بواسطة Nikolaos van Dam | أكتوبر 25, 2018 | Roundtables, غير مصنف
Describing critical turning points in the Syrian Conflict, implies giving a very concise survey of some of its most important developments. Of course, there are many more critical turning points than can be described in this short article.
At the beginning of the Syrian Revolution (March 2011), the wall of silence and fear was broken for the first time among large sections of the Syrian population, as they rose and demonstrated massively against the Syrian regime. It was a miracle that the demonstrations generally remained so peaceful for a relatively long time, when taking into consideration the severe repression and atrocities committed by the regime against the peaceful demonstrators. Concurrently with the peaceful demonstrations, however, there was already armed anti-regime violence during the early stages of the revolution, probably committed from the ‘side lines’ by radical Islamists and others.
Many officers and soldiers started to defect, and constituted military opposition groups, first small, but later on a larger scale, big enough to threaten the regime.
By June 2011 violence and counterviolence had increased to such an extent that any peaceful discussions and dialogue between regime and opposition
had become extremely difficult. At this point, the Syrian Revolution had already, to some extent, become overshadowed by radical Islamists. They saw the so-called Arab Spring developments in the region as an excellent opportunity to present themselves as viable alternatives in their efforts to spread the rule of Islam, and many wanted to settle accounts with the regime that earlier had severely suppressed them.
The solidarity visits of US ambassador Robert Ford and his French counterpart Eric Chevallier to the opposition movement in Hama in July 2011, meant the end of the possibility for the United States and France or other countries to play any role as mediator in the conflict. Their visits rather created false hopes among the opposition that essential Western support was forthcoming – but in the end it turned out not to be given as had been expected or suggested.
US President Obama’s demand that President al-Asad should step aside, created an almost irreversible momentum. Many other countries followed suit and demanded the same, without having the intention, will, or capacity to militarily force al-Asad and his regime to do so. Most countries which had turned against the regime, claimed they wanted a political solution. In reality, however, these countries only wanted to consider a solution which implied regime change. It was unrealistic, however, to expect the regime to be prepared to voluntarily give up its own position, and for President Bashar al-Asad to be willing to sign his own death warrant. Various countries created false expectations among the Syrian opposition groups that military intervention was forthcoming, which it was not.
By way of an alternative, the United States, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and others, started to supply huge quantities of financial and military aid to the military opposition groups, but their support was channelled to their respective favourites. Their lack of efficient coordination caused their help to be insufficient to help the opposition in winning the war. Their success in endangering the regime’s military position triggered a large-scale Russian military intervention in September 2015 and onwards, on top of the military support of Iran and Lebanese Hizballah, who all wanted to protect their strategic ally to stay in power. All this, strengthened Russia’s position considerably.
The Geneva Communiqué, adopted on 30 June 2012 by the Action Group for Syria, and endorsed by the permanent members of the UN Security Council, became a cornerstone for any future negotiations between the Syrian regime and the opposition. The Geneva Communiqué described a number of principles and guidelines for a Syrian-led transition. One of the most important guidelines dealt with a political transition that should be made possible through the establishment of a transitional governing body which was to establish a neutral environment in which the transition could take place. The transitional governing body was to exercise full executive powers. It could include members of the Syrian government, the opposition and ‘other groups’ and was to be formed on the basis of mutual consent. Although the Geneva Communiqué did not mention anything about the role of the Syrian president, the position of Bashar al-Asad became a principal point of dispute. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton suggested that President al-Asad could not take part in such a transitional governing body, whereas Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov denied this. The Syrian opposition, in general, strongly rejected any role for President al-Asad in the ‘transitional period’. For the Syrian regime itself it was President al-Asad who was to decide on such issues, not the opposition, nor foreign countries. The fixation on the departure of al-Asad constituted a serious obstacle in finding a solution to the conflict, the more so as he was in power in most of the country.
A great number of countries officially recognized the Syrian Opposition Coalition. They supported its demand that there was not to be any future role for Syrian President Bashar al-Asad and his supporters with blood on their hands, and that they had to be brought before justice. Most Western and Arab countries supported these demands, without providing the means to implement them. Thereby these demands became little more than declaratory policies, because no real will existed for any direct Western and Arab military intervention in Syria. Such intervention was even officially rejected in the United States and the United Kingdom after parliamentary discussions. The direct foreign military threat against the regime was thereby eliminated.
The war in Syria clearly developed into a war by proxy, with various countries (particularly the United States, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar) interfering in the internal affairs of Syria by supporting different armed and other opposition groups. Russia and Iran wanted to militarily maintain their strategic interests in Syria and did not want to lose their Syrian ally.
After the expansion of the Islamic State (IS) from Iraq into Syria in 2013, attention to the fight against the Syrian regime shifted to the fight against IS. Because of the IS terrorist threats in Western countries this came to be viewed with greater priority. The support for the direct struggle against the regime thereby gradually diminished.
As a result, the opposition felt abandoned and betrayed by Western countries, but was left with few, if any, alternatives. With Western countries providing the opposition with insufficient support, the chances for Russia and Iran to get the upper hand increased. The Russian military intervention that started in September 2015 made the prospects for the opposition even worse. Providing more intensive foreign support to the military opposition forces led to an intensification and prolongation of the war, but not enough for a defeat of the regime.
The ability to achieve peace in Syria does not only depend on the Syrians themselves, but also on the various countries involved in the war by proxy, and whether or not they are prepared to give priority to ending the Syrian conflict above their rival regional ambitions. Such a turning point has not yet been reached, and the prospects for real peace in Syria are still far away, even if the Syrian regime would militarily win the war.
[Other roundtable submissions can be found here.]
بواسطة Josephine Lippincott | أكتوبر 25, 2018 | Roundtables, غير مصنف
The Syrian conflict has witnessed seven years of overwhelming violence and death. An endless cycle of confrontation and ceasefire, punctuated by repeated aborted negotiation attempts, have all further complicated and prolonged what we have come to understand as the Syrian Civil War. Every aspect of the conflict, becomes either embroiled in discussion or debate, results in no action, or adds to the hardships faced by the Syrian population. Throughout the conflict, scholars and experts have debated the idea of turning points or critical junctures.
