Syria in a Week (17 September 2018)

Syria in a Week (17 September 2018)

The following is a selection by our editors of significant weekly developments in Syria. Depending on events, each issue will include anywhere from four to eight briefs. This series is produced in both Arabic and English in partnership between Salon Syria and Jadaliyya. Suggestions and blurbs may be sent to info@salonsyria.com.

 

Idlib at Sochi After Tehran

14 September 2018

Turkey launched a wide diplomatic campaign regarding the potential battle in Idlib. Turkey said that it has held talks with all sides in the Syrian conflict to prevent government forces from carrying out a full-scale attack on Idlib, which is under the control of the armed opposition.

A summit was held between the presidents of Russia and Turkey, who support rival parties in the anticipated battle. The summit comes after the failure to reach a ceasefire during the trilateral meeting in Tehran between Iran, Russia, and Turkey. However, the Idlib front witnessed a decline in the number of airstrikes, and militants in the Syrian opposition said that some government forces withdrew from front lines in northwest of Syria in recent days.

Turkey also held talks with foreign ministers of a number of countries and is having talks “with all parties in Syria” to reach a ceasefire in Idlib, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said. He reiterated Turkey’s call to carry out precise operations against fanatics, including Tahrir al-Sham, instead of launching a full-scale random attack. “We are ready to cooperate with everyone to fight terrorist organizations. But killing everyone – civilians, women, and children – like this in the name of fighting terrorist organizations is not right and is not humane,” he added. (Reuters)

Turkey reinforced a dozen military positions inside Idlib, which lies across its southern border and is controlled by Turkish-backed groups and jihadist fighters, in an attempt to deter the government offensive. Troops, armored vehicles, and equipment have been sent to the Syrian border. “We have a military presence there and if that military presence is damaged or attacked in any way, it would be considered an attack on Turkey and would therefore receive the necessary retaliation,” a Turkish security source said. A senior official in the Syrian opposition said that Turkey sent dozens of armored vehicles and tanks, in addition to hundreds of special forces troops to Idlib. A source in the opposition told Reuters that Turkey also increased its reinforcement to opposition forces in Idlib in recent days, including ammunition and rockets.

On the other hand, Interfax news agency reported Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov as saying that his country will continue to bomb military targets in the Syrian governorate of Idlib if there is a need, however, it will establish safe corridors for civilians to flee. During his visit to Berlin, Lavrov said that Russian air forces will destroy what he described as terrorist weapons manufacturing facilities in Idlib once they are observed, however, it will also encourage local reconciliation agreements. The official Russian news agency reported the Kremlin as saying that Putin discussed the situation in Idlib with members of Russia’s Security council on Friday and expressed his concern for the militant activities there. (Reuters)

The Kurds were not absent from the Russian-Turkish “negotiations” on Idlib. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said in a letter to The New York Times published on Thursday that the People’s Protection Units (YPG) might help the Syrian government in the offensive on Idlib. The YPG were a strong ally for the United States in its war on the Islamic State. However, Turkey considers them a terrorist organization and an extension of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party, which has been leading an armed rebellion against the Turkish state since the eighties. Ankara has repeatedly expressed its anger over US support for the YPG. (Reuters)

 

No Chemical Weapons or Refugees!

10 – 14 September 2018

Reuters

United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres on Tuesday appealed to Russia, Iran, and Turkey to “spare no effort to find solutions that protect civilians” in the Syrian governorate of Idlib and said it was “absolutely essential” a full-scale battle was avoided.

“This would unleash a humanitarian nightmare unlike any seen in the blood-soaked Syrian conflict,” he told reporters. “I understand that the present situation in Idlib is not sustainable and the presence of terrorist groups cannot be tolerated. But fighting terrorism does not absolve warring parties of their core obligations under international law,” said Guterres.

The UN cautioned that an offensive on Idlib would cause a humanitarian crisis in a region populated by three million people. Turkey, which already hosts three and a half million Syrian refugees, said that it cannot receive a new influx of refugees. The Turkish Presidential Spokesperson Ibrahim Kalin said that officials from Turkey, Russia, France, and Germany agreed during their talks in Istanbul on Friday that any attack on Idlib would have serious consequences and that a political solution must be reached. Kalin said that mass displacement of refugees from Syria would be a problem not only for his country but for the European Union as well. “We expect maintenance of Idlib’s current status, protection of civilians, and prevention of a humanitarian crisis there,” he told reporters.

The UN said it is preparing aid for around nine hundred thousand people who might flee in case the fighting intensifies. The opposition is accusing Russia and its allies of attacking hospitals and civil defense centers to force the opposition to surrender, in a replay of major military attacks on areas such as Aleppo and eastern Ghouta. The UN said that it has notified Russia, Turkey, and the United States of the GPS coordinates of two hundred and thirty-five schools, hospitals, and other civilian sites in Idlib, in hope the move will protect them from being attacked.

Four hospitals in Hama and Idlib have been hit by air strikes in the past week, constituting “serious attacks” that violate international law, Panos Moumtzis, UN regional humanitarian coordinator for the Syria crisis said. He called on all warring sides to ensure that civilians in Idlib were able to move freely in any direction to flee fighting or bombing, and for aid workers to have access to civilians. UN figures show that around thirty-eight thousand and three hundred people have fled Idlib this month. Thirty-three people were killed and sixty-seven others injured in aerial and ground bombardment from 4 to 9 September.

On Wednesday, French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drain warned that the indiscriminate bombing of Idlib could amount to war crimes. “The hypothesis of war crimes cannot be excluded … once one begins to indiscriminately bomb civilian populations and hospitals,” Jean-Yves Le Drian told parliament members.

Germany will make an autonomous decision on whether to participate in any military response to a future Syrian chemical weapons attack in line with international law and the German constitution, Foreign Minister Heiko Maas said on Wednesday. On Wednesday, German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen said that Germany and other countries have to do all they can to prevent the use of chemical weapons in Syria, adding that a “credible deterrent” was needed.

The United States, Britain, and France agreed that another use of chemical weapons by the Syrian government would result in a “much stronger response” compared to previous air strikes, President Donald Trump’s national security advisor John Bolton said on Monday.

On Wednesday, UN investigators said that they had documented three uses of banned chlorine gas by Syrian government forces that constituted war crimes, and urged major powers to help avert a “massacre” in the final battle for Idlib. In their latest report they said the attacks caused injuries in the Damascus suburb of Douma and in Idlib in the northwest in January and early February. They also said that they were still investigating a suspected chemical attack in Douma on 7 April that killed at least forty-nine people and wounded up to six hundred and fifty others.

 

Phosphorus Bombs

9 September 2018

Reuters

The Russian army said on Sunday that two US F-15 fighter jets dropped phosphorus bombs on Deir Azzour governorate in Syria on Sunday, TASS news agency and the official Russian news agency reported, an allegation the United States has denied.

