بواسطة Syria in a Week Editors | أكتوبر 31, 2018 | Media Roundups, Syria in a Week
The following is a selection by our editors of significant weekly developments in Syria. Depending on events, each issue will include anywhere from four to eight briefs. This series is produced in both Arabic and English in partnership between Salon Syria and Jadaliyya. Suggestions and blurbs may be sent to info@salonsyria.com.
The Istanbul Summit and Syria: Four Leaders and Four Positions
27 October 2018
Leaders of Turkey, Russia, France, and Germany called for preserving the ceasefire in Idilb governorate and a “political solution” for the conflict in Syria during a summit they held in Istanbul, Turkey on Saturday.
The meeting “stressed the importance of a lasting ceasefire (in Idlib) and the need to continue the fight against terrorism,” said Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the final statement of the summit.
The statement praised the “progress” achieved in Idlib in regards to the establishment of a demilitarized zone and the withdrawal of fanatic groups according to the Turkish-Russian agreement reached in September.
The summit was attended by Russian President Vladimir Putin, French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, in addition to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
The four leaders affirmed their determination “to work together to create favorable circumstances to preserve peace and security in Syria” and “support a political solution and strengthen international consensus on this issue.”
They also called for “the formation of a constitutional committee and for it to convene in Geneva before the end of the year if conditions are favorable.” The final statement also said that the four countries “stressed the need to create conditions that provide for the voluntary and safe return of Syrian refugees.”
It is up to the Syrian people “inside and abroad” to decide the fate of President Bashar al-Assad, said Erdogan at the end of the Summit on Saturday.
The French president called on Russia to apply very clear pressure on the Syrian government to “ensure a permanent ceasefire in Idlib,” saying “we are counting on Russia to exert a very clear pressure on the government which very clearly owes it its survival.”
Moscow “reserves the right to help the Syrian government in eliminating any terrorist threat in Idlib in case the fanatics launch an attack,” said the Russian president in a press release.
“We have to push the political process forward, which should lead to free and open elections to all Syrians, including those abroad,” said the German chancellor.
The summit was not attended by two active countries in the Syrian conflict, the two rivals Iran and the United States. However, Macron called US President Donald Trump on Thursday to coordinate positions.
On the issue of Russian influence after victories of the Syrian government, US Defense Secretary Jim Mattis said on Saturday that Russia cannot “replace the United States” in the Middle East.
Bombing Idlib: Who’s Responsible?
26 October 2018
The military leader of the opposition National Front for Liberations (NFL) blamed government forces for bombing the buffer zone in Hama and Idlib governorates on Saturday.
The military leader, who asked for his name not to be identified, told a news agency: “government forces continue their breach of the Sochi agreement by bombing demilitarized areas controlled by NFL factions. Twenty-five shells fell on the outskirts of Mork city in the northern countryside of Hama, and the town of al-Taman’eh in the southeastern countryside of Idlib was also bombed.”
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) said that “government forces targeted the village of al-Raffeh in the southern countryside of Idlib with artillery bombardment, killing seven civilians including three children and three women.”
Tahrir al-Sham (previously Nusra) controls this town which is located outside the demilitarized zone established by Russia and Turkey according to an agreement reached on 17 September. The agreement spared the governorate of Idlib a military offensive that Damascus hinted to for weeks.
The SOHR said the number of deaths is “the highest” in Idlib since the Russian-Turkish agreement.
The western outskirts of Aleppo city witnessed an exchange of gunfire between the factions and government forces for two consecutive days, according to the SOHR.
A child was killed in government bombing of the Kafr Hamra town in the western countryside of Aleppo, while one week before that three civilians were killed as a result of shells launched by opposition factions.
Since the agreement was announced, Idlib and surrounding areas have witnessed calmness on battle fronts to a great extent, however, there has been intermittent bombing from both sides.
The Russian-Turkish agreement provides for the establishment of a demilitarized zone in Idlib and surrounding areas. The withdrawal of heavy weapons has been completed as a first step, but jihadist factions were supposed to evacuate by mid-October.
Although jihadist have not withdrawn yet, both Moscow and Ankara have stressed that the agreement is being implemented.
Despite the agreement, Damascus has reiterated its intention to regain control of all Syrian territory, including Idlib.
Syria “will not allow Idlib to turn into new caves for terrorists,” the official Syrian news agency SANA reported the Syrian UN representative Bashar al-Jaafari as saying during a meeting of the UN Security Council on Friday.