When examining the idea of critical turning points, it is imperative that we consider events not just at the macro-level. What cannot be overemphasized is the fact that each of these turning points, while changing the broader trajectory of the conflict, also had very real, life-altering consequences for local communities. Through merging the idea of the local into the discussion of the macro, we gain a better understanding of the reality of some of the critical junctures within the Syrian conflict.
While there are many potential turning points, I identify three critical turning points in the Syrian conflict. They are as follows: the militarization of the Syrian uprising in early 2011, Obama’s failure to uphold his red-line declaration in 2013, and the 2015 commencement of Russian military intervention. Each of these situations altered the trajectory of the conflict dramatically, not just on a macro-level, but for local communities.
The militarization of the peaceful protests that began in March 2011 transformed the Syrian uprising into a bloody, violent full-scale military conflict. When the protests began in March 2011, Syrians across the country raised their voices in protest against the repression and tyranny of the Assad regime. In response, the government forces employed violence, cracking down on protesters. These events would escalate into more violence from the regime as well as the protesters. This initial event would usher the uprising in a direction that would leave a mark on Syrian history forever. The militarization of the opposition changed Syria from a country facing civil unrest to a country ensnared in conflict. Moreover, the escalating level of violence led to the formation of various opposition groups. These groups would develop different identities, sponsors, and alliances; resulting in a myriad of armed groups which would subsequently fractionalize the opposition and result in further fighting and violence. From this point on, the Syrian uprising had transformed into a civil war.
The escalation from protests to conflict altered the way the international community viewed Syria, but more importantly, it changed and disrupted the lives of Syrians. The militarization of the conflict would lead to the regime tightening its grasp on state services, leading to access challenges for Syrians. The fighting across the Syrian geography would disrupt daily life, prevent children from attending school, create financial problems for families, or lead Syrians to flee their homeland. These disruptions in daily life would be further exacerbated when the international system began to intervene and to strengthen certain parts of the armed opposition.
The second turning point was the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons and President Obama’s subsequent failure to uphold his red-line declaration in 2013. In August 2013, Assad and his forces used Sarine gas near Damascus, killing more than fourteen hundred civilians. The US intelligence assessment asserted that the regime used chemical weapons as a method to push Syrian opposition forces back from rebel-held territory when government forces were unable. With the failure of President Obama and the United States to provide any actionable response, the Assad regime became even less fearful of any foreign intervention. The regime action and the US inaction altered the geopolitics surrounding the Syria conflict. Given the lack of direct military action or an escalation in support to rebel groups by the United States, other countries such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia also began to disengage. The stalled support created a feeling of abandonment within the armed opposition. The lack of intensified engagement by the United States, prompted bolder action by the Assad regime, Iran, and eventually Russia. However, beyond the macro-level implications, this event also had large ramifications for the Syrian population. The chemical weapons attack signaled that Syrians’ fears would not be limited to airstrikes or gunfire, but would have to also include weapons such as sarine gas.
The third critical turning point that altered the conflict on both the macro and micro level was Russian military intervention. In September 2015, Russia launched airstrikes that were reported to target ISIS, however US intelligence reports argued that the airstrikes targeted key Assad opponents, including US-backed units. On an international level, the Russian-intervention altered the geopolitical dynamics. The Russian intervention solidified the alliance between Assad, Iran, and Russia, but also further demonstrated the lack of heightened support by Western actors. Moreover, as a result of this inaction, it became even more apparent to opposition groups and the Syrian population that they could not expect help or aid from the United States or other western countries. Rather, it would be the Russians who would ultimately guide how the Syrian conflict would unfold and negotiations for the conflict’s termination. Russian actions under the intervention have attempted to restrict the number of Russian casualties, but has led to higher civilian casualties due to less discriminate military tactics. The attempt to restrict Russian casualties raises the level of violence and the number of threats for Syrians. Now they must prepare for a bombing or chemical weapon attack from their own government, as well as attacks from a world superpower.
Following these events and so many other daily tragedies, the Syrian population has remained isolated from the international community. These three critical turning points have contributed to further deterioration of daily life for Syrians and altered geo-politics in the region. While the Assad regime has escalated its attacks through chemical weapons, international powers have delineated new rules and retained new spheres of influence. The failure of US engagement in the conflict, both militarily and diplomatically, along with the Russian-Syrian alliance has allowed for Russia, Iran, and Syria to largely control the results of the Syrian conflict. With the United States continuing its inaction to implement change or alter the status quo, other countries have also taken a less direct approach. As a result, the Syrian conflict continues as the Syrian population faces even more hardship.
[Other roundtable submissions can be found here.]
بواسطة Joel Veldkamp | أكتوبر 25, 2018 | Roundtables, غير مصنف
Syria’s seven years of war have been indelibly shaped by foreign interventions. Both the Assad regime and the rebel coalition that opposes his rule owe their continued existence to support from the outside. The most spectacular, and decisive, of these interventions was the air war that Russia launched against rebel forces in September 2015. Discussions about the United States’ role in Syria’s war, on the other hand, tend to focus on what the United States did not do – on why it never intervened militarily to topple the Assad regime, the way Russia intervened militarily to support it.
These discussions, while important, neglect the equally important US decision to provide arms, training and material support for the armed revolution in Syria, and to assist its allies in the region in sending far greater amounts of support.
Without this support, a sustained armed revolution against the premier police state in the Arab world would have been impossible. Indeed, when the United States withdrew their support in 2016-2017, the armed revolution quickly collapsed. These two “turning point” decisions – to begin providing lethal support to the uprising, and later, to withdraw it – were both taken behind-the-scenes, without public debate. They also permanently changed the course of the war.
Beginning in the autumn of 2011, the United States and its allies began providing funding, supplies and weaponry to Syria’s burgeoning armed rebellion. To those Syrians who were willing, this arms pipeline provided the means to fight back against a regime that had been killing protestors for six months and turn a protest movement into a full-scale civil war.
Over the next six years, billions of dollars and thousands of tons of weapons flowed to Syria’s rebel groups, usually airlifted into Turkey or Jordan and then smuggled across the border. At first, the weapons were supplied mostly by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey, while the CIA provided logistical assistance.
For several years, this assistance was at odds with stated US policy. On 11 April 2013, Assistant Secretary of State Elizabeth Jones testified to the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee, “We do not believe that it is in the United States or the Syrian people’s best interest to provide lethal support to the Syrian opposition.” By then, the CIA had already been involved in the airlift of some thirty-five hundred tons of weapons into Syria.