The airstrikes targeted the village of Hajin and resulted in fires, but there was no information about casualties, the Russian army said. A Pentagon spokesperson denied that US planes dropped phosphorus bombs. “At this time, we have not received any reports of any use of white phosphorous… None of the military units in the area are even equipped with white phosphorous munitions of any kind,” said Commander Sean Robertson. Human rights groups have said that the US-led coalition against the Islamic State has used white phosphorus munition over the course of the Syrian conflict. The bombs can create thick white smoke screens and are used as incendiary devices. Human rights group criticize use of the munitions in populated zones because they can kill and maim by burning people to bone. (Reuters)

 

Nassib Border Crossing Talks

13 September 2018

Reuters

On Thursday, an official Jordanian source said that Syria and Jordan held the first technical talks to open a major border crossing in southern Syria, which was recaptured from the opposition last July. Syria hopes to reopen the vital border crossing to revive its shattered economy and rebuild territory under its control. The source told Reuters that the meeting took place on Wednesday on the Jordanian side of the border upon a request from Syria. He said that technical groups started talks concerning the required practical arrangements to reopen the border crossing from customs to security. “The meetings will continue to put a complete view of all the arrangements linked to reopening the crossings in the coming period,” the source added. (Reuters)

 

Elections During War!

16 September 2018

Enab Baladi

Elections for local administration councils were held on Sunday, 16 September, in Syria, in areas under government forces control. According to the official news agency SANA, voters can exercise their right to vote with their personal IDs.

More than forty thousand candidates are competing for eighteen thousand and four hundred and seventy-eight seats in all governorates, SANA said. According to the election decree, applications are submitted before a certain time ahead of the election day. Each governorate issues its own laws, and an election committee is formed on the national level for sub-councils (cities, towns, and municipalities). Governorates also specify the number of seats and electoral procedures. Nomination is open to all people. Two lists are issued, the first (previously known as the “Progressive Front List”) is for the Baathists and is currently called the “National Unity List”. The National Leadership of the Arab Baath Socialist Party is responsible for issuing this list. The other list contains independent figures, and gets only thirty percent of the total list of candidates.

These elections are the first of their kind since the decree of 2011. The last local elections after the onset of the Syrian revolution were the legislative elections in 2016 and the presidential elections in 2014.

 

Eastern Ghouta x 20

Eastern Ghouta x 20

“After several days of calm, the battle in Eastern Ghouta enclave seems to have picked up again as President Bashar al-Assad’s government launched a new round of air strikes on Douma, the only city still left in insurgent hands. Leaders of the Islam Army, the opposition militia that rules the city, have insisted that they will stay in Douma come what may, but they do not have the military muscle to pull that off if Damascus and Moscow decide otherwise.

Should regime-rebel talks break down and end in a renewed, full-scale offensive, local civilians will be at risk.

UN sources recently estimated that as many as 78,000–150,000 people may remain in Douma alongside the Islamist fighters, though such figure are unreliable and have historically erred on the high side. Whatever the actual number, it is clear that many civilians in Douma have been forcibly prevented from fleeing by Islam Army rebels, who seem to want to exploit their presence as a card in negotiations, and that all are suffering from callous government siege tactics, with loyalist forces refusing to permit the entry of aid workers, medicine, and humanitarian supplies.

It remains to be seen what form Douma’s capitulation will ultimately take, and how much death, destruction, and displacement will accompany it. But when the city folds, as at some point it will, seven years of opposition rule in Eastern Ghouta are going to come to an end.

Other parts of the enclave have already been retaken since the offensive began in February, with rebels from Failaq al-Rahman, Ahrar al-Sham, and Tahrir al-Sham either killed, forced to surrender, or sent to northwestern Syria along with many civilians—according to the most recent UN numbers, as many as 49,000 people. Meanwhile, some 123,000 inhabitants of Eastern Ghouta are thought to have come under government control, either living inside retaken neighborhoods like Erbeen and Harasta or having fled to Damascus and a series overcrowded IDP shelters near the city.

The retaking of Eastern Ghouta seems almost an afterthought to Assad’s December 2016 victory in Eastern Aleppo, but this is in fact the bigger battle. It is being fought over a larger area, on the doorstep of the Syrian capital, with many more fighters involved and more civilians at risk. Whether more people died in Ghouta than in Aleppo, I don’t know—but many, many people have died.

* * *

Over the past few years, I have spent an unholy amount of time trying to understand the politics of Eastern Ghouta’s rebel movement. I have also written a lot about the area. Sifting through my archives the other day, I found that I had penned no less than twenty English-language articles, reports, and blog posts on the topic, for Syria Comment, the Carnegie Endowment, The Century Foundation, IRIN News, and others. The first one was published in February 2013, as pro-Assad forces prepared to put the region under siege, and the last one is less than a week old.

That’s a lot of text. Although in hindsight I can spot plenty of errors and misunderstandings, and there is still very much that I still don’t understand, there’s also a lot of material in there that seems like it could be useful to people trying to follow the crisis now unfolding near Damascus. Therefore, I have compiled all twenty pieces here, with a short introductory comment about each.

The latest publication is first on the page, so read from bottom to top if you want all five years in chronological order. If not, just pick and choose as you please.

– Aron Lund

• Trapped Between Rebels and Air Strikes, Civilians in Eastern Ghouta Face Chaos(IRIN, Mar. 2018)
With only Douma left in rebel hands by late March, I tried to investigate what became of Eastern Ghouta’s civilian population in more than a month of fighting. UN numbers are all over the map, but it’s clear that many ended up in shelters erected around the area while others stayed put despite the fighting, and that they will now come under Assad’s rule once again. Still others have joined the opposition as it was driven off to Idleb and Aleppo, where some will now be resettled in Afrin. Yet civilians also remain trapped inside insurgent-held Douma, as the clock ticks toward either a rebel surrender or a renewed military offensive.

• Assad’s Divide and Conquer Strategy Is Working (Foreign Policy, Mar. 2018)
Brute military force was certainly the main ingredient in Assad’s victory in Eastern Ghouta, but his government also reached its objectives using more sophisticated means, including by exploiting insurgent divisions to punch where their defenses were weakest, negotiating separate deals through well-connected siege merchants, and rallying supporters inside the enclave to work behind rebel lines. Among other things, this piece looks at the curious case of Sheikh Bassam Difdaa, a pro-government Sufi preacher who helped crack Failaq al-Rahman’s defenses in Kafr Batna.

• Aleppo Again? A Plea to Save Lives in in Eastern Ghouta (TCF, Mar. 2018)
As the final, brutal offensive in Eastern Ghouta got under way, it was obvious that loyalist forces were going to win—they were overwhelmingly superior and faced no risk of outside intervention. In other words, the best time to think about what that meant for civilians was before the battle was over. The pro-Assad side had clearly advertised that defeated rebels and activists would either have to submit to government rule (but some would not; some could not) or head to rebel-held northern Syria. But what about the larger civilian population? Varied in their allegiances and circumstances, some civilians would undoubtedly want to follow the opposition to Idleb, while others would just as undoubtedly want to stay in their homes after government forces returned. To my mind, this was a moment for the international community to push for and facilitate individual choice by, among other things, promoting an orderly handover once rebels surrendered and by dispatching monitors to gauge the voluntariness of civilians staying or leaving, in the hope of minimizing the amount of forced displacement and hostage-type situations. Also, regardless of all political dimensions, humanitarian aid needed to be rushed to relief organizations on the ground quickly, before IDP numbers grew unmanageable. In the end, not a lot of that happened, but many of these suggestions remain just as relevant as when I wrote this—now in Douma.

• Understanding Eastern Ghouta in Syria (IRIN, Feb. 2018)
A short but fairly comprehensive pre-battle backgrounder on Eastern Ghouta as it was in spring 2018, in which I attempt to map out who controlled what while also describing the issues at stake as Assad’s government readied itself to retake the enclave.

