بواسطة Syria in a Week Editors | نوفمبر 6, 2019 | Syria in a Week
The following is a selection by our editors of significant weekly developments in Syria. Depending on events, each issue will include anywhere from four to eight briefs. This series is produced in both Arabic and English in partnership between Salon Syria and Jadaliyya. Suggestions and blurbs may be sent to info@salonsyria.com.
Withdrawal or Return?
4 November 2019
A large US troops convoy of vehicles withdrew from Aleppo countryside and Raqqa in east Syria and headed toward the Syrian-Iraqi border.
“Around one hundred and fifty vehicles for US troops, coming from their bases in Ain Arab and Sarrine in the eastern countryside of Aleppo and Ain Issa in the northern countryside of Raqqa, have left the area and headed toward the city of Qamishli, and from there toward the Syrian-Iraqi border,” a source in the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) said.
“Syrian government forces have completed their deployment near the Aleppo/Qamishli highway. They were able to achieve the continuity of forces between Raqqa and Hasakeh governorates, securing a supply road for the forces,” a source close to the Syrian government troops told a German news agency.
Linking Lattakia to “Khomeini”
3 November 2019
There are ongoing studies on linking the Iranian port of Khomeini with Lattakia port, a Syrian newspaper said on Sunday.
Al-Watan newspaper cited reports by the Syrian ministry of transportation in regards to ongoing discussions on a project to link the Khomeini port on the Iranian side of the Persian Gulf with Lattakia port on the Mediterranean, in addition to a project to link the Iranian city of Shalmja with the Iraqi city of Basra – thirty-two kilometers – with Iran executing and financing the project. It will be finalized by linking Shalmaja to Khomeini port and Basra with Lattakia port.
The ministry said that the railroad running through Deir Azzor, al-Tabieh, and Bou Kama – 142.8 km long – is under construction according to global and modern technical specifications in regards to speed and infrastructure.
The railroad “was destroyed and sabotaged in most of its parts, therefore, there is a need to rehabilitate what the war destroyed and finish the execution of the remaining works in order to invest it,” the ministry added.
The ministry said that this route is part of the international transportation axis west-east of Syrian ports, running through Aleppo and then to Iraq, Iran, and east Asian countries. It is a strategic transit corridor for Syria and Iraq.
US Reassurance
2 November 2019
A US military delegation on Saturday visited positions for Kurdish fighters near Qamishli, northeast of Syria, despite Washington’s announcement of withdrawing troops from the area, according to two AFP reporters.
The reporters said they saw four armored vehicles raising the US flag as they entered a command center for the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Qamishli, whose gates were painted with the colors of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), in addition to a YPG center and a position for Kurdish security forces (Asayesh) in Qamishli.
This comes two days after US forces dispatched a patrol from its base in Rmailan in Hasakeh governorate to the town of al-Qahtanieh, accompanied by SDF members.
This is the first patrol since President Donald Trump decided to pull out US forces deployed in northern Syria.
Bombardment of Idlib Once Again
2 November 2019
At least six civilians were killed on Saturday in strikes by Russian war planes in Idlib governorate, north-west of Syria, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR).
The six civilians, including “at least one child and one woman,” were all from the same family and were killed by “Russian warplanes targeting the village of Jabala in the southern countryside of Idlib,” the SOHR said.
The number of dead is expected to rise because “there are people with severe injuries and people still trapped under rubble,” according to the SOHR.
Tahrir al-Sham (previously Nusra) controls most part of Idlib and its surrounding. There are also less influential Islamic and opposition factions.
Idlib and its surrounding have three million people, half of whom are displaced from other areas; they include tens of thousands of opposition fighters that were evacuated from other governorates after government forces attacks on their strongholds.
Constitutional Breakthrough
1 November 2019
The UN special envoy to Syria Geir Pedersen praised the meeting of the one hundred fifty members of the constitutional committee in the UN headquarters in Geneva despite “deep differences… and lack of trust” between government and opposition delegations.
Pedersen told journalists after the two-day meeting of the expanded constitutional committee that the talks were “very good.”
“We all know that after eight and a half years of conflict there are deep differences and a lot of suspicion and lack of trust,” he said.
“However, the truth is that one hundred and fifty Syrians were sitting together, showing respect for one another, talking to each other, and deliberating according to an agenda we agree on for the future of Syria. I think this impressing,” he added.