“It is normal for the Syrian government to fight terrorism in Idlib to rid its people of terrorism and extend its sovereignty over it,” he said.
Idlib, which hosts around three million people, is the last stronghold of opposition and jihadist factions in Syria. The majority of Idlib is controlled by Tahrir al-Sham.
Bombing Before the Ink Dried
28 October 2018
Turkish forces bombed positions of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) on the eastern bank of the Euphrates river in northern Syria, according to the Anatolia news agency on Sunday.
The news agency said that the bombardment targeted the Zor Maghar area, east of Ain al-Arab in northern Syria, and that it meant to prevent “terrorist activities”.
Turkey carried out an offensive against the YPG in the Syrian city of Afrin last year, and repeatedly said that it would target the YPG east of the Euphrates.
The bombardment came during the Istanbul summit as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan threatened to target “terrorist”, in a reference to Kurds east of the Euphrates.
Erdogan gave an ultimatum on Friday for those who are jeopardizing the security of Turkish border, and said that Turkey is determined to focus on Syrian Kurds east of the Euphrates.
Addressing a group of regional leaders in the Justice and Development Party in Ankara, Erdogan added that Turkey will focus on east of the Euphrates in Syria and not Manbej because of the presence of the YPG.
Turkey considers the YPG a terrorist group.
“The Sun Rises from Moscow”
26 October 2018
The chief negotiator of the Syrian opposition said during his visit to Moscow on Friday that the opposition is “seeking to reach an understanding” with Russia to find a political solution that ends the ongoing war in the country since 2011.
“We have strived and will continue to strive for dialogue and negotiations with Russia to achieve a political solution,” Hariri told reporters before he met the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.
“We think it is in Russia’s interest right now to look for a comprehensive political solution, it is in our interest as well,” he said.
“We all know that Russia is a country that has major influence on the Syrian issue, and influence outside the Syrian issue … we still believe that Russia is capable of seizing this this historic moment to help fix the relationship with the Syrian people.”
Hariri said that fixing this relationship requires Moscow “to adopt a rational political solution that not only takes the interests of the government, but also takes into account the people who revolted for eight years and paid a heavy price.”
Since the Russian military intervention in Syria to support President Bashar al-Assad’s forces, the Syrian opposition have repeatedly characterized this intervention as an “occupation”.
But Hariri’s remarks signaled the Syrian opposition’s readiness for more concessions following the government’s battlefield successes.
After the meeting between Hariri and Lavrov, Moscow said their talks had a “frank exchange of opinions” and that they stressed the need to settle the crisis as soon as possible.
Confrontation over the Syrian Constitution
25 October 2018
The UN Security Council held a session on Friday called for by the United States to discuss the Syrian crisis after Damascus refused the formation of a UN-sponsored committee to draft a new constitution.
UN Special Envoy to Syria Staffan de Mistura failed to acquire the Syrian government’s approval regarding the constitutional committee, which he was commissioned to form during a Syrian dialogue conference organized by Russia in Sochi in January.
De Mistura did not attend the Security Council session in person, but was present through video conference.
However, de Mistura told the Security Council in person last week that he had decided to resign from his position by the end of November and that he would work in the remaining period to overcome obstacles facing the formation of the constitutional committee.
In the last few months, de Mistura sought to form a constitutional committee that would include one hundred and fifty members to revive the negotiation track between the two sides of the Syrian conflict.
Both Damascus and the opposition’s High Negotiations Committee presented a list of fifty representatives. De Mistura, who was commissioned to present a third list of fifty names, told the Security Council that Damascus did not approve of the name he chose to take part in the committee, stressing the need for the committee not to be dominated by any side.
After choosing the members of the committee, fifteen members, representing the three lists, will be commissioned with making “constitutional reforms,” according to de Mistura.
The Syrian government and the opposition have different views regarding the tasks of this committee. Damascus restricts its powers to discussing the current constitution, while the opposition says that its objective is to draft a new constitution.
SANA reported the Syrian Foreign Minister Waleed Moualem, who met de Mistura on Wednesday, as saying that “this whole process should be under Syrian leadership and ownership, considering that the constitution, and anything related to it, is a purely sovereign matter that will be decided on by the Syrian people themselves without any foreign intervention, by which some parties and countries seek to impose their will on the Syrian people.”