The fact that the United States was apparently reluctant to arm the opposition directly, and initially restricted itself to providing logistical support for its allies’ operations in Syria, is sometimes taken as evidence that the United States was not leading the effort but being led. Perhaps the United States was hoping, by its involvement, to restrain its allies, prevent jihadists from acquiring the weapons being distributed, and retain some influence over the course of events in Syria. But this view of the United States as a reluctant player warrants some skepticism. As Aron Lund says, in the Syria conflict, “for reasons of evident geography, the Gulf states have always been forced to work through regional allies, and they also appear to have relied quite heavily on CIA coordination and facilitation.”
One cannot help but see a parallel in Saudi Arabia’s current war in Yemen: the United States often complains about the war’s atrocious human toll, but Saudi Arabia is carrying out the war with US-supplied bombs, and with US planes refueling Saudi bombers in mid-air. Researchers should not be too quick to accept US pretensions to reluctance in its participation in Middle East conflicts. Future research may yet reveal Washington as the driving force behind the Syrian intervention, as it was in Afghanistan in the 1980s.
In any case, by June 2013, the United States began providing support directly to Syria’s rebels. With President Obama’s go-ahead, the CIA launched a one billion dollar operation called “Timber Sycamore” to supply Syria’s rebels with weapons and support, including US-made anti-tank missiles. By the end of the program, an estimated one hundred thousand pro-regime fighters had been killed by CIA-backed groups in Syria (out of a total war toll of around five hundred thousand).
Crucially, though, the United States never gave the opposition enough support to actually defeat the regime. In April 2014, one rebel commander summed up the situation: “The aid that comes in now is only enough to keep us alive, and it covers only the lowest level of needs.” Another rebel leader angrily, but persuasively, noted, “We know that if you wanted to, you could topple Bashar al-Assad in ten days.” Charles Lister likewise compared the CIA program to “drip-feeding the opposition groups just enough to survive.” The intention of this “no victory, no defeat” aid strategy may not have been to prolong the Syrian civil war indefinitely, but that was the predictable effect.
The US intervention also affected Syria’s war in another way. Despite repeated claims from US officials that only “vetted,” “moderate” groups in Syria were receiving support, jihadist groups were ultimately the best poised to take advantage of the US-backed weapons flow. The jihadists were bolstered by foreign cadres hardened from earlier conflicts, received semi-discreet backing from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, enjoyed more ideological coherence than the loose coalition of non-Islamist rebels, were hindered by fewer local attachments and conflicts, and were less restrained by humanitarian or international PR concerns. Early on, the jihadists became the opposition’s strongest players.
Debate continues about how US policy affected this development. Charles Lister claims that the moderate opposition never received enough support from its foreign backers to defeat the jihadists (or resist the jihadists’ seizure of weapons provided by those backers). Sam Heller argues that the moderate opposition was never going to subordinate their fight against the regime to a fight against fellow rebels, whether they were jihadists or not. Regardless, in the final analysis, the jihadist movement in Syria was empowered by the US-backed weapons flow into Syria, much of which found its way into the jihadists’ hands. The jihadists’ resulting prominence undermined popular support for the opposition and drove Syria’s multi-religious population closer to the Assad regime.
In March 2015, an al Qaeda-led rebel coalition seized Idlib province. In that battle, US-supplied antitank missiles gave the rebels a crucial edge. That fall, with the Syrian regime retreating on multiple fronts, Russia launched a massive bombing campaign against the opposition, making it clear that they would never countenance Assad’s fall. That commitment was not matched by the United States. It was President Trump who officially terminated Timber Sycamore in June 2017, but President Obama who allowed the rebel stronghold in East Aleppo to fall, offering little more than rhetorical resistance to the regime’s signal victory.
Without the United States in the rebels’ corner, Jordan and Turkey both moved to mend ties with the Syrian regime and with Russia, and the Gulf States found themselves without the partners they needed to bring weapons to their proxies in Syria. The regime followed its victory in Aleppo with the re-conquest of Eastern Ghouta and Dara’a, leaving Idlib as the last rebel stronghold in Syria. As Syrian and Russian forces bore down on Dara’a in June 2018, the US Embassy in Amman released a curt statement advising the rebels not to “base your decisions on the assumption or expectation of a military intervention by us.” Within weeks, resistance in Dara’a evaporated.
Determining the full impact of US support for Syria’s revolution – and its later withdrawal – will require a great deal of research in the future. But while the Syrian civil war cannot be reduced to US intervention, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that US decision-making was crucial both to the war’s prolongation and to the uprising’s eventual defeat.
The consequences of these decisions for Syria’s civilian population have been horrendous. One may sympathize with policymakers making difficult choices about a complicated region. But all of this was easily foreseeable, and foreseen. Way back in October 2011, as the first decisions about arming Syria’s rebels were being made in Washington, an article in International Organization by Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham summarized existing political science research on foreign intervention this way: “Civil wars with outside involvement typically last longer, cause more fatalities, and are more difficult to resolve through negotiations.” It seems clear that Syria is no exception to this rule. In the future, scholars, policymakers, and concerned citizens should give American support for rebel groups – whether in Syria, Nicaragua, Angola, or elsewhere – the analytical and moral attention it deserves. It can be at least as important an “intervention” as airstrikes.
[Other roundtable submissions can be found here]
بواسطة Aron Lund | مايو 2, 2018 | غير مصنف
“After several days of calm, the battle in Eastern Ghouta enclave seems to have picked up again as President Bashar al-Assad’s government launched a new round of air strikes on Douma, the only city still left in insurgent hands. Leaders of the Islam Army, the opposition militia that rules the city, have insisted that they will stay in Douma come what may, but they do not have the military muscle to pull that off if Damascus and Moscow decide otherwise.
Should regime-rebel talks break down and end in a renewed, full-scale offensive, local civilians will be at risk.
UN sources recently estimated that as many as 78,000–150,000 people may remain in Douma alongside the Islamist fighters, though such figure are unreliable and have historically erred on the high side. Whatever the actual number, it is clear that many civilians in Douma have been forcibly prevented from fleeing by Islam Army rebels, who seem to want to exploit their presence as a card in negotiations, and that all are suffering from callous government siege tactics, with loyalist forces refusing to permit the entry of aid workers, medicine, and humanitarian supplies.