The United Nations on Wednesday launched the works of the committee which includes one hundred and fifty members distributed equally between the government, opposition, and civil society. Pedersen previously described its work as a “historic moment,” after eight years of conflict that tore Syria apart.
The UN and international powers hope that the work of the committee, which is commissioned with drafting a constitution, paves the way for a wider settlement of the conflict, although they acknowledge difficulty of the task.
According to its mandate, the committee is tasked with “revising the 2012 constitution… amending the current constitution or drafting a new constitution.” After that, new elections will be held with UN supervision according to the new constitution that must be approved by the people through a referendum.
President Bashar al-Assad told the official Syrian television on Thursday that the elections “would be completely, and from A to Z, under the supervision of the Syrian state.” He also said that the government “is not part” of the ongoing Geneva negotiations and that the Syrian delegation “represents the view point of the government.”
Russian – Turkish
1 November 2019
Turkish and Russian forces on Friday conducted their first joint patrol near the northern border of Syria under an agreement reached after the offensive launched by Turkey against Kurdish fighters, which changed balances on the ground.
After Ankara’s attack on 9 October, which was preceded by a US pull out from various border points, cards were reshuffled in Kurdish-controlled areas in northeast Syria, and government forces and their Russian ally became part of the equation.
It seems that the Americans and Russians divided the border map between them. While Russia is conducting patrols west of the border town of Qamishli, US forces on Thursday patrolled east of the city which is considered the capital of the self-administration declared by the Kurds in 2014.
To East of the Euphrates
31 October 2019
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad said, on Thursday, that his country’s ultimate goal is to restore state authority over areas controlled by Kurds in northeast Syria after the sudden withdrawal of US forces, but he said this will happen gradually.
The agreement reached this month between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin to oust the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units to a distance of thirty kilometers away from the border in order to establish a “safe zone” along the border. Al-Assad described in an interview with an official TV channel the agreement as a step that helps Damascus to achieve this goal.
Merging with the Army
30 October 2019
The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on Wednesday refused an invitation by the defense ministry in the Syrian government for its members to join Syrian government forces.
In a statement sent to a German news agency, the SDF said, “we categorically refuse this language directed towards individuals. The Syrian defense minister should have more correctly directed its speech to the general leadership of the Syrian Democratic Forces in order to open the door for a dialogue with an honest intent to unite efforts, and not deny reality in order to evade responsibilities.”
The Syrian defense ministry had called on members of the SDF to join the ranks of the Syrian army in confronting the Turkish army and opposition factions.
Presence near the Oil
29 October 2019
Iran and Russia condemned US President Donald Trump’s decision to keep a military presence near oil fields in northeast Syria. The Russian foreign minister said that any investment of the energy resources would be illegal.
Trump’s suggestion on Sunday for Exxon Mobile or another US oil company to manage Syrian oil fields stirred criticism from legal and energy experts.
US Defense Minister Mark Esper on Sunday said that the United States would boost its army’s presence in Syria by deploying additional assets, including “mechanical forces” to prevent Islamic State remnants or others from capturing the oil fields.
بواسطة Aron Lund | أكتوبر 10, 2019 | Reports, غير مصنف
Is the United States pulling out of Syria—again?
That was certainly what President Donald J. Trump seemed to say in a five-tweet rant on Monday morning. Hours earlier, the White House had announced that U.S. forces would no longer block a Turkish intervention in northeastern Syria: “Turkey will soon be moving forward with its long-planned operation into Northern Syria,” the press statement said, clarifying that the U.S. military “will not support or be involved in the operation, and United States forces, having defeated the ISIS territorial ‘Caliphate,’ will no longer be in the immediate area.”
Pentagon officials were reportedly “blindsided” by Trump’s decision, but Turkey was jubilant.
For years, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has pushed the United States to step aside and let Turkey attack the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The multi-ethnic, secular SDF has been America’s chief local ally in its war against the so-called Islamic State, or ISIS, but it is led by a Syrian section of the anti-Ankara Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Disputes over the SDF are at the heart of a sharp deterioration in the Washington–Ankara relationship, to the point where Turkey’s commitment to NATO is being questioned.
As recently as August, the United States and Turkey struck a deal to manage their differences through joint patrols in northern Syria, and U.S. troops forced the SDF to destroy fortifications close to the border. But Turkey was not satisfied, and kept pushing for more. On September 24, Erdogan treated the UN General Assembly to a map of a future Syria in which Turkey had seized virtually every Kurdish town in the country. And on October 5, he said Turkey would send troops across the border within days.