• The Man-Made Disaster in Syria’s Eastern Ghouta (IRIN, Dec. 2017)
On how the siege on Eastern Ghouta was tightened in September 2017, in preparation for the offensive that would follow early next year. The humanitarian effects of the siege had always been severe, but with smuggling tunnels now blocked, private food sales banned, and UN convoys prevented from entering, what had been a simmering crisis boiled over into full-scale disaster—hurting civilians much more than rebels, who controlled all levers of the economy. It was a war crime right out in the open, a very effective one.

• East Ghouta Turns on Itself, Again (TCF, May 2017)
In April 2017, the Islam Army and Failaq al-Rahman went back to fighting each other, one year to the day after their mini-civil war in 2016. Drivers this time around included the de-escalation deals being rolled out by Russia, the recent loss of the rebel smuggling tunnels, and a whole lot of pent-up anger.

• The Syrian Rebel Who Tried to Build an Islamic Paradise (Politico Magazine, Mar. 2017)
A long feature on Zahran Alloush and his attempts to unite the enclave under his own iron-fisted rule. Though capable and ruthless enough, the Islam Army leader’s grand project was ultimately frustrated by his failure to control the war economy and the resistance of rival factions. This article covers some of the same ground as the “Into the Tunnels” report, but has more storytelling and a tighter focus on Alloush’s role.

• Going South in East Ghouta (Carnegie, Feb. 2017)
By spring 2017, things were looking pretty hopeless for the rebels. The Syrian government had seized a lot of territory after Alloush’s death and it had just pocketed Eastern Aleppo. It looked as if Eastern Ghouta would be next, with Damascus pulling together troops and seizing the smuggling tunnels in Qaboun and Barzeh. But then fighting petered out, possibly because Russian-brokered de-escalation deals clicked into place during exactly this time, which shifted Assad’s attention to the Islamic State. The Russian military then cleverly played Eastern Ghouta’s factions off against each other, in particular by goading the Islam Army to go after Failaq-friendly jihadis. A new round of infighting would begin in April 2017.

• Into the Tunnels: The Rise and Fall of Syria’s Rebel Enclave in the Eastern Ghouta (TCF, Dec. 2016)
A detailed history of the Eastern Ghouta enclave and its political economy, this report attempts to chart the rise of the main rebel groups and their shifting rivalries, up to the point when they finally split the enclave in May 2016. It includes sections on the 2014 joint institutions, the 2015 wars over frontline crossings and smuggling tunnels, and some discussion of the ideology of the major factions. A shortened and slightly updated version of this report was later printed as a chapter in The Century Foundation’s Arab Politics After the Uprisings, an edited volume that I assume you’ve already bought and read many times over, since it is just that good.

• Showdown in East Ghouta (Carnegie, May 2016)
My quick take Eastern Ghouta’s just-beginning internal breakdown. Ending in a Qatari-brokered truce later in May, the infighting ended up splitting the enclave into two or three parts, depending on how you count them. The Islam Army took sole control over the northern and eastern parts stretching from Douma to Nashabiyeh; Failaq al-Rahman seized the Damascus suburbs; and Harasta remained in the Failaq-friendly hands of Fajr al-Umma. Nusra Front and Ahrar al-Sham Islamists were also part of the mix. Nusra had formally joined forces with Fajr to smash the Islam Army, but they were mostly floating around inside Failaq-land. Ghouta’s small Ahrar branch was fragmenting: some members backed the Islam Army, others fought the Islam Army alongside Nusra, still others tried to remain neutral.

• After Zahran: Rising Tension in the East Ghouta (Carnegie, Apr. 2016)
This was written alongside “An Islamist Experiment,” when Eastern Ghouta was on the verge of major internal conflict. After Zahran Alloush’s death, factions outside Douma had merged into two loosely allied blocks that sought to cut his successor down to size. The Islam Army had lashed out in response with preemptive arrests and assassinations, which didn’t improve the mood much. Right after publication, the Ghouta insurgency blew itself apart with a big, nasty bang.

• An Islamist Experiment: Political Order in the East Ghouta (Carnegie, Apr. 2016)
With infighting on the way, this article looks at the cross-factional institutions set up by Eastern Ghouta’s rebels to contain internal conflicts. Starting in 2014, Alloush had pushed for the creation of a joint military command and a sharia-based governance apparatus. At the peak of his power in early 2015, these institutions had seemed like they could potentially transform into a new political order of a sort. But the joint institutions frayed and hollowed quickly, with factional anarchy resurfacing to a greater extent than is clear in this article. I got a somewhat better understanding of the system later, with more detail presented the “Into the Tunnels” report.

• The Death of Zahran Alloush (Syria Comment, Dec. 2015)
On December 25, 2015, Zahran Alloush died in an air strike. Within weeks of his funeral, rival rebels in Failaq al-Rahman, Ajnad al-Sham, Fajr al-Umma, and the Nusra Front were ganging up on a shell-shocked and sullenly aggressive Islam Army in order to claim his mantle, with violence finally erupting on a large scale in late April 2016.

• Is Zahran Alloush in Amman? (Syria Comment, June 2015)
Yes, he was. Having somehow snuck out of besieged Eastern Ghouta, the Islam Army leader was taking a trip around the region, to Turkey and Jordan, where he met with Syrian rebel and religious allies as well as foreign fundraisers, agents, and diplomats, at a sensitive moment in the opposition’s history. But when I wrote this, it wasn’t yet very clear what was going on.

• Damascus Preachers and the Armed Rebellion (Carnegie, Mar. 2014)
This one takes a brief peak at the capital’s Ashaarite-traditionalist and Sufi networks, which had long dominated Syria’s state-approved Sunni Islamic establishment and would play a huge but under-studied role in the opposition after 2011. Today, their influence remains keenly felt through the Turkey-based Syrian Islamic Council. It is a companion piece to the article about Ajnad al-Sham, which grew out of exactly this clerical milieu and had visible ties to Damascene Sufism and less visible ones to exiled Ikhwani networks.

• The Ajnad al-Sham Islamic Union (Carnegie, Mar. 2014)
I look at the creation of Ajnad al-Sham, a group backed by local Sufi clerics and Muslim Brotherhood members. Later bolstering its ranks by absorbing aggrieved former Umma Army members, Ajnad al-Sham operated as one of Eastern Ghouta’s top three factions for nearly two years. In spring 2016, it merged into the other second-tier faction, Failaq al-Rahman, and launched a devastating attack on the Islam Army.

• The Greater Damascus Operations Room, part 1 (Carnegie, Nov. 2013)
• The Greater Damascus Operations Room, part 2 (Carnegie, Nov. 2013)
This two-parter is for the real nerds. With limited success, I tried to read the tea leaves of a major, foreign-funded rebel unity project in the wider Ghouta region. In particular, I was looking for clues about how it related to Brig. Gen. Salim Idriss’s hapless Free Syrian Army HQ in Turkey, to Ghouta’s Nusra and Islamic State jihadis, and to the unending internecine feuds in Douma, where Zahran Alloush was still struggling to establish himself as capo di tutti capi. I didn’t reach much clarity on any of these issues at the time, but some additional details had seeped out by the time I wrote the “Into the Tunnels” report.