It remains to be seen what form Douma’s capitulation will ultimately take, and how much death, destruction, and displacement will accompany it. But when the city folds, as at some point it will, seven years of opposition rule in Eastern Ghouta are going to come to an end.
Other parts of the enclave have already been retaken since the offensive began in February, with rebels from Failaq al-Rahman, Ahrar al-Sham, and Tahrir al-Sham either killed, forced to surrender, or sent to northwestern Syria along with many civilians—according to the most recent UN numbers, as many as 49,000 people. Meanwhile, some 123,000 inhabitants of Eastern Ghouta are thought to have come under government control, either living inside retaken neighborhoods like Erbeen and Harasta or having fled to Damascus and a series overcrowded IDP shelters near the city.
The retaking of Eastern Ghouta seems almost an afterthought to Assad’s December 2016 victory in Eastern Aleppo, but this is in fact the bigger battle. It is being fought over a larger area, on the doorstep of the Syrian capital, with many more fighters involved and more civilians at risk. Whether more people died in Ghouta than in Aleppo, I don’t know—but many, many people have died.
* * *
Over the past few years, I have spent an unholy amount of time trying to understand the politics of Eastern Ghouta’s rebel movement. I have also written a lot about the area. Sifting through my archives the other day, I found that I had penned no less than twenty English-language articles, reports, and blog posts on the topic, for Syria Comment, the Carnegie Endowment, The Century Foundation, IRIN News, and others. The first one was published in February 2013, as pro-Assad forces prepared to put the region under siege, and the last one is less than a week old.
That’s a lot of text. Although in hindsight I can spot plenty of errors and misunderstandings, and there is still very much that I still don’t understand, there’s also a lot of material in there that seems like it could be useful to people trying to follow the crisis now unfolding near Damascus. Therefore, I have compiled all twenty pieces here, with a short introductory comment about each.
The latest publication is first on the page, so read from bottom to top if you want all five years in chronological order. If not, just pick and choose as you please.
– Aron Lund
• Trapped Between Rebels and Air Strikes, Civilians in Eastern Ghouta Face Chaos(IRIN, Mar. 2018)
With only Douma left in rebel hands by late March, I tried to investigate what became of Eastern Ghouta’s civilian population in more than a month of fighting. UN numbers are all over the map, but it’s clear that many ended up in shelters erected around the area while others stayed put despite the fighting, and that they will now come under Assad’s rule once again. Still others have joined the opposition as it was driven off to Idleb and Aleppo, where some will now be resettled in Afrin. Yet civilians also remain trapped inside insurgent-held Douma, as the clock ticks toward either a rebel surrender or a renewed military offensive.
• Assad’s Divide and Conquer Strategy Is Working (Foreign Policy, Mar. 2018)
Brute military force was certainly the main ingredient in Assad’s victory in Eastern Ghouta, but his government also reached its objectives using more sophisticated means, including by exploiting insurgent divisions to punch where their defenses were weakest, negotiating separate deals through well-connected siege merchants, and rallying supporters inside the enclave to work behind rebel lines. Among other things, this piece looks at the curious case of Sheikh Bassam Difdaa, a pro-government Sufi preacher who helped crack Failaq al-Rahman’s defenses in Kafr Batna.
• Aleppo Again? A Plea to Save Lives in in Eastern Ghouta (TCF, Mar. 2018)
As the final, brutal offensive in Eastern Ghouta got under way, it was obvious that loyalist forces were going to win—they were overwhelmingly superior and faced no risk of outside intervention. In other words, the best time to think about what that meant for civilians was before the battle was over. The pro-Assad side had clearly advertised that defeated rebels and activists would either have to submit to government rule (but some would not; some could not) or head to rebel-held northern Syria. But what about the larger civilian population? Varied in their allegiances and circumstances, some civilians would undoubtedly want to follow the opposition to Idleb, while others would just as undoubtedly want to stay in their homes after government forces returned. To my mind, this was a moment for the international community to push for and facilitate individual choice by, among other things, promoting an orderly handover once rebels surrendered and by dispatching monitors to gauge the voluntariness of civilians staying or leaving, in the hope of minimizing the amount of forced displacement and hostage-type situations. Also, regardless of all political dimensions, humanitarian aid needed to be rushed to relief organizations on the ground quickly, before IDP numbers grew unmanageable. In the end, not a lot of that happened, but many of these suggestions remain just as relevant as when I wrote this—now in Douma.
• Understanding Eastern Ghouta in Syria (IRIN, Feb. 2018)
A short but fairly comprehensive pre-battle backgrounder on Eastern Ghouta as it was in spring 2018, in which I attempt to map out who controlled what while also describing the issues at stake as Assad’s government readied itself to retake the enclave.
• The Man-Made Disaster in Syria’s Eastern Ghouta (IRIN, Dec. 2017)
On how the siege on Eastern Ghouta was tightened in September 2017, in preparation for the offensive that would follow early next year. The humanitarian effects of the siege had always been severe, but with smuggling tunnels now blocked, private food sales banned, and UN convoys prevented from entering, what had been a simmering crisis boiled over into full-scale disaster—hurting civilians much more than rebels, who controlled all levers of the economy. It was a war crime right out in the open, a very effective one.
• East Ghouta Turns on Itself, Again (TCF, May 2017)
In April 2017, the Islam Army and Failaq al-Rahman went back to fighting each other, one year to the day after their mini-civil war in 2016. Drivers this time around included the de-escalation deals being rolled out by Russia, the recent loss of the rebel smuggling tunnels, and a whole lot of pent-up anger.
• The Syrian Rebel Who Tried to Build an Islamic Paradise (Politico Magazine, Mar. 2017)
A long feature on Zahran Alloush and his attempts to unite the enclave under his own iron-fisted rule. Though capable and ruthless enough, the Islam Army leader’s grand project was ultimately frustrated by his failure to control the war economy and the resistance of rival factions. This article covers some of the same ground as the “Into the Tunnels” report, but has more storytelling and a tighter focus on Alloush’s role.