The relentless Turkish brinksmanship seems to have been designed to pressure Trump to ditch the SDF in order to avoid U.S.–Turkish clashes or costly additional deployments. And it appears to have worked.
Muddled Messaging
It is still unclear exactly what Trump has agreed to. U.S. government rhetoric is so muddled at the moment that no one can quite figure out whether the White House has just begun a total pullout, or is merely taking a tactical step back to let Turkey have its way with a small part of Syria.
So far, U.S. forces have only retreated from a short stretch of Syrian-Turkish border land in the mostly Arab-populated region between Tell Abyad and Ras al-Ain. The 100–150 U.S. soldiers involved aren’t even leaving Syria, just relocating from the “immediate area” to stay clear of Turkey–SDF clashes. “We’re gonna get out of the way,” a U.S. official told the Washington Post.
However, the White House statement was unclear about the ultimate scope of the U.S. withdrawal, and also spoke about Turkey becoming responsible for holding SDF-imprisoned jihadis, most of whom are detained in the al-Hol camp on the other side of the SDF enclave.
How to handle the al-Hol detainees, including tens of thousands of family members of suspected Islamic State fighters, in addition to smaller numbers of Syrian and foreign combatants, has long bedevilled the United States. Trump has complained that European nations refuse to take back their citizens, and the White House statement kept hammering the point, insisting, in a flourish that seemed to betray the direct influence of the president, that the United States “will not hold them for what could be many years and great cost to the United States taxpayer” and concluding that “Turkey will now be responsible for all ISIS fighters in the area captured.”
Turkey appears to have little interest in sorting out the al-Hol issue, and would, at any rate, not be confronted with it unless Turkish troops occupy the entire SDF-held region in northeastern Syria. For now, Erdogan has simply brushed the problem away by insisting that the number of detainees is “a bit exaggerated.”
Trump’s Monday morning tweets added to the confusion by signalling an end to the U.S. involvement with Syria altogether. The United States needs to “get out of these ridiculous Endless Wars” and “bring our soldiers home,” Trump wrote, adding, “Turkey, Europe, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Russia and the Kurds, will now have to figure the situation out.”
So is this a limited redeployment from one part of the Syrian-Turkish border, or the beginning of the end of America’s five-year intervention in Syria? It looks like the former, but it sounds like the latter.
In part, this confused messaging might be intentional. By raising the prospect of a full-scale withdrawal, Trump may be calling Erdogan’s bluff. The Turkish leader is being informed that, unless he abides by past agreement, he will be on his own in sorting out the Syrian mess.
For all of Erdogan’s maximalist rhetoric and his UN antics, Turkey may have little interest in controlling the entire SDF-held region—nearly a third of Syria—unless it can do so with the support and approval of the United States, the EU, and perhaps Russia, too. The al-Hol detainee issue alone is daunting, and Turkey would run up against international objections and internal insurgencies. Ankara’s capacity to administer areas beyond its borders is limited, its economy is in bad shape, the military is stretched as it is, and the Syrian rebels Erdogan wants to use as proxies are pinned down by Russian and Syrian government forces in Idlib. For Turkey to seek full control over northeastern Syria on its own would be a violent, costly, and politically fraught undertaking—which is why Erdogan’s bark may be worse than his bite.
The SDF, however, seems to fear the worst, complaining that it fulfilled all its obligations under the August 2019 deal but is still deprived of promised U.S. protection. Rather than backing down, the group struck a militant note: “We in the SDF will not hesitate for a moment to defend ourselves and call upon our people of all sects, Arabs, Kurds and Syriacs, Assyrians to join forces and stand with their legitimate forces to defend our country against this Turkish aggression.”
This Has Happened Before
Strangely enough, we’ve seen this happen once before. In December 2018, Trump shocked his national security staff by suddenly announcing that he would withdraw from Syria and let Turkey take over.
It didn’t happen, that time. Trump came under immediate pressure to reverse his decision, which was opposed by a curious constellation of forces: strong voices in the Pentagon were unwilling to abandon the SDF fighters they had fought alongside for so long; the intelligence community warned that the Islamic State could respawn; and a variety of politicos and penfighters insisted that the United States must remain in Syria for reasons related to Iran, Israel, or some other Washingtonian pet cause. Last but not least, a large contingent of administration insiders, politicians, and pundits who actually did want to exit Syria felt that Trump was doing it the wrong way—they wanted to leave in an orderly and controlled fashion, to limit blowback to the United States, its allies, and interests.