• A Dispute in Douma (Carnegie, Oct. 2013)
In this one, I did my sorry best to make sense of rebel rivalries in Eastern Ghouta, whose internal functioning under a half-year old siege had yet to be hashed out. Though at the time this was only vaguely visible in local coalition politics, Zahran Alloush’s just-created Islam Army was drifting into conflict with a set of pugnacious, Free Syrian Army-flagged commanders and contraband kingpins united by their shared rejection of his dominance and the Islamist rule that came with it. A year later, they made a desperate, last-ditch attempt to kneecap the Islam Army and push it out of the smuggling economy by entering into an alliance known as the Umma Army. Zahran promptly dropped a piano on them. For more about that grim story, check the “Into the Tunnels” report or my piece for Politico.

• The Islamist Mess in Damascus (Syria Comment, Feb. 2013)
This old Syria Comment blog post was written just before Assad’s forces managed to place Eastern Ghouta under siege. It looks at how rebel coalition-building around Damascus had clicked with the major national-level insurgent alliances of the time, and we get an early glimpse of the headstrong ways of a certain Zahran Alloush.”

[This article was originally published by Syria Comment.]

Syria 2018: five key factors to watch

Syria 2018: five key factors to watch

“After a string of breakthroughs in 2016 and 2017, President Bashar al-Assad’s government now has the clear upper hand in Syria’s long war.

Out east, the so-called Islamic State has been crushed between the hammer and anvil of al-Assad’s army and a Kurdish-led group backed by the United States. A ceasefire between the army and the Kurds is now in place along the Euphrates River and, despite the much-ballyhooed de-escalation zones brokered by Moscow, violence has quickly drifted back west. In Idlib, renewed fighting has driven some 100,000 civilians on the run in the first weeksof 2018.

But if it seems like a government win is a foregone conclusion, there are still some developments that could throw the pro-Assad juggernaut off track. Plus, restored government control in Syria could take many forms. To help understand which way Syria’s war and peace might be headed, here are five key aspects to keep an eye on in 2018.

1. Iran

The street protests that shook Iran over the last weeks serve as a timely reminder of how important regional developments are to Syria’s future. The protests now seem to have petered out, but had the Iranian government been seriously weakened, the effects would soon have been felt in Syria.

There are other ways in which this key Damascus ally could get into trouble in 2018.

US President Donald Trump has long threatened to tear up the 2015 deal over Iran’s nuclear programme. On 12 January, he extended US compliance once more, but warned that this would be the last time, unless the terms are renegotiated. Deadlines will keep cropping up in 2018, the next one in April. Should the deal be allowed to lapse, it’s possible nothing much happens at all. But Iranian-American relations could fly off the rails, with unpredictable consequences for Syria.

Meanwhile, Israel has stepped up air strikes in Syria and is pushing to contain the Iran-backed Lebanese group Hezbollah in areas near the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. Israel also keeps a wary eye on Lebanon, where the first parliamentary elections in nearly a decade will be held in May.

A new Hezbollah-Israel war seems unlikely, but they always do until they happen. If one were to erupt in 2018, Syria would likely be drawn into the fighting.

2. Signs of an underground insurgency

Syrian rebels have long said that if al-Assad wins on the battlefield, they will flip to guerrilla warfare and wage a campaign of bombings and assassinations.

So far, that’s mostly talk, and areas retaken by the army have remained more or less stable.

The main exception is Homs, where rebels have staged repeated attacks on Alawite neighbourhoods. Aleppo has also seen a handful of bombings after al-Assad took back the city’s eastern half in December 2016, and every now and then a bomb goes off in Damascus.

While this level of violence seems like something al-Assad could easily tolerate, the underground campaign may escalate.

After losing the war in the east, IS is returning to subversive tactics, and the Idlib-based extremists in Tahrir al-Sham may end up doing the same at some point. Although they have been powerful enough on the battlefield, it is as urban guerrillas that the jihadis’ brutal tradecraft really shines.

In 2018, therefore, it is worth monitoring the frequency of car bombings, assassinations, and suicide attacks in government-held cities. Take special note of atrocities calculated to spark a sectarian backlash in religiously mixed areas like Homs and Tartous – a tried and true tactic of IS.

3. The reconstruction-transition link

Seven years of war has left Syria in ruins. A quarter of the population has fled abroad, with 5.5 million registered refugees near Syria’s borders and another million in Europe. Major cities like RaqqaDeir Ezzor, and eastern Aleppo are in ruins, and 6.1 million internally displaced people are suffering in terrible conditions. The economy is in a shambles, with jobs and services hard to come by and salaries hollowed out by inflation. In all, 13.1 millionpeople depend on aid to get by.

Although several areas of the country remain outside state control, al-Assad’s government now wants to talk about reconstruction. In large part, this is a pitch for money and international legitimacy, but Syrian envoys also point to the humanitarian situation and appeal to their interlocutors’ self-interest: after a war, there’s money to be made.

For major reconstruction to take place, al-Assad will need wealthy Western and Gulf Arab nations to open if not their hearts, then at least their wallets. So far, there are few takers – these nations hate the Syrian president, having tried to overthrow him for seven years.

The United States is pushing its allies to continue the isolation of al-Assad until he agrees to a political transition, though it seems clear that he never will. The policy is more of a holding pattern than a genuine plan for regime change, and some Europeans seem unpersuaded. But so far, all have stuck to the script, and Russian diplomats’ attempts to badger Europe into paying are making no headway.

Full-scale reconstruction seems unlikely. But as time passes and UN transition talks continue to come up blank, more policymakers will likely start arguing that the very real leverage that Western states enjoy through aid financing should be deployed in more practical ways. Transition seems like a dead end, but something has to be done about the situation – and perhaps the regime could be more flexible on other issues?

Once that conclusion settles in, Europeans will find much to haggle over: intelligence cooperation, business deals, prisoner releases, chemical weapons monitoring, restored diplomatic relations, UN cross-border access, Syrian-Israeli ties, the Kurdish question, and refugee return, to name but a few.

Opposition to dealing with al-Assad is still strong, but, at some point, it may begin to fray. In 2018, watch for shifts in Western rhetoric linking reconstruction funding to transition.

4. New faces in the regime

Assuming that the Syrian leader now feels more secure, 2018 could be the year that he starts putting his house in order.

Though civilian ministers have come and gone with regularity, the regime’s inner security sanctum has seen few changes in the past seven years, except to fill in for those killed. The top brass is getting old, both figuratively and literally. Meanwhile, a new stratum of businessmen, paramilitary leaders, and wartime fixers has risen to positions of influence through the war economy, and the army is partly displaced by militias whose loyalty to al-Assad may be assured but whose discipline and respect for public order is not.

There are no signs of organised resistance to al-Assad’s overarching control among these groups, but the loyalist camp clearly brims with accumulated personal, commercial, and institutional tensions. This ultimately undermines the state and makes it harder to normalise the situation.

It is something the Syrian president will want to deal with at some point, in so far as he can, and it also ties back to the reconstruction question. If al-Assad wants to signal that Syria is past the threshold and that a new era is beginning, he’ll need to pour new blood into the system, putting forth fresh faces not overly tainted by the past seven years.

In 2018, keep your ears peeled for talk about military reorganisation, security and ministerial reshuffles, and the use of new laws or anti-corruption campaigns to perform targeted interventions in the war economy.

5. The Kurds

With the anti-Assad opposition now unviable or hijacked by extremists, foreign actors are shifting their bets to Syrian Kurdistan. Since 2017, the Kurdish question has arguably become the conflict’s central axis.