• Going South in East Ghouta (Carnegie, Feb. 2017)
By spring 2017, things were looking pretty hopeless for the rebels. The Syrian government had seized a lot of territory after Alloush’s death and it had just pocketed Eastern Aleppo. It looked as if Eastern Ghouta would be next, with Damascus pulling together troops and seizing the smuggling tunnels in Qaboun and Barzeh. But then fighting petered out, possibly because Russian-brokered de-escalation deals clicked into place during exactly this time, which shifted Assad’s attention to the Islamic State. The Russian military then cleverly played Eastern Ghouta’s factions off against each other, in particular by goading the Islam Army to go after Failaq-friendly jihadis. A new round of infighting would begin in April 2017.
• Into the Tunnels: The Rise and Fall of Syria’s Rebel Enclave in the Eastern Ghouta (TCF, Dec. 2016)
A detailed history of the Eastern Ghouta enclave and its political economy, this report attempts to chart the rise of the main rebel groups and their shifting rivalries, up to the point when they finally split the enclave in May 2016. It includes sections on the 2014 joint institutions, the 2015 wars over frontline crossings and smuggling tunnels, and some discussion of the ideology of the major factions. A shortened and slightly updated version of this report was later printed as a chapter in The Century Foundation’s Arab Politics After the Uprisings, an edited volume that I assume you’ve already bought and read many times over, since it is just that good.
• Showdown in East Ghouta (Carnegie, May 2016)
My quick take Eastern Ghouta’s just-beginning internal breakdown. Ending in a Qatari-brokered truce later in May, the infighting ended up splitting the enclave into two or three parts, depending on how you count them. The Islam Army took sole control over the northern and eastern parts stretching from Douma to Nashabiyeh; Failaq al-Rahman seized the Damascus suburbs; and Harasta remained in the Failaq-friendly hands of Fajr al-Umma. Nusra Front and Ahrar al-Sham Islamists were also part of the mix. Nusra had formally joined forces with Fajr to smash the Islam Army, but they were mostly floating around inside Failaq-land. Ghouta’s small Ahrar branch was fragmenting: some members backed the Islam Army, others fought the Islam Army alongside Nusra, still others tried to remain neutral.
• After Zahran: Rising Tension in the East Ghouta (Carnegie, Apr. 2016)
This was written alongside “An Islamist Experiment,” when Eastern Ghouta was on the verge of major internal conflict. After Zahran Alloush’s death, factions outside Douma had merged into two loosely allied blocks that sought to cut his successor down to size. The Islam Army had lashed out in response with preemptive arrests and assassinations, which didn’t improve the mood much. Right after publication, the Ghouta insurgency blew itself apart with a big, nasty bang.
• An Islamist Experiment: Political Order in the East Ghouta (Carnegie, Apr. 2016)
With infighting on the way, this article looks at the cross-factional institutions set up by Eastern Ghouta’s rebels to contain internal conflicts. Starting in 2014, Alloush had pushed for the creation of a joint military command and a sharia-based governance apparatus. At the peak of his power in early 2015, these institutions had seemed like they could potentially transform into a new political order of a sort. But the joint institutions frayed and hollowed quickly, with factional anarchy resurfacing to a greater extent than is clear in this article. I got a somewhat better understanding of the system later, with more detail presented the “Into the Tunnels” report.
• The Death of Zahran Alloush (Syria Comment, Dec. 2015)
On December 25, 2015, Zahran Alloush died in an air strike. Within weeks of his funeral, rival rebels in Failaq al-Rahman, Ajnad al-Sham, Fajr al-Umma, and the Nusra Front were ganging up on a shell-shocked and sullenly aggressive Islam Army in order to claim his mantle, with violence finally erupting on a large scale in late April 2016.
• Is Zahran Alloush in Amman? (Syria Comment, June 2015)
Yes, he was. Having somehow snuck out of besieged Eastern Ghouta, the Islam Army leader was taking a trip around the region, to Turkey and Jordan, where he met with Syrian rebel and religious allies as well as foreign fundraisers, agents, and diplomats, at a sensitive moment in the opposition’s history. But when I wrote this, it wasn’t yet very clear what was going on.
• Damascus Preachers and the Armed Rebellion (Carnegie, Mar. 2014)
This one takes a brief peak at the capital’s Ashaarite-traditionalist and Sufi networks, which had long dominated Syria’s state-approved Sunni Islamic establishment and would play a huge but under-studied role in the opposition after 2011. Today, their influence remains keenly felt through the Turkey-based Syrian Islamic Council. It is a companion piece to the article about Ajnad al-Sham, which grew out of exactly this clerical milieu and had visible ties to Damascene Sufism and less visible ones to exiled Ikhwani networks.
• The Ajnad al-Sham Islamic Union (Carnegie, Mar. 2014)
I look at the creation of Ajnad al-Sham, a group backed by local Sufi clerics and Muslim Brotherhood members. Later bolstering its ranks by absorbing aggrieved former Umma Army members, Ajnad al-Sham operated as one of Eastern Ghouta’s top three factions for nearly two years. In spring 2016, it merged into the other second-tier faction, Failaq al-Rahman, and launched a devastating attack on the Islam Army.
• The Greater Damascus Operations Room, part 1 (Carnegie, Nov. 2013)
• The Greater Damascus Operations Room, part 2 (Carnegie, Nov. 2013)
This two-parter is for the real nerds. With limited success, I tried to read the tea leaves of a major, foreign-funded rebel unity project in the wider Ghouta region. In particular, I was looking for clues about how it related to Brig. Gen. Salim Idriss’s hapless Free Syrian Army HQ in Turkey, to Ghouta’s Nusra and Islamic State jihadis, and to the unending internecine feuds in Douma, where Zahran Alloush was still struggling to establish himself as capo di tutti capi. I didn’t reach much clarity on any of these issues at the time, but some additional details had seeped out by the time I wrote the “Into the Tunnels” report.
• A Dispute in Douma (Carnegie, Oct. 2013)
In this one, I did my sorry best to make sense of rebel rivalries in Eastern Ghouta, whose internal functioning under a half-year old siege had yet to be hashed out. Though at the time this was only vaguely visible in local coalition politics, Zahran Alloush’s just-created Islam Army was drifting into conflict with a set of pugnacious, Free Syrian Army-flagged commanders and contraband kingpins united by their shared rejection of his dominance and the Islamist rule that came with it. A year later, they made a desperate, last-ditch attempt to kneecap the Islam Army and push it out of the smuggling economy by entering into an alliance known as the Umma Army. Zahran promptly dropped a piano on them. For more about that grim story, check the “Into the Tunnels” report or my piece for Politico.