Internal outrage led Trump’s jihadi-hunter-in-chief, Brett McGurk, and his secretary of defense, James Mattis, both to resign in protest. The president was angry but impressed and, step by step, his decision was watered down to buy the mission more time. In the end, Trump agreed that some U.S. troops could stay while the SDF snuffed out remaining jihadi pockets, and the Department of State went panhandling in Europe and the Gulf for aid money and troops to cover U.S. cutbacks.
It didn’t work out very well, since, unsurprisingly, few U.S. allies were willing to put much on the line for so fickle a president. Ten months later, the United States is still the only pole holding up the tent in northern Syria—and Trump seems to be saying that time is up.
What Happens Now?
If Trump really did try to call Erdogan’s bluff, it may have worked, to a degree. Despite recently warning that an invasion was imminent, the Turkish leader has shifted to saying he will “discuss the depth of the operation” when he meets Trump in Washington early next month.
Erdogan may still end up launching a cross-border incursion, to stick his foot in the door while he can. But the Turkish leader also seems to fear that Trump will simply collapse the security architecture in northeastern Syria without putting anything in its place, and without giving Turkey time to develop its options.
Meanwhile, Trump will come under renewed pressure to keep troops in Syria. Roughly the same cast of people as last time are now crying foul again, and the U.S. president may settle for a more limited pullout. But Trump’s isolationist instincts are real, and his view of America’s post-9/11 wars as no-good quagmires is one of the few political ideas he has held with something approaching consistency. Continuing to prop up the SDF’s autonomous government will also grow harder and harder, once Turkey begins to develop its own proxies inside the northeast.
If Trump starts walking toward the exit, he may, whatever his original plans, soon find that the easiest choice is to just keep going.
Ultimately, however, what happens in Syria isn’t just up to Donald Trump. The rulers of Ankara, Damascus, Moscow, and Tehran, and a host of non state actors, including the SDF and whatever remains of the Islamic State, also have a vote. Their actions and reactions will shape U.S. options in the coming weeks, and, as many have learned by now, setting Syria’s chaos in motion is easy. Making it stop is a lot harder.
*This article was published at The Century Foundation website here.
بواسطة Syria in a Week Editors | أكتوبر 9, 2019 | Syria in a Week, غير مصنف
The following is a selection by our editors of significant weekly developments in Syria. Depending on events, each issue will include anywhere from four to eight briefs. This series is produced in both Arabic and English in partnership between Salon Syria and Jadaliyya. Suggestions and blurbs may be sent to info@salonsyria.com.
US Abandons the Kurds
7 October 2019
The United Nations cautioned on Monday that it is “preparing for the worst” in north eastern Syria after the United States said it would allow the Turkish army to carry out a military operation in the area.
“We do not know what will happen … we are preparing for the worst,” UN Syria Humanitarian Coordinator Panos Moumtzis said in Geneva, adding that the United Nations is in contact with all parties on the ground. He said the UN has a contingency plan to address any additional civilian suffering, but “it hopes it will not have to resort to it.”
In recent weeks, Turkey has sent reinforcement to the border area with Syria, as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said on Monday that the operation alluded to by Turkey for some time could begin “any night without warning.”
His comments came after Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said on Monday that his country was determined to “cleanse” Syria of “terrorist” who are threatening Turkey’s security, referring to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – which Kurdish fighters make the backbone of.
The United States began withdrawing its troops from the border strip with Turkey in northern Syrian on Monday, paving the way for Ankara to carry out its threat to launch an attack against Kurdish fighters and undermine efforts to fight the Islamic State.
The Kurdish units are a major partner in the US-led international coalition to fight ISIS, and they have managed to defeat the radical group in vast areas in north and east Syria.
The SDF cautioned that “the Turkish military operation in north and east Syria will have a huge negative effect on our war against ISIS (the Islamic State),” stressing their determination to “defend our land no matter the price.”
Call Between Erdogan and Trump
6 October 2019
Ankara said on Sunday that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan agreed, during a phone call with his US counterpart Donald Trump, to hold a meeting in Washington next month to discuss the “safe zone” in northern Syria.
Erdogan told trump that he “feels disappointed because of the failure of the US military and security bureaucracy to implement the deal” made by the two sides in August on a buffer zone on the Syrian border with Turkey, the Turkish presidency said in a statement.
