terrorism, refugees, chaos, or if Syria will emerge from a bitter war and head towards a better future.

In fact, the urgency to find superficial solutions that do not address crucial issues could lead to the emergence of a new type of insurgency, violence, and more profound rebellion in Syria. Hard-liners could then find supporters among the Syrian people.

There may be several scenarios, but there is one imperative: Syria must not turn into Iraq or Afghanistan.

 


[1] “Assad: liberation of Der Zour is the not the end of the war,” BBC Arabic, 7 November 2017, http://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast-41902909

 

[This article was originally by Turkish Policy Quarterly.]