• The Islamist Mess in Damascus (Syria Comment, Feb. 2013)
This old Syria Comment blog post was written just before Assad’s forces managed to place Eastern Ghouta under siege. It looks at how rebel coalition-building around Damascus had clicked with the major national-level insurgent alliances of the time, and we get an early glimpse of the headstrong ways of a certain Zahran Alloush.”
[This article was originally published by Syria Comment.]
بواسطة عمر الشيخ | أبريل 2, 2018 | Roundtables, غير مصنف
عندما كنت أغادر إحدى الخمارات في منطقة باب شرقي بدمشق القديمة، قبل الرحيل عن سورية أواخر العام 2015، كنت قد وصلت قرب الباب العتيق الفاصل بين الشارع المستقيم في المدينة القديمة والبيوت الدمشقية الجميلة وطريق السيارات العام، كنت أشاهد بحزن سحب الدخان الأسود والحرائق المتصاعدة من أطراف مدينة جوبر، ثم أعبر باب شرقي باتجاه موقع ميكروباص جرمانا عند مفترق طريق المليحة، عند الزاوية أمر بجانب جامع له مئذنة طويلة جداً، تطل على كل المدينة، تحت المئذنة تماماً ثمة باب للجامع وآخر لمقر يدعى “معهد الفتح الإسلامي”، وفيما بعد علمت أنه معهد “شرعي إسلامي” وتحت عين السلطات السورية ويساهم في تقديم حوافز دراسية مع تعزيز قدرات الطالب في الجانب “الإسلامي” وبقي السؤال يراودني: معهد للعلوم الدينية؟ ومعاهد الأسد لتحفيظ القرآن؟
والكثير من الجمعيات الخيرية والتنموية والدينية النشطة قبل الثورة، ترى ماذا قدمت للمجتمع السوري من تطور وتغيير؟ ما شأن الدين بالفتوحات الفكريّة التي ندعيها كبلد يعتبر مدنياً؟ لماذا لا يوجد معاهد للفتوحات الشعريّة والمسرحيّة والروائيّة والفنيّة؟ معاهد لتحفيظ الشّعر والقصص الأدبيّة؟ جمعية لنشر الكتب وتوزيع علوم الأدب من مختلف أنحاء العالم؟ لماذا كان للدين كلّ تلك الحفاوة؟ وكيف أصبح “إمام” الجّامع، قائداً لسمعة شباب الحارة؟! من وضع الوصاية وصكوك الأخلاق والتربية بيد عمّال الدّين؟ ولماذا ثِقل المدن السوريّة سكانياً هو أحياء عشوائيّة ومخالفات وينشط فيها الدّين على حساب الثقافة والفكر المتنوّر المتعدّد؟
الجّامع مفتاح الغضب ومقتله!
مع غياب أيّ دور سياسي فكري للمبادرات الأهليّة والشعبيّة في سورية منذ عقود، ظهر إلى السطح منذ منتصف ستينيات القرن الماضي، شكل واحد للخصومة السياسة ضد السلطة، ألا وهو المرجع الدّيني، فتشكل الوعي الشعبي على ما يجتهد به الشيوخ والدّعاة من أفكار وتفاسير تخدم “الإسلام السّياسي” وتجعل تجريبه فرصة بعد وصول العسكر إلى الحكم عام 1963، والمقصود هنا عسكر حزب البعث، وفي الضفة المقابلة الشعبيّة نشطت الحركات الإسلاميّة في سورية وخصوصاً تلك القادمة من فكر جماعة الإخوان المسلمين، ولو نظرنا إلى المشهد السّياسي منذ تسلم العسكر الحكم تحت رعاية وزير الدفاع في حينها حافظ الأسد، سوف نكتشف أن كل أشكال الحياة السياسيّة رسم لها كيان ومبدأ واحد هو المرجعية العسكريّة، والتي برغم عنفها وقربها إلى سدّة الحكم، إلا أنها لم تكن توازي النّشاط الديني الذي راح ينمو بقوة في الأوساط الاجتماعيّة معتمداً على دعم الفقراء والطبقات المتوسطة، وبات للجامع تأثيره الأقوى في الشارع السوريّ، الأمر الذي دفع “البعث” لبناء منظومة دينيّة موازية تسبّح بَحمدِ القائد والجيش وتنشر الدّين الذي يليق باستقرار النّظام وتجذره، وهذا ما نلاحظه في مباهاة البعث المستمرة أنه يبني الجوامع ودور العبادة على اختلاف أطيافها ومذاهبها، ولكنه يغلق أي نادٍ ثقافيّ أو سياسيّ ما لم يكن قد حصل على الموافقة “الأمنيّة”، وبالتالي وجد لدينا ما يعرف بقانون الطوارئ الذي أنهى الحياة السياسية تماماً في سورية حتى انتقلت أي مبادرة معارضة وسلميّة إلى موضع الاتهام والخيانة لأنها تستحضر التاريخ الأسود الذي سطّرته أحداث الإخوان في الثمانينات إلى أذهان الناس، إبان عسكرة “الطليعة المقاتلة” للمعارضة في حماة، وحسب توجيه السّلطة وتصنيع “بعبع” العنف الإسلامي، وتلك الشماعة كانت أقوى أسلحة النظام لصبغ الهويّة السياسيّة بالدّين “غير المغضوب عليه” من القائد.