Russian Airstrike in Idlib
5 October 2019
At least nine jihadist fighters were killed on Sunday in Russian airstrikes that targeted positions for two extremist factions, Horras al-Din and Ansar al-Tawheed, in eastern Idlib, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR).
These airstrikes came despite Idlib and its surrounding being included in a ceasefire since late August that was declared by Moscow and agreed to by Damascus. Due to this ceasefire, military jets have been absent from the air, however, artillery and missile breaches have continued intermittently.
Russia, which backs Syrian government forces, often launches strikes against the mobilization and headquarters of extremist organizations in Idlib and its surrounding.
Turkish Universities in Syria
4 October 2019
Turkey’s Gaziantep University will open three faculties in small northern Syrian towns, Ankara’s Official Gazette said on Friday, reflecting a growing Turkish presence in the region.
An Islamic sciences faculty will be opened in Syria’s Azaz, an education faculty in Afrin, and a faculty of economics and administrative sciences in al-Bab, Turkey’s official state publication said.
All three towns are in north-western Syria, west of the Euphrates river and broadly north of Aleppo, in regions to which Turkey has twice sent forces in the last three years to drive back the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and ISIS fighters, in a bid to protect its own border.
The towns have been struck in the past by bomb attacks, some of which have been blamed on ISIS and others on Kurdish fighters.
Ankara has previously built hospitals, restored schools, and trained fighters in northwest Syria, and Turkish media reports say it is planning to build an industrial zone in the region to create jobs for seven thousand people.
Mines and Explosive Devices
3 October 2019
At least one hundred and seventy-three people, including forty-one children, have been killed since the beginning of the year as a result of mines and explosive devices in various areas in Syria, according to a tally by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR). This represents a new challenge created by the war that threatens the lives of millions of people.
Mines and explosive devices are some of the complicated issues that emerged from the Syrian war which has been ongoing for more than eight years.
The victims include at least forty-four civilians, mostly women, who were killed during the truffle season in rural areas, according to the SOHR.
Mines have also left dozens of victims, mostly women, with injuries that ranged from amputation to severe injuries.
According to the United Nations, 10.2 million Syrians are in danger of getting hurt by an explosive device left behind in the country as a result of the war.
Planting mines was a strategy followed by several parties in the Syrian conflict, most notably ISIS which booby-trapped various objects such as buildings, cars, household items, and food containers.
The Syrian government and the United Nations signed a memorandum in July to support Damascus’s demining efforts.
Sports, Gardens, and Churches
2 October 2019
Four years after the onset of Russia’s military intervention in Syria, Russian soldiers are enjoying a lavish life in their main base in the coastal city of Tartous, and there is nothing to suggest that their stay will not be long.
A Russian officer points to little plants planted in a garden in the naval base. “They will have enough time to grow,” he confidently says.
Announcements of Russia withdrawing its troops and decreasing its operations significantly have been continuously coming, without this having an effect on its long-term presence in Syria, which seems key to the country’s future.
Russian soldiers can visit gyms, saunas, bakeries, and dry cleaners, in addition to a small Orthodox church. Soldiers have “all necessary leisure means,” said a Russian officer, who requested to remain anonymous as he is not authorized to speak to journalists.
The intervention of the Russian air force in the Syrian conflict since September 2015 allowed the balance to tip in Damascus’s favor, as government forces managed to advance at the expense of both militant and jihadist factions and retake control of large swaths of the country.
According to official statistics, three thousand Russian soldiers are deployed in Syria, in addition to jets, helicopters, warships, and submarines. The new S-400 air defense system provides protection for the facilities.
The Russian Hmeimim base, which was hastily built near the outskirts of a civil airport, has turned into a permanent base since 2017. The same thing happened in Tartous, as this Russian naval facility situated at the port has turned into a “permanent naval base.”
In both sites, Moscow has a forty-nine-year lease, cementing its presence in the Middle East and enabling it to exercise its influence, especially against the United States.
Testing the “S-500”
1 October 2019
The Russian Izvestia newspaper said that the Russian army has carried out successful tests on the most important components of the S-500 air defense missile system.
The newspaper said, citing sources in the Russian ministry of defense and the military and industrial complex, that “tests have revealed a number of gaps in the work of the system’s equipment which were quickly filled,” adding that “the tests are over and they were deemed successful.”