After helping Kurdish and allied Arab troops in the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) capture northeastern Syria from IS, US officials are now turning them into a 30,000-strong border security force. Its area of operations will be the Syrian-Iraqi and Syrian-Turkish national borders, but also the front line against al-Assad’s central government.

That’s a plan with no shortage of adversaries. Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Fesial Meqdad says it aims to “divide Syria;” Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov warns it could “split” the country.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is even more upset, accusing the US of building a “terror army” on his southern border. The Syrian Kurdish leadership is linked to Ankara’s domestic arch-enemy, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and US-Turkish relations have plummeted since Washington started supporting the Kurds in 2014.

Erdogan now threatens to invade Afrin, an isolated Kurdish enclave outside the protective umbrella extended by the US Air Force. Afrin does however host a symbolic contingent of Russian troops, which may or may not dissuade an attack – it is not yet clear what the Turks are planning.

All involved seem to be keeping their options open, dancing around the overt hostility between Turkey and the Syrian Kurds and trying to work with both sides.

The Americans are weighing their project in Kurdistan, which has come to represent their main source of leverage in Syria, against the damage to their relationship with Turkey, which is a major NATO ally. It is a difficult debate and the status quo may well win the day, leaving US troops in place as a holding force without any clear end goal.

Meanwhile, Moscow is trying to coax Erdogan into Damascus-friendly deals by dangling the Kurds in front of him, but Russian diplomats have also tried to interest al-Assad in some sort of federal construction that could leave the Kurds where they are and wind down the war.

The Syrian leader could either try that, or he could position himself as a counterweight to Kurdish ambitions, rallying Arab and perhaps even Turkish support for his claims on the northeast. Most likely, al-Assad will try to muddle through for now and wait for the Americans to pack up and leave.

The power games in northern Syria could take time to fully unfold. But in 2018, keep your eyes open for any clues on how US, Russian, and Syrian policymakers want to answer the Kurdish question and its Turkish corollary. What happens in Kurdistan could reshape Syria’s future, perhaps even its borders.

This work was supported in part by a research grant from The Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation.”

 

[This article was originally published by IRIN.]

الخوف من الثورة بوصفها فضيحة للهوية المشوهة

الخوف من الثورة بوصفها فضيحة للهوية المشوهة

عندما كنت أغادر إحدى الخمارات في منطقة باب شرقي بدمشق القديمة، قبل الرحيل عن سورية أواخر العام 2015، كنت قد وصلت قرب الباب العتيق الفاصل بين الشارع المستقيم في المدينة القديمة والبيوت الدمشقية الجميلة وطريق السيارات العام، كنت أشاهد بحزن سحب الدخان الأسود والحرائق المتصاعدة من أطراف مدينة جوبر، ثم أعبر باب شرقي باتجاه موقع ميكروباص جرمانا عند مفترق طريق المليحة، عند الزاوية أمر بجانب جامع له مئذنة طويلة جداً، تطل على كل المدينة، تحت المئذنة تماماً ثمة باب للجامع وآخر لمقر يدعى “معهد الفتح الإسلامي”، وفيما بعد علمت أنه معهد “شرعي إسلامي” وتحت عين السلطات السورية ويساهم في تقديم حوافز دراسية مع تعزيز قدرات الطالب في الجانب “الإسلامي” وبقي السؤال يراودني: معهد للعلوم الدينية؟ ومعاهد الأسد لتحفيظ القرآن؟

والكثير من الجمعيات الخيرية والتنموية والدينية النشطة قبل الثورة، ترى ماذا قدمت للمجتمع السوري من تطور وتغيير؟ ما شأن الدين بالفتوحات الفكريّة التي ندعيها كبلد يعتبر مدنياً؟ لماذا لا يوجد معاهد للفتوحات الشعريّة والمسرحيّة والروائيّة والفنيّة؟ معاهد لتحفيظ الشّعر والقصص الأدبيّة؟ جمعية لنشر الكتب وتوزيع علوم الأدب من مختلف أنحاء العالم؟ لماذا كان للدين كلّ تلك الحفاوة؟ وكيف أصبح “إمام” الجّامع، قائداً لسمعة شباب الحارة؟! من وضع الوصاية وصكوك الأخلاق والتربية بيد عمّال الدّين؟ ولماذا ثِقل المدن السوريّة سكانياً هو أحياء عشوائيّة ومخالفات وينشط فيها الدّين على حساب الثقافة والفكر المتنوّر المتعدّد؟

الجّامع مفتاح الغضب ومقتله!

مع غياب أيّ دور سياسي فكري للمبادرات الأهليّة والشعبيّة في سورية منذ عقود، ظهر إلى السطح منذ منتصف ستينيات القرن الماضي، شكل واحد للخصومة السياسة ضد السلطة، ألا وهو المرجع الدّيني، فتشكل الوعي الشعبي على ما يجتهد به الشيوخ والدّعاة من أفكار وتفاسير تخدم “الإسلام السّياسي” وتجعل تجريبه فرصة بعد وصول العسكر إلى الحكم عام 1963، والمقصود هنا عسكر حزب البعث، وفي الضفة المقابلة الشعبيّة نشطت الحركات الإسلاميّة في سورية وخصوصاً تلك القادمة من فكر جماعة الإخوان المسلمين، ولو نظرنا إلى المشهد السّياسي منذ تسلم العسكر الحكم تحت رعاية وزير الدفاع في حينها حافظ الأسد، سوف نكتشف أن كل أشكال الحياة السياسيّة رسم لها كيان ومبدأ واحد هو المرجعية العسكريّة، والتي برغم عنفها وقربها إلى سدّة الحكم، إلا أنها لم تكن توازي النّشاط الديني الذي راح ينمو بقوة في الأوساط الاجتماعيّة معتمداً على دعم الفقراء والطبقات المتوسطة، وبات للجامع تأثيره الأقوى في الشارع السوريّ، الأمر الذي دفع “البعث” لبناء منظومة دينيّة موازية تسبّح بَحمدِ القائد والجيش وتنشر الدّين الذي يليق باستقرار النّظام وتجذره، وهذا ما نلاحظه في مباهاة البعث المستمرة أنه يبني الجوامع ودور العبادة على اختلاف أطيافها ومذاهبها، ولكنه يغلق أي نادٍ ثقافيّ أو سياسيّ ما لم يكن قد حصل على الموافقة “الأمنيّة”، وبالتالي وجد لدينا ما يعرف بقانون الطوارئ الذي أنهى الحياة السياسية تماماً في سورية حتى انتقلت أي مبادرة معارضة وسلميّة إلى موضع الاتهام والخيانة لأنها تستحضر التاريخ الأسود الذي سطّرته أحداث الإخوان في الثمانينات إلى أذهان الناس، إبان عسكرة “الطليعة المقاتلة” للمعارضة في حماة، وحسب توجيه السّلطة وتصنيع “بعبع” العنف الإسلامي، وتلك الشماعة كانت أقوى أسلحة النظام لصبغ الهويّة السياسيّة بالدّين “غير المغضوب عليه” من القائد.