Western countries have called on the UN envoy to form this committee as soon as possible to resume the political process after it was dominated by parallel diplomatic efforts led by Russia, Turkey, and Iran.
Since 2016, de Mistura has headed nine rounds of indirect talks between Damascus and the opposition, with little progress to settle the conflict that has led to the deaths of more than three hundred and sixty thousand people since its onset in 2011.
A US Drone Storm on Hmeimeim
24 October 2018
The Russian deputy defense minister accused the United States of attacking the main Russian airbase in Syria. General Alexander Fomin said in a statement reported by TASS news agency that a US reconnaissance airplane took control of thirteen drones in order to attack the Russian Hmeimeim airbase in January.
TASS reported Fomin as saying during a security conference in Beijing that a US P-8 Poseidon airplane was on “manual control” of the drones as it flew near them.
On 5 January, more than twelve drones loaded with explosives attacked the Russian airbase in Hmeimiem and the marine base in Tartus west of Syria, in a night attack, according to a report from the Russian defense ministry that was released a few days after.
At that time, the Russian army said in a statement that it was able to overtake radio communication with some drones and control them, while other drones were destroyed.
The Russian army also said then that a US plane was flying over the Mediterranean and may be involved in the attack, without presenting any charges.
The Kremlin said that the presence of evidence implicating the United States in the attack on the Russian base is “extremely disturbing”.
ISIS Returns to Eastern Syria
28 October 2018
ISIS retook control of all areas it lost after the advance of Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which is a coalition of Kurdish and Arab factions, in the last enclave it controls in Deir Azzor governorate in eastern Syria, according to the SOHR on Sunday.
On 10 September, the SDF, with support from the US-led international coalition, launched a military operation against ISIS in the area of Hajeeen, in the eastern countryside of Deir Azzor near the Iraqi border.
These forces were able to advance and control several towns and villages. However, two weeks ago, ISIS launched a counter-attack, taking advantage of a sand storm in this desert region, according to the SOHR.
The Head of the SOHR Rami Abdurrahman told the AFP “in vast attacks that continued from Friday until early Sunday, ISIS was able to regain control over all the areas that the SDF had advanced to.”
A leader in the SDF, who did not wish to be identified, confirmed to the AFP that ISIS had indeed retaken control of all the areas it lost during the last seven weeks. He attributed this to the “sand storm and ISIS’s knowledge of the area more than our forces.”
The SDF has dispatched military reinforcement, according to the SOHR.
“Military reinforcements and heavy weaponry have been sent to the fronts. Some units will be replaced with more experienced and capable units,” said the leader in SDF, adding that “a new military campaign will be launched immediately after the reinforcements arrive.”
Since Friday, ISIS’s attacks have led to the deaths of seventy-two members of the SDF, according to the SOHR.
The battles have led to the deaths of around five hundred jihadists and more than three hundred fighters from the SDF since 10 September, according to the SOHR.
The international coalition estimates the number of ISIS fighters in the enclave to be around two thousand. The coalition spokesman Sean Ryan told the AFP on Saturday that “the sandstorm allowed an ISIS counterattack … but now the air is clear, the coalition will continue to increase air and fire support to assist our partners.”
ISIS suffered consecutive defeats in Syria in the last two years, and now only controls a few small pockets at the far end of Deir Azzor and in the Syrian desert east of Homs.
Flashfloods and Hell
28 October 2018
Anatolia news agency reported that six immigrants died on the Turkish border with Syria after they were swept away by flashfloods. The news agency said that the immigrants were trying to illegally cross into Turkey’s border with Syria in the Hatay region. The agency did not specify the nationality of the immigrants.
Turkey, which now hosts three and a half million Syrian refugees, was a main crossroad for more than a million immigrants who went by sea to the European Union in 2015. Many of them were fleeing conflicts and poverty in the Middle East and Africa.
On a different note, a 44-year old Japanese journalist went back to his country and had rice balls prepared by his mother after spending three years as a hostage by fanatics in Syria, which was described as a physical and emotional “hell”.
Jumpei Yasuda, who resigned from his job in a Japanese newspaper to cover the Iraq war in 2003, arrived in Tokyo coming from Turkey, rekindling debate in Japan about journalism in war areas, which some sea as a reckless adventure and others see as a brave journalistic work.