أصبح الجامع مكاناً للقاءات وتقارب الناس مع بعضها وفرصة للمخبرين لمعرفة توجهات الأهالي مع انتشار الأعداد الكبيرة من الجوامع في سورية بتوجيه مدروس من النظام، وعندما اشتعلت الثّورات العربية، لم نكن نرى مظاهرة تخرج من مسرح أو مقهى أو نادي سياسي، لم نكن نسمع شعارات ثورية بقدر ما هي ذات جذور دينيّة، وكذلك الأمر في سورية التي استيقظت فجأة على الغضب الشعبي، وراح الشارع ينادي “الله سورية حريّة وبس…!” شعار أنجبه الجامع وثقافته التي لا تقبل النقد، وتؤيد “الدعاة ممن يحفظون القرآن والسنن والأحاديث المحمدية!” وهي بطبيعة الحال ثقافة تنويم أصبحت فطريّة، يعتمد عليها الإسلام السّياسيّ لاستنهاض عواطف النّاس واستثمارها في أي انتفاضة شعبيّة ليكونوا في المقدمة، وتجربة إخوان مصر، خير دليل على ذلك الفشل السياسي! ولكن، هنا في سورية الأمر مختلف كلياً، فالنظام أسّس وساهم ببناء الجوامع والمعاهد الشرعية وجعل بذور “الجّهاد” حاضرة منذ غزو العراق، فتح باب التطوع تحت شعارات دينية، لكشف الجّهاديين في سورية من الإخوان وسواهم، وفيما بعد اعتقل كل من أفرزته تلك الثقافة من مقاتلين سياسيين، فور عودتهم من العمليات العسكرية ضد الجيش الأمريكي في العراق، وبقيت الثورة- المعارضة، رهن الدين والمرجعيات المزعومة التي توجهه.
لو افترضنا أن الثقافة كمفهوم ثوريّ تنويريّ، يطالب بالتغيير السلميّ ويحترم الخصومة السياسيّة، إذ لا يبحث هذا المفهوم عن ماهيّة الأديان، بل يعتبرها ثقافة اعتقادية روحانيّة خالصة وتخص الفرد وحده، لا تعمم على المجتمع، غير قابلة للتداول أو التّحشيد الشعبي، ولكن لطالما كان أصحاب الدين يعتقدون أنفسهم هم الصّواب والحلّ بالكتب المقدسة التي يؤمنون بها ويشرعون منها فقط! ولعل تجربة “تنظيم الدولة” و “جبهة النصرة” والفصائل الإسلاميّة “المعارضة” التي تقول بأنها سورية، قد أثبتت مساهمتها الكبيرة في تدمير الثورة وتشويه الهويّة السورية، هؤلاء كانوا يشترطون على الأتباع أن يؤمنوا غيبيّاً ومذهبيّاً، وأن تكون عقيدتهم تابعة لجملة من “مجالس الشورى” بينما نرى أن الثقافة لا تحتاج للدين كبوصلة لتقوم بالتّغيير، إنّما تحتاج للانفتاح على الجميع، بلا عنف جهاديّ عقائديّ، فقط بالحجة والدليل العقلي المادي الملموس، وبالمحصلة هي تعتمد على المعرفة وترحّب باختلاف الأديان، لأنها ترى الدين، كما أسلفنا، ثقافة روحانية منزلية لا يمكن المتاجرة بها وقيادة المجتمع عبرها.
حين تظاهر السوريون من الجوامع منذ اللّحظات الأولى، صبغوا الثورة بالشكل الديني، وأبعدوا المدنيّة عن طريقهم، فتنشّط الدعاة والشيوخ والجماعات الإسلامية للتدخل والبحث عن تمويل ودعم سياسي لاستثمار بيت أسرارها وصلتها مع الناس: الجامع! فكان ما كان، بدأت الثورة بالجامع ووصلت إلى فصائل متشدّدّة وأخرى تريد تحكيم شرع الله، وثالثة تعتقد أن هناك مدنية إسلامية معتدلة (…) فقط كي ترضي الآخرين، وحين تصل للحكم سوف تسحق كل من لا يؤمن بفكرها “الإخواني”.
ربّما قتل السوريين حلمهم حين كانت فرصة الانتفاضة تنادي بالحرية والعدالة والمساواة والمدنيّة، لأنهم طيلة العقود الماضية كانوا قد أصيبوا بالتدّجين الفكري، لا تجربة سياسية حقيقية وأحزاب تقود الحراك.
الجامع، معبد إسلاميّ لا يمكن أن يقود حراكاً سياسيّاً، لقد سَخِرت المعارضة والكثير من الشخصيات السياسية “الطارئة” من تعليق الشاعر السوري أدونيس حين قال: “لا أخرج في مظاهرة سياسية تخرج من الجامع” هو المقتل الواضح الذي نستنتج منه أن الدولة السورية حتى اليوم هي دولة قائمة على تشريعات الإسلام من دستورها إلى قوانين الأحوال الشخصية والنفوس والتربية والميراث ونظرة الدين للمرأة…إلخ، فكيف لا يكون الجامع هو بوصلة السّلطة لتنويم الشعب، لكن ذاك الجامع احتقن وألهب الشوارع السورية بالمظاهرات، لتصبح الثورة بعد أشهر تنادي “يا الله ما إلنا غيرك يا الله” أين السّياسية في ذلك يا سادة، أين الثورة في قاموس ينتظر من السماء أن تحل همومه؟ مع خالص احترامنا للإسلام والمسلمين، إلا أن ذلك لا علاقة له إلا بالقضاء على هوية المجتمع المدني، هوية المجتمع السوري، وذلك ما تم منذ العام 1963 ولا زال، والنتائج المدمرة الآن هي حاصل طبيعي لكل ذاك الاحتقان الديني وتراكم الجهل السياسي لكن بإضافة بسيطة هي خطاب “البعث الإسلامي”.
العنف وملعب الدين والمواجهة
أستغرب ممن يقول إنّ النظام السوري واجه المظاهرات بعنف شديد! هل كان النظام لطيفاً وحضاريّاً ومنفتحاً ويقبل الآخر- السلمي، قبل ذلك مثلاً، بالتأكيد: لا! وهذا لا يعني السكوت عن المواجهات الإجرامية بحق العزل أيام المظاهرات السلمية، إلاّ أنّ العسكرة التي تم جرّ الثورة السورية إليها، كانت غاية النّظام الأولى حتى يصبح لديه مبررات لسحق الاحتجاجات والمناطق الخارجة منها أمام الرأي العام وحلفائه الدوليين، معللاً ذلك بأنّ لديه “عصابات مسلّحة” غير قانونية وتثير الفوضى، يقتل باسمها ويعتقل وينشر التلفيقات والمفخخات التي يراها مناسبة لخدمة مصالح بقائه، ومع تلك التلفيقات نشط الدّين في جانبه الإسلاميّ، وخصوصاً بعد الإفراج من قبل النظام السوري عن مجموعة كبيرة من أخطر الشخصيات المتهمة بقضايا “سياسية” ولها مرجعية دينية متطرفة من جماعة الإخوان المسلمين والتيارات الجهادية والسلفية، وهي التي أسست الفصائل الإسلامية، وكان مقرها الجغرافي والأيديولوجي “سجن صيدنايا”.