أصبح الجامع مكاناً للقاءات وتقارب الناس مع بعضها وفرصة للمخبرين لمعرفة توجهات الأهالي مع انتشار الأعداد الكبيرة من الجوامع في سورية بتوجيه مدروس من النظام، وعندما اشتعلت الثّورات العربية، لم نكن نرى مظاهرة تخرج من مسرح أو مقهى أو نادي سياسي، لم نكن نسمع شعارات ثورية بقدر ما هي ذات جذور دينيّة، وكذلك الأمر في سورية التي استيقظت فجأة على الغضب الشعبي، وراح الشارع ينادي “الله سورية حريّة وبس…!” شعار أنجبه الجامع وثقافته التي لا تقبل النقد، وتؤيد “الدعاة ممن يحفظون القرآن والسنن والأحاديث المحمدية!” وهي بطبيعة الحال ثقافة تنويم أصبحت فطريّة، يعتمد عليها الإسلام السّياسيّ لاستنهاض عواطف النّاس واستثمارها في أي انتفاضة شعبيّة ليكونوا في المقدمة، وتجربة إخوان مصر، خير دليل على ذلك الفشل السياسي! ولكن، هنا في سورية الأمر مختلف كلياً، فالنظام أسّس وساهم ببناء الجوامع والمعاهد الشرعية وجعل بذور “الجّهاد” حاضرة منذ غزو العراق، فتح باب التطوع تحت شعارات دينية، لكشف الجّهاديين في سورية من الإخوان وسواهم، وفيما بعد اعتقل كل من أفرزته تلك الثقافة من مقاتلين سياسيين، فور عودتهم من العمليات العسكرية ضد الجيش الأمريكي في العراق، وبقيت الثورة- المعارضة، رهن الدين والمرجعيات المزعومة التي توجهه.

لو افترضنا أن الثقافة كمفهوم ثوريّ تنويريّ، يطالب بالتغيير السلميّ ويحترم الخصومة السياسيّة، إذ لا يبحث هذا المفهوم عن ماهيّة الأديان، بل يعتبرها ثقافة اعتقادية روحانيّة خالصة وتخص الفرد وحده، لا تعمم على المجتمع، غير قابلة للتداول أو التّحشيد الشعبي، ولكن لطالما كان أصحاب الدين يعتقدون أنفسهم هم الصّواب والحلّ بالكتب المقدسة التي يؤمنون بها ويشرعون منها فقط! ولعل تجربة “تنظيم الدولة” و “جبهة النصرة” والفصائل الإسلاميّة “المعارضة” التي تقول بأنها سورية، قد أثبتت مساهمتها الكبيرة في تدمير الثورة وتشويه الهويّة السورية، هؤلاء كانوا يشترطون على الأتباع أن يؤمنوا غيبيّاً ومذهبيّاً، وأن تكون عقيدتهم تابعة لجملة من “مجالس الشورى” بينما نرى أن الثقافة لا تحتاج للدين كبوصلة لتقوم بالتّغيير، إنّما تحتاج للانفتاح على الجميع، بلا عنف جهاديّ عقائديّ، فقط بالحجة والدليل العقلي المادي الملموس، وبالمحصلة هي تعتمد على المعرفة وترحّب باختلاف الأديان، لأنها ترى الدين، كما أسلفنا، ثقافة روحانية منزلية لا يمكن المتاجرة بها وقيادة المجتمع عبرها.

حين تظاهر السوريون من الجوامع منذ اللّحظات الأولى، صبغوا الثورة بالشكل الديني، وأبعدوا المدنيّة عن طريقهم، فتنشّط الدعاة والشيوخ والجماعات الإسلامية للتدخل والبحث عن تمويل ودعم سياسي لاستثمار بيت أسرارها وصلتها مع الناس: الجامع! فكان ما كان، بدأت الثورة بالجامع ووصلت إلى فصائل متشدّدّة وأخرى تريد تحكيم شرع الله، وثالثة تعتقد أن هناك مدنية إسلامية معتدلة (…) فقط كي ترضي الآخرين، وحين تصل للحكم سوف تسحق كل من لا يؤمن بفكرها “الإخواني”.

ربّما قتل السوريين حلمهم حين كانت فرصة الانتفاضة تنادي بالحرية والعدالة والمساواة والمدنيّة، لأنهم طيلة العقود الماضية كانوا قد أصيبوا بالتدّجين الفكري، لا تجربة سياسية حقيقية وأحزاب تقود الحراك.

الجامع، معبد إسلاميّ لا يمكن أن يقود حراكاً سياسيّاً، لقد سَخِرت المعارضة والكثير من الشخصيات السياسية “الطارئة” من تعليق الشاعر السوري أدونيس حين قال: “لا أخرج في مظاهرة سياسية تخرج من الجامع” هو المقتل الواضح الذي نستنتج منه أن الدولة السورية حتى اليوم هي دولة قائمة على تشريعات الإسلام من دستورها إلى قوانين الأحوال الشخصية والنفوس والتربية والميراث ونظرة الدين للمرأة…إلخ، فكيف لا يكون الجامع هو بوصلة السّلطة لتنويم الشعب، لكن ذاك الجامع احتقن وألهب الشوارع السورية بالمظاهرات، لتصبح الثورة بعد أشهر تنادي “يا الله ما إلنا غيرك يا الله” أين السّياسية في ذلك يا سادة، أين الثورة في قاموس ينتظر من السماء أن تحل همومه؟ مع خالص احترامنا للإسلام والمسلمين، إلا أن ذلك لا علاقة له إلا بالقضاء على هوية المجتمع المدني، هوية المجتمع السوري، وذلك ما تم منذ العام 1963 ولا زال، والنتائج المدمرة الآن هي حاصل طبيعي لكل ذاك الاحتقان الديني وتراكم الجهل السياسي لكن بإضافة بسيطة هي خطاب “البعث الإسلامي”.

العنف وملعب الدين والمواجهة

أستغرب ممن يقول إنّ النظام السوري واجه المظاهرات بعنف شديد! هل كان النظام لطيفاً وحضاريّاً ومنفتحاً ويقبل الآخر- السلمي، قبل ذلك مثلاً، بالتأكيد: لا! وهذا لا يعني السكوت عن المواجهات الإجرامية بحق العزل أيام المظاهرات السلمية، إلاّ أنّ العسكرة التي تم جرّ الثورة السورية إليها، كانت غاية النّظام الأولى حتى يصبح لديه مبررات لسحق الاحتجاجات والمناطق الخارجة منها أمام الرأي العام وحلفائه الدوليين، معللاً ذلك بأنّ لديه “عصابات مسلّحة” غير قانونية وتثير الفوضى، يقتل باسمها ويعتقل وينشر التلفيقات والمفخخات التي يراها مناسبة لخدمة مصالح بقائه، ومع تلك التلفيقات نشط الدّين في جانبه الإسلاميّ، وخصوصاً بعد الإفراج من قبل النظام السوري عن مجموعة كبيرة من أخطر الشخصيات المتهمة بقضايا “سياسية” ولها مرجعية دينية متطرفة من جماعة الإخوان المسلمين والتيارات الجهادية والسلفية، وهي التي أسست الفصائل الإسلامية، وكان مقرها الجغرافي والأيديولوجي “سجن صيدنايا”.

هل لاحظتم أن المعتقلين السياسيين الذين ليس لهم انتماءات دينية تؤثر على نضالهم الفكري، قد بقوا في أقبية المخابرات؟ لأنهم يفكرون بلا عنف، ويعرفون معنى النضال الثوري السّلمي الذي حُرمت منه الثورة السورية بعد أشهر قليلة من انطلاقها، وذهبت إلى أيدي الجهاديين وأصحاب الأحزمة الانتحارية والعمليات “الانغماسية” إحدى أبرز هويات الإجرام لدى “النصرة” و “داعش”.