TV footage showed the exhausted Yasude as he descended stairs on his way to the car waiting for him at Narita airport to take him to another building near the airport. To reporters’ calls of “Welcome home” he simply nodded with a strained smile as he disappeared down a corridor to where his family waited.
Later, his wife, a singer known as Myu, bowed deeply and apologized to a packed news conference at which Yasuda did not appear. “He would like to apologize for causing a fuss and making people worry about him, but fortunately he was able to safely return to Japan,” she said, sniffing back tears.
“He feels he has a responsibility to explain things to you as much as possible,” she added, but said this would have to wait until he had undergone medical checks.
Yasuda gave few details of his captivity but told his parents, who were also there, that he had worried they might not be alive, Myu said, adding that he ate some rice balls his mother had made for him “very happily”.
بواسطة Aron Lund | أكتوبر 25, 2018 | Roundtables, غير مصنف
Looking back at seven years of Syrian civil war, it is striking how many pivotal moments have been the result of foreign intervention and external meddling.
That is not to say events since 2011 have played out according to a foreign script. Portraying Syria’s civil war as a process masterminded by foreigners would be unfair to Syrians – and, given the state of Syria, probably also to the foreigners. In reality, although many outside powers have tried to rearrange the Syrian battlefield, most of their grand ambitions have sunk without rescue into Syria’s swamp of competing factions.
But although local realities have fixed the conflict’s terms and frustrated many meddling outsiders, Syrians have had little power over their fate. Once it was clear that President Bashar al-Assad would not bend to the demands of his opponents and that those opponents had waded so far into the struggle that they could no longer see a way back, events began to unfold according to their own infernal logic.
In that spiral of state breakdown and social polarization, what one side felt to be a desperate act of survival would be perceived by the other as unconscionable escalation and met in kind. The structural makeup of the warring sides largely determined their behavior from 2011 onward, with many little situational upsets and gambles but few big-picture surprises – except for those that came from outside Syria’s borders.
In retrospect, some such interventions stand out as especially important. Most have of course been thoroughly dissected.
For example, the 2013 chemical weapons crisis has gained near-mythical significance in both Syrian and US politics, becoming a strange sort of shibboleth. But though the events of that summer and autumn were undeniably important, it is hard to shake the impression that President Barack Obama’s decision to settle for a Russian-inspired deal instead of firing missiles into Syria did more to disperse the fog of politics from existing circumstances than to break new ground.
Had Obama opted to pull the trigger anyway, for a one-off display of overwhelming dominance, Assad’s regime would likely have received one more disfiguring scar, the conflict would have taken a few extra spins, and the question of Syria’s chemical weapons program would have lingered as an equal or greater problem than it is today.
But there is little reason to assume that the conflict’s fundamentals would have evolved along radically different paths. Given the way the regime worked and the opposition did not, Obama had no credible path to victory on terms compatible with US politics – he knew it, and was trapped by that understanding.
In some sense, the 2013 crisis was like Assad’s December 2016 retaking of eastern Aleppo: a devastating turning point for the opposition and its backers, but also, ultimately, an unsurprising outcome of the war’s configuration at that moment.
Less obvious, but no less important, were the roads not taken.
In June 2012, the late Kofi Annan, who at the time served as a joint envoy of the UN secretary-general and the Arab League, summoned a group of major international players to sign off on basic principles for a peaceful solution in Syria. What came out of the Geneva I meeting could not have ended the war – the actual plan was idealistic claptrap. But if a UN-guided framework for international talks had been brought forward with appropriate caution and a stringent focus on more achievable goals – like trying to limit civilian suffering, preventing regional spillover, and hashing out mutually acceptable red lines – Annan’s gambit might have succeeded in routinizing conflict management habits more effective than the angry shouting matches that were to follow.
A display of early diplomatic pragmatism and collaboration on second-order issues might have spared Syrians some of the heartbreak that followed. Or maybe the opportunity would have been squandered by clashing agendas and over-ambitious diplomats.
We will never know, because Russian-US collaboration instantly broke down in a clutter of irreconcilable statements, partly, it seems, due to the strains on the White House in election season. Not until 2015 were Syria’s main foreign actors brought into the same room again, in very different circumstances: then, as a result of the reality-check provided by a Russian military intervention.
Unlike the United States, Russia did have a stand-alone partner that it could work with on the ground toward an end state that would be ugly but acceptable to Moscow. That combination allowed for the deployment of untrammeled military power in Assad’s favor, which made all the difference.