هل لاحظتم أن المعتقلين السياسيين الذين ليس لهم انتماءات دينية تؤثر على نضالهم الفكري، قد بقوا في أقبية المخابرات؟ لأنهم يفكرون بلا عنف، ويعرفون معنى النضال الثوري السّلمي الذي حُرمت منه الثورة السورية بعد أشهر قليلة من انطلاقها، وذهبت إلى أيدي الجهاديين وأصحاب الأحزمة الانتحارية والعمليات “الانغماسية” إحدى أبرز هويات الإجرام لدى “النصرة” و “داعش”.
لم يكن يعلم الشارع السوري، ربّما أنّ رفع لافتة في الطريق والتظاهر دون سلاح هو أقوى ضربة يمكن أن توجه لنظام الحكم العسكري، لأن الذهنية السائدة هي مواجهة العنف بالعنف المفرط، وهذا ملعب العسكر الذين منذ تسلمهم البلاد وهم حريصون على لحظة تسلّح الخصوم بعد بناء جيش عقائدي حزبي، والتجذر الشديد بالدول المحورية في المنطقة، مع حلف الأنظمة التي تدعي “الاشتراكية” مثل روسيا الاتحادية! التي لاتزال تلعب ذات الدور في تسليح النظام ودعمه دولياً لأنه حليفها الأخير في الشرق الأوسط.
إذاً تعتمد السلطة في سورية منذ سنوات على مقابلة المشكلات السياسيّة، بافتعال تداعيات خطيرة في الشّارع، وجرّبت ذلك أثناء الثورة السورية، حتى أصبح الافتعال، واقعاً! والمقصود هنا الجماعات الإسلاميّة المرتهنة للدول الداعمة للإسلام السياسي تارة، وللبحث عن موطئ قدم لها في الحصة الجغرافية لبلاد الشام مثل الولايات المتحدة- إيران- تركيا- إسرائيل- وروسيا، هي دول فاعلة بقوة عبر المليشيات المتقاتلة على الأرض. ولكن المثير في الأمر أن تتماهى السلطة في سورية منذ بداية الثورة لكشف هوية المجتمع السوري الذي عملت على تعديل مخيلته ودفعه نحو التديّن، فوجدت الحلّ مثلاً بإطلاق قناة إسلامية من التلفزيون السوري الرسمي من وسط ساحة الأمويين وهي قناة “نور الشام” التي تبث أفكاراً دينية تخدم مصلحة النظام، على اعتبار أن الصراع بوجهة نظر الشارع والمجتمع هو صراع ديني، حسب رأي النظام! الأمر الذي يبرر الفتاوى المستمرة بقتال أبناء الديانة الواحدة الذين اختلفوا قليلاً بأمراض تدعى “المذاهب الدينية” وبالتالي أصبح المجتمع الذي اشتغل عليه حزب البعث مكشوفاً للهشاشة الفكرية ويتدخل في تسييره من يريد، ذلك أن النّواة الأساسية التي اعتمد عليها هذا الحزب هي الدين بالمرتبة الأولى وكسب الشخصيات الدينية في وزارة مخصّصّة لهم ضمن حكومته، هي “وزارة الأوقاف” وهنا نتذكر: أليست هي ذاتها الوزارة التي كانت تسمح لأئمة كانوا فيما مضى يقيمون “الدروس الإسلامية” والجلسات “الدعوية” عبر الراديو والتلفزيون الرسمي والجوامع والمراكز الدينية إياها التي تحدثنا عنها بداية، بينما الآن نراهم في تركيا يقفزون في المجالس “الشرعية” حيث تقود ما بقي من فصائل إسلامية في المناطق الواقعة تحت سيطرة المعارضة السورية؟
الثورة فضيحة الهوية
لا بد من فِكر… نظرة للتجارب الثوريّة القائمة على أفكار يساريّة مثلاً، وتنظير ثوري جديد لقراءة الثورات؛ لا بد من مراجعة جديّة للثورة السورية من أجل الوقوف إلى جانب هذا الشعب العظيم الذي أنجب حضارات منذ آلاف السنوات ومع تقدم الزمن بدأ يعود -بفضل السياسيين والطغاة- إلى التخلف.
إن “الفتوحات الدينيّة” ليست فكراً، بقدر ما هي مرجعيّة لغيبيات روحيّة قد تجعل معظم الناس في راحة من أسئلة الوجود والهوية، وهي لا تحل مشكلات سياسية مرهونة بالحاضر وتبدلاته المستمرة؛ وفي سورية، السلطة الحاكمة اخترعت ديناً خاصاً بها، والشارع تمرّد عليه، فيما بعد، صنع ديناً خاصاً به، وسجون المتطرفين الذين كانوا تحت عين السلطة وجدوا من الشارع فرصة لتطرفهم وتسليحهم فسحقوا الحياة السورية في الداخل وشتتوا الشعب إلى جانب نظام لا يرى سوى البندقية والقائد قاموساً للحوار ولا هوية له إلا القتل والأنانية، القتل الذي أورثه لخصومه حتى أصبحنا في غابة وحوش كاسرة من معارضة ومولاة وحلفاء من دول العالم يمدونهم بالسلاح والمرتزقة.
بالمحصلة الدين يفشل أمام السياسة، لأن كل مفهوم قائم هو على طرف مغاير للآخر في الحياة، لا يمكن أن يلتقيا، وتوحيدهما في جسم اجتماعي واحد أوصلنا للذي نحن به الآن في سورية، الدين أصبح شُبهة وتشدد وتطرّف، لقد لوّثته الغايات السلطوية، والسياسة أصبحت عسكرة وتحالفات دولية ونسيت أن تطور المجتمع، والشعب أضاع هويته المشوهة، دفعها إلى الجحيم في ثورة لازالت تبحث عن قادتها السياسيين بعيداً عن الكتب المقدسة ومن يلحقها من تجار الدين.