لم يكن يعلم الشارع السوري، ربّما أنّ رفع لافتة في الطريق والتظاهر دون سلاح هو أقوى ضربة يمكن أن توجه لنظام الحكم العسكري، لأن الذهنية السائدة هي مواجهة العنف بالعنف المفرط، وهذا ملعب العسكر الذين منذ تسلمهم البلاد وهم حريصون على لحظة تسلّح الخصوم بعد بناء جيش عقائدي حزبي، والتجذر الشديد بالدول المحورية في المنطقة، مع حلف الأنظمة التي تدعي “الاشتراكية” مثل روسيا الاتحادية! التي لاتزال تلعب ذات الدور في تسليح النظام ودعمه دولياً لأنه حليفها الأخير في الشرق الأوسط.

إذاً تعتمد السلطة في سورية منذ سنوات على مقابلة المشكلات السياسيّة، بافتعال تداعيات خطيرة في الشّارع، وجرّبت ذلك أثناء الثورة السورية، حتى أصبح الافتعال، واقعاً! والمقصود هنا الجماعات الإسلاميّة المرتهنة للدول الداعمة للإسلام السياسي تارة، وللبحث عن موطئ قدم لها في الحصة الجغرافية لبلاد الشام مثل الولايات المتحدة- إيران- تركيا- إسرائيل- وروسيا، هي دول فاعلة بقوة عبر المليشيات المتقاتلة على الأرض. ولكن المثير في الأمر أن تتماهى السلطة في سورية منذ بداية الثورة لكشف هوية المجتمع السوري الذي عملت على تعديل مخيلته ودفعه نحو التديّن، فوجدت الحلّ مثلاً بإطلاق قناة إسلامية من التلفزيون السوري الرسمي من وسط ساحة الأمويين وهي قناة “نور الشام” التي تبث أفكاراً دينية تخدم مصلحة النظام، على اعتبار أن الصراع بوجهة نظر الشارع والمجتمع هو صراع ديني، حسب رأي النظام! الأمر الذي يبرر الفتاوى المستمرة بقتال أبناء الديانة الواحدة الذين اختلفوا قليلاً بأمراض تدعى “المذاهب الدينية” وبالتالي أصبح المجتمع الذي اشتغل عليه حزب البعث مكشوفاً للهشاشة الفكرية ويتدخل في تسييره من يريد، ذلك أن النّواة الأساسية التي اعتمد عليها هذا الحزب هي الدين بالمرتبة الأولى وكسب الشخصيات الدينية في وزارة مخصّصّة لهم ضمن حكومته، هي “وزارة الأوقاف” وهنا نتذكر: أليست هي ذاتها الوزارة التي كانت تسمح لأئمة كانوا فيما مضى يقيمون “الدروس الإسلامية” والجلسات “الدعوية” عبر الراديو والتلفزيون الرسمي والجوامع والمراكز الدينية إياها التي تحدثنا عنها بداية، بينما الآن نراهم في تركيا يقفزون في المجالس “الشرعية” حيث تقود ما بقي من فصائل إسلامية في المناطق الواقعة تحت سيطرة المعارضة السورية؟

الثورة فضيحة الهوية

لا بد من فِكر… نظرة للتجارب الثوريّة القائمة على أفكار يساريّة مثلاً، وتنظير ثوري جديد لقراءة الثورات؛ لا بد من مراجعة جديّة للثورة السورية من أجل الوقوف إلى جانب هذا الشعب العظيم الذي أنجب حضارات منذ آلاف السنوات ومع تقدم الزمن بدأ يعود -بفضل السياسيين والطغاة- إلى التخلف.

إن “الفتوحات الدينيّة” ليست فكراً، بقدر ما هي مرجعيّة لغيبيات روحيّة قد تجعل معظم الناس في راحة من أسئلة الوجود والهوية، وهي لا تحل مشكلات سياسية مرهونة بالحاضر وتبدلاته المستمرة؛ وفي سورية، السلطة الحاكمة اخترعت ديناً خاصاً بها، والشارع تمرّد عليه، فيما بعد، صنع ديناً خاصاً به، وسجون المتطرفين الذين كانوا تحت عين السلطة وجدوا من الشارع فرصة لتطرفهم وتسليحهم فسحقوا الحياة السورية في الداخل وشتتوا الشعب إلى جانب نظام لا يرى سوى البندقية والقائد قاموساً للحوار ولا هوية له إلا القتل والأنانية، القتل الذي أورثه لخصومه حتى أصبحنا في غابة وحوش كاسرة من معارضة ومولاة وحلفاء من دول العالم يمدونهم بالسلاح والمرتزقة.

بالمحصلة الدين يفشل أمام السياسة، لأن كل مفهوم قائم هو على طرف مغاير للآخر في الحياة، لا يمكن أن يلتقيا، وتوحيدهما في جسم اجتماعي واحد أوصلنا للذي نحن به الآن في سورية، الدين أصبح شُبهة وتشدد وتطرّف، لقد لوّثته الغايات السلطوية، والسياسة أصبحت عسكرة وتحالفات دولية ونسيت أن تطور المجتمع، والشعب أضاع هويته المشوهة، دفعها إلى الجحيم في ثورة لازالت تبحث عن قادتها السياسيين بعيداً عن الكتب المقدسة ومن يلحقها من تجار الدين.

يدفنون أنفسهم’ في الغوطة … وخائفون في دمشق’

يدفنون أنفسهم’ في الغوطة … وخائفون في دمشق’

منذ أيام، لم يذق سكان الغوطة الشرقية وأطفالهم المذعورون طعم الأمان، يلازمون الطوابق السفلية والملاجئ خشية قصف الطائرات التي لا تفارق أجواء منطقتهم، فيما خفّت الحركة في بعض أحياء دمشق جراء القذائف التي تطلقها الفصائل المعارضة، حسب تقرير لوكالة الصحافة الفرنسية من دوما شرق دمشق.

في الغوطة الشرقية القريبة من دمشق والمحاصرة منذ سنوات، قُتل نحو ٤٠٠ مدني منذ الأحد الماضي، ولم تخفف ردّات الفعل المستهجنة من الدول والمنظمات غير الحكومية من حدة هذا القصف الذي دمر ١٣ مستشفى ومركزا طبياً.

وانتقل الخوف أيضاً إلى سكان أحياء دمشق القديمة القريبة من الغوطة، بعد تكرار سقوط قذائف عشوائية تطلقها الفصائل في الغوطة وتسببت في وقوع عشرات القتلى والجرحى.

ويقول أبو محمد العفا (٣٩ عاماً) من أحد الأقبية التي يتخذها ملجأ له في مدينة دوما لوكالة الصحافة الفرنسية: «هناك تخوف كبير من دخول النظام، لم يبقَ أمامنا مخرج ولا بلد نلجأ إليه، لم يبق لدينا سوى الأقبية». ويضيف: «الخوف كله يتجسد هنا في الملجأ أو القبو» حيث يتجمع عشرات الأشخاص بين ٤ جدران، مضيفاً: «الخوف عظيم والعالم كله يتفرج علينا».