The Russian intervention in September 2015 became one of the Syrian war’s decisive turning points. Ever since President Vladimir Putin’s air force went to work against the rebellion, it has slowly and brutally transformed the battlefield.
The intervention also wrought changes on the regional and international stage. Being browbeaten by Russia was what finally forced Turkey to shift its position, in mid-2016, to seek some form of understanding with Assad’s allies. That, too, was a game changer.
History writes itself in a terrible hand, which can take time to decipher. But it seems clear that Syria is now in a new and different phase of the war, which looks to be an endgame of sorts. Barring a regional war or a dramatic upset inside the Syrian, Russian, or Iranian regimes, all of which are structurally unsound in their own ways, the battle for Damascus is over: Assad has won.
What is left is a mostly Russian-piloted contest over Syria’s economic future and independence, including the refugee crisis and the fate of three remaining border enclaves: the US-controlled areas in Tanf and the northeast, and the Turkish-run northwest. Will these areas revert to central government control, or stay propped up by external patronage in a frozen conflict? Again, foreigners will call the shots.
[Other roundtable submissions can be found here]
بواسطة Nikolaos van Dam | أكتوبر 25, 2018 | Roundtables, غير مصنف
Describing critical turning points in the Syrian Conflict, implies giving a very concise survey of some of its most important developments. Of course, there are many more critical turning points than can be described in this short article.
At the beginning of the Syrian Revolution (March 2011), the wall of silence and fear was broken for the first time among large sections of the Syrian population, as they rose and demonstrated massively against the Syrian regime. It was a miracle that the demonstrations generally remained so peaceful for a relatively long time, when taking into consideration the severe repression and atrocities committed by the regime against the peaceful demonstrators. Concurrently with the peaceful demonstrations, however, there was already armed anti-regime violence during the early stages of the revolution, probably committed from the ‘side lines’ by radical Islamists and others.
Many officers and soldiers started to defect, and constituted military opposition groups, first small, but later on a larger scale, big enough to threaten the regime.
By June 2011 violence and counterviolence had increased to such an extent that any peaceful discussions and dialogue between regime and opposition
had become extremely difficult. At this point, the Syrian Revolution had already, to some extent, become overshadowed by radical Islamists. They saw the so-called Arab Spring developments in the region as an excellent opportunity to present themselves as viable alternatives in their efforts to spread the rule of Islam, and many wanted to settle accounts with the regime that earlier had severely suppressed them.
The solidarity visits of US ambassador Robert Ford and his French counterpart Eric Chevallier to the opposition movement in Hama in July 2011, meant the end of the possibility for the United States and France or other countries to play any role as mediator in the conflict. Their visits rather created false hopes among the opposition that essential Western support was forthcoming – but in the end it turned out not to be given as had been expected or suggested.
US President Obama’s demand that President al-Asad should step aside, created an almost irreversible momentum. Many other countries followed suit and demanded the same, without having the intention, will, or capacity to militarily force al-Asad and his regime to do so. Most countries which had turned against the regime, claimed they wanted a political solution. In reality, however, these countries only wanted to consider a solution which implied regime change. It was unrealistic, however, to expect the regime to be prepared to voluntarily give up its own position, and for President Bashar al-Asad to be willing to sign his own death warrant. Various countries created false expectations among the Syrian opposition groups that military intervention was forthcoming, which it was not.
By way of an alternative, the United States, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and others, started to supply huge quantities of financial and military aid to the military opposition groups, but their support was channelled to their respective favourites. Their lack of efficient coordination caused their help to be insufficient to help the opposition in winning the war. Their success in endangering the regime’s military position triggered a large-scale Russian military intervention in September 2015 and onwards, on top of the military support of Iran and Lebanese Hizballah, who all wanted to protect their strategic ally to stay in power. All this, strengthened Russia’s position considerably.
The Geneva Communiqué, adopted on 30 June 2012 by the Action Group for Syria, and endorsed by the permanent members of the UN Security Council, became a cornerstone for any future negotiations between the Syrian regime and the opposition. The Geneva Communiqué described a number of principles and guidelines for a Syrian-led transition. One of the most important guidelines dealt with a political transition that should be made possible through the establishment of a transitional governing body which was to establish a neutral environment in which the transition could take place. The transitional governing body was to exercise full executive powers. It could include members of the Syrian government, the opposition and ‘other groups’ and was to be formed on the basis of mutual consent. Although the Geneva Communiqué did not mention anything about the role of the Syrian president, the position of Bashar al-Asad became a principal point of dispute. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton suggested that President al-Asad could not take part in such a transitional governing body, whereas Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov denied this. The Syrian opposition, in general, strongly rejected any role for President al-Asad in the ‘transitional period’. For the Syrian regime itself it was President al-Asad who was to decide on such issues, not the opposition, nor foreign countries. The fixation on the departure of al-Asad constituted a serious obstacle in finding a solution to the conflict, the more so as he was in power in most of the country.
A great number of countries officially recognized the Syrian Opposition Coalition. They supported its demand that there was not to be any future role for Syrian President Bashar al-Asad and his supporters with blood on their hands, and that they had to be brought before justice. Most Western and Arab countries supported these demands, without providing the means to implement them. Thereby these demands became little more than declaratory policies, because no real will existed for any direct Western and Arab military intervention in Syria. Such intervention was even officially rejected in the United States and the United Kingdom after parliamentary discussions. The direct foreign military threat against the regime was thereby eliminated.
The war in Syria clearly developed into a war by proxy, with various countries (particularly the United States, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar) interfering in the internal affairs of Syria by supporting different armed and other opposition groups. Russia and Iran wanted to militarily maintain their strategic interests in Syria and did not want to lose their Syrian ally.
After the expansion of the Islamic State (IS) from Iraq into Syria in 2013, attention to the fight against the Syrian regime shifted to the fight against IS. Because of the IS terrorist threats in Western countries this came to be viewed with greater priority. The support for the direct struggle against the regime thereby gradually diminished.
As a result, the opposition felt abandoned and betrayed by Western countries, but was left with few, if any, alternatives. With Western countries providing the opposition with insufficient support, the chances for Russia and Iran to get the upper hand increased. The Russian military intervention that started in September 2015 made the prospects for the opposition even worse. Providing more intensive foreign support to the military opposition forces led to an intensification and prolongation of the war, but not enough for a defeat of the regime.
The ability to achieve peace in Syria does not only depend on the Syrians themselves, but also on the various countries involved in the war by proxy, and whether or not they are prepared to give priority to ending the Syrian conflict above their rival regional ambitions. Such a turning point has not yet been reached, and the prospects for real peace in Syria are still far away, even if the Syrian regime would militarily win the war.
[Other roundtable submissions can be found here.]
بواسطة Josephine Lippincott | أكتوبر 25, 2018 | Roundtables, غير مصنف
The Syrian conflict has witnessed seven years of overwhelming violence and death. An endless cycle of confrontation and ceasefire, punctuated by repeated aborted negotiation attempts, have all further complicated and prolonged what we have come to understand as the Syrian Civil War. Every aspect of the conflict, becomes either embroiled in discussion or debate, results in no action, or adds to the hardships faced by the Syrian population. Throughout the conflict, scholars and experts have debated the idea of turning points or critical junctures.
When examining the idea of critical turning points, it is imperative that we consider events not just at the macro-level. What cannot be overemphasized is the fact that each of these turning points, while changing the broader trajectory of the conflict, also had very real, life-altering consequences for local communities. Through merging the idea of the local into the discussion of the macro, we gain a better understanding of the reality of some of the critical junctures within the Syrian conflict.
While there are many potential turning points, I identify three critical turning points in the Syrian conflict. They are as follows: the militarization of the Syrian uprising in early 2011, Obama’s failure to uphold his red-line declaration in 2013, and the 2015 commencement of Russian military intervention. Each of these situations altered the trajectory of the conflict dramatically, not just on a macro-level, but for local communities.
The militarization of the peaceful protests that began in March 2011 transformed the Syrian uprising into a bloody, violent full-scale military conflict. When the protests began in March 2011, Syrians across the country raised their voices in protest against the repression and tyranny of the Assad regime. In response, the government forces employed violence, cracking down on protesters. These events would escalate into more violence from the regime as well as the protesters. This initial event would usher the uprising in a direction that would leave a mark on Syrian history forever. The militarization of the opposition changed Syria from a country facing civil unrest to a country ensnared in conflict. Moreover, the escalating level of violence led to the formation of various opposition groups. These groups would develop different identities, sponsors, and alliances; resulting in a myriad of armed groups which would subsequently fractionalize the opposition and result in further fighting and violence. From this point on, the Syrian uprising had transformed into a civil war.