ومع أن الغوطة الشرقية تتعرض منذ سيطرة الفصائل المعارضة عليها في عام ٢٠١٢ لقصف عنيف من قوات النظام، ولاحقاً من حليفته روسيا، فإن الوضع أكثر تعقيداً، بعدما استكملت قوات النظام السوري تعزيزاتها العسكرية في محيط المنطقة، ما يُنذر بهجوم بري وشيك عليها.

وتلخص أمل الوهيبي (35 عاماً) من دوما، معاناة السكان، بالقول: «ننزل إلى هذا القبر (في إشارة إلى الملجأ الذي تختبئ فيه) نقبر أنفسنا قبل أن نموت». وتضيف: «ما نذوقه اليوم أصعب من أن يدخلوا (قوات النظام). قد يكون من الأفضل إذا دخلوا (…) فنحن نتساءل: متى سنموت؟».

بعد سنوات من المعاناة، بات أهالي الغوطة الشرقية تواقين إلى الأمان فحسب، وفق ما تقول أم محمد، المدرّسة في دوما. وتوضح الشابة النحيلة التي ترتدي معطفاً أسود اللون وتضع حجاباً فوق رأسها: «يقول بعض الأهالي إنه ليست هناك من مشكلة في دخول النظام، المهم أن يبقى ابني وزوجي بأمان، المهم أن أعيش بأمان».

وتضيف: «يقول آخرون العكس، أيْ حاربنا ٧ سنوات لنسلم الآن الأرض؟ ونسلم الصغير والكبير والشيخ للذبح؟ لا». وتقول: «الناس محتارون»، بعد ورود أنباء عن تعزيزات تُمهد لهجوم بري: «اليوم، من أول طلقة، يهرع الناس إلى الملاجئ، أو المقابر الجماعية أي الملاجئ غير المهيأة».

وتقصف قوات النظام منذ ليل الأحد الماضي، بالطائرات والمدفعية والصواريخ، الغوطة الشرقية التي تحاصرها بشكل محكم منذ ٢٠١٣ ما تسبب بمقتل أكثر من نحو ٤٠٠ مدني بينهم أكثر من عشرات الاطفال.

وتبدو شوارع مدن وبلدات الغوطة الشرقية خالية إلا من الأبنية المدمرة والركام المتناثر في الشوارع، والدخان المتصاعد من القصف والحيوانات المشردة. وبادر سكان لا ملجأ لديهم يؤويهم إلى حفر غرف تحت منازلهم للاحتماء من القصف الذي طال أيضاً مستشفيات عدة، وفق ما شاهد مراسل وكالة الصحافة الفرنسية.

في ملجأ تحت الأرض في دوما، تقول خديجة (٥٣ عاماً) بتوتر شديد: «لا نتجرأ على الخروج، لا نتجرأ على الصعود من هذا الملجأ، الوضع مأساوي جداً». وتضيف المرأة بصوت يرتجف وقد تجمع حولها عدد من الأطفال في غرفة مظلمة: «الطيران من فوقنا والقذائف من حولنا (…) أين نذهب بأطفالنا؟».

وعلى غرار خديجة، انتقل الكثيرون من سكان الغوطة الشرقية إلى الملاجئ والأقبية تحت الأرض لتفادي غارات ومدافع قوات النظام التي تستهدف أحيائهم وأسواقهم ومنازلهم.

وأدان العديد من المنظمات الإنسانية الدولية التصعيد على الغوطة الشرقية، وحذرت الأمم المتحدة من أثره «المدمر»، فيما يبدو المجتمع الدولي عاجزاً عن تبني موقف موحد يضع حداً للقصف، وسط محاولات لتمرير قرار في مجلس الأمن لهدنة انسانية لثلاثين يوماً.

ورغم التصعيد الشديد، يقول صالح أبو دقة (٤٧ عاماً)، أحد سكان دوما: «الناس اعتادوا. والقصف لم يهدأ على الغوطة منذ 6 سنوات، يأتينا موجات خلف موجات».

والى جانب الخسائر البشرية، أدى القصف المكثّف من النظام إلى دمار كبير في الأبنية وممتلكات مواطنين والبنى التحتية، وإلى تفاقم المأساة الإنسانية وتردّي الوضع الصحي والطبي والغذائي الذي بلغ أسوأ حالاته منذ بداية الحصار على الغوطة قبل ٥ سنوات. وأعلن الناشط في الغوطة الشرقية عبد الملك عبود لـ«الشرق الأوسط»، أن «الوضع الإنساني مأساوي للغاية». ولفت إلى أن «أغلب المشافي والنقاط الطبية استُهدفت وخرجت من الخدمة نهائياً»، مشيراً إلى أن «الأطباء انتقلوا إلى المنازل والأقبية لإجراء العمليات الجراحية للمصابين، وهم يعانون من نقص حاد في المستلزمات الطبية»، لافتاً إلى أن «المجالس المحلية شكّلت لجان طوارئ في كل المدن والبلدات المنكوبة، لتجهيز الأقبية ونقل المدنيين إليها، في ظل استحالة السكن فوق الأرض».

على بُعد بضعة كيلومترات فقط، يعتري الخوف أيضاً سكان دمشق مع اشتداد وتيرة سقوط القذائف التي تطلقها الفصائل المعارضة المنتشرة في الغوطة الشرقية، وتستهدف بشكل أساسي المدينة القديمة.

وغداة مقتل ١٣ مدنياً أول من أمس (الثلاثاء)، في دمشق، وفق الإعلام السوري الرسمي، فضّل كثيرون التزام منازلهم ومتابعة آخر التطورات على نشرات الأخبار، بينما تُسمع أصوات الطائرات المحلقة فوق الغوطة الشرقية وضرباتها الجوية. وامتنع الكثير من الأهالي عن إرسال أولادهم إلى المدارس، وأعلنت مدارس في الأحياء التي تستهدفها القذائف إقفال أبوابها.

يقول إبراهيم (٥١ عاماً) في أثناء تفقده الأضرار التي خلّفتها إحدى القذائف في منطقة باب شرقي، لوكالة الصحافة الفرنسية: «نريد من الجيش أن يخلّصنا من هذا الوضع بأي حل يراه مناسباً، لقد مللنا القذائف التي تسقط ليلاً ونهاراً». ويضيف: «لم نعد نتجرأ على إرسال أبنائنا إلى المدارس. بات الخوف هو المسيطر»، موضحاً: «سنتحمّل قليلاً لنرتاح لاحقاً».

وبعد بدء التصعيد، ووسط أنباء عن هجوم وشيك على الغوطة، قال سكان في دمشق إنهم بدأوا التفكير في حلول تبعدهم عن القذائف على غرار «كريم» الذي قرر الانتقال مع عائلته إلى مسقط رأسه على الساحل السوري «حتى عودة الهدوء».

وبدا حي باب توما في دمشق القديمة، حيث تنتشر المقاهي والحانات، شبه خالٍ إلا من بضعة «مُغامرين بحياتهم»، كما وصفهم أحد المارة.

ولم تمنع القذائف فهد بركيل (٥٤ عاماً) من التوجه إلى عمله في ورشة تصليح السيارات في شرق دمشق، ويقول: «سكني وعملي في منطقة مستهدفة بالقذائف، لكن إمكاناتي المادية لا تسمح لي بالذهاب إلى مكان آخر». ويضيف: «ليس لديّ خيار آخر، سأبقى وليساعدنا الله».

نقلا عن “الشرق الآوسط” و فرانس برس ونشطاء