The escalation from protests to conflict altered the way the international community viewed Syria, but more importantly, it changed and disrupted the lives of Syrians. The militarization of the conflict would lead to the regime tightening its grasp on state services, leading to access challenges for Syrians. The fighting across the Syrian geography would disrupt daily life, prevent children from attending school, create financial problems for families, or lead Syrians to flee their homeland. These disruptions in daily life would be further exacerbated when the international system began to intervene and to strengthen certain parts of the armed opposition.
The second turning point was the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons and President Obama’s subsequent failure to uphold his red-line declaration in 2013. In August 2013, Assad and his forces used Sarine gas near Damascus, killing more than fourteen hundred civilians. The US intelligence assessment asserted that the regime used chemical weapons as a method to push Syrian opposition forces back from rebel-held territory when government forces were unable. With the failure of President Obama and the United States to provide any actionable response, the Assad regime became even less fearful of any foreign intervention. The regime action and the US inaction altered the geopolitics surrounding the Syria conflict. Given the lack of direct military action or an escalation in support to rebel groups by the United States, other countries such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia also began to disengage. The stalled support created a feeling of abandonment within the armed opposition. The lack of intensified engagement by the United States, prompted bolder action by the Assad regime, Iran, and eventually Russia. However, beyond the macro-level implications, this event also had large ramifications for the Syrian population. The chemical weapons attack signaled that Syrians’ fears would not be limited to airstrikes or gunfire, but would have to also include weapons such as sarine gas.
The third critical turning point that altered the conflict on both the macro and micro level was Russian military intervention. In September 2015, Russia launched airstrikes that were reported to target ISIS, however US intelligence reports argued that the airstrikes targeted key Assad opponents, including US-backed units. On an international level, the Russian-intervention altered the geopolitical dynamics. The Russian intervention solidified the alliance between Assad, Iran, and Russia, but also further demonstrated the lack of heightened support by Western actors. Moreover, as a result of this inaction, it became even more apparent to opposition groups and the Syrian population that they could not expect help or aid from the United States or other western countries. Rather, it would be the Russians who would ultimately guide how the Syrian conflict would unfold and negotiations for the conflict’s termination. Russian actions under the intervention have attempted to restrict the number of Russian casualties, but has led to higher civilian casualties due to less discriminate military tactics. The attempt to restrict Russian casualties raises the level of violence and the number of threats for Syrians. Now they must prepare for a bombing or chemical weapon attack from their own government, as well as attacks from a world superpower.
Following these events and so many other daily tragedies, the Syrian population has remained isolated from the international community. These three critical turning points have contributed to further deterioration of daily life for Syrians and altered geo-politics in the region. While the Assad regime has escalated its attacks through chemical weapons, international powers have delineated new rules and retained new spheres of influence. The failure of US engagement in the conflict, both militarily and diplomatically, along with the Russian-Syrian alliance has allowed for Russia, Iran, and Syria to largely control the results of the Syrian conflict. With the United States continuing its inaction to implement change or alter the status quo, other countries have also taken a less direct approach. As a result, the Syrian conflict continues as the Syrian population faces even more hardship.
[Other roundtable submissions can be found here.]
بواسطة Syria in a Week Editors | أكتوبر 9, 2018 | Media Roundups, Syria in a Week
The following is a selection by our editors of significant weekly developments in Syria. Depending on events, each issue will include anywhere from four to eight briefs. This series is produced in both Arabic and English in partnership between Salon Syria and Jadaliyya. Suggestions and blurbs may be sent to info@salonsyria.com.
Change in Discourse: Temporary or Permanent?
Will the fate of the settlement in Idlib be different from those in other areas that preceded it in the Syrian war, especially with all actors insisting on their strategies and Russia and the Syrian government affirming their goal in having the Syrian army regain control over all the country? Will the Russian-Turkish negotiations determine the “price” for the agreement on Idlib’s fate, including their position regarding the Kurdish issue in Syria?
Russian “Keenness”: No Major Operations in Idlib
2 – 3 October 2018
Reuters
Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Wednesday that the de-escalation zone in Idlib was effective and that there are no plans for major military operations in the area. “And that means, no large scale military actions are expected there … Military action for the sake of military action is unnecessary,” he said. However, Putin added that Moscow wants to see all foreign troops withdraw from Syria eventually, including Russian forces. He also said that the presence of US forces in Syria is “a breach of the UN charter.”
It is noteworthy that the Syrian government, through a statement by Foreign Minister Walid Moulem, confirmed that Turkey is capable of carrying out its obligations under the Idlib agreement.
Turkish Keenness … Withdrawal and Elections
2, 4, 6 October 2018
Reuters
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said on Thursday that Turkey would not leave Syria until the Syrian people hold elections. “Whenever the Syrian people hold an election, we will leave Syria to its owners after they hold their elections,” Erdogan said at a forum in Istanbul. He also said that Turkey is not experiencing difficulty in conducting talks with radical groups in Idlib, the last major area still under the control of armed opposition.
Erdogan pledged to strengthen Turkish observations posts in Idlib.
The Turkish role was manifested in armed opposition groups withdrawing their heavy weaponry from the demilitarized zone agreed upon by Turkey and Russia in north-west of Syria. The National Front for Liberation said in a statement that the process of withdrawing heavy weapons had begun, but the fighters would remain in their positions within the demilitarized zone. Opposition forces in northern Syria said on Tuesday that Tukey had confirmed that Russian forces would not deploy in the area.
On the other hand, Erdogan said on Monday that Turkey is seeking to secure the area east of the Euphrates in northern Syria by eliminating the Kurdish People’s Protection Units, in continuation of the Turkish strategy towards the Kurds.
Iranian Keenness … Response to Ahwaz in Boukamal
2 October 2018
Reuters
Iranian “rage” over the Ahwaz attack burst in Syria as Iran said that the missile attack it carried out in Syria on Monday had killed forty “top leaders” in ISIS.
Iran fired six missiles at targets in Boukamal and Hajin regions in eastern Syria, in retaliation for the attack on a military parade in Iran on 22 September that killed twenty-five people, nearly half of them members of the Revolutionary Guard.
Israeli Keenness
3, 4, 5 October 2018
Reuters
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on Sunday he will meet Russian President Vladimir Putin soon to discuss security coordination over Syria, amid friction with Moscow over Israel’s air operations.
On Tuesday, Russia said it had upgraded Syria’s air defenses with the S-300 missile system, after accusing Israel of indirect responsibility for the downing of a Russian spy plane by Syrian forces as they fired on attacking Israeli jets last month. There have been no reports of Israeli air strikes in Syria since the Russia plane was shot down.
The French foreign ministry said on Friday that Russia’s deployment of the S-300 system in Syria risks fueling military escalation and hindering prospects for a political solution to the seven-year civil war.
General Joseph Votel, who oversees US forces in the Middle East, said that the deployment seemed to be an effort by Moscow to help shield “nefarious activities” by Iranian and Syrian forces in the country.
German Keenness Against Chemical Weapons
3 October 2018
Reuters
German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas said on Wednesday that his country and the United States agreed on the need to do everything possible to prevent the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Maas comments came after a meeting with his US counterpart Mike Pompeo in Washington. He also said that Pompeo understood the scope of the political debate in Germany concerning the potential participation in any US-led military response in the event of a chemical attack.
Aid Keenness and Economies of War
4 October 2018
Reuters
The Unites States Agency for International Development and the British Department for International Development found out that Bab al-Hawa border crossing in north-western Syria is being used by extremist groups to collect taxes from aid trucks. Therefore, they directed their partners to stop all use of the border crossing starting from 26 September.
Tahrir al-Sham, the main Islamic group in Idlib governorate, is designated a terrorist organization by the United Nations, the United States, and Turkey. Bab al-Hawa is the only official border crossing connecting Turkey to the Idlib governorate, where an estimated 2.1 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance. Around two thousand and two hundred and eighty-four trucks carrying aid went through the crossing in the first eight months of this year, according to David Swanson of the United Nation’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
US Keenness for the Kurds!
2 & 3 October 2018
Reuters
Kurdish officials said that a series of visits by US diplomats to Syria in the last two months to renew preparations to discuss the future of the country indicate a long-term commitment. US forces are seen as a shield against Turkish attacks from the north and any attempt by the Syrian government to seize the region’s wheat and oil fields.
The number of US diplomats in Syria has doubled as ISIS fighters near a military defeat, US Defense Secretary James Mattis said on Tuesday. “Our diplomats there on the ground have been doubled in number. As we see the military operations becoming less, we will see the diplomatic effort now able to take root,” Mattis said.
